Corporate Law

What are the duties of a Condo Board When They Employ a Property Management Company?

If a condo owner has a problem they should first consult with the property management company.  The property management company serves as an agent for the condo association, and they should therefore be responsive to a condo owner’s needs or concerns.  If for some reason the property management company is not responsive, then a condo owner would be wise to consult the president of the Condo Board.  If the Condo Board is unresponsive after this it may be wise to consult an attorney to represent you while dealing with the Board.

If you have any questions regarding housing in Connecticut, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at (203) 221-3100 or e-mail him directly at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

What are the duties of a Condo Board When They Employ a Property Management Company?

If a condo owner has a problem they should first consult with the property management company.  The property management company serves as an agent for the condo association, and they should therefore be responsive to a condo owner’s needs or concerns.  If for some reason the property management company is not responsive, then a condo owner would be wise to consult the president of the Condo Board.  If the Condo Board is unresponsive after this it may be wise to consult an attorney to represent you while dealing with the Board.

If you have any questions regarding housing in Connecticut, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at (203) 221-3100 or e-mail him directly at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

The Attorneys of Maya Murphy, P.C. In the News

The attorneys of Maya Murphy have received significant news coverage for their excellent representation on a variety of issues. Please scroll through the newspaper clippings below to view the news coverage.


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Federal Court Found Form U-4 and FINRA Rules to Constitute a Sufficient Basis for an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties

Federal Court Found Form U-4 and FINRA Rules to Constitute a Sufficient Basis for an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties

Lawrence R. Gilmore v. Scott T. Brandt, 2011 WL 5240421 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2011).

In a recent case before United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Lawrence Gilmore (“Gilmore”) filed a motion to confirm the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award in his favor, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 9. Scott Brandt (“Brandt”) responded by filing a motion to vacate the FINRA award pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10. The court granted Gilmore’s motion to confirm the award, entered judgment for the award and denied Brandt’s motion to vacate the award.

The dispute underlying the FINRA arbitration began when Brandt, a representative of Lighthouse Capital Corporation, suggested that Gilmore invest $92,000 in Diversified Lending Group, Inc. (“DLG”). Gilmore made the investment, which was quickly decimated. Gilmore alleged that DLG was a Ponzi scheme and filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA. Rather than seek a stay of arbitration, Brandt contested the issue of arbitrability by appending a statement of jurisdictional objection to his FINRA Arbitration Submission Agreement and raising jurisdictional objections throughout the arbitration proceedings. FINRA appointed a panel of arbitrators to hear the matter; however, the arbitration panel did not directly address Brandt’s jurisdictional objection. In December 2010, the panel issued an arbitration award in Gilmore’s favor for compensatory damages of $106,024.68, post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees.

In his motion for vacatur, Brandt argued that he never entered into an arbitration agreement with Gilmore; therefore, their dispute should not have been subjected to arbitration. The district court found that Brandt had sufficiently preserved his objection to arbitrability, and that it fell to the court to decide whether the dispute was in fact arbitrable.

Because arbitration is entirely a matter of contract, a party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute that it has not agreed to submit to arbitration. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995). When Brandt first sought to be licensed to sell securities, he executed a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (“Form U-4”), which contained a section agreeing “to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of [FINRA].” The court determined that the agreement embodied in Brandt’s Form U-4 would constitute an agreement to arbitrate the dispute with Gilmore only if FINRA rules required this dispute to be arbitrated.

FINRA Rule 12200 is a broad provision that generally applies to any customer dispute arising in connection with the business activities of a FINRA member. Specifically, FINRA Rule 12200 requires that a dispute must be arbitrated under the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure if: (1) arbitration is required by written agreement or requested by a customer; (2) the dispute is between a customer and a FINRA member or associated person; and (3) the dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the FINRA member or associated person. By submitting his Statement of Claim to FINRA for arbitration, Gilmore was clearly requesting arbitration of the dispute. The district court found that Gilmore was in a customer relationship with Brandt because Brandt had induced him to invest in DLG. Additionally, the district court found that Gilmore’s claims related to Brandt’s recommendation of an investment in particular securities fell within the class of disputes reasonably regulated by FINRA. Therefore, the district court determined that FINRA Rule 12200 required the dispute between Gilmore and Brandt be submitted to arbitration. Because of this result, Brandt’s U-4 Form was determined to be his agreement to submit to arbitration of the dispute.

