Posts tagged with "blood alcohol content"

Plaintiffs Contend Intoxilyzer Results Do Not Comply With Connecticut Statutes, but State DMV and Superior Court Disagree Leave a Reply

In a criminal law matter, a Superior Court of Connecticut dismissed the appeals of four plaintiffs who were challenging their license suspensions, unconvinced that a device used to measure blood alcohol content (BAC) did not comply with statutory regulations.

Case Background 

In this case, the plaintiffs submitted to BAC tests administered using an Intoxilyzer machine and each had readings over the legal limit of 0.08. As such, they were charged with operating a motor vehicle with an elevated BAC in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a(a)(2), a per se statute. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended their licenses and the plaintiffs appealed, contesting the validity of the Intoxilyzer results. A hearing was held before the court, and the appeals were remanded to the DMV Commissioner.

During the remand hearing, the hearing officer found that the Intoxilyzer measures the amount of alcohol present on a person’s breath on a “weight-per-volume basis.” The machine itself does not have the ability to convert this number to a “weight-by-weight” figure, though this can be accomplished through extrapolation. The appeals were dismissed, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court. They argued that § 14-227b(o) of the per se statute requires that BAC be measured by weight in the context of administrative license suspension, and because the Intoxilyzer instead measures BAC by volume, the results were not valid.

BAC Measurement

Under § 14-227a(d), the Connecticut legislature clearly envisioned that a person’s BAC could be measured by breath. Indeed, the Superior Court reviewed case precedent which “implicitly approved” Intoxilyzers and held that a BAC measurement from breath is “an ‘equivalent’ of the blood alcohol content measure of blood.” These cases prompted the legislature to amend the criminal regulations “to permit equivalent measurements of [BAC] by the Intoxilyzer.” By extension, the per se regulations permit equivalent measurements because “the per se regulations piggyback on the criminal regulations.” Therefore, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeals.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

DMV License Suspension Hearings Are Limited in Scope, State Appellate Court Rejects Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Claim

In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut considered whether lack of recertification by an officer administering chemical analysis tests following a DUI arrest renders, as invalid, a hearing officer’s conclusions based on the results of these tests.

Case Details

This case arose from an incident that occurred on November 1, 2008. The plaintiff was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) held an administrative hearing, where two chemical analysis tests, which revealed a blood alcohol content more than twice the statutory limit, were admitted along with other evidence. After considering four statutory criteria, the DMV commissioner ordered that plaintiff’s driver’s license be suspended for a period of ten months, as well as a lifetime disqualification from operating a commercial motor vehicle.

The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the test results were inadmissible because the police officer who administered the tests “had failed to undergo a review of his proficiency in the operation of the breath test device within twelve months since his last review,” which took place in August, 2006. The court was not persuaded and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, and the plaintiff appealed once more.

Suspending a Driver’s License

When a DMV hearing officer considers a request to suspend a driver’s license, he or she is limited to four statutory criteria set forth in General Statute § 14-227b(g). The officer will consider whether the driver in question operated the motor vehicle and either refused or consented to a test or analysis within two hours of the operation, and if the results indicated an elevated blood alcohol content.

In addition, the officer must establish whether probable cause to arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence existed, and if the driver was arrested. No other evidence will be considered for purposes of this administrative hearing. In a prior case, the State Supreme Court found that “lack of recertification as required by the regulations does not prevent the commissioner’s consideration of and reliance on the officer’s report.” Since this was the grounds for appeal by the plaintiff, the Appellate Court affirmed judgment.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Sentencing Review Division Affirms Sentence of Remorseless DUI Driver with Rare Disease

In a criminal law matter, a Superior Court of Connecticut affirmed the sentence of a petitioner following his conviction for a DUI related fatality.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on night of July 28, 1998. The petitioner suffered from Neurofibromatosis Type 2 (NF2), a rare illness that can cause deafness, blindness, or even death. That morning, he underwent a radiation treatment, and then attended a farewell party that evening. At the party, the petitioner drank nine to twelve ounces of scotch and was visibly intoxicated by the time he left alone.

He traveled various highways in the wrong direction and then entered a northbound ramp going southbound. The petitioner drove into an oncoming vehicle, which resulted in a fatality. He was transported to a nearby hospital for treatment, and blood tests revealed that he had a blood alcohol content of 0.210, over two-and-a-half times the legal limit.

The Charges

The petitioner was charged with reckless manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter with a motor vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) of alcohol. At his jury trial, he argued that he was not intoxicated at the time of the accident; rather, a defense expert testified that the defendant “lost consciousness as a result of a seizure caused by his NF2 disease.” The jury was not convinced and convicted the petitioner on all counts, and he was sentenced to fifteen years execution suspended after ten years, with five years’ probation and a $21,000 fine.

