Defeating Governmental Immunity: Navigating the Uphill Climb

Lawsuits against the State of Connecticut or its local municipalities are notoriously difficult to pursue from a legal perspective, in large part due to various statutory protections and administrative hurdles put in place by the legislature.  For example, a plaintiff seeking to initiate a personal injury case against her own town must adhere to strict time limitations and procedural requirements in order to have her case successfully get into court and survive the scrutiny of a judge, well before she ever comes close to having a “day in court” before a jury of her peers.

Unless the site of a plaintiff’s injury falls within one of a few narrow exceptions (such as an injury on a “public highway,” which would invoke the protections and mechanisms of Connecticut’s “highway defect statute,” or Connecticut General Statutes Section 13a-149), a plaintiff is entitled only to proceed against a state or municipality under the Political Subdivision Liability Statute (Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-557n).

Section 52-557n, however, contains its own pitfalls for prospective plaintiffs.  The statute provides that a town or political subdivision may be liable for negligent acts of its employees, officers, or agents except if such actions or omissions constitute criminal conduct or willful misconduct, or, significantly, if such negligent acts or omissions require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the job responsibility.

The latter part of this test is key – and is a gold mine for municipalities (and their lawyers) seeking to invoke the governmental immunity doctrine and escape liability for the negligence of its employees, even if such negligence is established by an injured person.  What the provision states, in plain language, is that a town may well be free and clear from liability if the task that was performed negligently was a task which required an exercise of judgment on the part of the town employee.

Take the hypothetical example of a plaintiff who was injured when she slipped on ice on the front steps of City Hall.  The evidence suggests that the maintenance workers either knew or should have known that ice had built up on the steps, that they were expecting the public to be walking in and out of the building, and that someone clearly “dropped the ball” in making sure that the ice was scraped off and that salt or sand was applied generously to the area.  Instead, nothing was done, nothing was scraped, no sand or salt was used, no warning signs were posted, and the ice remained for several business days before this plaintiff came along and fell on her very first visit to City Hall.

Even with these simplified facts (which appear at first blush to be quite damaging to the City), the City will surely investigate the existence of any policy, procedure, and practice of those maintenance workers who were assigned to the front steps of the building.  In this case, the City will attempt to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “judgment” and “discretion” of the City employees was required to be exercised to keep those steps free of snow and ice.  On the contrary, a plaintiff will seek to demonstrate that the actions (or omissions) of the City workers were “ministerial” – that is, the workers had a clear directive to do something (e.g. to clear the ice at certain times, in a certain manner, with no exercise of judgment) and yet they failed to carry out that task, resulting in the plaintiff’s injury.

When the proverbial dust settles, if no clear, articulated policy existed to clear the steps, to inspect the steps on a scheduled basis, or to take preventative measures against ice buildup, a municipal defendant in this instance would likely argue (perhaps successfully) that the maintenance workers were required not to follow any protocol, but only to “use their judgment and discretion” in determining what needed to be kept safe and clear for pedestrian traffic.

An unknowing plaintiff (or perhaps an inexperienced attorney) who advances her case against a town believing that a jury would be shocked if there is no snow removal policy might find herself equally shocked when or if it is determined that any negligence was of a “discretionary” nature and governmental immunity therefore applies, subject to other very narrow legal exceptions not discussed here.

A savvy plaintiff, in discovery and at the very outset of the lawsuit, might request that the town admit, under oath and in writing, to the existence of a clear and articulated policy (even if it is unwritten) with regard to the safety issue which resulted in her injury.  While towns (and their attorneys) are often eager to show that preventative measures are and were in place, in this instance, they may well eliminate – as a matter of law – their own sacred protection of governmental immunity at trial.  With a valid legal admission of a clear and articulated policy, a municipal defendant is effectively hamstrung – it cannot simultaneously admit to the existence of a policy and directive while claiming that its employees were simply exercising their own judgment.  Dramatically and emphatically, the curtain of governmental immunity draws away, paving the way for a plaintiff to reach the eyes and ears of a jury.

