Posts tagged with "bankruptcy"

Federal Court Confirms FINRA Arbitration Award that Refuses to Classify a Forgivable Loan as Employee Compensation Subject to the Wage Act

Pauline Sheedy v. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL 5519909 (D. Mass. Nov. 14, 2011)

In a recent Massachusetts case, Pauline Sheedy (“Sheedy”), a former managing director at Lehman Brothers, Inc., filed an action in state court seeking to vacate a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award entered in favor of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“LBHI”).  LBHI removed the case from state to federal court, and filed a motion to dismiss Sheedy’s complaint, confirm the FINRA arbitration award, and award “collection expenses.”  The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts allowed LBHI’s motion.

Case Background

The underlying dispute in this case involves LBHI’s efforts to collect the unpaid principal balance, plus interest and fees, for a forgivable loan that was extended to Sheedy when she began her employment with Lehman Brothers, Inc. Sheedy alleged that her compensation package included a “one-time incentive signing bonus” of $1 million; however, Lehman’s offer letter characterized the $1 million payment a loan to be forgiven in five equal installments of $200,000 on the first through fifth anniversary of her employment start date.

The offer letter further stated that if Sheedy separated from Lehman Brothers, Inc. for “any reason” prior to full forgiveness of the loan, she would be required to repay the remaining principal balance, plus interest accrued through her separation date.  In 2008, Lehman Brothers, Inc. was forced to file for bankruptcy protection and ceased doing business in Massachusetts.

As a result, Sheedy was separated from Lehman Brothers, Inc. in September 2008, approximately two months prior to the second anniversary of her employment start date. During the marshaling of assets for the bankruptcy estate, Lehman Brothers, Inc. assigned Sheedy’s promissory note for the loan to LBHI.

The Arbitration Award

LBHI initiated FINRA arbitration proceedings against Sheedy, claiming the principal balance due of $800,000, plus interest and fees.  A single FINRA arbitrator was appointed to hear the case.  In June 2011, the arbitrator entered an award ordering Sheedy to repay LBHI the outstanding balance of $800,000, plus interest and attorneys’ fees.

After the arbitration award, Sheedy filed an action in Massachusetts state court to vacate the FINRA arbitration award pursuant to the state Uniform Arbitration Act for Commercial Disputes. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 251, §§ 1-19.   LBHI timely removed the case from state to federal court.

Sheedy sought vacatur on two grounds: (1) that the arbitrator exceeded her authority because the award requires her to “forfeit earned compensation” in violation of the Massachusetts Weekly Wage Act (“Wage Act”), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148; and (2) that the award violated the Massachusetts public policy prohibiting the unlawful restraint of trade and competition.

Sheedy’s Arguments

Both the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act for Commercial Disputes and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provide statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award where an arbitrator exceeds his authority.  Compare Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 251, §§ 12(a)(3) with 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).   Sheedy argued that the FINRA arbitrator exceeded her authority by issuing an award that required Sheedy to forfeit earned compensation in violation of the Wage Act.

The Wage Act defines the requirements for payment of employee wages and commissions, and prohibits the use of “special contract…or other means” to create exemptions from these requirements.  Citing Massachusetts case law, Sheedy argued that the provisions of the Wage Act cover any payment that an employer is obligated to pay an employee; therefore, once she signed Lehman’s offer letter and Lehman was bound to make the $1 million payment to her, that payment became a non-discretionary deed subject to the Wage Act.

The court disagreed with this characterization of the payment.  The court determined that the accepted offer clearly made forgiveness of the full amount of the loan contingent upon completing five years of employment at Lehman Brothers, Inc.; therefore, the portion of the payment which remained outstanding at the time of Sheedy’s termination was never “earned” within the meaning of the Wage Act.  The court denied vacatur on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded her authority because the award was not in violation of the Wage Act.

The Court’s Decision

An arbitration award may also be challenged by reference to a “well-defined and dominant” public policy. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 28, 43 (1987).   Arbitrators may not award relief that offends public policy or requires a result contrary to statutory provisions.  Plymouth–Carver Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., 553 N.E.2d 1284 (1985).   Sheedy argued that the FINRA arbitration award should be vacated because forfeiture of the payment is an unlawful penalty to punish her if she chose to leave Lehman and freely compete in the market place.

