Posts tagged with "contract"

FINRA Arbitration Awards Employer Over $500,000 for Promissory Notes Accelerated by Employee’s Termination

In the Matter of the Arbitration between Claimants Morgan Stanley Smith Barney and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney FA Notes Holdings, LLC v. Respondent Robert W. Hathaway (2012 WL 2675417)

In a recent Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration, a sole FINRA arbitrator held that an employee is liable to satisfy his indebtedness on promissory notes, including interest, to his employer upon termination of employment.

Case Details

In this case, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney (“MSSB”) and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney FA Notes Holdings, LLC, alleged that Robert W. Hathaway (“Hathaway”) was in breach of two promissory notes executed while he was employed by MSSB.  In its arbitration filing, MSSB claimed the principal balances due under both notes, per diem interest for both notes, and costs of collection and arbitration.  This matter proceeded pursuant to Rule 13806 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure because Hathaway neither filed a Statement of Answer nor appeared at the hearing.

On or about March 8, 2008, Hathaway executed the first promissory note with MSSB for $729,560, at an interest rate of three-percent per annum, to be repaid in nine consecutive annual installments beginning on March 19, 2009.  The terms of the note included an agreement to pay all costs and expenses of collection, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.  On or about June 9, 2009, Hathaway executed the second promissory note for $75,257.83 at an interest rate of 2.25-percent per annum, to be repaid in eight consecutive annual installments beginning on June 9, 2010.

The Decision

On or about September 19, 2011, Hathaway’s employment at MSSB ended.  MSSB alleged that termination of employment triggered acceleration of the promissory notes and made a demand for immediate re-payment.  Hathaway failed and refused to satisfy the indebtedness.

After considering the pleadings and the submissions, the sole arbitrator decided that Hathaway was liable for the principal balance due under each promissory note.  Hathaway was also liable for per diem interest accruing from the date employment was terminated through the date of payment on each note.  Finally, Hathaway was to reimburse MSSB for the non-refundable portion of its initial claim filing fee.  The final award to MSSB totaled $542,816.00.


Should you have any questions relating to FINRA, arbitration or employment issues generally, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Court Confirms FINRA Arbitration Award for Employee in the Amount of $150,000 with Interest

Scoble v. Blaylock & Partners, L.P., 2012 U.S. LEXIS 13706 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)

Matthew W. Scoble (“Scoble”) filed a petition against his former employer, Blaylock & Partners, L.P., subsequently known as Blaylock & Company, Inc. (“Blaylock”), to confirm an arbitration award pursuant to § 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 9.  Scoble claimed that Blaylock breached a contract between the parties by failing to make a severance payment of $150,000 to him after Blaylock terminated his employment without cause.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) appointed a panel of three arbitrators to hear the matter after both parties agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration for a decision and award.  Both parties participated in the arbitration hearing that lasted several days.  Thereafter, the Arbitration Panel issued an award to Scoble in the amount $150,000 in compensatory damages.  The responsible party, Blaylock, would be liable for post-judgment interest pursuant to FINRA’s Code of Arbitration Procedure if it did not pay the award within thirty days.

The Court found that Scoble’s petition was sufficiently supported and indicated that there was no question of material fact.  Blaylock did not move to modify, vacate or correct the arbitration award and did not submit an opposition to the petition.  The petition to confirm the arbitration award was granted and judgment was entered for Scoble in the amount of $150,000 with post-judgment interest.

If you have any question relating to FINRA or arbitration, please do not hesitate to contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced employment law attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. at (203) 221-3100 or JMaya@Mayalaw.com to schedule a free initial consultation.

Change in Business Services/Products Doesn’t Invalidate a Non-Compete Agreement

DiscoveryTel SPC, Inc. v. Pinho, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2683

In 2002, DiscoveryTel SPC hired Mr. Ismael Pinho as its chief financial officer (CFO) as an at will employee.  The parties later executed an employment agreement on December 27, 2004 that would go into effect January 1, 2005.  The employment contract modified Mr. Pinho’s employment from at will to a one-year automatic renewable basis and outlined his salary, incentive bonuses, vacation, personal days, insurances, severance package, and several restrictive covenants.

