Posts tagged with "contract"

Accepting Funds from a Charitable Trust may Create a Contract that Cannot be Unilaterally Modified

Blumenthal v. Getraer, CV106007120S, 2011 WL 4953727 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2011)

In a case before the Superior Court of Connecticut, the Attorney General of the State of Connecticut brought a declaratory judgment action to represent the public interest in protecting gifts intended for charitable purposes, pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 3-125.  The action posed four specific questions to the court regarding a charitable trust that was intended to honor a respected synagogue member and provide funds for capital improvements to the synagogue to which he belonged.

Case Background

In 2002, a respected member of the synagogue passed away, and was survived by his wife and son.  The following year, a charitable foundation in New York City gave the synagogue he attended a gift of $40,000 which was contingent upon the synagogue’s agreement to name its sanctuary after the deceased.  The gift and additional donations of over $100,000 were placed in a memorial fund, which was controlled by the widow and her son.

After receiving the gift, the synagogue erected a plaque over the entrance to the sanctuary declaring that it was named in honor of the deceased.  At the synagogue’s next board of directors meeting, the widow offered, on behalf of the memorial fund, to give the money in the fund to the synagogue with the restriction that it be used only for capital improvements and not ordinary expenses.  The widow and the son would act as the trustees of the fund and disburse monies for capital improvements at their absolute discretion.  The board of directors approved the arrangement.

The Dispute

A dispute later arose between the widow and her son, and the board of directors.  The widow and her son were dissatisfied because the memorial plaque was covered on several occasions so that it was not visible to people in the synagogue.  For example, during the 110th anniversary celebration of the synagogue, a sign announcing the name of the synagogue was placed over the memorial plaque.  During one Chanukah celebration, decorations were placed over the plaque and left there until July of the following year.

The board of directors was dissatisfied because the widow and her son stopped paying for capital improvements.  The board of directors that approved the arrangement with the widow and her son was dismissed and replaced with a new board.  This new board of directors voted to request the widow and her son to turn control of the fund over to the synagogue.

Determining the Rights of the Parties

In an action seeking declaratory judgment, the sole function of the trial court is to ascertain the rights of the parties under existing law.  Ginsberg v. Post, 177 Conn. 610, 616 (1979).  Four specific questions were posed to the court to determine the rights of the trustees and the rights of the synagogue.

Prior to addressing these questions, the court found that a contract had been formed between the fund and the synagogue based on the synagogue’s acceptance of monies from the fund and other actions taken by the synagogue board of directors.  Therefore, the court found that the vote by the new board of directors had no legal significance because they could not unilaterally change the terms of the previous contract with the widow and her son.

The Court’s Findings

Based on finding the existence of a contract, the court determined that the widow and her son were entitled to continue to control the fund and act as its trustees.  However, the court also found that equity required them, in their capacity as trustees, to reimburse the synagogue for the capital expenditures made in reasonable reliance on the agreement that the fund would pay for capital improvements.  The trustees had discretion to determine what constituted a capital improvement.  The fund was also required to continue to pay for capital improvements, on the condition that the memorial plaque was visible to all who would be able to see it.

The court ordered that the memorial plaque not be covered and, if it was, that would constitute a breach of contract on the part of the synagogue.  In that event, the widow and son would be free to terminate the trust and the fund, and either return the money to the donors or use it for other charitable purposes at their discretion.  Finally, the court suggested that the fund cease soliciting further donations and allow the remaining monies to be depleted to that the relationship between the parties could be terminated.

Should you have any questions relating to charitable trusts or other personal asset protection issues, please do not hesitate to contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. at (203) 221-3100 or to schedule a consultation today.

What is a Pre-Need Funeral Services Contract?

A pre-need funeral services contract allows an individual to set aside funds, before his or her death, to be used specifically to pay for funeral expenses. Under the terms of such a contract, a “purchaser” signs the contract and advances funds, which are held in an escrow account for the purpose of paying for future funeral services for the “beneficiary” upon his or her demise. See C.G.S. §42-202. A pre-need funeral services contract may only be sold by a funeral director licensed by the public health commissioner. See C.G.S. §42-201.