The court determined that the structure of the forgivable loan in the offer letter was not equivalent to a non-compete agreement that restricted an employee’s ability to work in the same field within a given geographic area.  Therefore, the arbitration award did not violate the state public policy against unlawful restraint of trade and competition and the court denied vacatur on these grounds.

The court allowed LBHI’s motion to dismiss Sheedy’s complaint, confirm the arbitration decision and award collection expenses.  The court gave LBHI fourteen days from the date of its order to submit a request for attorneys’ fees and a proposed form of judgment.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA, arbitration or employment issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

State Employee Retirement Benefits Payments are Not Exempt from Garnishment by Victims of Violent Crime

Klingman v. Winters, KNLCV020560881, 2010 WL 5493498 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2010)
Wage Execution

In a case before the Superior Court of Connecticut, a victim of a violent crime sought to have a wage execution enforced against the retirement payments of her convicted assailant in order to collect the awarded judgment. The court found that the claim for a wage execution was valid and enforceable.

The plaintiff was awarded a $240,000 judgment for injuries she sustained from a physical attack by the defendant.  The judgment was entered on a four-count complaint claiming negligence, reckless and wanton assault, intentional assault and violation of the Violence Against Women Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, based upon the applicable Connecticut General Statutes.

The defendant declared bankruptcy; however, the bankruptcy court found that the plaintiff’s judgment was not subject to bankruptcy exemptions.  In its memorandum of decision, the bankruptcy court characterized the attack as “vicious and brutal” and the injuries inflicted as “willful and malicious.”

A wage execution was entered against the defendant and the defendant’s employer, the State of Connecticut, and was paid to the plaintiff until the defendant retired.  The plaintiff applied for a new wage execution, which was served on the State and returned by reason of the defendant’s retirement.

The State contended that it discontinued payments on the wage execution because the defendant was placed on hazardous duty disability retirement and  the execution was impermissible according to Connecticut law prohibiting assignments of state employees’ retirement benefits, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-171.

Retirement Benefits Payments 

Under Connecticut law, retirement benefits of state employees are intended to support the member or beneficiary who is entitled to those payments; therefore, any assignment of such benefits is “null and void.”  Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-171.  These benefits are “exempt from the claims of creditors.” However, if these general provisions are contrary to the law governing a particular circumstance, the law dictates “any payment shall be exempt to the maximum extent permitted by law.” Id. 

Connecticut law governing the general availability of retirement income to creditors, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-321a, exempts “any pension plan, annuity or insurance contract or similar arrangement … established by federal or state statute for federal, state or municipal employees for the primary purpose of providing benefits upon retirement by reason of age, health or length of service” from the claims of all creditors of the plan beneficiary. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-321a(a)(5).

However, this law also provides a specific exception for victims of violent crime: “Nothing in this section … shall impair the rights of a victim of crime … to recover damages awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction from any federal, state or municipal pension, annuity or insurance contract or similar arrangement … when such damages are the result of a crime committed by [the] participant or beneficiary.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-321a(b).

The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s retirement payments should be garnished pursuant to the Connecticut law governing the availability of retirement income to creditors, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-321a.  She asserted that this law governed her particular circumstance as a victim of violent crime, and established an exception to the exemption of state employee retirement benefits stated in Section 5-171.

The Court’s Decision

The plaintiff’s argument raises an issue of first impression in Connecticut.  Connecticut appellate courts have not addressed the specific issue of a victim’s right to enforce a withholding order pursuant to law governing the availability of retirement income to creditors, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-321a.  Discussion of the general applicability of this law has been limited to trial court decisions regarding alimony and child support obligations.

These cases have consistently found that pension benefits covered by Section 52-321a are not exempt from income withholding orders. See, e.g., Sinicropi v. Sinicropi, 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 49 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998);  Foley v. Foley, 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 644 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997).