Mr. Pinho was prohibited from directly or indirectly competing with DiscoveryTel by being involved in the purchase and/or sale of international voice and traffic data systems during the term of the employment agreement or during any period for which he was receiving severance pay.  Additionally, the agreement stated that he was bound by an indefinite non-disclosure clause pertaining to DiscoveryTel’s confidential and proprietary information.

In between 2004 and 2010, DiscoveryTel experienced a corporate reorganization and shifted its focus and the services it provided.  By 2010, it was no longer engaged in the purchase and/or sale of international voice and data traffic but instead facilitated the sale of telephone traffic.

The Defense’s Argument

Mr. Pinho informed the president of DiscoveryTel in a May 21, 2010 letter that he had accepted a position with World Telecom Exchange Communications, LLC (WTEC) and would be starting at the new company on June 1, 2010.  DiscoveryTel brought suit and requested that the court grant its request for an injunction to prevent any violations of the restrictive covenants in connection to Mr. Pinho’s new employment.  Mr. Pinho did not have an issue with the non-disclosure clause in the employment contract but asserted that his mere employment with WTEC was not a violation of the non-compete agreement.

He contended that the agreement did not prohibit working for a competitor but rather specifically from “being involved in ‘any business relating to the purchase and sale of international voice and data traffic’”.  He went on to argue that engaging in this sector of the industry should not violate a non-compete agreement because DiscoveryTel was no longer engaged in that specific industry activity.  Additionally, he argued that the agreement had inadequate consideration and was therefore unenforceable.

The Court’s Findings

The court found these arguments unconvincing however and granted DiscoveryTel’s request for injunctive relief and restrained Mr. Pinho from working for WTEC until December 31, 2010 (the end of the current employment term) in order to prevent further violations of the non-compete agreement.  It looked to the modification in the nature of Mr. Pinho’s employment (from at will to a contract renewable on an annual basis) and enhanced benefits (mainly the introduction of a severance package) in the employment agreement to conclude that there was sufficient consideration.

Finally, the court analyzed whether Mr. Pinho’s activities as an employee of WTEC violated the covenant, taking into account DiscoveryTel’s reorganization and shift in focus.  The court ultimately held that Mr. Pinho had indeed violated the non-compete agreement by working at WTEC and that a mere change in business services/products did not render the non-compete agreement invalid or release Mr. Pinho from its obligations.


The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Federal Court Found Form U-4 and FINRA Rules to Constitute a Sufficient Basis for an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties

Lawrence R. Gilmore v. Scott T. Brandt, 2011 WL 5240421 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2011).

In a case before the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Lawrence Gilmore (“Gilmore”) filed a motion to confirm the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award in his favor, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 9.  Scott Brandt (“Brandt”) responded by filing a motion to vacate the FINRA award pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10.  The court granted Gilmore’s motion to confirm the award, entered judgment for the award, and denied Brandt’s motion to vacate the award.

Case Details

The dispute underlying the FINRA arbitration began when Brandt, a representative of Lighthouse Capital Corporation, suggested that Gilmore invest $92,000 in Diversified Lending Group, Inc. (“DLG”).  Gilmore made the investment, which was quickly decimated.  Gilmore alleged that DLG was a Ponzi scheme and filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA.  Rather than seek a stay of arbitration, Brandt contested the issue of arbitrability by appending a statement of jurisdictional objection to his FINRA Arbitration Submission Agreement and raising jurisdictional objections throughout the arbitration proceedings.

FINRA appointed a panel of arbitrators to hear the matter, however, the arbitration panel did not directly address Brandt’s jurisdictional challenge.  In December 2010, the panel issued an arbitration award in Gilmore’s favor for compensatory damages of $106,024.68, post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees.

