If you are currently employed as a physician and your employment agreement contains a provision similar to the type of covenant described above, you probably want to understand how a Court will determine the validity of such a clause in order to understand how such a clause will impact your future as a physician after the termination of your current employment contract, joinder and/or partnership agreement.

Below is a summary on the way Courts are handling the non-compete clauses included in the employment contracts of physicians employed in Connecticut and New York.  This review and analysis consists of two separate, but related parts.  First, a Court must determine whether the non-compete clause is valid, and therefore enforceable.  Second, if a clause is valid, as a way to prevent you from pursuing your newly found employment opportunity, your employer may ask the Court to grant a temporary and/or permanent injunction.  The second section of this analysis focuses on whether a Court will grant your employer’s request for a temporary or permanent injunction.  If granted, this injunction would prevent you from obtaining employment in any manner which violates the restrictive covenant. 

The Validity and Enforceability of Physician Non-Compete Clauses in New York and Connecticut

The laws governing the validity and enforceability of non-compete clauses in New York and Connecticut are fairly similar.  In both states Courts seek to determine if the restraints provided for under the non-compete clause are reasonable.  In making that determination, Courts consider the following factors:  (1) the employer’s need to protect legitimate business interests (such as trade secrets and customer lists), (2) the employee’s need to earn a living and support his or her family, (3) the public’s need to secure the employee’s presence in the labor pool, and (4) the amount of time, and the area restricted under the covenant.

Employer’s Need to Protect Legitimate Business Interests: 

In general, Courts have found an employer to have a legitimate business interest in situations where the employer needs to protect against the former employee’s use of a trade secret or a highly valuable patient list.  If the employer is not able to protect the employee from using such things in the course of their future employment, the employer’s business will noticeably suffer.  This is what the Courts will try and protect against through the enforcement of the restrictive covenant.  In Connecticut, however, it is important to note that it is not the employer who needs to prove a legitimate business interest, but instead, the employee who needs to disprove the employer’s need to protect legitimate business interests through enforcement of the non-compete clause.

Employee’s Need to Earn a Living:  When considering the impact of the enforcement of a non-compete clause on the earning potential of a former employee, Courts will try to determine if enforcement of a restrictive covenant will unreasonably prevent the employee from earning a living, and therefore being able to support themselves.  Significantly, Courts noted, however, that this does not mean the operation of a covenant not to compete must maintain a former employee’s income at present levels in order to be found reasonable.  It is the burden of the former employee to prove that if the covenant is enforced it will substantially damage his or her ability to earn a living.

The Public’s Need to Secure Employee’s Services:  The principal objection to restrictive covenants in physician employment contracts is that they can potentially interfere with continuity of care for a patient.  Therefore, a Court is more reluctant to enforce a covenant if the covenant would impact the care of the former employee’s current patients.  There are however, many covenants that are drafted to allow a physician to continue providing post-operative, or other limited care, for current patients.  If a restrictive covenant will allow for such continuity of care, the Court is more likely to find its restrictions reasonable, and enforceable. 

Time and Area Restrictions:  The amount of time, and the area restricted under non-compete clauses varies greatly between different employment agreements, depending on the type of services involved and the location of the parties.  In making a finding, Courts will look to whether or not the time and area restrictions are reasonable.  Recent decisions held clauses limiting the former employee for up to a period of five years within a thirty mile radius reasonable.  Reasonableness depends, however, on the specific circumstances of the case. 

Other Considerations:  Courts also consider the bargaining power between the parties to the employment contract in determining the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant.  Some Courts may be more reluctant to find a restrictive covenant unenforceable where the employment agreement is created between partners to a practice, rather then when the agreement is held between an employer and an employee.  The Courts have explained this discrepancy on the parties’ ability to negotiate the terms of the employment agreement.  A partner will most likely have a greater ability to negotiate the terms of the contract, than will an employee.   

Injunctive Relief

An injunction is an equitable remedy in the form of a Court order, whereby a party is required to do, or to refrain from doing, certain acts. In this case, those certain acts would include being employed in a way which would violate the restrictive covenant.  When considering an employer’s request for a temporary or permanent injunction, the Courts in New York and Connecticut consider whether the employer has demonstrated that he or she would suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, that he or she is likely to prevail on the merits of the case, and that the balancing of equities favors the issuance of an injunction. 

Irreparable Harm:  In considering the irreparable harm an employer may suffer, a Court will rely on factors such as the employer’s revenues, patient flow and the employer’s ability to maintain their business on a long-term basis.  Such calculations will consider only the employer’s losses, and not the former employee’s gains.
Balancing of the Equities:  When balancing the equities, Courts consider the following: the effect the injunctive relief will have on the employer’s business, the effect that the injunctive relief will have on the employee’s earning potential, and the effect that an injunction will have on the public.  In determining the effect on the employer, the Court analyzes how the employer will benefit from the injunctive relief.  As for the effect on the employee, the Court considers the options available to the employee if the relief is granted.  If the employee can reasonably continue to earn a living, Courts are more willing to grant the employer’s injunctive relief request.  In considering the public interest, Courts look at factors such as the hardship the injunctive relief would have on a doctor’s existing patients and the doctor’s contributions to the surrounding community that would be limited by the granting of injunctive relief. 