Because the arbitration panel had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, the award decision is entitled to deference by the federal court. 9 U.S.C. § 9-11. Because Brandt provided no argument that satisfied the statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), the court granted Gilmore’s motion for confirmation of the arbitration award of compensatory damages of $106,024.68, with interest, and attorneys’ fees.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA or arbitration issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Federal Court Found Form U-4 and FINRA Rules to Constitute a Sufficient Basis for an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties

Federal Court Found Form U-4 and FINRA Rules to Constitute a Sufficient Basis for an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties

Lawrence R. Gilmore v. Scott T. Brandt, 2011 WL 5240421 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2011).

In a recent case before United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Lawrence Gilmore (“Gilmore”) filed a motion to confirm the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award in his favor, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 9. Scott Brandt (“Brandt”) responded by filing a motion to vacate the FINRA award pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10. The court granted Gilmore’s motion to confirm the award, entered judgment for the award and denied Brandt’s motion to vacate the award.

The dispute underlying the FINRA arbitration began when Brandt, a representative of Lighthouse Capital Corporation, suggested that Gilmore invest $92,000 in Diversified Lending Group, Inc. (“DLG”). Gilmore made the investment, which was quickly decimated. Gilmore alleged that DLG was a Ponzi scheme and filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA. Rather than seek a stay of arbitration, Brandt contested the issue of arbitrability by appending a statement of jurisdictional objection to his FINRA Arbitration Submission Agreement and raising jurisdictional objections throughout the arbitration proceedings. FINRA appointed a panel of arbitrators to hear the matter; however, the arbitration panel did not directly address Brandt’s jurisdictional objection. In December 2010, the panel issued an arbitration award in Gilmore’s favor for compensatory damages of $106,024.68, post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees.

In his motion for vacatur, Brandt argued that he never entered into an arbitration agreement with Gilmore; therefore, their dispute should not have been subjected to arbitration. The district court found that Brandt had sufficiently preserved his objection to arbitrability, and that it fell to the court to decide whether the dispute was in fact arbitrable.

Because arbitration is entirely a matter of contract, a party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute that it has not agreed to submit to arbitration. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995). When Brandt first sought to be licensed to sell securities, he executed a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (“Form U-4”), which contained a section agreeing “to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of [FINRA].” The court determined that the agreement embodied in Brandt’s Form U-4 would constitute an agreement to arbitrate the dispute with Gilmore only if FINRA rules required this dispute to be arbitrated.

FINRA Rule 12200 is a broad provision that generally applies to any customer dispute arising in connection with the business activities of a FINRA member. Specifically, FINRA Rule 12200 requires that a dispute must be arbitrated under the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure if: (1) arbitration is required by written agreement or requested by a customer; (2) the dispute is between a customer and a FINRA member or associated person; and (3) the dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the FINRA member or associated person. By submitting his Statement of Claim to FINRA for arbitration, Gilmore was clearly requesting arbitration of the dispute. The district court found that Gilmore was in a customer relationship with Brandt because Brandt had induced him to invest in DLG. Additionally, the district court found that Gilmore’s claims related to Brandt’s recommendation of an investment in particular securities fell within the class of disputes reasonably regulated by FINRA. Therefore, the district court determined that FINRA Rule 12200 required the dispute between Gilmore and Brandt be submitted to arbitration. Because of this result, Brandt’s U-4 Form was determined to be his agreement to submit to arbitration of the dispute.

Because the arbitration panel had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, the award decision is entitled to deference by the federal court. 9 U.S.C. § 9-11. Because Brandt provided no argument that satisfied the statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), the court granted Gilmore’s motion for confirmation of the arbitration award of compensatory damages of $106,024.68, with interest, and attorneys’ fees.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA or arbitration issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Effects on Non-Competes When a Company Splits and Grants a License to the New Entity

Effects on Non-Competes When a Company Splits and Grants a License to the New Entity

Multicare Physicians & Rehabilitation Group, P.C. v. Wong, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1351

