Posts tagged with "cell phone"

‘Distracted Doctoring’ a Danger to Patients

A recent survey found that 55 percent of technicians monitoring bypass machines admitted to talking on cell phones during surgery. Half admitted to texting while in surgery.

A widely read editorial in Anesthesiology News by Peter J. Papadakos, MD, says health care workers today are “fixated on computer screens” and rarely receive information directly from their patients.

Papadakos referred to a study presented to the American Society of Anesthesiologists this year that said nurse anesthetists and residents were distracted by something other than patient care in 54 percent of cases. The study further cited surfing the Internet as the primary distraction. Additionally, a recent report in The New York Times cited polls of medical professionals in which a majority of respondents admitted using cellphones during critical procedures.

The Times cited a survey of medical technicians published this year in Perfusion, a journal about cardio-pulmonary bypass surgery, which found that 55 percent of technicians who monitor bypass machines acknowledged talking on cell phones during heart surgery and half said they had texted while in surgery.

“Why does anyone carry a cell phone into an operating room?” Patrick A. Salvi, managing equity partner of Salvi, Schostok & Pritchard P.C. in Chicago, asked. “The patient on the table deserves the undivided attention of everyone in that room.”

Salvi, a medical malpractice attorney, expressed concern that health care workers’ increased reliance on electronic devices has become a distraction that has led to medical errors and injuries.

“We’re dismayed by reports that say doctors, nurses, technicians and others providing medical care are spending too much time focused on smartphones, computer screens and other devices when they should be paying attention to their patients.”

“We’re not against the use of electronic devices for delivery of medical records or even personal communication, but it is absolutely crucial that a focus on the patient is not dropped from the accepted standards of medical care,” said Salvi.

Anyone believing their injuries or the injury or death of a loved one in a hospital or another medical setting may have been caused by medical errors resulting from distraction should contact an experienced medical malpractice attorney immediately.

By: Larry Bodine

At Maya Murphy, P.C., our experienced team of personal injury attorneys is dedicated to achieving the best results for individuals and their families and loved ones whose daily lives have been disrupted by injury.  Our personal injury attorneys assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and throughout Fairfield County. If you have any questions relating to a medical malpractice claims, medical negligence or injury, or a personal injury claim or would like to schedule a free consultation, please contact our Westport office by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com 

 

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Jury Reasonably Inferred Defendant Intended to Sell Cocaine He Constructively Possessed

In a recent criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut found that the State provided sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of possession of narcotics with intent to sell (PWID).

At 2am on October 19, 2004, a Norwalk police officer observed a vehicle near a business that reported problems with trespassing and the presence of narcotics transactions. After following this vehicle, the officer saw another one in the business’ parking lot, so he initiated a traffic stop of the second vehicle and radioed for assistance. The car had three occupants including the defendant, who was located behind the front-seat passenger. All appeared nervous, and the driver claimed the defendant was his uncle and they were there picking him up. When the officer went to run a check on the driver, the defendant changed his position to behind the driver’s seat.

After backup arrived, the officers placed the occupants under arrest for trespass. However, as the defendant exited the car, officers observed forty-three knotted bags and envelopes with cocaine, a small bag of marijuana, and $15 cash in plain view on the floor behind the front passenger seat. A search of the vehicle produced another bag of marijuana, a cell phone, and $640 in small denominations. No drugs or paraphernalia were found on the defendant, though after being transported to the police station, he provided a false name.

The defendant was charged with PWID (cocaine), a violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 21a-227(a), as well as other crimes. At trial, State witnesses testified that the cocaine was packaged in a manner consistent with sales and the defendant was located in a known high drug activity area with no paraphernalia located on him indicating personal use. In addition, the presence of a cell phone and cash in small denominations is common in situations involving drug sales. At the close of State’s evidence, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied. The jury returned guilty verdicts and the defendant renewed his motion, which was again denied. On appeal, he argued in part that the court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that he possessed the cocaine and that he intended to sell it.