Connecticut – Adequate Remedy at Law:  In addition to the above factors, Connecticut Courts consider whether the employer has no other adequate remedy at law available to them.  Although some Connecticut Courts have held that the lack of an adequate remedy at law is presumed to be established where a party seeks to enforce a covenant not to compete, not all Courts have relied on that.  The Courts that do rely on that theory, however, state that it is only a rebuttable presumption; meaning that it may be possible for the employee to convince the Court that this presumption does not apply in a certain situation.  The Connecticut Courts that have not followed that presumption have held the presumption to apply only in the limited instances where the calculation of damages may be difficult or impossible and therefore limits the employer’s potential remedies.  These Courts have found that employers have an adequate remedy at law where they are in a position to bring a breach of contract claim, meaning that the employer is able to calculate the damages suffered as a result of the former employee’s actions. 
Physician Restrictive Covenant Cases in Connecticut   

As a way of bringing together the above information, and to demonstrate the effects of certain factual situations on an outcome, the following illustrations provide examples of restrictive covenant cases heard and decided by the Connecticut Courts in recent years.  

Restrictive covenant valid, Injunction denied:

Opticare, P.C. v. Zimmerman, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 759 (2008).

In this Connecticut case, a doctor entered into an employment contract with physician practice group which provided, among other things, that in the event the doctor voluntarily left the practice but intended to continue practicing medicine he would be prohibited from practicing the type of medicine he practiced with the group, within a specific area for a period of 18 months.  The restricted area was in the shape of a hexagon and ranged from between fifteen to thirty miles from the locations in which the doctor had been employed with the practice group.

After 22 years of employment, the doctor left the physician practice group and opened his own office, practicing the same kind of medicine as he had been, before the 18 month time period had passed and less than four miles away from his former employer’s office.  Upon learning of the physician’s new practice, the practice group asked the Court to grant injunctive relief to prohibit the physician from continuing his practice in violation of the restrictive covenant. 

In denying the group’s request, the Court determined that although the restrictive covenant was valid, the group did not establish a showing of irreparable harm.  The practice group was still in business, and it had failed to demonstrate that the practice was permanently harmed in any way.  The Court also determined that the employer had available to them an adequate remedy at law because the employer had the ability to calculate the damages incurred as a result of the physician’s actions.  Finally, the Court found that the equities balanced in favor of the former employee, due in part to the fact that the doctor frequently donated his time to assisting uninsured premature infants at local hospitals and that an injunction would place an undue hardship on his current patients. 

Restrictive covenant valid, Injunction granted: 

Fairfield County Bariatrics v. Ehrlich, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 568 (2010).

The case of Fairfield County Bariatrics v. Ehrlich, is a case in which the restrictive covenant was deemed valid and injunctive relief was granted to the employer.  It involved a situation where a physician developed a very prominent practice performing bariatric surgeries for the physician practice group with whom he was employed and was a one-third shareholder.   

As part of his employment with the physician practice group, the physician signed an employment agreement which, among other things, provided that for a period of two years following the termination of his employment, the physician could not practice medicine or general surgery within 15 miles of the practice’s office, and that he could not practice bariatric surgery in five local hospitals. 

Following his termination from the group, the physician retrieved a list of the patients he had treated during his employment with the physician practice group.  The physician contacted each patient and informed them that he was no longer associated with the group and directed them to contact him at his new office.  

The physician’s new office was located within the restricted area provided for in the employment agreement.  Additionally, the physician continued to perform bariatric surgeries at the hospitals restricted under the restrictive covenant in the employment agreement. 

The Court held the restrictive covenant valid, finding the length of time and area of coverage to be within reasonable limitations.  Furthermore, the Court determined that the physician practice group had legitimate business interests that needed the protection of the restrictive covenant.  In that finding the Court relied on the practice’s fear that because of the extremely large amount of bariatric surgeries the physician performed on a yearly basis, if the physician were allowed to continue practicing bariatric surgeries at the hospitals within the county, it would drastically dilute the number of surgeries performed at the hospitals in which the practice performed those surgeries.  Additionally, the Court determined that the physician’s ability to earn an income was not so restricted by the covenant as to make it unreasonable.  Under the covenant, the physician was able to perform surgeries throughout the majority of the county in which he resided, and was able to continue providing post-operative care for his current patients.  Finally, the Court determined that the public’s need to secure the physician’s services would only be slightly impacted and that because the physician was still able to provide post-operative care, the public’s need did not render this covenant invalid. 

Continuing in their decision, the Court granted the practice’s request for injunctive relief as the Court believed the practice was likely to prevail at a trial.  In its decision the Court found the physician practice group would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief were not granted as it was able to demonstrate the physician had the ability to drastically dilute the number of available surgeries.  As for the balance of equities, the Court determined the harm the physician practice group could potentially suffer if their request was denied was much greater than the harm the physician would suffer if the relief was granted. 
Restrictive covenant invalid, Injunction denied: 

Merryfield Animal Hosp. v. Mackay, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2628 (2002).

