Posts tagged with "arbitration agreement"

Federal Court Narrows the Definition of “Customer” to Limit Compelled Arbitration Under the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes

Herschel and Mona Zarecor, et al, v. Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc., 2011 WL 5508860 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 10, 2011)

In a case before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Herschel and Mona Zarecor (“the Zarecors”) filed a petition to confirm a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award entered in their favor in October 2010. Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc., (“Morgan Keegan”) filed a counterclaim to vacate the award. The court granted Morgan Keegan’s motion for vacatur. In a later action before the same court, the Zarecors filed a motion for reconsideration. The court denied the motion for reconsideration.

Case Background

In this case, the underlying dispute is based on a Statement of Claims that the Zarecors filed with FINRA to institute an arbitration proceeding against Morgan Keegan. The Zarecors alleged that Morgan Keegan violated state laws by failing to disclose risks associated with the Regions Morgan Keegan funds (“RMK Funds”) that the Zarecors purchased for their individual retirement accounts. The Zarecors alleged that the prospectus and written sales materials for the RMK funds represented these funds as traditional income or bond funds, when these funds were invested instead in risky structured financial products and derivatives. Over ninety-percent of the Zarecors original investment in the RMK funds was lost.

The Arguments

In their Statement of Claims, the Zarecors asserted that FINRA had jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute in absence of a written arbitration agreement because Morgan Keegan was a FINRA member and the Zarecors were public customers. Pursuant to FINRA Rule 12200, a member firm must arbitrate a dispute if: (a) arbitration is required by written agreement or requested by the customer; (b) the dispute is between a FINRA member or associated person of a FINRA member and its customer; and (c) the dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the member or the associated person.

Morgan Keegan alleged that the Zarecors did not qualify as their customers because the Zarecors never sought advice from or held accounts with Morgan Keegan; the Zarecors purchased the RMK funds from competitor brokerage firms, held accounts at competitor brokerage firms and had no direct dealings with Morgan Keegan. Morgan Keegan also filed a motion to dismiss under FINRA Rule 12504(a)(6)(B), which the arbitration panel denied after hearing oral arguments from the parties. After three days of arbitration hearings, the FINRA arbitration panel issued an award finding Morgan Keegan liable to the Zarecors for $541,000 in compensatory damages. In November 2010, the Zarecors commenced an action to confirm the award and Morgan Keegan filed a counterclaim to vacate the award.

Grounds for Vacating Arbitration

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11, provides statutory grounds for judicial review to confirm, vacate or modify an arbitration award. Where there has been an arbitration agreement between the parties, judicial review is severely limited and the arbitration decision may be vacated on very narrowly defined statutory grounds. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).

Morgan Keegan asked the court to vacate the arbitration award on two grounds: (1) there was no such arbitration agreement between the parties; and (2) the underlying dispute is not subject to mandatory arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 because the Zarecors were not customers entitled to request arbitration. The Zarecors countered that, because Morgan Keegan had not sought to enjoin the arbitration proceedings and had participated in the arbitration hearings, they claimed that the firm had waived its right to contest whether the underlying dispute could be submitted for arbitration.

Morgan Keegan may Contest Arbitrability

A party opposed to arbitration has several alternatives to preserve the issue for judicial review: (1) object to the arbitrator’s authority, refuse to argue the arbitrability issue, and proceed to the merits of the agreement; (2) seek declaratory or injunctive relief from a court prior to commencement of arbitration; (3) notify the arbitrators of a refusal to arbitrate altogether; or (4) file a timely motion to vacate in district court. See International Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 545 v. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084, 1101–02 (8th Cir. 2004).

The court determined that Morgan Keegan did not waive its right to contest arbitrability by failing to enjoin the arbitration proceedings; its motion to dismiss, its objections to the arbitration panel’s jurisdiction during the hearings and its timely motion to vacate the award supported the court’s finding that Morgan Keegan sufficiently preserved its right to contest that the underlying dispute was not subject to FINRA arbitration.

