Posts tagged with "assault"

Defendant’s Actions Evidenced Bigotry and Bias Toward Homosexuals; Intimidation Conviction Upheld

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut affirmed a defendant’s conviction for intimidation based on bigotry or bias, because the evidence established that he possessed the specific intent to intimidate or harass the victim based on actual or perceived homosexuality.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on September 12, 2005. The victim and defendant were homeless and lived in tents at a wooded campsite. That afternoon, they drank alcohol at a park with an unidentified man (man), who implied that he was homosexual. When the victim and defendant returned to the campsite, the defendant stated he did not want “fags” in their area, particularly the man. The two spent the evening drinking and got into an argument when the victim began undressing. The defendant claimed the victim must be a “fag” because “[o]nly a fag would take his clothes off in front of another man” and because he was spending time with the man.

A fight ensued, lasting at least ten minutes, when the defendant poured a bottle of vodka on the victim and tried to light him on fire. Unsuccessful in this attempt, the defendant then threatened to burn the victim with gasoline before leaving the campsite. The victim went to a local soup kitchen for help, and gave police a sworn statement about what occurred. The defendant was subsequently arrested and signed a waiver of rights before making both oral and written statements, in which he repeatedly used the word “fag.”

The Trial

A jury found the defendant guilty of attempt to commit assault in the second degree, threatening in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the second degree, intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree, and disorderly conduct. The defendant appealed, arguing in part that there was insufficient evidence that he committed intimidation. He claimed that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had “the requisite specific intent to intimidate or harass [the victim] because of [the victim’s] actual or perceived sexual orientation.”

Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-181k(a) prohibits acts in which a person specifically intends to intimidate or harass another person on the basis of actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity. “Specific intent involves a ‘conscious objective to cause [a] result,’” and is often inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant’s verbal or physical conduct.

The Court’s Decision

The Appellate Court found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant possessed the required specific intent to violate § 53a-181k(a). Based on his oral and written statements, the jury could infer a bias toward homosexuals as well as his question as to whether the victim was homosexual as well. He stated he did not want homosexuals at the campsite and then accused the victim of being a “fag” before fighting him.

In addition, the defendant attempted to set the victim on fire, and threatened a second attempt to do so. Therefore, “the jury could have inferred that the defendant acted with intent to harass or to intimidate [the victim] because of his actual or perceived sexual orientation.” Thus, the judgment was affirmed.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of assault, threatening, or intimidation, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Convict Unsuccessfully Argues that Spitting Does Not Constitute Breach of Peace

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut held that a trial court did not err in denying a defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, as spitting qualifies for the requisite act for a breach of peace.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on December 1, 2005. Following an alleged robbery, the defendant was transported to the hospital after complaining about injuries. He was partially restrained to a gurney and under police guard. He repeatedly threatened an emergency room nurse and, while being discharged, he spat in the nurse’s face.

The defendant was charged with and convicted of breach of peace in the second degree, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-181(a)(1) and (5). He twice moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. On appeal, the defendant argued that “spitting is not a violent behavior and, because he was strapped to the gurney, he could not engage in violent of tumultuous behavior.”

What is Considered Breach of Peace?

A person commits second-degree breach of peace “when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior in a public place.” The language of § 53a-181(a)(1) shows that the legislature intended to prohibit any conduct that involves either actual physical violence or the threat of physical violence. Because spitting involves applying force to a victim’s body, it qualifies as a physical act.

The Appellate Court further noted that the words “inconvenience, annoyance or alarm” encompass conduct that a reasonable person would perceive to be as such in light of generally accepted community standards. The highly unsanitary act of one person spitting on another “is almost universally acknowledged as contemptuous and is calculated to incite others to act in retaliation.” As such, it was reasonable for a jury to conclude that the elements of breach of peace were satisfied.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of breach of peace or assault, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Though Defendant’s Statement Was Not A “Model of English Grammar and Spelling,” It Was Voluntarily Made

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress a written statement, claiming his Miranda waiver was not properly made and his statement was voluntary.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on August 4, 2004 in Danbury, Connecticut. Following a roadway altercation, two victims were subject to a brutal beating inflicted by the defendant and his friends. One victim was repeatedly punched and kicked in the head, resulting in very significant head-related injuries, the need for an abdominal feeding tube for two months, and extensive physical, speech, and occupational therapy.