The court found that the plaintiff was a victim of a crime; therefore, her claim for a wage execution upon the retirement benefits of the defendant fell within the statutory exception of Section 52-321a(b) and constituted a particular circumstance that fell within the statutory exception of Section 5-171.   The court ordered that a wage execution may be issued against the retirement benefits payments to the defendant by the State of Connecticut.

GPS Evidence Stricken: A Victory for the Fourth Amendment

GPS Evidence Stricken: A Victory for the Fourth Amendment

GPS units are not only handy devices that are, for many, becoming indispensable on the roads, but the technology is increasingly being utilized by law enforcement officials to track suspects, gather evidence, and ultimately build cases against criminal defendants.

Advocates of individual civil liberties and opponents of excessive governmental intrusion argue that the surreptitious placement of a GPS device by the police under a private citizen’s automobile runs afoul of the Constitutional protections against unlawful searches and seizures.  Prosecutors, on the other hand, contend that police have the right and option to view individuals operating their vehicles on private roads without a warrant, and the GPS device is merely an extension of such ability.

A defendant’s constitutional challenge to the practice was upheld in the Court of Appeals in New York (resulting in a reversal of a conviction, and ultimately a dismissal of criminal charges).  The issue is ripe to be challenged in Connecticut and other jurisdictions across the nation.

Our firm in Westport serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to an attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100 for a free consultation. Divorce is difficult, education is power. Call today.

Breaking News: CT Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Same-Sex Marriage

Breaking News: Connecticut Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Same-Sex Marriage

In a narrowly split decision, the CT Supreme Court held that same-sex couples have the right to marriage, protected by the Connecticut State Constitution. Justice Palmer authored the decision, joined by Justices Harper, Katz and Norcott. The full text of the 85-page decision can be found on the judicial branch website: http://www.jud.ct.gov/.

Our firm in Westport serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to an attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100 for a free consultation. Divorce is difficult, education is power. Call today.

Fairfield County Divorce Guidebook: A Roadmap to Matrimonial Law in Connecticut

The matrimonial law group at Maya Murphy PC has published a 66-page publication devoted exclusively to the subject of matrimonial law in Connecticut.  Intended as a guide for divorcing spouses, the publication covers the major areas, concerns, and focal points of family law cases in our court system.  Husbands and wives confronted with the difficult prospect of divorce are encouraged to read the guidebook in order to demystify the process and to enable them to better communicate with their attorney of choice.

The publication may be viewed by following this link: Fairfield County Divorce Guidebook.

Copyright © 2012 · Maya Murphy, P.C.
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Our firm in Westport serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to an attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100 for a free consultation. Divorce is difficult, education is power. Call today.

Should I File For Bankruptcy in Connecticut if I Also Have an Ongoing Divorce in Connecticut?

If you have an ongoing divorce action in a state, you are better off filing for bankruptcy in that same state.  You cannot file for divorce in a state unless you have resided in the state for a certain period of time.  The same applies when filing for bankruptcy.  In Connecticut, you may not be eligible for file for bankruptcy unless you have lived in the state for over 90 days.  It would be best to consult with an experienced attorney who has dealt with these issues in the past.  An experienced attorney can consider the specific facts of your case and educate you on the best course of action to take.

If you have any further questions regarding divorce or bankruptcy law in Connecticut, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at (203) 221-3100 or e-mail him directly at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Court Rules that Father’s Child Support Obligation Did Not Automatically End Upon Child’s Eighteenth Birthday

A recent decision rendered in the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Hartford illustrates the consequences of failing to file a motion to modify child support in a timely manner.  In this particular case, the parties obtained a divorce in 1994.  At that time, they agreed that the husband would pay child support for their minor child.  Several years later, the parties stipulated to an increase in the husband’s obligation.  However, none of the agreements contained language specifying when the husband’s child support obligation would end.

Although the child turned eighteen in 2011, the husband continued to pay support for close to another year.  When he finally sought a modification, he requested reimbursement for overpayments dating back to the child’s eighteenth birthday, claiming that the court’s order was self-executing, or, in other words, terminated automatically.