Funeral Service Requirements Under Connecticut Law

There are strict requirements for such contracts under Connecticut law. For example, funeral services contracts must be in writing, and must contain the following:

(1) The name, address, telephone number and Social Security number of the beneficiary and the purchaser;

(2) The name, address, telephone number and license number of the funeral director for the funeral service establishment providing the goods or services;

(3) A list of the selected goods or services, if any;

(4) The amount of funds paid or to be paid by the purchaser for such contract, the method of payment and a description of how such funds will be invested and how such investments are limited to those authorized pursuant to subsection (c) of section 42-202;

(5) A description of any price guarantees by the funeral service establishment or, if there are no such guarantees, a specific statement that the contract contains no guarantees on the price of the goods or services contained in the contract;

(6) The name and address of the escrow agent designated to hold the prepaid funeral services funds;

(7) A written representation, in clear and conspicuous type, that the purchaser should receive a notice from the escrow agent acknowledging receipt of the initial deposit not later than twenty-five days after receipt of such deposit by a licensed funeral director;

(8) A description of any fees to be paid from the escrow account to the escrow agent or any third party provider;

(9) A description of the ability of the purchaser or the beneficiary to cancel a revocable funeral service contract and the effect of cancelling such contract;

(10) For irrevocable contracts, a description of the ability of the beneficiary to transfer such contract to another funeral home; and

(11) The signature of the purchaser or authorized representative and the licensed funeral director of the funeral service establishment.

Funeral Service Contracts

See C.G.S. §42-200(b). A funeral services contract must also contain a statement that if the particular merchandise provided for in the contract is not available at the time of death, the funeral service establishment will furnish merchandise similar in style and at least equal in quality of material and workmanship to the merchandise provided for in the contract.  See C.G.S. §42-202(g). Funeral services contracts should not be confused with burial insurance policies, which are separately codified in the Connecticut General Statutes, under Section 38a-464.

For further information on pre-need funeral services contracts in Connecticut, see Chapter 743C of the Connecticut General Statutes. The General Statutes can be found online at: Additional information is available in the State of Connecticut’s Office of Legal Research Report on pre-need funeral services contracts online at:

If you have any questions regarding funeral services contracts, please do not hesitate to contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. at (203) 221-3100 or to schedule a consultation today.

Five Things You Need to Know About Connecticut Separation Agreements

As a result of the state of the economy, in general, and in Fairfield County, in particular, we in the Westport, Connecticut office of Maya Murphy, P.C. have seen a spate of Separation Agreements brought to us by recently terminated employees.  Our experienced employment-law attorneys review and critique these Agreements, and often advocate on behalf of our clients to enhance a separation package.

Here are five things you need to know about Separation Agreements:

They are here and more may be on the way. 

Companies are scrutinizing their bottom lines to try to increase profits, decrease expenses, and improve share value or owner’s equity.  If sales can’t be increased or cost-of-goods-sold decreased, one alternative is to cut personnel.  Often senior (and more highly paid) employees are let go in favor of younger (i.e., “cheaper”) employees, thereby also raising the specter of an age discrimination claim (a topic deserving of its own post).

They are complex. 

For an employee over the age of 40, a federal statute known as the “Older Workers Benefit Protection Act” requires that your Separation Agreement contain certain provisions, including a comprehensive release of all claims that you might have against your employer.  The statute also gives you specific time periods to review the Agreement prior to signing, and even to rescind your approval after you have signed.  It is not uncommon to have Separation Agreements exceed 10 pages in length.  All of the language is important.

They are a minefield. 

Separation Agreements frequently contain “restrictive covenants,” usually in the form of confidentiality, non-solicitation, and non-competition provisions.  These can have a profound effect on your ability to relocate to another position and have to be carefully reviewed and analyzed to avoid potentially devastating long-term consequences after the Agreement has been signed and the revocation period has expired.

They are not “carved in stone.”

Although many companies ascribe to a “one size fits all” and a “take it or leave it” policy with regard to Separation Agreements, such is not necessarily the case.  Often, Maya Murphy employment attorneys can find an “exposed nerve” and leverage that point to obtain for a client more severance pay, longer health benefits, or some other perquisite to ease the client’s transition into a new job with a new employer.  Every case is factually (and perhaps legally) different and you should not assume that your severance package should be determined by those that have gone before you.

You need an advocate.

You need an experienced attorney to elevate discussion of your Separation Agreement above the HR level.  HR directors have limited discretion and are tasked with keeping severance benefits to an absolute minimum.  Maya Murphy’s goal is to generate a dialogue with more senior management to drive home the point that a particular client under certain circumstances is equitably entitled to greater benefits than initially offered.

If you find yourself in the unfortunate position of having been presented with a Separation Agreement, you should contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced employment law attorneys in our Westport, Connecticut office by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at

Expunging a Dirty U-5—Be Careful What You Ask For!

Expunging a Dirty U-5

The view from the impending “fiscal cliff” takes in much of Fairfield County’s “Gold Coast”—Greenwich, Stamford, Darien, and Westport.  We at Maya Murphy, P.C. represent many residents employed in the financial industry, both within and without the State of Connecticut.  Some of their financial employers may be considering reductions in personnel depending upon the results of the upcoming Presidential election, Congressional action (or inaction) concerning “taxmaggedon” and “sequestration,” and their own Q4 and year-end results.  If a financial firm retrenches, there will be a dirty U-5 on “the street.”