The defendant was later apprehended in Rhode Island by federal authorities. En route to Connecticut, Danbury officers transporting the defendant stopped at a McDonald’s restaurant to get him food. There, the defendant wished to give a statement, which was taken after he was given his Miranda warnings and signed a waiver of rights form.

Defendant Claims Statement was Involuntary

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress his statement. He claimed that he drank roughly one gallon of Hennessy cognac with a codefendant twenty hours before being arrested. The defendant argued he was still intoxicated at the time he gave the written statement, so his waiver was not voluntary. To bolster his position, he cited the statement, “which was replete with typographical and grammatical errors, evincing that he merely wrote what the police instructed him to write.”

The State countered that due to the passage of time, the defendant was not under the influence at the time he gave his statement. One Danbury officer testified that the defendant did not appear as such at the McDonald’s, and that he had eaten two meals while in custody prior to giving the statement.

The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the State’s argument. It noted the defendant’s express interest in giving the statement and that he voluntarily signed the form, among other findings. In addition, the court stated that the statement was “clear and not reflective of someone who was under the influence of alcohol.” Though it was not a “model of English grammar and spelling,” the statement was comprehensible.

Court’s Ruling

The defendant was subsequently convicted of assault in the first degree, conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree, and two counts assault in the first degree as an accessory. Post-sentencing he appealed, arguing in part that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. The defendant reiterated his previous arguments that the statement was not voluntarily made.

A waiver of Miranda rights must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. It is the burden of the State to prove a valid waiver by the preponderance of the evidence, and a reviewing court will look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the waiver is valid. In this case, the Appellate Court determined that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s findings that the statement was voluntary and the waiver valid. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the written statement.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of assault or conspiracy, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Inflammatory Comments by Prosecutor Found Not Sufficiently Prejudicial to Warrant Reversal

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In a criminal law matter, the Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled that a prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments were improper because they appealed to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jurors. However, they did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial; thus, his due process claim was unpersuasive and the motion for impropriety was denied.

Case Background

This case arose from a quadruple homicide that occurred on September 25, 1996. The defendant and a coconspirator planned on robbing a man following a dispute about crack cocaine sales, but instead murdered him in his home. There were three other people at the house, including the man’s teenage daughter, and each was fatally shot to prevent witness identification. Nonetheless, the defendant was linked to the crime and subsequently faced a host of charges, including four counts each of murder and felony murder.

During closing arguments, the prosecutor talked of grieving relatives “clutching” to past memories of their lost loved ones and the victim’s silent voices crying out for justice. The trial started one day after the September 11th attacks, and the prosecutor equated the jury’s civic duty to that of American troops “defending American values abroad.” He played a 911 recording in which the daughter can be heard “gasping for breath, unable to talk” and made explicit references to the biblical story of Cain and Abel.

Defense counsel vehemently objected and moved for a mistrial, but the trial court denied the motion, instead electing to issue curative jury instructions. The defendant was convicted and given a total effective sentence of two hundred sixty (260) years of incarceration. On appeal, he argued in part that these statements improperly played on the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial.

Determining Impropriety

In deciding a claim of prosecutorial impropriety, a reviewing court must first determine whether an impropriety even occurred, and if so, whether it deprived a criminal defendant of his or her right to a fair trial. What is crucial is whether the improprieties, as a whole, caused the trial itself to be fundamentally unfair, thus depriving a defendant of the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.