Arbitrability of a Dispute

In his motion for vacatur, Brandt argued that he never entered into an arbitration agreement with Gilmore; therefore, their dispute should not have been subjected to arbitration. The district court found that Brandt had sufficiently preserved his objection to arbitrability, and that it fell to the court to decide whether the dispute was in fact arbitrable.

Because arbitration is entirely a matter of contract, a party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute that it has not agreed to submit to arbitration. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995).  When Brandt first sought to be licensed to sell securities, he executed a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (“Form U-4”), which contained a section agreeing “to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of [FINRA].”

The court determined that the agreement embodied in Brandt’s Form U-4 would constitute an agreement to arbitrate the dispute with Gilmore only if FINRA rules required this dispute to be arbitrated.

FINRA Rule 12200

FINRA Rule 12200 is a broad provision that generally applies to any customer dispute arising in connection with the business activities of a FINRA member.  Specifically, FINRA Rule 12200 requires that a dispute must be arbitrated under the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure if: (1) arbitration is required by written agreement or requested by a customer; (2) the dispute is between a customer and a FINRA member or associated person; and (3) the dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the FINRA member or associated person.

By submitting his Statement of Claim to FINRA for arbitration, Gilmore was clearly requesting arbitration of the dispute.  The district court found that Gilmore was in a customer relationship with Brandt because Brandt had induced him to invest in DLG.

The Court’s Decision

Additionally, the district court found that Gilmore’s claims related to Brandt’s recommendation of an investment in particular securities fell within the class of disputes reasonably regulated by FINRA.  Therefore, the district court determined that FINRA Rule 12200 required the dispute between Gilmore and Brandt be submitted to arbitration.  Because of this result, Brandt’s U-4 Form was determined to be his agreement to submit to arbitration of the dispute.

Because the arbitration panel had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, the award decision is entitled to deference by the federal court.  9 U.S.C. § 9-11.  Because Brandt provided no argument that satisfied the statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), the court granted Gilmore’s motion for confirmation of the arbitration award of compensatory damages of $106,024.68, with interest, and attorneys’ fees.


Should you have any questions relating to FINRA or arbitration issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya of Maya Murphy, P.C. in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

ERISA Claim Challenges Vague Language of FINRA Arbitration Award in order to Include Back Pay as Benefits-Eligible Compensation

Ronald A. Roganti  v .Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, et el, 2012 WL 2324476 (S.D.N.Y.  June 18, 2012)

In a case before the Southern District of New York, Ronald Roganti (“Roganti”), a former employee of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”), asserted claims under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (“SOX”), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (“ERISA”). Both claims challenge MetLife’s denial of Roganti’s request that a 2010 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award be treated as benefits-eligible compensation.  MetLife moved to dismiss both claims on several grounds.  The court granted MetLife’s motion with respect to the SOX claim and denied the motion with respect to the ERISA claim.

Case Background

The underlying dispute in this case arose during Roganti’s employment with MetLife, which lasted from 1971 to 2005.  In 1999, Roganti began to voice concerns regarding allegedly-suspect business practices at MetLife and continued to do so until he terminated his employment in 2005.   Roganti claimed that throughout that time period, MetLife repeatedly disregarded his complaints and actively retaliated against him, including undermining his authority within the business subsets he oversaw and reducing his compensation with the specific purpose of reducing his pension benefits.

In July 2004, Roganti filed his initial Statement of Claim with the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) to arbitrate his disputes with MetLife.  FINRA, the successor to NASD, appointed a panel of three arbitrators to adjudicate four claims brought by Roganti: (1) the breach of contract claim, based on MetLife’s reduction of Roganti’s compensation; (2) violation of SOX retaliation provisions, based on MetLife’s retaliation against Roganti for reporting questionable business practices; (3) for the value of services rendered by Roganti; and (4) for violating ERISA, on the theory that, in reducing Roganti’s compensation, MetLife also sought to reduce his pension benefits.