The petitioner asked the Sentencing Review Division of the Superior Court to reduce the non-suspended part of his sentence for three reasons. He first argued that the sentence imposed was inappropriate and disproportionate, as those similarly situated received lighter sentences. Second, he argued that the trial court did not consider his health problems when determining his sentence, and that he was receiving inadequate treatment by the Department of Corrections. Finally the petitioner stated that because he was “a person of good moral character” who accepted responsibility for his crime, modification was warranted.

The Court’s Decision

The Superior Court rejected all of the petitioner’s arguments for sentence reduction. It noted that despite claiming that individuals convicted of similar crimes received lighter sentences, the petitioner provided little to no information about those cases that would facilitate a proper comparative analysis. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that the sentencing court was “fully aware of his health issues,” and the sentence was made after appropriate consideration of the petitioner’s health. In addition, the Court would not address the petitioner’s DOC complaint, because it “may only consider matters which were before the sentencing court at the time of sentencing.”

Finally, the sentencing court considered the petitioner’s background and history, and found that he was “in denial regarding the role that alcohol played [in] his crime, failed to show any empathy for the suffering caused by the victim’s family and posed a danger to society.” Therefore, the Superior Court affirmed the sentence because it was neither inappropriate nor disproportionate.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

In Light of Recently Decided Precedent Regarding Breath Tests, Court Affirms Judgment in Pending DUI Appeal

In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut considered whether a court improperly denied a defendant’s motions in limine to exclude toxicology evidence that he argued did not comply with statutory requirements.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred after midnight on July 10, 2004. The defendant was driving his vehicle on the Merritt Parkway when he drove off the Exit 38 off-ramp and hit multiple trees before coming to a stop. A Norwalk police officer arrived and observed the defendant outside the vehicle, but the defendant denied that he was the driver. Soon thereafter, a state trooper arrived and made the following observations of the defendant: the smell of alcohol, red glassy eyes, and a cut on his hand and lip. He concluded that the defendant was the driver, and administered field sobriety tests, which the defendant failed.

The defendant was brought to the state police barracks in Bridgeport and asked when he started to drink. He responded he consumed four beers at a restaurant in Stamford beginning at 10pm the night before and stopped drinking after the accident occurred. He additionally noted that he did not have anything to eat since breakfast the morning before. The defendant submitted to two breath tests on the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine, which resulted in blood alcohol content readings of 0.225 and 0.209, both more than two-and-a-half times the legal limit.

The Charges

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an elevated blood alcohol content, which violated Connecticut General Statutes (CGS) § 14-227a(a)(2). Before trial, he submitted several motions in limine exclude the Intoxilyzer results, claiming that the tests “did not comply with state regulations in force at the time of the incident.” The court denied the motion, noting that the breath tests performed in this case were in compliance. The defendant plead nolo contendere (no contest), and after sentencing he appealed his conviction. He argued that the court improperly denied his motion because “the apparatus reports blood alcohol content in terms of weight per volume percent and not a weight per weight percent.”

Admissibility of Chemical Analysis Evidence

After the defendant’s initial brief was submitted, but prior to adjudication of this appeal, the Appellate Court published its decision in State v. Pilotti, 99 Conn. App. 563 (2007). In Pilotti, the facts were substantially the same and the defendant made the same argument as presented in the case at bar. The Pilotti Court noted that the legislature intended to include breath testing under CGS § 14-227a(b), not just blood testing, and further wrote:

[CGS] § 14-227a(b) requires the state to establish as a foundation for the admissibility of chemical analysis evidence that the test was performed with equipment approved by the department of public safety. It does not require … that the device satisfy the criteria set forth in the regulations.

In other words, evidence will not be deemed inadmissible where “testing that complies with the regulatory requirements is deemed to be competent evidence.” Thus, in the case at bar, the Appellate Court found that Pilotti was controlling, and because this case was nearly identical, it held that use of the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine satisfied the statutory requirements of CGS § 14-227a(b).

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Toxicology Report Suppressed in DUI Case Because Warrantless Search Exceptions Did Not Apply

In this criminal law matter, a Superior Court of Connecticut granted a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, because the State did not show exigent circumstances allowing the warrantless seizure.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on August 15, 2003. The defendant was involved in an automobile accident, resulting in the death of the other driver. He was transported to a nearby hospital where, without a warrant, police requested that his blood be drawn. One of the officers unaware of this order was informed of that the blood had been drawn, so he elected to not perform the field sobriety and chemical alcohol tests. Five days later, police applied for and was granted a warrant for the blood toxicology report.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI), in violation of Connecticut General Statutes (CGS) § 14-227a(a), and second-degree manslaughter with a motor vehicle, among several other counts. On March 8, 2004, the defendant submitted a motion to suppress the toxicology report, arguing that they were obtained in violation of the search and seizure protections of the state and federal constitutions.