In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the use of the 911 recording was not improper. It was admitted as a full exhibit into evidence, as the defendant did not seek a limiting instruction on its use. “An exhibit offered and received as a full exhibit is in the case for all purposes.” Thus, because the prosecutor used the tape for a proper purpose, even though it “undoubtedly… had a great dramatic effect,” he was within his discretion to do so.

The Court, however, agreed with the defendant that the other comments overstepped the bounds of impropriety. These statements had “nothing to do with the evidence in the case or the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Rather, they allowed the jury to decide the case “not according to a rational appraisal of the evidence, but on the basis of powerful and irrelevant factors which are likely to skew that appraisal.” It is notable that courts traditionally disapprove the use of religious imagery and references during criminal trials.

The Court’s Ruling

Even though the first prong of this analysis was answered in the affirmative, the Supreme Court determined that due process was not violated. It considered the following six factors, finding that only the first weighed in favor of the defendant:

[T]he extent to which the impropriety was invited by the defendant’s conduct or argument, the severity of the impropriety, the frequency of the impropriety, the centrality of the impropriety to the critical issues in the case, the strength of the curative measures adopted and the strength of the state’s case.

The defendant did nothing to provoke the comments. However, the statements were infrequent in light of the entire closing argument and not “grossly egregious.” The trial court took issue with the fact that the comments had nothing to do with the evidence. Finally, the prosecution’s case was strong, and the instructions telling the jury they had to decide the case on the evidence, not the statements, sympathy, or prejudice. Therefore, the Supreme Court, after addressing additional matters on appeal, affirmed the judgment.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of a homicide crime, assault, or robbery, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

By Purposefully Driving At Officer on Foot, Defendant Took “Substantial Step” to Commit Assault

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut affirmed a defendant’s conviction for attempt to commit assault in the first degree, following an incident where he attempted to hit an officer with his vehicle.

The Case

This case arose from an incident that occurred on March 16, 2006. A police cruiser pursued the operator of a motor vehicle into a fenced-in construction site after he sped off during a valid traffic stop. Two foot patrol officers, C and H, assisted and made their way to a closed gate on the other side of the property. With weapons drawn, the officers repeatedly yelled at the operator, later identified as the defendant, to stop.

The defendant flashed his high beams at the officers and drove his vehicle into the fence, which in turn struck C, who “flew in the air and landed in the street.” The fence did not break, and the defendant once again drove at it. H realized that if the defendant continued on this path, C, who was lying motionless in the street, would be run over. H fired four shots at the defendant’s car, which turned and drove directly toward him. H managed to get out of the way of the car, which instead made contact with H’s service weapon.

The Charges

The defendant was subsequently arrested, charged with, and convicted of assault of a peace officer, attempt to commit assault in the first degree, and attempt to commit assault of a peace officer, among other charges. On appeal, the defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence “to prove that he intended to cause serious physical injury to [H] or that he took a substantial step to commit the crime.”

To be convicted of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, the State must prove “intentional conduct constituting a substantial step toward intentionally causing the victim serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument.” Unless a defendant confesses, circumstantial evidence is frequently used to infer intent to commit a crime. As the Appellate Court previously explained:

Intent may be gleaned from circumstantial evidence such as the type of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events leading up to and immediately following the incident. … [I]t is a permissible… inference that a defendant intended the natural consequences of his conduct.

The Defendant’s Argument

The defendant claimed that he simply intended to elude police, but the Court was not persuaded. “The existence of an intent to escape does not necessarily negate the existence of an intent to cause serious physical injury when making the escape.” Instead, the Court held that a jury could reasonably find that intent to injury H was established: the defendant knew of the officers’ location, because they were repeatedly yelling at him; he flashed his high beams at them; he struck C with his car; and he purposefully turned his vehicle toward H on his second attempt to escape.