Multicare Physicians & Rehabilitation Group, P.C. was a Connecticut company that provided healthcare services and maintained offices in Milford, Ansonia, Wallingford, and Cheshire. Dr. Wong began to work for the company and executed an employment agreement on January 21, 2004, pursuant to the company’s employment regulations and standards. There was a restrictive covenant in paragraph nine of the agreement that prohibited Dr. Wong from practicing within fifteen miles of “the corporation’s offices” within the four towns previously mentioned for a period of two years following termination. The agreement stated that Physicians would be entitled to equitable and legal damages (a court ordered injunction and monetary relief respectively) in the event of a breach.
The company split up in the summer of 2004 into Physicians and a new company, Multicare Medical Center, P.C. (“Medical”), that practiced out of the Milford and Ansonia offices previously occupied by Physicians. Physicians licensed “the Name” to Medical in exchange for consideration for $10, and this license gave Medical the right to brand and advertise itself as Physicians. Medical officially became “independently owned company” on August 6, 2004. In August 2005, Dr. Wong gave Physicians notice that he would not be renewing his employment contract with them and then proceeded to accept a part-time position at Medical beginning in December 2005. Physicians learned of Dr. Wong’s new employment and interpreted this as in direct violation of the non-compete clause contained in the employment agreement. Physicians sued Dr. Wong in Connecticut state court and requested enforcement of the restrictive covenant.
The court had to decide whether Dr. Wong had violated the non-compete agreement by working as an employee of Medical, for which it concluded that he had not breached the employment contract with Physicians and denied the company’s request for an injunction restraining Dr. Wong’s further employment at Medical. The main factor that the court analyzed to reach this conclusion was the existence and terms of the license granted to Medical by Physicians on June 30, 2004. The court made it clear that since the company split in 2004, Physicians did not have any offices in Milford or Ansonia and as such, Dr. Wong was free to practice medicine in these towns without violating the non-compete clause. Medical was permitted to operate as Physicians by using its name pursuant to the license but the offices in Milford and Ansonia were not by any means components of Physicians’ business structure or operations. Those offices, while under the trade name of Physicians, were wholly owned and operated Medical business offices.
This decision highlights the special relationship between companies when they split and one party grants the other a license to continue to operate under the same trade name. The court emphasized that while the companies were the same with respect to their trade name, for all other intents and purposes they were completely separate companies with different business structures and operations.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Effects on Non-Competes When a Company Splits and Grants a License to the New Entity

Effects on Non-Competes When a Company Splits and Grants a License to the New Entity

Multicare Physicians & Rehabilitation Group, P.C. v. Wong, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1351

Multicare Physicians & Rehabilitation Group, P.C. was a Connecticut company that provided healthcare services and maintained offices in Milford, Ansonia, Wallingford, and Cheshire. Dr. Wong began to work for the company and executed an employment agreement on January 21, 2004, pursuant to the company’s employment regulations and standards. There was a restrictive covenant in paragraph nine of the agreement that prohibited Dr. Wong from practicing within fifteen miles of “the corporation’s offices” within the four towns previously mentioned for a period of two years following termination. The agreement stated that Physicians would be entitled to equitable and legal damages (a court ordered injunction and monetary relief respectively) in the event of a breach.
The company split up in the summer of 2004 into Physicians and a new company, Multicare Medical Center, P.C. (“Medical”), that practiced out of the Milford and Ansonia offices previously occupied by Physicians. Physicians licensed “the Name” to Medical in exchange for consideration for $10, and this license gave Medical the right to brand and advertise itself as Physicians. Medical officially became “independently owned company” on August 6, 2004. In August 2005, Dr. Wong gave Physicians notice that he would not be renewing his employment contract with them and then proceeded to accept a part-time position at Medical beginning in December 2005. Physicians learned of Dr. Wong’s new employment and interpreted this as in direct violation of the non-compete clause contained in the employment agreement. Physicians sued Dr. Wong in Connecticut state court and requested enforcement of the restrictive covenant.
The court had to decide whether Dr. Wong had violated the non-compete agreement by working as an employee of Medical, for which it concluded that he had not breached the employment contract with Physicians and denied the company’s request for an injunction restraining Dr. Wong’s further employment at Medical. The main factor that the court analyzed to reach this conclusion was the existence and terms of the license granted to Medical by Physicians on June 30, 2004. The court made it clear that since the company split in 2004, Physicians did not have any offices in Milford or Ansonia and as such, Dr. Wong was free to practice medicine in these towns without violating the non-compete clause. Medical was permitted to operate as Physicians by using its name pursuant to the license but the offices in Milford and Ansonia were not by any means components of Physicians’ business structure or operations. Those offices, while under the trade name of Physicians, were wholly owned and operated Medical business offices.
This decision highlights the special relationship between companies when they split and one party grants the other a license to continue to operate under the same trade name. The court emphasized that while the companies were the same with respect to their trade name, for all other intents and purposes they were completely separate companies with different business structures and operations.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Hostile Work Environments and the Faragher/Ellerth Defense