In this Connecticut case, the Court determined that the restrictive covenant included in the employment agreement was invalid.  Consequently, the Court denied the employer’s request for injunctive relief.  The doctor in this case had been employed under an employment agreement that contained a non-compete provision.  This provision restricted the employee from owning, managing, operating, controlling, participating in, or being employed or in any way connected with an organization providing the services provided by the employer for a period of two years after his termination, and within a seven mile radius from the employer’s locations. 

Shortly after his termination the physician obtained employment with a different practice group performing the same services he had been for his former employer. His new employment was located within the seven mile radius restricted under the restrictive covenant.  The employer turned to the Court, seeking a temporary injunction which would order the doctor to comply with the specific provisions of the restrictive covenant.

Although the Court found the time and area restrictions provided for in the restrictive covenant reasonable, it ultimately determined that the covenant was unenforceable and therefore denied the employer’s request.  In doing so the Court relied exclusively on its finding that the restriction under the covenant was overly broad and not reasonably necessary for the fair protection of the group’s business.  If enforced, the language of the covenant would have prevented the doctor, not only from his new position, but even from employment that could in no way bring him in competition with his former employer.         Finding the expansive limitations provided for by the language of the restrictive covenant unreasonable, the Court determined the covenant unenforceable, and consequently denied the employer’s request for injunctive relief. 

Restrictive covenant invalid, Injunction denied: 

Merryfield Animal Hosp. v. Mackay, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 4099 (2002).

A Connecticut Court determined the restrictive covenant at question in this case to be overly protective of the employer’s interest, and therefore determined that the covenant was invalid.  Pursuant to the terms of that clause the doctor in this case agreed he would not involve himself with or be employed by a business providing the professional services he provided for the practice within a seven-mile radius of the practice, and for two years after his employment contract terminated. 

After providing written notice of his termination, the doctor accepted a position with another practice, located slightly less than seven miles from his former employer’s office.  During the course of his new employment the doctor did not solicit any of his former employer’s patients and even rejected any patients he knew to have been patients of his old practice.  The Court, therefore found no evidence of a legitimate business interest that the practice needed to protect.  Furthermore, the practice was unable to demonstrate it suffered or would suffer any loss as a result of the doctor’s actions.  Consequently, the Court determined the restrictive covenant was unenforceable and denied the practice’s request for injunctive relief. 

Physician Restrictive Covenant Cases in New York

As a way of bringing together the above information, and to demonstrate the effects of certain factual situations on an outcome, the following illustrations provide examples of restrictive covenant cases heard and decided by New York Courts.  

Restrictive covenant valid, Injunction denied:

Millet v. Slocum, 4 A.D.2d 528 (1957).

Following the termination of his employment as a partner in a physician partnership, the physician in this case brought an action before the Court asking the Court to render the restrictive covenant contained in his employment agreement unenforceable.  Under the terms of his employment agreement, following his termination, the physician was barred from practicing medicine or surgery within a 25 mile radius from the city in which the partnership was located for a two-year period.  The partnership, in response, asked the Court for injunctive relief which would prevent the physician from practicing in contravention of the employment agreement. 

Before working with this partnership, the physician never worked as a physician in New York State.  During the time the physician served the partnership he developed a professional reputation for competence and earned the trust of the partnership’s patients.  As a result, the Court concluded that if the physician were able to directly compete with the partnership, the remaining partners would suffer a loss of patients and good will.  Considering next, the physician’s ability to earn a living, the Court decided that the hardship imposed on the physician was not, when balanced with the needs of the partnership, sufficient to invalidate the covenant.  The physician had the ability to practice medicine and surgery anywhere outside of the 25 mile radius, and the Court noted that since he had been able to come to New York and build such a strong professional reputation when beginning his work with the practice, it would not be so unreasonable for him to do so again.  The Court therefore, concluded that the restrictive covenant was valid and enforceable. 

Despite the validity of the restrictive covenant, the Court denied the partnership’s request for injunctive relief based on its finding that the partnership breached the partnership agreement when it expelled the physician from the partnership without justification, as was required pursuant to the agreement.  The Court held the partnership’s actions constituted such a breach of the partnership agreement as to not entitle the partnership to the injunctive relief requested. 

Restrictive covenant valid, Injunction granted: 

Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 41 N.Y.2d 680 (1977).

After a few years of employment as a partner to a partnership practice, the physician in this case was expelled pursuant to the partnership agreement.  Under the terms of the partnership agreement, the physician had agreed not to practice his profession within a radius of 30 miles of the village in which the partnership was located for a period of five years.  Disregarding the restrictive covenant, the physician resumed his surgical practice as a single practitioner, practicing in the same village as the partnership and within two months of his expulsion.  The partnership, in an effort to protect its practice, asked the Court to enforce the restrictive covenant and grant injunctive relief. 