In addition, the defendant argued that the State failed to prove that he took a substantial step to commit a first-degree assault. “To constitute a substantial step, the conduct must be strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.” The defendant stated that he merely brushed H’s service weapon, which was simply not enough. The Appellate Court disagreed, writing that simply because H dodged the oncoming vehicle did not mean that there was insufficient showing the defendant intended to inflict serious physical injury. “An attempt is complete and punishable, when an act is done with intent to commit the crime… whether the purpose fails by reason of interruption… or for other extrinsic cause.”

Thus, in this case, the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant’s actions “constituted a substantial step that strongly corroborated the defendant’s criminal purpose.” Therefore, this aspect of the defendant’s appeal failed.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of assault or attempt, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Left-Handed Defendant Presented No Scientific Evidence of Inability to Use Right Hand to Stab a Victim

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut declined to overturn a defendant’s convictions for assault and carrying a dangerous weapon, rejecting his appellate claim of physically impossible conclusions.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on July 9, 2006. An ongoing feud existed between the defendant and the victim, which came to a head at the Puerto Rican Day Parade in Bridgeport. The two first engaged in a verbal argument, then physical blows. When the defendant was on his knees, he reached for his back right pocket and stabbed the victim in the stomach before running off. At the hospital, the victim recovered and told police that the defendant was his attacker.

The defendant was charged with assault in the first degree and carrying a dangerous weapon, among other counts. At trial, a witness verified that they saw the defendant pull a butterfly knife from his right rear pocket, and a medical expert testified that the injuries sustained were consistent with those made by someone holding a knife with his right hand.

Defendant Claims “Physically Impossible Conclusions”

However, the defendant testified that he was left-handed and thus could not have inflicted the injuries. He contended that one of the State witnesses, who received a plea bargain for his testimony, had a knife as well and could have caused the injury. This individual conceded that he had an eight-inch hunting knife that he unsheathed and waved around in an attempt to break up the fight. However, the blade was at the minimum 2.25 inches wide, while the victim’s injuries were only 1.75 inches in width.

At the close of evidence, the defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied. He was then convicted by a jury and appealed, arguing once again that the conviction was improper “because it was based on physically impossible conclusions.” The defendant claimed that as a left-handed person he could not have inflicted injuries on the victim’s right side, and it was impossible for him to reach a knife from his right-rear pocket using his left hand. In addition, he stated that a butterfly knife could not have caused the injuries.

A verdict rendered by a jury is typically given great deference, for it is their province to serve as the ultimate arbiter of credibility in a criminal case. However, there are a few situations where overturning the verdict is proper because it is based on conclusions that simply are not possible:

[A] verdict should be set aside [w]here testimony is thus in conflict with indisputable physical facts, the facts demonstrate that the testimony is either intentionally or unintentionally untrue, and leave no real question of conflict of evidence for the jury concerning which reasonable minds could reasonably differ.

Court’s Ruling

In this case, the Appellate Court found that, even assuming the jury took the defendant at his word that he was left-handed, “this does not lead to the logical conclusion that he could not have used his right hand to stab the victim.” Having predominant use of one hand does not instantly render the other one unusable, and the Court pointed out that the defendant presented no scientific evidence that he was unable to use his right hand.

In addition, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument regarding the possibility that the State witness inflicted the injury. It noted that the blade was too wide, whereas the defendant’s knife was “long enough” to cause the victim’s injuries. Because the defendant failed to provide any evidence that the jury made unreasonable findings and conclusions, this aspect of his appeal was unsuccessful. After dispensing with other matters brought forth on appeal, the defendant’s conviction was sustained.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of assault or carrying a deadly weapon, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Assault Convict “A Danger to Society;” Sentence Modification Not Warranted

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In a criminal law matter, the Sentence Revision Division of the Superior Court of Connecticut (Division) declined to modify a defendant’s lengthy sentence after he was convicted of first-degree assault, as it was neither inappropriate nor disproportionate.

The Case and the Charges

In this case, the petitioner was operating a car, with a sawed off shotgun in plain view, when a marked police cruiser initiated a valid traffic stop. Two foot patrol officers were nearby and provided backup, but the petitioner sped away to a nearby, confined property. As the petitioner attempted to escape the area, he “struck one of the officers on foot with the car [causing a serious physical injury] and drove it at the other without hitting him.”