In August 2010, the FINRA panel held that MetLife was liable to Roganti for $2,492,442.07 in “compensatory damages … above [MetLife’s] existing pension and benefit obligation to Claimant.” The arbitral award explain neither how the arbitrators arrived at this sum nor for what the award was intended to compensate Roganti. FINRA Docket Number 04-04876.

Benefits Claim

On March 24, 2011, Roganti filed a benefits claim with MetLife, in its capacity as the Plan Administrator, asking that the arbitral award be treated as compensation for income which MetLife had improperly denied him, and that the award be factored into the calculation of the benefits which he was entitled to under his pension plan with MetLife. MetLife denied the request for three reasons.

First, only income of current employees was benefits-eligible; therefore, since Roganti was not employed by MetLife when he received the award, it did not qualify as benefits-eligible compensation.  Second, FINRA broadly termed the award as “compensatory damages” rather than stating it was compensation for lost income.  Finally, the FINRA award did not indicate to which years of Roganti’s employment the award applied; therefore, even if the award represented unpaid income, it would be impossible for MetLife to determine concretely how the award should affect Roganti’s pension benefits. Roganti appealed this decision to MetLife, and MetLife again denied his claim.  Subsequently, Roganti filed SOX and ERISA claims in federal district court.

Because Roganti’s current SOX and ERISA claims are based on the 2011 denial of pension benefits, the court determined that these have not already been dispositioned by the 2010 FINRA arbitration.  Therefore, the court denied MetLife’s motions to dismiss both claims on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  However, because Roganti did not exhaust administrative remedies before filing his SOX claim in federal district court, the court determined that his SOX claim must be dismissed.

ERISA Claims

Roganti made two claims under ERISA, which creates a private right of action to enforce the provisions of a retirement benefits plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  First, he alleged that the FINRA arbitral award compensated him for unpaid wages that resulted from MetLife’s retaliation against him.  Second, he argued that because the award constituted back pay, it must be taken into account in calculating his pension benefits.  The court determined that central to both claims is the issue of whether the FINRA arbitration award constitutes back pay to compensate Roganti for services rendered while he was a MetLife employee, which would properly be included in pension benefits calculations.

The Court’s Decision

Neither the brevity of the FINRA arbitration award nor Roganti’s statement of claims to FINRA provided the court with sufficient clarity to resolve the factual issue of exactly what the award represented. The court, therefore, construed the ambiguity in the award language in the light most favorable to Roganti.  The court concluded that he had met his burden and denied MetLife’s motion to dismiss the ERISA claim.

Because the three-month timeframe to seek clarification from a FINRA arbitration panel pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 12 had elapsed, the court ordered the ERISA Plan Director to closely review the arbitral record, in the context of the evidence offered and arguments made by both sides at the arbitration, to determine whether or not the award represented back pay for Roganti.  The court found it unacceptable that the initial denials of benefits were based on the terse language of the arbitration award, rather than a more detailed analysis as to what the award amounts represented.


Should you have any questions relating to FINRA, employment, compensation or benefits issues please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya of Maya Murphy, P.C. in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Enforcing a Non-Compete Agreement to Protect Software Company’s Confidential Information

Weseley Software Development Corporation v. Burdette, 977 F. Supp. 137

Mr. Wesley Burdette worked for Weseley Development Corporation first as a Logistics Analyst and then as a Senior Logistics Analyst from May 1993 to September 16, 1996.  Weseley was a software development company based in Shelton, Connecticut whose focus product was a transportation and logistics management program referred to as TRACS (Tactical Routing and Consolidation System).  Mr. Burdette played a significant role in the development and testing of TRACS versions 3.0 and 3.1.  He worked with “customers and potential customers to evaluate, develop, tailor, and implement Weseley’s products” during his approximately three years of employment.