In denying the husband’s request for reimbursement, the Court noted that under C.G.S.A. 46b-84, a parent is obligated to provide support until a child reaches the age of eighteen, or if the child is still in high school and in need of maintenance, until the child graduates or reaches the age of nineteen, whichever occurs first.  Thus, pursuant to the parties’ agreement which was silent as to termination, the husband’s support obligation could have continued well beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday.  Because the parties’ agreement contained no language calling for an automatic termination, the court found that the provision was not self-executing.  Moreover, a child support award may not be modified retroactively prior to the date of service of the motion.  Thus, although the court terminated the husband’s child support obligation, it only ordered the wife to reimburse him for the amount he paid after she received his motion.

By: Joseph Maya, Esq.

Should you have questions regarding child support, or divorce matters in general, please feel free to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya  He can be reached in the firm’s Westport office at (203) 221-3100 or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.

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Our firm in Westport serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to an attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100 for a free consultation. Divorce is difficult, education is power. Call today.

In Divorce Action, Husband’s Appeal Dismissed Due to Repeated Instances of Contempt

As indicated in a Connecticut Appellate Court decision, a party that has engaged in repeated instances of contemptuous conduct may be precluded from pursuing an appeal.  In this particular case, the parties obtained a divorce in the Judicial District of Stamford / Norwalk.  At that time, the husband was ordered to pay the wife alimony in the amount of $22,000.00 per month and child support in the amount of $686.00 per week.  The court also ordered the husband to appear in court once per month with updates as to his employment search.  Shortly thereafter, the wife filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the husband had moved to Florida and stopped paying financial support.  The court granted the wife’s motion, entered an incarceration order with a purge amount of almost $25,000.00, and issued a capias since the defendant had failed to appear.

Despite the foregoing orders, the husband failed to appear at subsequent hearings, and was found in contempt several more times.  As of March 1, 2011, the court had entered nine contempt orders against him.  When the husband later filed an appeal, the wife moved to dismiss, claiming that the husband’s “persistent contemptuous conduct demonstrate[d] a manifest disregard and deliberate defiance of the court’s orders.”

The Appellate Court agreed.  In furtherance of its decision, the Court explained that it has discretion to dismiss an appeal where the appellant is in contempt of the trial court’s orders.  Although such instances are rare, the Court has acted in cases where there was “clearly a calculated and continued pattern of contemptuous behavior in defiance of the authority of the courts of this state.”  Bubrosky v. Bubrosky, 129 Conn. App. 338 (2011).  The Court will look at a number of factors, including the number of times the appellant was held in contempt, whether it is likely that the appellant will continue to frustrate orders of the court issued in connection with the same matter, whether the appellant has appeared when summoned to court, and whether the appellant has ever purged himself of the contempt.  Id.

In this particular case, the Court found that the husband was held in contempt nine times since the filing of his appeal, that he had not amended his appeal to challenge the contempt findings, that he failed to appeared in court on several occasions, and that there was nothing in the record to suggest that he would comply with additional orders.

By: Attorney Joseph Maya, Esq.

Should you have any questions regarding the enforcement of divorce orders, or matrimonial matters in general, please feel free to contact Attorney Joseph Maya He can be reached in the firm’s Westport office at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at jmaya@mayalaw.com.

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Our firm in Westport serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to an attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100 for a free consultation. Divorce is difficult, education is power. Call today.

Appellate Court Holds that Order Awarding Wife Rental Income from Former Marital Residence Constituted Impermissible Post Judgment Property Assignment

In a decision released on September 11, 2012, the Connecticut Appellate Court held that a post judgment trial court order permitting an ex-wife to rent the parties’ former marital residence, and use the proceeds to pay the mortgage, constituted an unauthorized post judgment property assignment.  Pursuant to the original dissolution judgment, the wife was awarded exclusive use and possession of the former marital residence.  The judgment also provided that the home would remain on the market for sale, with each party responsible for one-half of the monthly mortgage payments until it was sold.

Following the parties’ divorce, the ex-husband stopped paying his one-half share of the monthly mortgage obligation.  The ex-wife filed a motion for contempt, and after a hearing, the court found that the husband was in fact in willful violation of the court’s orders.  The ex-wife subsequently filed a post judgment motion for modification requesting permission to rent the home so she could use the proceeds to pay the mortgage.  According to the wife, the husband was still in default, and since she was unable to pay the entire amount, the home would likely be foreclosed upon.  The court granted the ex-wife’s request.