To convict a defendant for PWID, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “knew the character of the substance, knew of its presence and exercised dominion and control over it.” However, where the defendant does not have exclusive possession of the premises containing the drugs, the State must proceed on a theory of constructive possession, or possession without direct physical contact. Knowledge of the substance cannot be inferred without a showing of incriminating statements and other circumstances. Intent to sell, the second element, may be proven by the manner in which the narcotics are packaged, the defendant’s presence in a known drug trafficking area, and the absence of drug paraphernalia indicating personal use of the substance.

In this case, the Appellate Court found that the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant constructively possessed the cocaine and intended to sell it. The Court specifically cited such behavior as the defendant’s movement in the car to distance himself from the narcotics, easy access to the narcotics, and his close proximity indicating he had knowledge of its narcotic character because “[i]t is by now common knowledge that cocaine is often packaged as a white powder in small plastic bags.” This form of packaging, in conjunction with the defendant’s presence in a known drug trafficking area and the fact police found no drug paraphernalia on his person, allowed a jury to reasonably infer the defendant intended to sell the cocaine. Therefore, the defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim failed.

When faced with a charge for possession or distribution of controlled substances, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-211-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Perpetrator Not “Beamed There By Martians” – Court Upholds Defendant’s Accessory Conviction

In a recent criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected a defendant’s claim that the State presented insufficient evidence that she participated in a plot to steal nearly a quarter of a million dollars from her employer.

This case involved the February 22, 2005 theft of approximately $248,000 in cash from a bank located in New Britain. The interior of the location has little public access, and employees must first be buzzed into or use their key to access a “mantrap” before proceeding through another door to the employee area. This section of the store contains a bathroom and the safe room, and the only exit is to proceed back through the mantrap.

The defendant was a store manager at the bank and was working alone for five and a half hours prior to closing. An hour before leaving the store, she received a phone call from a former district manager (former manager), who had been fired following a previous unsolved robbery at the bank years earlier. The defendant counted the money in the safe, after which she closed down the store and set the alarm. Approximately thirty minutes later, motion sensors and alarms were rapidly triggered in reverse order from the safe room to the front door. The bank owners called the defendant, who was in the vicinity of the bank, and asked her to allow police into the building. When police arrived, they found no evidence of forced entry, but the money was gone and the defendant did not look or act surprised.

Telephone records revealed that the phone call received by the defendant prior to closing the bank was made from a cell phone in New Britain. She received two more calls from numbers belonging to the former manager: the first from a landline in Manhattan only minutes after the incident; the second twenty minutes thereafter once again from the cell phone, this time placed from the New Haven area.

The defendant was subsequently arrested for accessory to larceny in the first degree, conspiracy to commit larceny in the first degree, and accessory to burglary in the third degree, in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8, 53a-122(a)(2), 53a-48, and 53a-103. The State’s theory of the case was that the defendant knowingly permitted someone to stay behind in the employee area prior to her departure. The defendant argued that one of the employees working earlier that day “could have let someone into the bathroom unbeknownst to [her].” The prosecutor countered that this was unreasonable: “The idea of somebody sitting in this bathroom for five and one-half hours, waiting for business to close, is as ludicrous as saying that they were beamed there by Martians.” The defendant was convicted on all counts and appealed, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence identifying her as a participant, and therefore the jury convicted her “on the basis of mere speculation.”

When a jury considers the facts presented in a case, they are permitted to make reasonable and rational inferences stemming from those facts. “When we infer, we derive a conclusion from proven facts because such considerations as experience, or history, or science have demonstrated that there is a likely correlation between those facts and the conclusion.” The more strained the correlation, the less reasonable the inference will be. In this case, the Appellate Court admitted that the evidence presented was scant, but still sufficient to support the convictions. The jury could reasonably infer that the defendant was knowingly involved in the scheme to steal the money from the bank, permitting someone to remain behind after she set the alarm and left for the night. Therefore, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment.

When faced with a charge of larceny, burglary, conspiracy, or accessory, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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