Under state and federal law, individuals are protected against unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, and effects. The “[c]ompulsory administration of a blood test” clearly constitutes a search and seizure of one’s person. If a search is conducted without a warrant evidencing probable cause, it is per se unreasonable, and evidence derived from this illegal search will be excluded unless one of a “few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” applies. Two such exceptions to the exclusionary rule are inevitable discovery and exigent circumstances.

The Court’s Decision

The inevitable discovery exception will thwart suppression of evidence if the State can show, by the preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not), that through lawful means the evidence would have been discovered anyway. Officers must have been actively pursuing such means before the constitutional violation in question occurred.

In this case, the State argued that this exception applied because had the officer not been told the blood was drawn, he would have proceeded with the various OMVUI-related tests. Therefore, the State would have inevitably discovered the defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC). However, the Superior Court was not persuaded, because the State assumed that the defendant would have consented to the alcohol chemical tests. Under CGS § 14-227b, a person is free to refuse the test, though he will face license suspension for doing so. As such, the police could not presume that this procedure would inevitably lead them to discovery of the defendant’s BAC level.

Exigent Circumstances Doctrine

Exigent circumstances doctrine applies where police officers, who have requisite probable cause, do not have time to get a warrant. They must act swiftly to effectuate an arrest, search, or seizure, to avoid, for example, the destruction of evidence. The State bears the burden to point to specific and articulable facts that gave rise to the exigent circumstances.

In this case, the State argued that if they did not order that the defendant’s blood be taken, they would have lost evidence of his BAC level. However, the Superior Court noted that the record was devoid of any facts to support this proposition. Therefore, because neither exception applied to the facts of this case, the Superior Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Being Asleep at the Wheel of a Parked, but Running, Vehicle Constitutes “Operation” Under State DUI Law

In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut considered whether a driver, who was asleep in the driver’s seat of his car while it was still running, operated a motor vehicle under Connecticut’s DUI law.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred after midnight on December 24, 2005. Officers found the defendant asleep in the driver’s seat of his motor vehicle while the engine was still running. After waking the defendant and observing him as visibly intoxicated, the officers administered the standard field sobriety tests, all of which the defendant failed. The defendant was arrested, and at the police department, he submitted to two chemical alcohol tests, which revealed the defendant’s blood alcohol content as more than twice the legal limit.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) of alcohol, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 14-227a. He filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he was not operating his car. Rather, “he merely was asleep in his motor vehicle on a cold night with the motor running only to provide heat and power to run the radio.” However, the court denied the motion, and the defendant entered into a conditional plea of nolo contendere. Such a conditional plea reserves a defendant’s right to appeal. After sentencing, the defendant appealed, arguing that the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss was improper.

The Appellate Court’s Decision

Under Connecticut case law, “operation” of a motor vehicle does not require that the vehicle actually be driven. Rather, “the insertion of a key into the ignition is an act… which alone or in sequence will set into motion the motive power of the vehicle.” Thus, simply putting the key into the ignition “constitute[s] operation of a motor vehicle within the meaning of § 14-227a(a).” This proposition has been upheld, for example, even when the operator is unconscious in the driver’s seat while the engine is running.

In this case, the Appellate Court found that the defendant operated his car because he was in the driver’s seat of his vehicle with the engine turned on; it did not matter, for purposes of “operation,” that he was asleep at the time. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the Appellate Court affirmed judgment.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

For Remorseless Drunk Driver, Stiff Sentence Was Neither Disproportionate Nor Inappropriate

In a criminal law matter, the Sentence Review Division of the Superior Court assessed whether a defendant’s sentence following a DUI-related trial was proper.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on July 27, 1997. The defendant was driving under the influence when he struck two teenage pedestrians. One died at the scene and the other the next day at Hartford Hospital. The defendant did not stop to help them; rather, he drove until he got his car hit a tree, after which he fled. Soon after, police found the defendant, who admitted that he hit what he believed was a dog. A subsequent chemical alcohol test revealed the defendant’s blood alcohol content at 0.163, over twice the legal limit, as well as the presence of cannabis.

The defendant was charged with and convicted of two counts of second-degree manslaughter with a motor vehicle, offense committed while on release, and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) of alcohol and/or drugs. At the sentencing hearing, the court noted that “the impact of the defendant’s actions was clearly significant,” noting the very young age of the victims.