The petitioner was subsequently arrested and charged with attempted assault in the first degree, assault on a peace officer, attempted assault on a peace officer, and possession of a sawed off shotgun. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration. The petitioner sought downward modification of his sentence, arguing it was inappropriate and disproportionate: “he claim[ed] that had no intent to hurt anyone, that he was raised in a crime ridden neighborhood and that he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the incident.”

The Court’s Decision

In opposing modification, the State argued that the jury convicted the petitioner of assault in the first degree, which requires “the specific intent to do serious physical injury to the victim by use of a dangerous instrument.” It further pointed out that at the time of the incident, the petitioner was participating in a gang initiation, had multiple felony convictions as well as a limited work history, and had been involved with illegal drug activity since he was in his teens.

When the Division reviews a sentence, it is without authority to modify unless the sentence is “inappropriate or disproportionate” in light of such factors as the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.  Taking into account the State’s arguments, the Division found no merit to the petitioner’s claim, and characterized him as “a danger to society.” Therefore, it affirmed the sentence as both appropriate and proportionate.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Defendant’s Dual-Conviction Violated Double Jeopardy Protections

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According to a previous article, a criminal defendant was unsuccessful on his claim that the State provided insufficient evidence to convict him of assault of a peace officer. However, he claim that his convictions for both that crime and interfering with an officer constituted a double jeopardy violation.

The defendant was found guilty on one count each assault of a peace officer and interfering with an officer, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes §§ 53a-167c(a)(1) and 53a-167a(a), respectively. In his appeal, the defendant argued that a conviction for both violated his constitutional protections against double jeopardy under state and federal law.

The Double Jeopardy Clause

Under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, criminal defendants cannot receive two punishments for two crimes, which he asserts to be a single crime, arising from the same transaction and prosecuted in a single trial. To be entitled to this protection, a criminal defendant must show that the charges arise from the same act or transaction and that the charged crimes are, in fact, the same offense. If, however, the court determines that each charge requires proof of an element that the other does not, double jeopardy is typically not implicated.

In this case, the Appellate Court agreed that the double jeopardy clause prohibited conviction for both assault of a peace officer and interfering with an officer. When one looks to the statutory language of each, the latter offense does not contain any criminal elements not also found in the latter offense. The State did not argue the merits of the defendant’s claim. It simply conceded that it expected the Court would vacate the sentence on the second count and combine it with the first, a course of action the Court indeed follow. With respect to the remainder of the defendant’s appeal, the judgment was affirmed.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of assault of a peace officer or interfering with an officer, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Requisite Intent for Assaulting an Officer is to Prevent Performance of Duties, Not to Cause Injury

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut declined to reverse a defendant’s conviction for assault of a peace officer because there was sufficient evidence for a jury to return a guilty verdict.

The Case

This case arose from an incident that occurred at 1:00am on January 13, 2006, in Norwalk. The defendant was engaged in a high-speed chase with police when he lost control of his vehicle and crashed into a guardrail. He attempted to flee from the scene when an officer tackled him from behind, causing both to fall to the ground.

The defendant “violently fought bad kicked [the officer],” who attempted numerous times to subdue the defendant with his Taser gun. Only when other officers arrived was the defendant successfully handcuffed and placed under arrest. Afterwards, the officer realized that he had “bloodied both knees … [and] had an ankle injury which required doctor’s attention.” In addition, the officer suffered a tear to his Achilles tendon that required him to file a worker’s compensation claim and take several days off from work.

Assault of a Peace Officer Charge

The defendant was charged for numerous offenses, including assault of a peace officer in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 35a-167c(a)(1). On appeal, the defendant argued, in part, that the evidence offered by the State was insufficient to convict him. Specifically, he claimed that the State failed to show that he had the requisite specific intent to injure the officer, and that the officer was injured by the defendant’s actions.