The Court ultimately determined this restrictive covenant was valid.  Its decision was due, in part, to the small size of the village in which the partnership was located and had built its practice.  In such a small area, the threat of competition from the physician, if allowed, could result in serious damage to the partnership’s number of patients and its revenues.  The Court also considered the impact that the covenant could have on the physician’s ability to earn a living and found that throughout the course of his career, this physician had repeatedly changed professional associations within a range of thousands of miles.  Therefore, the Court did not credit the physician’s argument that relocating his practice would unreasonably impair his ability to earn an income.  Finally, the Court considered the interest of the public and noted the public would not be affected by the enforcement of this covenant, as they could easily obtain the services provided by the physician elsewhere.  Granting the employer’s injunction, the Court noted that the damage the partnership would suffer without injunctive relief, when balanced with the losses the physician may face if the covenant were enforced, justified the enforcement of this restrictive covenant. 

Restrictive covenant invalid, Injunction denied:

Michael I. Weintraub, M. D., P. C. v. Schwartz, 131 A.D.2d 663 (1987). 

The physician in this case had been employed by a certain professional practice group for a period of two years at the time his employment contract was terminated.  Pursuant to the terms of his employment agreement, the physician was restricted from engaging in the type of services he performed for the physician practice group within a five mile radius from the professional practice’s office, and within a five mile radius of any hospital at which he had worked at on behalf of the professional practice for a period of one year after the effective date of his termination.  Before that one-year period lapsed the physician established an office to perform the restricted type of services within five miles from a hospital where the physician worked on the group’s behalf.  The professional group initiated an action against the physician to enforce the restrictive covenant and prevent him from breaching his employment agreement. 

In reviewing the restrictive covenant, the Court determined the provision restricting the physician from practicing within five miles of the group’s offices was reasonable and enforceable.  The Court, however, found the portion of the covenant prohibiting the physician from practicing within a five-mile radius of any hospital where he worked on the group’s behalf was overly broad and oppressive, and thus unenforceable.  If the physician had been required to follow the terms of the covenant it would essentially prohibit him from practicing at or near any of the major hospitals in the two nearest counties.  The Court furthered noted an absence of evidence indicating the group’s business related concerns were implicated in any manner through the physician’s breach of the restrictive covenant.  Consequently, the Court denied the group’s motion for injunctive relief.

Restrictive Covenant Severed:

Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d 45 (1971).

In the following case the Court held even though the restrictive covenant contained an unreasonable provision, the remaining restrictions provided for under the agreement would be enforceable against the former physician employee.  In essence, the Court severed the unreasonable restriction from the restrictive covenant, and held the remainder to be valid.  This situation involved a dentist employed by an oral surgeon.  As part of his employment with the oral surgeon he agreed to never practice dentistry or oral surgery in any of the surrounding counties except in association with the oral surgeon.

Upon voluntarily ending his employment with the oral surgeon, the dentist opened his own office in violation of the restrictive covenant.  After the competition created by the dentist’s new office forced the oral surgeon to close one of his offices, the oral surgeon asked the Court to enforce the restrictive covenant.  The Court ultimately held the employer was entitled to an injunction barring the dentist from practicing oral surgery in the five specified counties named in the covenant, but that the covenant’s restriction on the practice of dentistry was too broad.  Since the oral surgeon’s business consisted only of performing oral surgeries and related operations, a dental practice providing only dentistry services, and no oral surgery services, would provide no direct competition.  The Court, therefore determining the restriction on the practice of dentistry to be too broad, severed that restriction from the covenant, but enforced the remaining provisions of the agreement. 

Situations involving these restrictive covenants, or non-compete agreements, are very fact specific, requiring case by case analysis and determinations.  Determining the consequences of your employment agreement and your options will require an in-depth review.  A violation of a restrictive covenant, if such covenant is in fact enforceable, may result in other contractual claims being brought against you by a former employer.  If you have any questions relating to your restrictive covenant or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Are you currently employed in Connecticut and have been promised a year-end bonus or had been promised a year-end bonus and never received it?   A recent Connecticut Supreme Court decision may affect the amount of protection you are afforded under Connecticut law if your employer defaults or has defaulted on that promise.

This recent case addressed the question of whether a year-end bonus promised by an employer is considered a ‘wage’ for the purposes of the Connecticut Wage Act.  Answering that question in the negative, the Supreme Court denied a Connecticut employee the ability to proceed with a wrongful withholding of wages claim that he had initially pursued after his employer failed to pay out what the employee had thought to be a promised year-end bonus.

Under this recently decided Supreme Court case, the amount of liability your employer will face for failing to pay out a promised year end bonus will hinge upon how your employer defined the conditions under which a bonus would be paid.  If the conditions are specific goals set for you as an individual employee (e.g. a certain number of billable hours need to be reached), then under the Connecticut Wage Act your employer will be required to pay out that bonus as wages in accordance with their promise.  If they do not, you are afforded the protections of the Wage Act and can bring an action against your employer for wrongfully withholding wages.  If successful, it is possible that you could receive, by way of damages, twice the full amount of your bonus and any attorney fees incurred in pursuing the action.  In addition, due to the serious nature of such an offense, your employer could potentially be fined and/or imprisoned for their actions.

Unfortunately, however, if your employer was more ambiguous about the requisite conditions for a bonus, under this new case law, it is likely that they will be able to avoid liability for wrongfully withholding your wages.  If that is the case, while you can still pursue other causes of action against your employer, you will not be able to receive twice the full amount of your bonus or attorney fees.

