Posts tagged with "§ 14-215(c)"

When ATVs are Driven on Public Highways, They Are “Motor Vehicles” for Purposes of State Suspension Laws

In a criminal law matter, the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed a trial court’s revocation of a defendant’s probation after he operated his all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on public roads while his driver’s license was suspended.

Case Background

In this case, the defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence as a third-time offender. He was sentenced to three years’ incarceration, execution suspended after one year, with three years’ probation. The following conditions of probation were imposed: a general condition prohibiting the violation of any state criminal statute, and a special condition prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle with a suspended license.

The Department of Motor Vehicles permanently suspended the defendant’s driver’s license due to his history of suspensions. The defendant served the one unsuspended year in jail, then began his probation. Before the term expired, he received two criminal citations after he operated an ATV in the travel lanes of town roads. Therefore, he was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license in violation of CGS § 14-215, as well as violation of probation.

A probation revocation hearing was held, where the trial court determined that the defendant violated the general and special conditions. His probation was revoked, and he was ordered to serve the remaining two years of his suspended sentence. The defendant appealed, arguing that CGS § 14-215(c) was unconstitutionally vague with respect to application to ATV usage. As he emphasized, “a person of ordinary intelligence could not reasonably have been expected to know that the term ‘motor vehicle’ included an ATV.”

Unconstitutionally Vague Statute

Everyone is presumed to know the law, and ignorance is no excuse from criminal punishment. However, laws must be drafted so that “ordinary people understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” So long as the meaning of the statute can be fairly ascertained, it won’t be struck down as void for vagueness. In this case, the burden rested with the defendant to “demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [CGS § 14-215(c)], as applied to him, deprived him of adequate notice of what conduct the statute proscribed or that he fell victim to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”

CGS § 14-215(c) makes it a crime for a person to operate a motor vehicle while their driver’s license is under suspension. This statute is located in Chapter 248, which defines “motor vehicle” as including “all vehicles used on public highways.” In CGS § 14-212(9), “vehicle” is synonymous with “motor vehicle,” so the Supreme Court opined that if an ATV qualifies as a vehicle, it is a motor vehicle for purposes of the suspension law. The Court considered the definitions of ATV under other statutes, which use the language “a self-propelled vehicle” and “motorized vehicle.” CGS §§ 14-379 and 23-26a. Thus, for purposes of CGS § 14-215(c), an ATV was a motor vehicle when used on a public highway.

The Court’s Decision

With this statutory framework in mind, the Supreme Court determined that the defendant failed to meet his burden. Rather, CGS § 14-215(c) “affords a person of ordinary intelligence with fair warning that he is prohibited from operating an ATV on a public highway while his license is suspended.” The Court found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and the trial court did not err in revoking the defendant’s probation.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or operation under suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Mini-Motorcycles are “Motor Vehicles” For Purposes of Statute Prohibiting Operation Under Suspension

In a criminal law matter, the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield, Geographical Area 2 at Bridgeport considered whether a mini-motorcycle was a motor vehicle for purposes of General Statutes § 14-215, the state’s operation under suspension law.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on October 6, 2007. The defendant was previously convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) on March 20, 2007, and his license was suspended for one year. However, on the date in question, the defendant was driving a mini-motorcycle on a public highway in Fairfield. Because his license was still suspended, the defendant was charged with violating Chapter 248 § 14-215(c), which “prohibits a person whose license is under suspension from operating a motor vehicle.”

The defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that a mini-motorcycle was not a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the statute. He claimed that because § 14-215 refers to Chapter 246 § 14-1, which under subsection 50 explicitly excludes mini-motorcycles from its definition of “motor vehicle,” he was not operating a motor vehicle under suspension.

The Court’s Findings

The court in State v. Knybel faced a nearly identical factual scenario and argument as those in the present case, and it engaged in a comprehensive discussion regarding competing definitions of “motor vehicle.” In essence, the Knybel court wrote that the definition used in Chapter 248 is broader so as to include all “vehicles” used within the various chapters of the General Statutes. Therefore, the Knybel court concluded “it is clear that the [more limited] definition of the term ‘motor vehicle’ in § 14-1,” which is found in a different chapter, does not apply to § 14-215(c).

With these principles in mind, the Superior Court rejected the defendant’s argument. The Court wrote that § 14-215 specifically defined “motor vehicle” to include “all vehicles used on the public highway.” Thus, the Court held that a mini-motorcycle is a motor vehicle for purposes of the operation under suspension statute, and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or operation under suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.