He gave Weseley his two weeks notice on August 29, 1996 and planned to switch companies to work for Manugistics for the marketing and sales of its product titled MTP.  Management reminded Mr. Burdette of the non-compete clause in his employment agreement that he had signed.

The most important covenants that he signed in conjunction with his employment contract were those not to compete or disclose confidential information.  The agreement was signed on January 14, 1995 after Mr. Burdette was allowed time to consult with an attorney regarding any and all of the agreement’s provisions.  The non-compete clause stipulated that he could not work for a competitor for a period of six months following his termination with Weseley or disclose confidential information for an indefinite period of time.

The company sued Mr. Burdette to enforce the non-compete and asked the court to enjoin him from further employment with Manugistics.  Mr. Burdette countered that the agreement was unenforceable because its provisions were unreasonable and that Weseley had only signed the agreement once litigation began.

The Court’s Decision

The court found in favor of Weseley and enforced the non-compete covenant, enjoining Mr. Burdette from working for Manugistics for a period of six months as stated in the language of the agreement.  It validated the agreement because there was adequate consideration in the form of “continued employment, an articulated paid vacation entitlement, a new entitlement to severance benefits, and stock options”.  Furthermore, it found the limitations to be reasonable such that they fairly balanced Weseley’s desire to protect its business and Mr. Burdette’s desire to still be able to pursue his career.

It was paramount that the court protected the company’s interests since Mr. Burdette had a great deal of access to proprietary research & development information that could have severely disadvantaged Weseley should Mr. Burdette have shared the information with Manugistics.  Although the court stated that there was no evidence that he had already disclosed confidential information, it held that he would inadvertently draw upon his knowledge gained while employed at Weseley and eventually disclose some amount, however small it may be, in the course of his new employment with Manugistics.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Federal Court Confirms FINRA Arbitration Award that Refuses to Classify a Forgivable Loan as Employee Compensation Subject to the Wage Act

Pauline Sheedy v. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL 5519909 (D. Mass. Nov. 14, 2011)

In a recent Massachusetts case, Pauline Sheedy (“Sheedy”), a former managing director at Lehman Brothers, Inc., filed an action in state court seeking to vacate a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award entered in favor of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“LBHI”).  LBHI removed the case from state to federal court, and filed a motion to dismiss Sheedy’s complaint, confirm the FINRA arbitration award, and award “collection expenses.”  The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts allowed LBHI’s motion.

Case Background

The underlying dispute in this case involves LBHI’s efforts to collect the unpaid principal balance, plus interest and fees, for a forgivable loan that was extended to Sheedy when she began her employment with Lehman Brothers, Inc. Sheedy alleged that her compensation package included a “one-time incentive signing bonus” of $1 million; however, Lehman’s offer letter characterized the $1 million payment a loan to be forgiven in five equal installments of $200,000 on the first through fifth anniversary of her employment start date.

The offer letter further stated that if Sheedy separated from Lehman Brothers, Inc. for “any reason” prior to full forgiveness of the loan, she would be required to repay the remaining principal balance, plus interest accrued through her separation date.  In 2008, Lehman Brothers, Inc. was forced to file for bankruptcy protection and ceased doing business in Massachusetts.

As a result, Sheedy was separated from Lehman Brothers, Inc. in September 2008, approximately two months prior to the second anniversary of her employment start date. During the marshaling of assets for the bankruptcy estate, Lehman Brothers, Inc. assigned Sheedy’s promissory note for the loan to LBHI.

The Arbitration Award

LBHI initiated FINRA arbitration proceedings against Sheedy, claiming the principal balance due of $800,000, plus interest and fees.  A single FINRA arbitrator was appointed to hear the case.  In June 2011, the arbitrator entered an award ordering Sheedy to repay LBHI the outstanding balance of $800,000, plus interest and attorneys’ fees.

After the arbitration award, Sheedy filed an action in Massachusetts state court to vacate the FINRA arbitration award pursuant to the state Uniform Arbitration Act for Commercial Disputes. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 251, §§ 1-19.   LBHI timely removed the case from state to federal court.