The events of this recently decided case unfolded as follows:   At the beginning of the employment relationship between an employee and a Connecticut law firm, the parties agreed that the employee’s annual compensation would consist of a base salary and a year-end bonus.  The employment contract called for this year-end bonus to be based on factors such as seniority, business generation, productivity, professional ability, pro bono work and loyalty to the firm.  The employee remained at the firm for several years and each year he received his salary and the promised year-end bonus.  When the employee left the firm he discovered that he was not going to receive the year-end bonus for that last year of his employment.  To try and recover what he had thought was a promised bonus; the employee commenced an action against his employer alleging breach of contract and wrongful withholding of wages.

The trial court dismissed the wrongful withholding of wages claim, determining that the year-end bonus was not ‘wages’ as defined by the Connecticut Wage Act.  The breach of contract claim, however, went to trial.  The Trial Court found in favor of the employee and awarded him damages in the amount of his year-end bonus plus interest.  On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the Trial Court’s finding as to the breach of contract claim, but reversed the Trial Court’s decision to dismiss the wrongful withholdings of wages claim.  The Appellate Court determined that the structure of the agreement as to the year-end bonus meant that the bonus could have been classified as ‘wages’ under the Connecticut Wage Act and therefore held that the employee could proceed with his wrongful withholding of wages claim.

The issue of the wrongful withholdings of wages claim was appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court where the Court decided that because the employee’s bonus was discretionary, (not ascertainable by applying a formula) it did not constitute ‘wages’ under the Connecticut Wage Act.  The employee therefore was not able to proceed with his wrongful withholding of wages claim.

Although the employee did recover some monetary damages through his breach of contract claim, it was not anywhere near as much as he would have received if he had been able to proceed with his wrongful withholding of wages action.

It is quite possible that after the release of this opinion many employers will revisit their bonus polices to make the language a little less precise or announce that their bonuses are discretionary in order to take advantage of the protections afforded under this recent case.  It is important, therefore, that as an employee you are aware of what kind of bonus you have been promised so that you know how strongly to rely on that promised bonus and what options are available to you if the employer refuses to pay.

If you have already been denied your year-end bonus and believe that it was a discretionary bonus, there are still ways in which you can potentially recover that lost income, such as the breach of contract claim pursued by the employee in this recent case.  If you have been denied a year-end bonus that was not discretionary and you had met the required conditions for receiving that bonus, you are still protected under the Connecticut Wage Act and can bring a wrongful withholding of wages action against your employer.  This action may allow you to receive damages in the amount double your bonus and possibly receive any incurred attorney fees.

If you have any questions regarding employment and labor law in Connecticut, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He can be reached at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com. Mr. Maya handles cases involving employment contracts, separation agreements, non-competition agreements, restrictive covenants, union arbitrations, and employment discrimination cases in New York and Connecticut.

By contrast, a lawyer advocate for a minor child in a custody proceeding, referred to in many jurisdictions as an Attorney for the Minor Child(ren) (or AMC), is just that: a lawyer who is appointed and charged with vigilantly representing and advocating for his or her clients’ interests, including those positions which are expressed to the lawyer in the context of privileged attorney-client communications.

The fact that a GAL – who may, in fact, be a lawyer – does not enjoy the same attorney-client privilege with the minor children he or she represents creates certain significant issues with respect to discovery and document disclosure in the context of custody litigation.

In a recent decision on an issue of first impression, a Connecticut Superior Court determined that an attorney GAL’s entire file (including correspondence, emails, and handwritten notes) be disclosed to the parties over the objection of that GAL, who asserted the protections of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.

The net effect of that Court’s determination is essentially to permit parents (litigants) who are understandably concerned about the position, progress, and considerable impact of a GAL’s opinion on his or her custody claim, to gain unfettered access to a GAL’s file regardless of that person’s status as an attorney.  In custody cases where a GAL may ultimately testify as a witness and opine to a court regarding a minor child’s “best interests,” a preview of that GAL’s work product and interview notes may prove invaluable.

Attorneys armed with both experience and an understanding of applicable case law can best advise our divorce clients regarding custody evaluations, GAL involvement, and overall trial strategy.

Any questions about this posting or confidential inquiries concerning the subject matter may be directed to Attorney H. Daniel Murphy at hdmurphy@mayalaw.com.

Generally speaking, the legal decisions covered by the authority of “legal custody” consist of non-emergency medical decisions, educational decisions, and those relating to the child’s religious upbringing.

Joint legal custody, as defined by Connecticut General Statutes §46(b)-56a(a), is “an order awarding legal custody of the minor child to both parents, providing for joint decision-making by the parents and providing that physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the child of continuing contact with both parents.”

In certain circumstances, whether by agreement of the parties or by court order following a hearing or trial, joint legal custody may be awarded with a catch known as “final decision-making authority.”  In some instances, perhaps where communication between the parents is strained or ineffective, a court may find it appropriate to require the parties to communicate and discuss a major decision in good faith, but may award only one party the ultimate decision-making authority if an impasse remains – essentially giving one party a tiebreaking vote.