An injured person seeking legal assistance as against the state or a municipality faces a virtual hornet’s nest of obstacles and legal entanglements.  A trusted, informed advocate is essential to place such a claim in the best possible legal position.  The invitation is open to consult with attorneys at our Firm who are experienced in this type of civil litigation.

If you have any questions about this posting or confidential inquiries concerning the subject matter, please contact Attorney H. Daniel Murphy at hdmurphy@mayalaw.com.

Federal Court Case of First Impression-Statute of Limitations Defense

This afternoon, the Honorable Stefan R. Underhill of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut issued a decision denying summary judgment to a defendant in a case in which Maya Murphy P.C., represents the Plaintiff (Chappetta v. Soto, 3:06 cv 1913(SRU)).  Andrea Chappetta was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle collision on I-95 in Connecticut in 2003; following surgery to address her injuries, she fell in a movie theater (in New York) owned by Regal Cinemas, which fall irreparably and significantly damaged her surgically repaired shoulder while also causing new injuries.

Plaintiff commenced one lawsuit against two defendants in different states, suing both the Connecticut motor vehicle operator and the New York movie theater in the United States District Court in June of 2005.  Following initial motion practice, the lawsuit against the Connecticut driver was dismissed by the Court for lack of personal jurisdiction, on the basis of a claimed statute of limitations defense.

Plaintiff re-filed the action, invoking the protections and applicability of the Connecticut “Savings Statute” (C.G.S. Sec. 52.592), and immediately faced a second attack by the Connecticut defendant, who sought to escape liability and dismiss the lawsuit rather than proceed to trial on the merits of Ms. Chappetta’s claims.

After exhaustive discovery, comprehensive motion practice, and extensive oral argument before the Court, this afternoon’s decision represents a landmark interpretation and clear definition of the Connecticut savings statute in federal diversity jurisdiction cases.  The Court held that the mere filing of an action in federal court (the filing was prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, even though personal service was not completed until after the statute of limitations had expired) was sufficient to satisfy the savings statute and allow a case to be heard on the merits.  This was clearly a case of first impression; indeed, the Court acknowledged during oral arguments that no case existed under State or Federal case law which was directly on point.  Today’s decision carefully analyzed and expanded the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 2004 holding in Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541 (2004), stating, in part:

“In my view, however, the better reading of Rocco is that the Court held that the defendant’s receipt of actual notice of the pendency of a federal court action is sufficient, but not necessary, to commence an action for purposes of the savings statute.  In other words, by indicating that the action was commenced ‘when’ the defendant received notice, the Court meant that on that date, which was within the statute of limitations, the Rocco plaintiffs’ action had been commenced; it did not mean that the action had been commenced because the defendant received actual notice or that the action was commenced by reason of the receipt of actual notice…”

The Court went on to reason the following:

“In a real sense, therefore, an action is commenced in federal court upon filing; indeed, with federal court cases other than diversity of citizenship cases, the statute of limitations is satisfied upon the filing of the complaint rather than service of process.  Although commencement in the sense of opening a federal court case and assigning a docket number does not satisfy the statute of limitations under Connecticut law, the Rocco Court suggested that it might constitute ‘commencement’ of an action for purposes of the savings statute…if an action governed by Connecticut law is filed in federal court within the statute of limitations, but is not properly served pursuant to Connecticut law so that it has not been timely commenced for purposes of the statute of limitations, the savings statute permits it to be brought again within one year.”

And so, with the Court’s adept reasoning and today’s clear decision – after persistent, aggressive legal work and detailed argument from counsel – Ms. Chappetta will soon have the opportunity to have a jury consider the gravity of her injuries and all parties responsible for her damages.  A link to the 11-page decision will be posted when the decision is officially published.

For further information, please contact Attorney H. Daniel Murphy at hdmurphy@mayalaw.com.