The defendant did not exhibit remorse for his conduct, and he tried blaming the victims because at the time of the accident, they were wearing dark clothing. The court considered the defendant’s background and upbringing, but was particularly disturbed by the following statement from his pre-sentence investigation report: “I’ve been driving like this for 35 years… I can drink and drive… I am a good drunk driver.”

Disproportionate Sentencing

The defendant was subsequently sentenced to thirty-five years execution suspended after twenty-six and a half years, with five years probation. He sought review of his sentence, arguing that it was “disproportionate” to the sentences imposed on others who were similarly situated.

The scope of review by the Sentencing Review Division is confined to the parameters of Connecticut Practice Book § 43-23 et seq. A sentence may be modified upon a showing that it was “inappropriate or disproportionate” in light of various factors, such as the nature of the offense and protection of public interests. In this case, the Court stated that modification was not warranted based on the unique facts of this case. It wrote how it appeared “the sentencing court was unable to identify anything that it could use as mitigation to merit a lesser sentence.” Therefore, the sentence was affirmed.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Petitioner’s Blood Properly Drawn Pursuant to Statutory Dictates Following DUI-Related Accident

In a criminal law matter, a Superior Court of Connecticut denied a petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus, unconvinced by any of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on December 24, 2007. The petitioner fled from police in his motor vehicle, and during the pursuit he struck and officer’s cruiser multiple times. Police were able to bring his car to a stop, through despite repeated exit commands, the petitioner refused to do so. Officers subdued him using a taser, then removed and placed him into the back of a cruiser. Because the petitioner continued to act erratically and vomited, police decided that he needed medical attention, so they transported him to Yale-New Haven Hospital.

At the hospital, in order to perform medical tests, a doctor (treating doctor) drew some of the petitioner’s blood. Police sought and obtained a warrant for this blood so they could determine whether the petitioner’s blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit. Indeed it did, and the results were used in the subsequent criminal case.

The Charges

The petitioner was charged with operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol content in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a(a)(2), among other charges. At trial, the treating doctor testified that he ordered testing of the petitioner’s blood because he had been in a motor vehicle accident and taser afterward. According to the doctor, “the blood tests performed were the standard set if there was concern about neurological injury from trauma.” In addition, the officers testified that they did not play any role in ordering that the petitioner’s blood be drawn.

The petitioner was convicted on all counts, and thereafter submitted a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He put forth multiple claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, on one ground that his defense counsel did not present evidence – medical records, in particular – of the petitioner’s medical condition on the day the police chase occurred. As the Superior Court later discerned, the petitioner sought to establish that had his attorney submitted such evidence, the jury would have seen that the petitioner was not actually injured, thus negating the hospital’s basis to treat him and draw his blood.

The Court’s Decision

General Statutes § 14-227a(k) dictates when a blood sample may be taken for purposes of establishing probable cause to arrest for a violation of § 14-227a. The most relevant language, as it pertains to this case, is “an operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident who has suffered or allegedly suffered physical injury in such accident.” (Emphasis added in case.) Other Connecticut cases have found that there is no distinction between whether the accident was intentional or unintentional. In this case, the Superior Court was not persuaded by the petitioner’s argument.

The evidence clearly showed that he operated a motor vehicle involved in an accident, the blood was drawn pursuant to the dictates of § 14-227a(k), and it did not matter whether the accident was intentional or unintentional. After considering and rejecting the petitioner’s other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Superior Court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Porter Hearing Not Required Where Accident Reconstructionists’ Testimonies Were Based on Principles of Dynamics and the Law of Motion

In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut found that a trial court did not err in denying a defendant’s motion to strike the expert testimony of two State witnesses.

Case Details

This case arose from an incident that occurred at 10:00pm on September 2, 2003. The defendant became intoxicated at a bar and was asked by the bartender to leave. Two patrons attempted to persuade the defendant to allow them to drive him home, but abandoned their efforts once the defendant started to become violent. The defendant got into his truck and drove southbound on Route 85 in Hebron when he struck a car in the northbound lane. The other driver was pronounced dead at the scene and the defendant was transported to the hospital, where he registered a blood alcohol content of 0.248.

The defendant was charged with first-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter with a motor vehicle, and two counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) of alcohol. He filed a motion in limine, requesting that any and all evidence related to accident reconstruction be excluded because “the state would be unable to establish the scientific validity of the methodologies utilized by the state’s reconstructionists [State experts] under State v. Porter.” This motion was denied, though the defendant would have the option of filing a motion to strike after the State experts testified.