In a decision released just this week, Connecticut’s Appellate Court stated that such an award of ultimate decision-making power remains consistent with a finding of joint legal custody, where the trial court enters orders including “any such custody arrangements as the court may determine to be in the best interests of the child” (C.G.S. § 46(b)-56(b)).  Citing its own 1991 decision, the Appellate Court has noted its continued rejection of the argument that ultimate decision-making authority by one party effectively constitutes an award of sole custody.

In its ruling, the Court affirms a custodial arrangement whereby the parties were compelled to attempt to agree in good faith on any major decision relating to the child, after which they were directed to resolve the agreement through mediation.  In that case, only where mediation did not produce an agreement was one party given the authority to exercise final decision-making – effectively, the tiebreak.  The Court noted that the construct and process did not prevent either party from meaningfully participating in the major decisions relating to the child, but rather, merely “provided the parties with a solution for the occasion when, despite good faith and multiple attempts to reach a decision, the parties were stymied.”

Often in family law disputes, it takes creativity and a keen understanding of the parties’ interpersonal dynamics to arrive at solutions that not only benefit the minor children, but could also prevent future tension and litigation.

Any questions about this posting or confidential inquiries concerning the subject matter may be directed to Attorney H. Daniel Murphy at hdmurphy@mayalaw.com.

Entirely separate from the determination of legal custody (which relates to the parties’ arrangements for major legal decisions to be made for and on behalf of the minor child) is the subject of a visitation arrangement, also sometimes referred to as a “parental access plan.”  Regardless of which parent is awarded legal custody, a non-custodial parent has a right to visit with his or her child, although such visitation is not guaranteed to be unfettered and unrestricted in all circumstances.

In the best case scenario, the parties or their lawyers may arrange for “flexible, liberal rights of visitation” for the non-custodial parent, which might mean that the parties work out their access schedule amongst themselves, rather than reducing the intricacies of a schedule to writing.  In some instances, the parties might follow a broad-brush, general guideline for visits and holiday scheduling which ebbs and flows according to the parties’ schedules and the child’s activities and needs.

On the other end of the spectrum, visitation by a non-custodial parent can be suspended, temporarily denied, or restricted in some fashion by a court if it is found that a parent’s visitation with a minor child would be adverse to that child’s best interest.  If it can be demonstrated in a court of law that a child’s personal safety, physical, mental, or emotional well-being, would be negatively and seriously impacted by visitation with a parent, it is likely that such a parent’s visitation will be severely limited, if not suspended entirely.

However, any restriction of a parent’s ability to spend quality time with his or her child is not taken lightly – not by attorneys, and not by the courts.  Before taking such drastic measures, courts will look for compelling, factual predicates based on very specific, presently existing circumstances.  Before any type of restriction on visitation, a non-custodial parent has a right to a full evidentiary hearing, an opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses, and a chance to argue to a court that the custodial parent has not established that continued, unlimited visitation would be injurious to the minor child’s best interests.

There are limited situations in which courts deem it appropriate to deny visitation entirely; others in which visitation is restricted in time, place, or manner; still others in which visitation is required to be supervised by a third party, such as a family member or an independent agency.

Obviously, acts or omissions by the non-custodial parent which have directly impacted the child (such as cases of physical abuse, or outright neglect for the child) are looked at most critically and could potentially result in the most drastic of remedies to protect a minor child.

Of course, there are certain other factors which could – in isolated cases – result in restricted visitation by a non-custodial parent.  Violence or the threat of violence on the part of the non-custodial parent will be considered as an important factor, provided the evidence offered is competent and survives judicial scrutiny.  In very extreme cases only, a mental illness or a psychiatric condition could impact visitation time, but only where it is established, proven, and accepted by a court that there would be harm to the child as a result of the illness if visitation were to take place.

More commonly, issues concerning substance and/or alcohol abuse could and may impact visitation by a non-custodial parent, especially where the behavior is found to be likely to jeopardize a minor child’s welfare.  Even in these cases, with the best interests of the child in mind, courts are likely to favor a continued, healthy and loving relationship between the minor child and his or her non-custodial parent, provided that the visitation environment is such that the child will not be harmed or put at risk.

Whether a visitation arrangement will be “flexible and liberal” or heavily regulated is dependent on the factual circumstances of each case, the weight of the evidence, the credibility of the parties and their witnesses, and what is determined by a court to be the best interests of the minor child or children.  A legal advisor in this area is challenged not merely to advance a client’s desires, but to simultaneously consider and protect the welfare of the minor child (and the parent-child relationship) when advising his or her client.

Any questions about this posting or confidential inquiries concerning the subject matter, may be directed to Attorney H. Daniel Murphy at hdmurphy@mayalaw.com.

Nowhere is that more evident than in cases where one spouse seeks to relocate with the minor children to a new state – perhaps hundreds of miles away from his or her former spouse, and his or her former life.

Developments in the law even in the past few years have refined the processes and legal burdens for spouses seeking to take their children to another location, perhaps to be closer to extended family or a support network, nearer to a new job or opportunity, or for other economic reasons.

The legal burden in Connecticut now rests squarely upon the parent seeking a relocation to prove to a court (assuming the other parent objects to the move) that the relocation of the children is for a legitimate purpose, that the relocation is reasonably related to achieving that purpose, and that the move and resulting transplantation is truly in the best interests of the minor child or children of the marriage.