Definition of “Customer”

FINRA Rule 12100(i) provides the following definition of a “customer” to be used throughout the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes: “A customer shall not include a broker or dealer.” The district court was concerned that the definition of a “customer” under this rule not be construed too narrowly, nor be interpreted in a manner that would ignore the reasonable expectations of FINRA members.

For the purposes of compelling a member firm to arbitrate a dispute, precedent within the Eighth Circuit limits the definition of a “customer” to “one involved in a business relationship with [a FINRA] member that is related directly to investment or brokerage related services.” Fleet Boston Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. Innovex, Inc., 264 F.3d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 2001). This narrower definition excludes individuals who receive only financial advice, not investment or brokerage services, from the FINRA member. Id.

Zarecors not Qualified as Customers

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Zarecors purchased the RMK Funds from competitor brokers and did not have a direct transactional relationship with Morgan Keegan; however, the Zarecors asserted that they qualified as customers of Morgan Keegan based on phone conversations with Morgan Keegan representatives regarding the funds, including their liquidity and exposure to the sub-prime market.

Courts have found a customer relationship based on interactions between an investor and a FINRA member’s representative only where there is conduct on the part of the representative that indicates the existence of a business or investment relationship, such as soliciting a purchase, taking money from an investor, or facilitating investment transactions. See Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 1995). The Zarecors’ interaction with Morgan Keegan did not satisfy this standard. Therefore, the district court determined that there were no connections or customer relations between the parties that would justify compelling arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200.

Because the district court found that the requirements for compelling arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 were not satisfied, the court denied the Zarecors’ motion for judgment confirming the arbitration award and granted Morgan Keegan’s counterclaim to vacate the award.

Motion for Reconsideration Denied

In November 2011, the Zarecors filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Rules of Federal Civil Procedure, which permits a district court to correct its own mistakes in the time period immediately following entry of judgment. Rule 59(e) cannot be used to introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories or raise arguments that could have been offered prior to entry of judgment. In their motion for reconsideration, the Zarecors contended that the court overlooked the material fact that Morgan Keegan signed an agreement to submit to arbitration and that this submission agreement had been part of the record.

Although the submission agreement was part of the record, the Zarecors failed to reference it or discuss its relevance in briefs filed prior to judgment. The court’s failure to notice the submission agreement, therefore, did not amount to manifest error of law or fact. The Zarecors additionally contended that Morgan Keegan submitted the issue of arbitrability to the arbitration panel for decision. The court considered this argument to be a new legal theory, contradictory to the Zarecors’ previous argument that Morgan Keegan had waived its right to object to arbitrability by failing to contest the issue before the arbitration panel. Therefore, the district court rejected both contentions as sufficient bases for reconsideration under Rule 59(e).

The district court determined that that the Zarecors were not entitled to relief under Rule 59(e) and, therefore, denied their motion for reconsideration. The court’s previous order and judgment to vacate the FINRA arbitration award were undisturbed.

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Should you have any questions relating to FINRA or arbitration issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Federal Court Found Form U-4 and FINRA Rules to Constitute a Sufficient Basis for an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties

Lawrence R. Gilmore v. Scott T. Brandt, 2011 WL 5240421 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2011).

In a case before the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Lawrence Gilmore (“Gilmore”) filed a motion to confirm the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award in his favor, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 9. Scott Brandt (“Brandt”) responded by filing a motion to vacate the FINRA award pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10. The court granted Gilmore’s motion to confirm the award, entered judgment for the award, and denied Brandt’s motion to vacate the award.

Case Details

The dispute underlying the FINRA arbitration began when Brandt, a representative of Lighthouse Capital Corporation, suggested that Gilmore invest $92,000 in Diversified Lending Group, Inc. (“DLG”). Gilmore made the investment, which was quickly decimated. Gilmore alleged that DLG was a Ponzi scheme and filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA. Rather than seek a stay of arbitration, Brandt contested the issue of arbitrability by appending a statement of jurisdictional objection to his FINRA Arbitration Submission Agreement and raising jurisdictional objections throughout the arbitration proceedings.