Sheedy sought vacatur on two grounds: (1) that the arbitrator exceeded her authority because the award requires her to “forfeit earned compensation” in violation of the Massachusetts Weekly Wage Act (“Wage Act”), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148; and (2) that the award violated the Massachusetts public policy prohibiting the unlawful restraint of trade and competition.

Sheedy’s Arguments

Both the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act for Commercial Disputes and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provide statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award where an arbitrator exceeds his authority.  Compare Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 251, §§ 12(a)(3) with 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).   Sheedy argued that the FINRA arbitrator exceeded her authority by issuing an award that required Sheedy to forfeit earned compensation in violation of the Wage Act.

The Wage Act defines the requirements for payment of employee wages and commissions, and prohibits the use of “special contract…or other means” to create exemptions from these requirements.  Citing Massachusetts case law, Sheedy argued that the provisions of the Wage Act cover any payment that an employer is obligated to pay an employee; therefore, once she signed Lehman’s offer letter and Lehman was bound to make the $1 million payment to her, that payment became a non-discretionary deed subject to the Wage Act.

The court disagreed with this characterization of the payment.  The court determined that the accepted offer clearly made forgiveness of the full amount of the loan contingent upon completing five years of employment at Lehman Brothers, Inc.; therefore, the portion of the payment which remained outstanding at the time of Sheedy’s termination was never “earned” within the meaning of the Wage Act.  The court denied vacatur on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded her authority because the award was not in violation of the Wage Act.

The Court’s Decision

An arbitration award may also be challenged by reference to a “well-defined and dominant” public policy. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 28, 43 (1987).  Arbitrators may not award relief that offends public policy or requires a result contrary to statutory provisions.  Plymouth–Carver Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., 553 N.E.2d 1284 (1985).  Sheedy argued that the FINRA arbitration award should be vacated because forfeiture of the payment is an unlawful penalty to punish her if she chose to leave Lehman and freely compete in the market place.

The court determined that the structure of the forgivable loan in the offer letter was not equivalent to a non-compete agreement that restricted an employee’s ability to work in the same field within a given geographic area.  Therefore, the arbitration award did not violate the state public policy against unlawful restraint of trade and competition and the court denied vacatur on these grounds.

The court allowed LBHI’s motion to dismiss Sheedy’s complaint, confirm the arbitration decision and award collection expenses.  The court gave LBHI fourteen days from the date of its order to submit a request for attorneys’ fees and a proposed form of judgment.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA, arbitration or employment issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Contractual Rights for Teachers: An Overview

Contracts for School Teachers

The law of contracts applies to contracts between teachers and school districts. This law includes the concepts of offer, acceptance, mutual assent, and consideration. For a teacher to determine whether a contract exists, he or she should consult authority on the general law of contracts. This section focuses on contract laws specific to teaching and education.

Ratification of Contracts by School Districts

Even if a school official offers a teacher a job and the teacher accepts this offer, many state laws require that the school board ratify the contract before it becomes binding. Thus, even if a principal of a school district informs a prospective teacher that the teacher has been hired, the contract is not final until the school district accepts or ratifies the contract. The same is true if a school district fails to follow proper procedures when determining whether to ratify a contract.

Teacher’s Handbook as a Contract

Some teachers have argued successfully that provisions in a teacher’s handbook granted the teacher certain contractual rights. However, this is not common, as many employee handbooks include clauses stating that the handbook is not a contract. For a provision in a handbook to be legally binding, the teacher must demonstrate that the actions of the teacher and the school district were such that the elements for creating a contract were met.

Breach of Teacher Contract

Either a teacher or a school district can breach a contract. Whether a breach has occurred depends on the facts of the case and the terms of the contract. Breach of contract cases between teachers and school districts arise because a school district has terminated the employment of a teacher, even though the teacher has not violated any of the terms of the employment agreement.