In reaching its determination, a court will likely hear evidence from each parent, relevant witnesses and/or healthcare professionals or experts, and likely a court-appointed guardian to represent the child’s interests in such a proceeding.  Among other things, a court shall consider each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the relocation, the relationship each parent has with the subject child or children, any potential enhancement that the relocation might have on the child’s life or development, the feasibility of visitation or maintained contact between the non-relocating parent and the child notwithstanding the geographic shift, and the impact the relocation would have on the relationship between the child and the parent who might be left behind.

These types of post-judgment proceedings are often painful for both litigants and are driven by facts as much as the law – facts which could and often do have nothing whatever to do with the underlying reasons for the divorce itself.  A parent involved in a post-judgment relocation dispute in Connecticut must prepare for a contentious legal battle where personal convictions, risk tolerance, and emotions can and will be tested.

We advise clients in these cases not merely to weigh their legal options, but to evaluate and assess the best interests of their children who are innocently caught in perhaps the cruelest game of tug-of-war imaginable.  We prepare our clients and assist them in structuring their case for the most favorable presentation of facts and evidence to support their legal position.  Those considering or faced with the specter of a relocation petition should retain counsel who are both well-versed in the law and attuned to the reality and repercussions that litigation brings to children’s lives – sometimes years after the ink has dried on a divorce decree.

Any questions about this posting or confidential inquiries concerning the subject matter, may be directed to Attorney H. Daniel Murphy at hdmurphy@mayalaw.com.

Invariably, that reference relates not merely to the two individuals who have decided that their marriage is no longer viable; rather, the fallout often squarely lands on the children caught in the midst of a custody battle during a divorce – or sometimes, in a residential relocation petition by one parent in the years after a divorce.

Where young children are involved, divorce lawyers regrettably see a frequency of parental alienation by one party or the other, an active or passive attempt by a divorce litigant to cause the children of that union to align against his or her soon-to-be ex-spouse.

Parental Alienation Syndrome consists of thoughts and behavior that can develop in a child of separated parents wherein the custodial parent causes a child, through repeated manipulation and restriction of visitation and access to the other parent, to unjustifiably fear or have anger towards the other parent.  Also referred to as “hostile aggressive parenting,” the syndrome essentially deprives a young child of his or her ability to be loved by – and show love for – both of his parents, unconditionally.

The syndrome manifests itself in our cases in many forms.  As lawyers, we have seen parents who file false police or DCF reports against the other parent to force an arrest or an ejection from the marital home.  We sometimes learn of a parent who loudly disparages the other within earshot of the minor children.  We often deal with litigants who unjustifiably attempt to “micro-manage” all aspects of visitation with the other parent, to the extent where the parental access – and the parent-child relationship itself – is materially (if not irreparably) harmed.

In divorce litigation, it is the attorneys’ task to dispassionately assess the evidence for and against our clients, to give sound advice, and to pursue legal remedies aggressively where other avenues have failed.  Protecting the rights and psychological well-being of children caught in the middle of litigation is, and must be, of the utmost concern.  At every turn, we seek to advise our clients of the perceived benefits, risks, and consequences of the lawsuit in which they are involved, lest they lose sight of the most valuable assets of their marriage: their children.

Any questions about this posting or confidential inquiries concerning the subject matter, may be directed to Attorney H. Daniel Murphy at hdmurphy@mayalaw.com.

Unless the site of a plaintiff’s injury falls within one of a few narrow exceptions (such as an injury on a “public highway,” which would invoke the protections and mechanisms of Connecticut’s “highway defect statute,” or Connecticut General Statutes Section 13a-149), a plaintiff is entitled only to proceed against a state or municipality under the Political Subdivision Liability Statute (Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-557n).

Section 52-557n, however, contains its own pitfalls for prospective plaintiffs.  The statute provides that a town or political subdivision may be liable for negligent acts of its employees, officers, or agents except if such actions or omissions constitute criminal conduct or willful misconduct, or, significantly, if such negligent acts or omissions require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the job responsibility.

The latter part of this test is key – and is a gold mine for municipalities (and their lawyers) seeking to invoke the governmental immunity doctrine and escape liability for the negligence of its employees, even if such negligence is established by an injured person.  What the provision states, in plain language, is that a town may well be free and clear from liability if the task that was performed negligently was a task which required an exercise of judgment on the part of the town employee.

Take the hypothetical example of a plaintiff who was injured when she slipped on ice on the front steps of City Hall.  The evidence suggests that the maintenance workers either knew or should have known that ice had built up on the steps, that they were expecting the public to be walking in and out of the building, and that someone clearly “dropped the ball” in making sure that the ice was scraped off and that salt or sand was applied generously to the area.  Instead, nothing was done, nothing was scraped, no sand or salt was used, no warning signs were posted, and the ice remained for several business days before this plaintiff came along and fell on her very first visit to City Hall.