Years later the wife once again moved for a finding of contempt against the husband for failing to pay one-half of the mortgage, and prevailed.  The husband appealed, claiming that by requiring him to contribute toward the monthly payment, despite the fact that the rental income covered the monthly payments in full, the court effectively awarded the wife his one-half share of the rental proceeds.  According the husband, the court’s order constituted an impermissible post judgment property assignment.

The Appellate Court agreed.  In reaching its decision, it noted that, “The court’s judgment in an action for dissolution of a marriage is final and binding upon the parties, where no appeal is taken therefrom, unless and to the extent that statutes, the common law or rules of court permit the setting aside or modification of that judgment..”  Buehler v. Buehler, 138 Conn. App. 63 (2012).  Although C.G.S. § 46b-86(a) allows for the modification of periodic alimony and child support (unless the order specifically precludes modification) the statute does not apply to property assignments under C.G.S. § 46b-81.  As the Court in Buehler explained, “The statute, therefore, deprives the Superior Court of continuing jurisdiction over that portion of a dissolution judgment providing for the assignment of  property of one party to the other party under General Statutes § 46b-81.”  “Although the court has jurisdiction to assign property in connection with C.G.S. § 46b-81, that assignment is not modifiable.”  Buehler, supra.

By: Joseph Maya, Esq.

Should you have any questions regarding matrimonial matters, please feel free to contact Attorney Joseph Maya  He can be reached by telephone in the firm’s Westport office at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at jmaya@mayalaw.com.
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Our firm in Westport serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to an attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100 for a free consultation. Divorce is difficult, education is power. Call today.

Connecticut Supreme Court Defines “Dissipation of Marital Assets” in the Context of Divorce Proceedings

Clients often express concern over the manner in which their soon to be ex-spouse expended marital funds during the course of their marriage, and ultimately inquire as to whether the court will consider the dissipation of assets when dividing the marital estate.  The Connecticut Supreme Court addressed this very issue in Gershman v. Gershman, 286 Conn. 341 (2007).

In Gershman, the parties were married for approximately twenty years and were the parents of three minor children.  With respect to the wife’s claim that the husband dissipated assets, the lower court found that in 2002, the husband invested $105,000 in a series of partnerships, which at the time of trial were only valued at $31,074.  The court further found that during the marriage, the parties agreed to spend approximately $500,000 to build a new home; however, unbeknownst to the wife, the husband ended up spending well over $900,000.

In entering its orders, the trial court explained that the defendant had made a bad investment decision with respect to the aforementioned partnerships and that he was responsible for the cost overruns for the parties’ new home, causing them to lose $200,000 when it was sold.  The court ultimately stated that, “The matter of the dissipation of family assets ha[d] been taken into consideration in the overall asset division.”

The husband appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly concluded that he had dissipated family assets.  In reviewing the law of several other jurisdictions, the Connecticut Supreme Court explained that a poor investment decision or the use of marital assets to purchase marital property alone does not constitute dissipation.  Rather, courts generally require that a marital asset be used for a non-marital purpose.  Some courts have concluded that dissipation only occurs where a spouse acts in bad faith with an intent to deprive the other spouse of marital assets.  In such cases, there must be some evidence of willful misconduct, bad faith, or an intention to dissipate marital assets before a court may alter the equitable distribution award.  Taking those general concepts into consideration, and ultimately ruling in the husband’s favor, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that, “at a minimum, dissipation in the marital dissolution context requires financial misconduct involving marital assets, such as intentional waste or a selfish financial impropriety, coupled with a purpose unrelated to the marriage.”  Gershman at 351.

By: Joseph Maya, Esq.

Should you have any questions regarding the dissipation of marital assets, or divorce matters generally, please feel free to contact Attorney Joseph Maya  He can be reached in the firm’s Westport office at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at jmaya@mayalaw.com.
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Our firm in Westport serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to an attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100 for a free consultation. Divorce is difficult, education is power. Call today.