In a landmark case, the United States Supreme Court established the standard by which an employer could be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the creation of a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment.  By way of background, Title VII is a federal law that prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion, and is applicable to employers with 15 or more employees.

The reach of Title VII was brought to the Supreme Court’s attention in 1998, when it decided Faragher v. Boca Raton.  In that case, Faragher worked part time as a lifeguard between 1985 and 1990, finally resigning in 1990.[1] In 1992, she brought an action against her immediate supervisors and the city and asserted claims under Title VII.  In her suit, Faragher alleged that her supervisors created a sexually hostile work environment by making lewd remarks and subjecting Faragher and other female lifeguards to unwanted and offensive touching.[2] The district court, considering evidence of a pattern of inappropriate conduct engaged in by Faragher’s supervisors, concluded that the conduct was “discriminatory harassment sufficiently serious to alter the conditions of Faragher’s employment and constitute an abusive working environment.”  The Court based its finding on three principles: “(1) the harassment was pervasive enough to support an inference that the City had ‘knowledge, or constructive knowledge’ of it; (2) the City was liable under traditional agency principles because [her supervisors] were acting as its agents when they committed the harassing acts; (3) Gordon’s knowledge of the harassment, combined with his inaction, ‘provides a further basis for imputing liability on the City.’”  The district court awarded Faragher one dollar in nominal damages.[3]

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment against the city on appeal, based on its finding that the City had no actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment.

The case reached the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit and reinstated judgment in favor of Faraghar.  In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court set down bright line rules to determine the liability of an employer under Title VII when its employees have created a hostile sexual work environment.

First noting that in order to weed out complaints attacking ordinary “tribulations of the workplace,” the Court noted that in the past it had “made it clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.”[4] Undertaking a detailed analysis, the Court ultimately held that “[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.  When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”[5] Essentially, the Court provided for an employer to raise a defense to a claim of a hostile work environment, if the employer can show that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior, and second, that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.  This created what has become known as the Faragher/Ellerth defense.

The Court, however, was unable to find any evidence tending to prove the affirmative defense.  Instead the Court found that Faragher’s supervisors “’were granted virtually unchecked authority’ over their subordinates.”[6]

With that, the Court established that employer can be liable for discriminatory behavior by supervisory personnel.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had an opportunity to apply and interpret the “Faragher defense” recently in Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., in 2010.  There, plaintiff Gorzynski brought an employment discrimination action against her employer JetBlue, alleging that she suffered a hostile work environment due to race, sex and age discrimination.  Pursuant to her employer’s sexual harassment policy, Gorzynski complained of the harassment to her supervisor, who also was her harasser.  The district court held that defendant JetBlue was entitled to the Faragher/Ellerth defense.  The Second Circuit found that while taken individually, the complained-of incidents may not have risen to the level of egregiousness necessary to prevail on a sexual harassment claim, “when taken together they do describe a work environment in which a jury could find that men, including Gorzynski’s supervisor, were able to – and did at will – comment inappropriately on women as sexual objects.”[7] Having found that Gorzynski established the existence of a hostile work environment, the Second Circuit next considered whether her employer could prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.  Rejecting a rigid reading of the Faragher rule, the Second Circuit held that “an employer is not, as a matter of law, entitled to the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense simply because an employer’s sexual harassment policy provides that the plaintiff could have complained to other persons as well as the alleged harasser.  Instead, we conclude that the facts and circumstances of each case must be examined to determine wheter, by not pursuing other avenues provided in the employer’s sexual harassment policy, the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s preventative measures.”[8]

The holding of this case applies to employees and employers in Connecticut, as the Second Circuit covers Connecticut, in addition to New York and Vermont.  The decision is important for several reasons, one of them being the notion that an employee’s sexual harassment claim will not fail for complaining of sexual harassment to the wrong person.  It also serves as a reminder to employees to become familiar with their company’s sexual harassment policy.