Even with these simplified facts (which appear at first blush to be quite damaging to the City), the City will surely investigate the existence of any policy, procedure, and practice of those maintenance workers who were assigned to the front steps of the building.  In this case, the City will attempt to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “judgment” and “discretion” of the City employees was required to be exercised to keep those steps free of snow and ice.  On the contrary, a plaintiff will seek to demonstrate that the actions (or omissions) of the City workers were “ministerial” – that is, the workers had a clear directive to do something (e.g. to clear the ice at certain times, in a certain manner, with no exercise of judgment) and yet they failed to carry out that task, resulting in the plaintiff’s injury.

When the proverbial dust settles, if no clear, articulated policy existed to clear the steps, to inspect the steps on a scheduled basis, or to take preventative measures against ice buildup, a municipal defendant in this instance would likely argue (perhaps successfully) that the maintenance workers were required not to follow any protocol, but only to “use their judgment and discretion” in determining what needed to be kept safe and clear for pedestrian traffic.

An unknowing plaintiff (or perhaps an inexperienced attorney) who advances her case against a town believing that a jury would be shocked if there is no snow removal policy might find herself equally shocked when or if it is determined that any negligence was of a “discretionary” nature and governmental immunity therefore applies, subject to other very narrow legal exceptions not discussed here.

A savvy plaintiff, in discovery and at the very outset of the lawsuit, might request that the town admit, under oath and in writing, to the existence of a clear and articulated policy (even if it is unwritten) with regard to the safety issue which resulted in her injury.  While towns (and their attorneys) are often eager to show that preventative measures are and were in place, in this instance, they may well eliminate – as a matter of law – their own sacred protection of governmental immunity at trial.  With a valid legal admission of a clear and articulated policy, a municipal defendant is effectively hamstrung – it cannot simultaneously admit to the existence of a policy and directive while claiming that its employees were simply exercising their own judgment.  Dramatically and emphatically, the curtain of governmental immunity draws away, paving the way for a plaintiff to reach the eyes and ears of a jury.

An injured person seeking legal assistance as against the state or a municipality faces a virtual hornet’s nest of obstacles and legal entanglements.  A trusted, informed advocate is essential to place such a claim in the best possible legal position.  The invitation is open to consult with attorneys at our Firm who are experienced in this type of civil litigation.

If you have any questions about this posting or confidential inquiries concerning the subject matter, please contact Attorney H. Daniel Murphy at hdmurphy@mayalaw.com.

Under what has become known as the Faragher/Ellerth defense, employers since 1998 have been permitted by the courts to put forth and establish an affirmative defense to victims’ lawsuits against inappropriately behaving employees, so long as they are able to prove one of two things: A) that the victim unreasonably failed to take advantage of a company’s established procedures and opportunities to prevent sexual harassment (such as policies, training, and complaint mechanisms through human resources), or B) that the victim employee complained about the conduct and the employer took prompt and appropriate corrective action (such as an investigation, discipline, and/or termination of the harasser).

If a defendant company succeeds in proving one of these two elements, that company may not be held liable for the sexual harassment of one of its employees, even under some egregious circumstances.  Today, many companies have policies and procedures in place, and in most circumstances, a company can successfully claim that it would have been “unreasonable” for a victim not to complain about a harasser’s misconduct and to put the company on notice when something untoward occurs.

However, sometimes victims do not complain right away.  In some cases, the harassment is committed by a supervisor – someone in a position of power over the victim, with a stranglehold on the victim’s voice, on her employment, on her will.

Our law makes adjustments accordingly.  Therefore, where the harassment is committed not just by a co-worker of the victim, but by the victim’s work supervisor, the standard shifts dramatically – the employer company is “presumptively responsible” for the harasser’s conduct.  In that instance, also, there is a proscribed limitation under which an employer can put forth the Faragher/Ellerth defense and potentially escape liability.  Specifically, the test becomes whether the supervisor’s harassment (or unwanted sexual advance) culminated in what is known as a “tangible employment action” – such as a demotion, a denial of a promotion, a change in job responsibilities, or a termination of employment.

In other words, in cases of supervisor-subordinate harassment, a trial court applies a test to determine whether the tangible employment action is “linked” in some fashion to the supervisor’s discriminatory harassment.  If indeed a connection is found – if a supervisor, for example, ultimately fires his victim of sexual harassment for fear she will disclose his reprehensible conduct to others – then the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense is not available to the employer company.  The purpose of this rule is to insure that, despite the procedures they might put in place to protect their employees from sexual harassment, companies may and often will be held liable and accountable for the actions of supervisors who harass their subordinates and then utilize their positions of power to remove their victims from the workplace.

If you are the victim of sexual harassment in the workplace, we urge you to seek legal advice immediately and to learn your rights.  Our firm has decades of experience in successfully handling sexual harassment and discrimination cases throughout New York and Connecticut, in both state and federal courts.  Our clients present us with the facts; we arm them with the law and the aggressive, informed advocacy to seek justice on their behalf.

If you have any questions about this posting or confidential inquiries concerning the subject matter, please contact Attorney H. Daniel Murphy at hdmurphy@mayalaw.com.

If you have any questions about this posting or confidential inquiries concerning the subject matter, please contact Attorney H. Daniel Murphy at hdmurphy@mayalaw.com.