The Trial

At trial, the State experts rendered their opinions as to how the accident collision occurred. They stated that their methods of reconstruction are “generally accepted and used throughout the nation” and did not involve “new material.” Each reached conclusions that the accident could not have occurred in the lane in which the defendant was traveling due to the “[p]rincipal direction of force and momentum” and because “[t]he vehicle dynamics don’t allow that.” As such, they opined that the defendant’s truck crossed the center yellow line and struck the other driver’s car.

Defense counsel moved to strike the State experts’ testimonies, arguing that the methods used were scientifically unreliable. The State countered that “[t]he subject of the testimony… is no[t] new, novel science” but were based on principles of physics “that had been put forth centuries ago.” The court denied the defendant’s motion to strike testimony because the testimony was sufficiently reliable and did not require a Porter hearing. The defendant was subsequently convicted on three counts and appealed, arguing, in part, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike.

A Related Case

In the landmark case Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, the U.S. Supreme Court described the manner in which scientific evidence will be admissible in a trial. Connecticut adopted this analysis in State v. Porter, where a court will hold a so-called Porter hearing to determine whether the proffered evidence is reliable and relevant. However, some scientific principles are so well established that it is unnecessary to review evidence under an explicit Daubert analysis. Therefore, scientific evidence derived under these principles that would “clearly withstand a Daubert analysis” will be admissible at trial upon a showing a relevance.

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Appellate Court concluded that the methods used by the State experts in reconstructing the accident and reaching their conclusions were not new and original. Rather, when the State experts determined where the accident occurred, they applied “principles and theories that have been in the recognized literature and have been taught at training academies for decades.” Therefore, a Porter hearing was not required prior to their testimony and the court’s subsequent refusal to grant the defendant’s motion to strike was proper.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Appellate Court Upholds License Suspension, Citing Circumstantial Evidence That Plaintiff Operated the Motor Vehicle in Question

In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected a plaintiff’s argument that the commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) had insufficient evidence to suspend his driver’s license.

Case Details

This case arose from an incident that occurred at 2:31am on May 19, 2007. Police dispatch received emergency phone calls from two citizen informants (informants) regarding an erratic driver. They described the driver as male, provided a description of his vehicle, and indicated they were both following him in their own cars. The informants conveyed to dispatch that the driver was constantly switching lanes, traveling slowly then accelerating rapidly, and swerving, and that he pulled into a Home Depot parking lot.

When officers arrived at this location, they saw the plaintiff sitting alone in his vehicle, which matched the description given by the informants. His car was turned off and the ignition key was in his pocket. Additionally, no one else was in the vicinity, including the informants. When officers engaged in a conversation with the plaintiff, they observed slurred speech, glassy eyes, and the smell of alcohol.

In addition, after the plaintiff exited the vehicle he was unsteady on his feet. The plaintiff failed three field sobriety tests and was arrested for and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI). Approximately a half hour later at the police station, the plaintiff spoke to an attorney and then refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.

Driver’s License Suspension

Because the plaintiff refused to submit to a chemical alcohol test, the DMV suspended his license for one year. The plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, during which the hearing officer found: 1) that police had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for OMVUI; 2) the plaintiff was arrested; 3) the plaintiff refused to submit to the breathalyzer test; and 4) the plaintiff operated a motor vehicle. The one-year suspension was upheld, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, who dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff sought recourse with the Appellate Court, where he argued that the record lacked sufficient evidence to support a finding that he operated the motor vehicle at issue.

What qualifies as an OMVUI?

To be found guilty of OMVUI, the State must prove that the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence or with an elevated blood alcohol content. Direct evidence is not required to establish “operation;” oftentimes, circumstantial evidence “may be more certain, satisfying and persuasive.” Pursuant to the substantial evidence rule, the findings of an administrative agency are upheld “if the record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.” This is a highly deferential standard, and the plaintiff must prove that the DMV commissioner abused his discretion in suspending the plaintiff’s license.

The Court’s Decision

The Appellate Court was not persuaded that there was insufficient evidence proving the plaintiff was the driver of the vehicle. It cited police observations that the defendant was alone in the vehicle and at the location precisely identified by the informants, whose absence was immaterial. In addition, because the commissioner determined “operation” on the basis of the informant’s observations and subsequent identification of the plaintiff as the operator of the erratically driven vehicle, it was not relevant that the plaintiff’s car was not running when officers arrived. Therefore, the Appellate Court concluded there was substantial evidence of the commissioner’s finding that the plaintiff operated the motor vehicle in question and affirmed judgment.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.