FINRA appointed a panel of arbitrators to hear the matter; however, the arbitration panel did not directly address Brandt’s jurisdictional challenge. In December 2010, the panel issued an arbitration award in Gilmore’s favor for compensatory damages of $106,024.68, post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees.

Arbitrability of a Dispute

In his motion for vacatur, Brandt argued that he never entered into an arbitration agreement with Gilmore; therefore, their dispute should not have been subjected to arbitration. The district court found that Brandt had sufficiently preserved his objection to arbitrability, and that it fell to the court to decide whether the dispute was in fact arbitrable.

Because arbitration is entirely a matter of contract, a party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute that it has not agreed to submit to arbitration. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995). When Brandt first sought to be licensed to sell securities, he executed a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (“Form U-4”), which contained a section agreeing “to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of [FINRA].”

The court determined that the agreement embodied in Brandt’s Form U-4 would constitute an agreement to arbitrate the dispute with Gilmore only if FINRA rules required this dispute to be arbitrated.

FINRA Rule 12200

FINRA Rule 12200 is a broad provision that generally applies to any customer dispute arising in connection with the business activities of a FINRA member. Specifically, FINRA Rule 12200 requires that a dispute must be arbitrated under the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure if: (1) arbitration is required by written agreement or requested by a customer; (2) the dispute is between a customer and a FINRA member or associated person; and (3) the dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the FINRA member or associated person.

By submitting his Statement of Claim to FINRA for arbitration, Gilmore was clearly requesting arbitration of the dispute. The district court found that Gilmore was in a customer relationship with Brandt because Brandt had induced him to invest in DLG.

The Court’s Decision

Additionally, the district court found that Gilmore’s claims related to Brandt’s recommendation of an investment in particular securities fell within the class of disputes reasonably regulated by FINRA. Therefore, the district court determined that FINRA Rule 12200 required the dispute between Gilmore and Brandt be submitted to arbitration. Because of this result, Brandt’s U-4 Form was determined to be his agreement to submit to arbitration of the dispute.

Because the arbitration panel had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, the award decision is entitled to deference by the federal court. 9 U.S.C. § 9-11. Because Brandt provided no argument that satisfied the statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), the court granted Gilmore’s motion for confirmation of the arbitration award of compensatory damages of $106,024.68, with interest, and attorneys’ fees.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA or arbitration issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Form U5 – Employment Termination in the Securities Industry

Reason for Termination

If the employer elects to describe a full termination as “permitted to resign,” “discharged,” or “other,”, then an explanation must be provided. No such explanation is necessary if the full termination is deemed “voluntary.” Disclosure of the employee’s involvement in investigations, internal reviews, regulatory actions, criminal matters and customer complaints must also be made by the employer.

In many cases, an employer and employee may disagree on what led to an employment termination and on the circumstances of the departure. A disparaging remark, untrue statement or misleading explanation on Form U5 can jeopardize the ability of an individual to continue working in the securities industry. A prospective employer may pass over a job candidate who has what has come to be known as a “Dirty U5” from a previous employer.

Dirty U5s

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) does provide a forum for an employee to pursue arbitration against a former employer to contest a “Dirty U5.” However, the best course of action is to avoid the problem from ever arising. Registered employees in the securities industry are well advised to seek legal advice and counsel once it becomes apparent that their employment may be coming to an end. In many cases, the disclosures made in the Form U5 by the employer may be mutually agreed upon before the employment termination ever occurs.

Should you have any questions relating to the Form U5, or employment issues generally, please feel free to contact Russell J. Sweeting, Esq. by telephone at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at rsweeting@mayalaw.com.