Posts tagged with "circumstances"

Veterinary Doctor’s Non-Compete Invalidated When Terms Unreasonably Favor Employer

Merryfield Animal Hospital v. MacKay, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 4099

Case Background

Dr. Morgan MacKay worked as a doctor of veterinary medicine at Merryfield Animal Hospital, a clinic owned by Dr. Engstrom, from May 15, 2000, to April 16, 2002. There were two employment contracts between Dr. MacKay and Merryfield that described employment from May 15, 2000, to May 15, 2001, and a second covering May 1, 2001, to April 30, 2002. Each contained restrictive covenants and was supported by adequate consideration, specifically the second agreement listed a substantial pay increase. The non-compete agreement prohibited Dr. MacKay from owning or working at another veterinary facility within seven miles of Merryfield for a period of two years.

Dr. MacKay voluntarily terminated his employment in a letter to Dr. Engstrom dated April 16, 2002 stating that he “could no longer tolerate the veterinarian service practices that were occurring at Merryfield”. Following this decision, he began to work at New Haven Central Hospital, a veterinary facility located 6.2 miles from Merryfield, clearly within the seven-mile radius prohibited area as defined in the non-compete covenant.

Merryfield sued Dr. MacKay to enforce the terms of the non-compete agreement and curtail further employment at New Haven Central Hospital. Dr. MacKay however contended that the terms of the agreement afforded Merryfield an unnecessary and unfair amount of protection, to the degree that it rendered the covenant unreasonable and unenforceable.

The Court’s Decision

The court found in favor of Dr. MacKay and held that the terms of the non-compete agreement “afforded greater protection to the plaintiff [Merryfield] than is reasonably necessary and the non-compete is unenforceable”. The court supported its ruling with the argument that it had the obligation to ensure that the agreement should only afford a fair degree of protection to the interest of the employer while also safeguarding the interests of the employee himself. The agreement went well beyond creating reasonable protections for Merryfield and unnecessarily restricted Mr. MacKay’s career opportunities and his ability to earn a living.

The language of the restrictive covenant was so broad and general that it prohibited several activities that Merryfield did not engage in. For instance, the agreement prohibited Dr. MacKay from delivering veterinary care to horses, cattle, sheep, or swine even though Merryfield did not treat those types of animals.

Additionally, the wording of the agreement was so vague that it would have even prevented Dr. MacKay from working as a meat inspector. Even the finite restriction of a seven-mile radius was deemed unreasonable given the specific circumstances of the veterinary industry in the area. The language of the agreement would prevent Dr. MacKay from bringing in animals to New Haven Central Hospital if he was employed at a clinic that lacked surgical facilities, as was the case with the vast majority of the veterinary facilities outside the seven mile prohibited radius.

Conclusion

While the restriction of seven miles for two years is reasonable at face value, it becomes clear that it can easily transform into an incredibly unreasonable restriction in light of certain facts. It was the use of vague language throughout the document and the unforeseen consequences that ultimately invalidated the restrictive covenant between Dr. MacKay and Merryfield.

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If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

In Sexual Harassment Claims, Court Will Consider the Totality of the Circumstances

Title VII

Working in a hostile environment can be a very traumatic experience. Indeed, victims of sexual harassment often experience a pattern of mistreatment over an extended period of time. This may include physical or verbal abuse, and often includes overtly gender-specific conduct as well as behavior which on its face appears to be gender-neutral (behavior that while abusive, when considered independently, may appear to have nothing to do with one’s gender).

When considering whether a victim of sexual harassment is entitled to judicial redress, it is important to take both types of conduct into account. In fact, when considering a claim brought under Title VII, a court will consider the totality of the circumstances, including both facially gender-specific behavior as well as behavior that is facially gender-neutral.

Generally speaking, Title VII prohibits, “discrimination against any individual with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s… sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII is not limited to “’economic” or “tangible” discrimination, however. The phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993).

As the Court explained in Harris, Title VII is violated, “When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,” Id. Importantly, an employer is presumed to be responsible where the perpetrator of the harassment was the plaintiff’s supervisor. See, e.g., Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1998).

In determining whether an environment is “hostile” or “abusive,” the Court in Harris stated that one must consider all the circumstances surrounding the alleged discrimination. 510 U.S. at 23. This may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. The effect on the employee’s psychological well-being is also relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive.