In several of these cases, a teacher has taken a leave of absence, which did not violate the employment agreement, and the school district terminated the teacher due to the leave of absence. Similarly, a teacher may breach a contract by resigning from the district before the end of the contract term (usually the end of the school year).

Remedies for Breach of Contract

The usual remedy for a breach of contract between a school district and a teacher is monetary damages. If a school district has breached a contract, the teacher will usually receive the amount the teacher would have received under the contract, less the amount the teacher receives (or could receive) by attaining alternative employment. Other damages, such as the cost to the teacher in finding other employment, may also be available.

Non-monetary remedies, such as a court requiring a school district to rehire a teacher or to comply with contract terms, are available in some circumstances, though courts are usually hesitant to order such remedies. If a teacher breaches a contract, damages may be the cost to the school district for finding a replacement. Many contracts contain provisions prescribing the amount of damages a teacher must pay if he or she terminates employment before the end of the contract.

Source: FindLaw

If you feel you have been mistreated by your employer or in your place of employment and would like to explore your employment law options, contact the experienced employment law attorneys today at 203-221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com. We have the experience and knowledge you need at this critical juncture. We serve clients in both New York and Connecticut including New Canaan, Bridgeport, White Plains, and Darien.

This case was not handled by our firm. However, if you have any questions regarding this case, or any employment law matter, please contact Joseph Maya at 203-221-3100 or by email at JMaya@MayaLaw.com.

***All posts for the MayaLaw.com blog are created as a public service for the community. This case overview is intended for informational purposes only, and is not a solicitation of any client.***

Five Things You Need to Know About Connecticut Separation Agreements

As a result of the state of the economy, in general, and in Fairfield County, in particular, we in the Westport, Connecticut office of Maya Murphy, P.C. have seen a spate of Separation Agreements brought to us by recently terminated employees.  Our experienced employment-law attorneys review and critique these Agreements, and often advocate on behalf of our clients to enhance a separation package.

Here are five things you need to know about Separation Agreements:

  1. They are here and more may be on the way. 

    Companies are scrutinizing their bottom lines to try to increase profits, decrease expenses, and improve share value or owner’s equity.  If sales can’t be increased or cost-of-goods-sold decreased, one alternative is to cut personnel.  Often senior (and more highly paid) employees are let go in favor of younger (i.e., “cheaper”) employees, thereby also raising the specter of an age discrimination claim (a topic deserving of its own post).

  2. They are complex. 

    For an employee over the age of 40, a federal statute known as the “Older Workers Benefit Protection Act” requires that your Separation Agreement contain certain provisions, including a comprehensive release of all claims that you might have against your employer.  The statute also gives you specific time periods to review the Agreement prior to signing, and even to rescind your approval after you have signed.  It is not uncommon to have Separation Agreements exceed 10 pages in length.  All of the language is important.

  3. They are a minefield. 

    Separation Agreements frequently contain “restrictive covenants,” usually in the form of confidentiality, non-solicitation, and non-competition provisions.  These can have a profound effect on your ability to relocate to another position and have to be carefully reviewed and analyzed to avoid potentially devastating long-term consequences after the Agreement has been signed and the revocation period has expired.

  4. They are not “carved in stone.”

    Although many companies ascribe to a “one size fits all” and a “take it or leave it” policy with regard to Separation Agreements, such is not necessarily the case.  Often, Maya Murphy employment attorneys can find an “exposed nerve” and leverage that point to obtain for a client more severance pay, longer health benefits, or some other perquisite to ease the client’s transition into a new job with a new employer.  Every case is factually (and perhaps legally) different and you should not assume that your severance package should be determined by those that have gone before you.

  5. You need an advocate.

    You need an experienced attorney to elevate discussion of your Separation Agreement above the HR level.  HR directors have limited discretion and are tasked with keeping severance benefits to an absolute minimum.  Maya Murphy’s goal is to generate a dialogue with more senior management to drive home the point that a particular client under certain circumstances is equitably entitled to greater benefits than initially offered.