To secure a conviction for assault of a peace officer, the State must offer proof establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant “with intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer… from performing his or her duties, and while such peace officer… is acting in the performance of his duties… causes physical injury to such peace officer.” However, the intent required is to prevent the performance of duties, not the intent to cause injury.

The Decision

In this case, the Appellate Court found that a jury could reasonably find that the defendant committed the offense. It noted there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury that “the defendant had the requisite intent to prevent [the officer] from performing his duties, and the defendant’s actions were a proximate cause of the [officer’s] injuries.” Therefore, the defendant’s insufficiency of the evidence claim was rejected.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of interfering with a police officer or assault of a peace officer, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Knife-Wielding Defendant Properly Convicted of Attempted Assault, Appellate Court Finds

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut found that the State provided sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of attempt to commit assault in the first degree.

The Case

This case arose from an incident that occurred on October 21, 2006. The defendant and his wife were arguing over his alcoholism when he threatened to kill her. The defendant went to the butcher’s block for a knife, and as the wife fled their home, she saw him opening a kitchen drawer containing loose knives. At a neighbor’s house, the wife called her daughter and asked to be picked up. After the daughter arrived with her boyfriend, the wife realized she forgot her medication at the house, so the group returned to retrieve it.

After entering the home, they saw the defendant standing at the top of the stairs wielding a knife saying “I’m going… to kill her.” As the wife ran for the door, “she saw the defendant start down the stairs toward her, knife raised, before she again ran from the home.” The daughter’s boyfriend saw the defendant swing the knife. Outside, the group called police as the defendant entered the garage. He was placed under arrest, but police could not find a knife on him or inside the garage. However, they located a three-inch knife on the kitchen table.

The Defendant’s Charges

The defendant was charged with attempt to commit assault in the first degree, among other crimes, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes §§ 53a-49(a)(2) and 53a-59(a)(1). At trial, the daughter’s boyfriend testified that the knife he saw the defendant holding was approximately 2.5 to 3 inches in length. The three witnesses, however, provided inconsistent testimony regarding the distance the defendant moved down the stairs. Regardless, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to eighteen years of incarceration.

On appeal, the defendant argued in part that the State provided insufficient evidence to convict him of attempted assault. He claimed that the State did not show he came within close proximity of the wife, or that the knife submitted into evidence was the one he alleged wielded. Finally, he argued that because the testimonial inconsistencies were not resolved, the State failed to meet their burden.

Conviction of Attempted Assault in the First Degree

In Connecticut, to be convicted of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, the State must provide “proof of intentional conduct constituting a substantial step toward intentionally causing the victim serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument.” To qualify as a substantial step, the act taken by the assailant “must be strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.” In other words, the action had to be the start of “a line of conduct which will lead naturally to the commission of the crime.”

In this case, the Appellate Court was not persuaded by any aspect of the defendant’s insufficiency of the evidence claim. It stated that there is no requirement under Connecticut law that “an assailant must obtain a particular physical proximity to an intended victim to have taken a substantial step toward committing an assault.” Indeed, various types of conduct enumerated in the attempt statute, such as lying in wait and following a contemplated victim, have no physical proximity requirement.

The Court’s Decision

The Appellate Court disagreed that the State failed to authenticate the knife found at the scene as the one used in the crime. It noted the boyfriend’s testimony as consistent with the knife actually found, and noted that the defense “offered no argument in law or logic that a three inch knife cannot be a deadly weapon.” Finally, it is the responsibility of a jury to weigh the credibility of witness testimony, and could either accept all of it, some of it, or none of it.

However, in this case, “nothing in the testimony of the witnesses contradicted the basic facts… that the defendant was holding a knife and advancing toward [his wife] after having threatened her life.” Therefore, it was reasonable for a jury to conclude that the defendant attempted to commit assault using a dangerous instrument.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of assault, battery, or attempt, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.