Notably, while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required. Id. Because the analysis of severity and pervasiveness looks to the totality of the circumstances, the crucial inquiry focuses on the nature of the workplace environment as a whole. To that end, a plaintiff who herself experiences discriminatory harassment need not be the target of other instances of hostility in order for those incidents to support her claim. Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 2000).

Gender Discrimination in a Hostile Work Environment

It is fairly well settled that to prevail on a claim of hostile work environment based on gender discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that the abuse was indeed based on his or her gender. See, e.g., Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 621 (2d Cir. 2001). However, facially neutral incidents may be included among the “totality of the circumstances” that courts consider. Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 378 (2d Cir. 2002). In determining whether facially sex-neutral incidents were part of a pattern of discrimination on the basis of gender the Court may consider, for example, whether the same individual engaged in multiple acts of harassment, though some may have been overtly sexual and some not. Id.

Gender Hostility Cases

In Raniola, supra, the Court concluded that, given proof of instances of overt gender hostility by the supervisor of the female plaintiff, a rational juror could have permissibly inferred that his entire alleged pattern of harassment against her was motivated by her gender, even though some of the harassment was not facially sex-based. Thus, the relevant circumstances in Raniola included not only offensive sex-based remarks, but also one facially gender-neutral threat of physical harm by the supervisor who had made the remarks.

In Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corporation, 609 F. 3d 537 (2d Cir 2010), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adhered to this principle. In that case, the plaintiff, an administrative assistant in the defendant’s engineering department, brought suit under Title VII alleging that the department manager sexually harassed her. The plaintiff alleged that in addition to constantly staring at her and making suggestive advances, the manager also threatened her with physical harm. For example, the manager allegedly told the plaintiff he wished she was dead, saying, “I’d like to see you in your coffin.”

Additionally, on six occasions, the manager allegedly told the plaintiff he wanted to choke her. In overturning the trial Court’s decision which effectively dismissed the plaintiff’s case, the Appellate Court explained, “…the court should not have excluded from consideration [the plaintiff’s] testimony as to [the manager’s] stated desires to choke her, to see her in a coffin, and to kill her.” According to the court, one could permissibly infer that the manager’s harsh treatment of the plaintiff was the result of his spurned advances and that the facially gender-neutral threats he directed at the plaintiff were, in fact, because of her sex.

By: Joseph Maya, Esq.

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If you have any questions regarding workplace harassment or other employment matters, do not hesitate to contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced employment law attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. at (203) 221-3100 or JMaya@Mayalaw.com to schedule a free initial consultation.

What is a Constructive Discharge?

Employment Resignation

Hopefully, you have never been fired – that is a discharge or termination. Sometimes, however, an employee has no reasonable alternative to quitting – that is a constructive discharge. The involuntary nature of the employee’s “quit” may enable him or her to claim the constructive discharge as an adverse employment action so as to maintain a claim for employment discrimination. An employee’s reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is, for remedial purposes, equated to a formal discharge.

A constructive discharge occurs when an employer indirectly, but deliberately, makes an employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced involuntarily to resign. The key points of inquiry are the employer’s intentional conduct and the intolerable level of the employee’s working conditions. The standard for evaluation is objective – how would a reasonable employee behave in the particular employee’s shoes? Subjective feelings as to the intolerable nature of the employee’s position cannot support a finding of constructive discharge.

Establishing Constructive Discharge

In assessing a claim of constructive discharge, individual factors, standing alone, may be insufficient to carry the day. For this reason, the pertinent conditions are aggregated since a reasonable person encounters life’s circumstances cumulatively rather than individually. Some routine workplace events – e.g. a poor performance appraisal, lack of training, or increased job demands – are to be expected and do not support an inference that a reasonable person would be “compelled” to resign. The standard for constructive discharge goes beyond difficult or unpleasant working conditions.

As is so often the case in employment law, the presence of a constructive discharge depends upon the circumstances of the particular employee involved. If you feel that your employer deliberately made your work environment intolerable and that you were forced to quit, you should confer with a seasoned employment law litigator to determine your rights.

The employment law attorneys in the Westport, Connecticut office of Maya Murphy, P.C. have extensive experience in the negotiation and litigation of all sorts of employment-related disputes and assist clients from Greenwich, Stamford, New Canaan, Darien, Norwalk, Westport and Fairfield in resolving such issues. If you have any questions regarding constructive discharge or other matters of employment law, please do not hesitate to contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. at (203) 221-3100 or JMaya@Mayalaw.com to schedule a free initial consultation.