If you find yourself in the unfortunate position of having been presented with a Separation Agreement, you should contact an experienced employment law attorney in our Westport, Connecticut office by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard for Judicial Review of a FINRA Arbitration Award Excludes Questions of Fact

Patrick R. Murray v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 2011 WL 5523680 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2011)
Case Background

In a case before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Patrick R. Murray (“Murray”) filed motions to vacate, modify, or correct portions of a Financial Industry Regulatory (“FINRA”) arbitration award.  Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., (“CGMI”) filed a cross-motion to confirm the arbitration award and to award costs and fees incurred while seeking confirmation.   The court denied Murray’s motions to vacate, modify or correct the arbitration award and granted CGMI’s motion to confirm the arbitration award.  CGMI’s request for costs and fees was denied.

In July 2000, Murray was hired as a financial advisor in a local Smith Barney office, which was later acquired by CGMI.  As required by FINRA rules, Murray executed a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (“Form U–4”).  He also executed a promissory note for a $1,508,401 forgivable loan, and an addendum to the promissory note that extended the length of the repayment period from seven years to nine years.

The instruments provided that the loan was to be repaid in nine equal annual installments commencing on the first anniversary date of its execution and that, if Murray terminated his employment prior to full repayment, the outstanding balance would be immediately payable with interest accruing from the date of termination.  In April 2009, Murray resigned after having made eight annual payments on the loan.

The Arbitration

In May 2009, Murray sued CGMI in state court alleging that CGMI fraudulently induced him to sign the addendum to the promissory note and illegally confiscated his assets related to a capital accumulation plan account.  CGMI removed the case to federal court, where it filed a motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the arbitration clauses in the Form U-4, the promissory note, the addendum to the promissory note and a separate signed acknowledgment of the CGMI employee handbook were valid and enforceable; therefore, it granted CGMI’s motion to compel arbitration.

FINRA appointed a panel of three neutral arbitrators to hear the matter.  In April 2011, the FINRA panel awarded CGMI compensatory damages of $40,153.00 representing the unpaid balance on the promissory note and awarded Murray compensatory damages of $25,705.95.

Murray filed the instant motion to vacate, modify or correct portions of the arbitration award in federal court and CGMI filed its response and cross-motion to confirm the arbitration award.  Murray challenged the arbitration award on the following grounds: (1) the award was irrational; (2) the award did not draw its essence from the contract between the parties; (3) the award violated public policy; and (4) the award manifestly disregarded the law.

Vacating an Arbitration Award

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, defines four limited statutory grounds on which a court may vacate an arbitration award, including instances of fraud or corruption, evident partiality, misbehavior or misconduct and acts exceeding the arbitration panel’s authority.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a).  The court found that none of Murray’s first three grounds for vacatur satisfied these statutory requirements.

Several federal circuits, including the Sixth Circuit, have held that an arbitration award can be vacated “if it displays ‘manifest disregard of the law.’ ” Jacada, Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 712 (6th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds, (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 718, 421 (6th Cir. 1995)).

The Court’s Decision

However, the court found that Murray’s assertions of manifest disregard of the law were based on questions of fact rather than questions of law.  A federal court does not have the authority to re-litigate facts when reviewing an arbitration award to determine whether the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law.   See Bd. Of County Commis of Lawrence County, Ohio v. L. Robert Kimball & Assocs., 860 F.2d 683, 688 (6th Cir.1988).  Therefore, the court denied Murray’s motion to vacate the arbitration award.

The court additionally determined that, although Murray was incorrect on the merits of his case, he did not engage in the degree of bad faith or vexatious behavior that would compel the court to award CGMI fees and costs for the instant litigation.  Therefore, the court confirmed the arbitration award in its entirety without awarding CGMI additional fees and costs.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA, arbitration or employment issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.