As the above cases demonstrate, sexual harassment claims can be complicated.  If you think that you have been subjected to a sexually hostile work environment, you should consult with an experienced employment attorney with the knowledge and resources to advocate on your behalf.  Please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq., to set up an initial consultation, at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@mayalaw.com.


[1] Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).

[2] Id. at 781.

[3] Id. at 783.

[4] Id. at 788.

[5] Id. at 807.

[6] Id.

[7] Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010).

[8] Id. at 105.

A Woman’s Right – 3 who fought back and won

A cleaning woman, who speaks no English, is raped by a supervisor. A plumber’s boss insists that she change into work clothes in front of male employees. A proofreader is fondled by a coworker. Other employees tell obscene jokes and make sexist remarks.

All three women filed complaints with the New York City Commission on Human Rights – and won.

“Discrimination is a strange animal. So many people don’t realize they are doing it,” said Joseph Maya, the attorney who handled the three cases. “I have cases all the time where someone has been subjected to sexual harassment, one of the most traumatic experiences a person could have.”

“Even with such serious charges, often the respondents don’t think they harassed. They think theirs is a natural reaction to a woman.”

Maya said the city agency investigates every complaint, and if someone “fears retalliation, we will prosecute a retalliation complaint too.”

He said the agency also tries to get companies to implement and adopt sexual harassment policies, telling employes it won’t be tolerated.

“Companies could save thousands of dollars by establishing such policies,” said Maya.

The proofreader he represented received $44,200 from her employer. The plumber got $18,000 and a seperate changing area. The cleaning woman got an undisclosed amount and all supervisors in her company were required to attend sensitivity training.

 

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment law practitioners and assist clients in New York City, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere throughout Fairfield County. Should you have any questions about sexual harassment or workplace discrimination or would like to schedule a consultation, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut, by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.

FINRA Arbitration Awards Employer Over $500,000 for Promissory Notes Accelerated by Employee’s Termination

In the Matter of the Arbitration between Claimants Morgan Stanley Smith Barney and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney FA Notes Holdings, LLC v. Respondent Robert W. Hathaway (2012 WL 2675417)

In a recent Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration, a sole FINRA arbitrator held that an employee is liable to satisfy his indebtedness on promissory notes, including interest, to his employer upon termination of employment.

In this case, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney (“MSSB”) and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney FA Notes Holdings, LLC, alleged that Robert W. Hathaway (“Hathaway”) was in breach of two promissory notes executed while he was employed by MSSB. In its arbitration filing, MSSB claimed the principal balances due under both notes, per diem interest for both notes, and costs of collection and arbitration. This matter proceeded pursuant to Rule 13806 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure because Hathaway neither filed a Statement of Answer nor appeared at the hearing.

On or about March 8, 2008, Hathaway executed the first promissory note with MSSB for $729,560, at an interest rate of three-percent per annum, to be repaid in nine consecutive annual installments beginning on March 19, 2009. The terms of the note included an agreement to pay all costs and expenses of collection, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. On or about June 9, 2009, Hathaway executed the second promissory note for $75,257.83 at an interest rate of 2.25-percent per annum, to be repaid in eight consecutive annual installments beginning on June 9, 2010.

On or about September 19, 2011, Hathaway’s employment at MSSB ended. MSSB alleged that termination of employment triggered acceleration of the promissory notes and made a demand for immediate re-payment. Hathaway failed and refused to satisfy the indebtedness.

After considering the pleadings and the submissions, the sole arbitrator decided that Hathaway was liable for the principal balance due under each promissory note. Hathaway was also liable for per diem interest accruing from the date employment was terminated through the date of payment on each note. Finally, Hathaway was to reimburse MSSB for non-refundable portion of its initial claim filing fee. The final award to MSSB totaled $542,816.00.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA, arbitration or employment issues generally, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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