We are often asked about the possibility of “scrubbing” a U-5 or expunging it altogether.  The current economic climate and new proposed rules from FINRA warrant a warning that usually accompanies our advice.

The current FINRA Customer and Industry Codes do not afford “unnamed persons,” i.e., the subject of allegations but not named parties to the underlying arbitration, to seek expunging of allegations reported to the Central Registration Depository (“CRD”) on Form U-5 (and available to the public through such resources as “Broker Check”).  To rectify that situation (recognizing that a dirty U-5 impacts one’s livelihood), FINRA has proposed In re expungement rules seeking to balance the respective interests of the registered professional and the investing public.  Public comment on the proposed rules was closed on May 21, 2012.

The purpose of this post is not to critique the new rules that, while not problem-free, at least address the issue of incorrect allegations remaining on CRD records in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to determine the accuracy of those allegations.  The purpose of this post is to point out that the new rules, in whatever final form they may take, can be a cure worse than the disease.

The Original Language

There is no denying the injustice of having a registered representative’s U-5 amended to reflect a customer complaint without the representative being named as a respondent in subsequent arbitration. The net effect is to have the representative tried in absentia without the ability to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses by way of defense.  The proposed In re expungement rules, however, may not be all they are cracked up to be.  A recent FINRA arbitration decision points up the problem.

In the Matter of the FINRA Arbitration between Eduard Van Raay, Claimant v. Raymond James Financial Services, Inc., et al., Respondents (FINRA 11-04544, July 16, 2012), the underlying claim was settled and an arbitrator was appointed solely for the purpose of considering a request for U-5 expunging.  The original offending, terminating language was: “Violation of firm policy. Failure to disclose an outside business activity (personal representative relationship with a client).”  After the arbitration, the recommendation was for the language to be amended to read: “Permitted to resign. Advisor chose to continue unapproved outside business activity.”  This was hardly an improvement to that which he sought to have expunged.

The Post-Arbitration Language

The original language was cryptic, susceptible to differing interpretations, and perhaps easily explained.  The post-arbitration language, however, was clear, concise, damaging, and most importantly, the product of FINRA arbitration.  Instead of vague allegations of a personal relationship with a client, the representative’s CRD will now be saddled with a finding that he chose to continue an unapproved outside business activity.  The takeaway is that the outcome would not survive a rigorous pre-arbitration risk/reward analysis.  Arbitrations, as with lawsuits, are a lot like wars—they are easier to start than to stop.  They often bring with them unintended consequences.

The new In re expungement rules present registered representatives with an additional option that was previously unavailable.  Assuming their future adoption, that does not mean that every offending CRD entry should be the subject of a FINRA arbitration.

Whether, and when, to pursue expunging is a decision that should be discussed thoroughly with a seasoned litigator familiar with the FINRA Rules and decisions.  We, here, in Maya Murphy’s Westport, Connecticut office stand ready to assist in that regard.  Please contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at to schedule a consultation today.

Court Enforces Non-Compete Agreement Against Connecticut Ophthalmologist

Musto v. OptiCare Eye Health Centers, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2298
Employment Background

Dr. Anthony Musto owned an eye care services professional corporation with two other doctors from 1973 to 1996.  He worked as a private practice ophthalmologist in the greater Bridgeport area until the three doctors sold the practice to OptiCare Eye Health Centers, Inc. on July 31, 1996.  Dr. Musto owned one-third of the shares of the business, sold them to OptiCare for a profit of $590,000, and signed an employment agreement with OptiCare to work as an ophthalmologist on their payroll.

He worked as an OptiCare employee from August 1, 1996, to August 4, 2000, providing management with a one-year written notice of voluntary termination on August 1, 1999.  Following his termination, Dr. Musto proceeded to open a private practice office in Fairfield and perform surgeries at Bridgeport Hospital, including three extremely rare procedures: dactocystorhinostomy, blethoroplasty, and removal of eyelid tumors.

The Non-Compete Agreement

Dr. Musto signed a non-compete agreement with OptiCare as part of his employment contract and initialed each page to demonstrate he understood the agreement’s obligations and restrictions.  The restrictive covenant stipulated that Dr. Musto be prohibited from engaging in the practice of ophthalmology or ophthalmic surgery for a period of eighteen months following termination with fifteen miles of OptiCare’s Stratford or Bridgeport offices.

OptiCare sued to prevent further violations of the non-compete agreement because of Dr. Musto’s new practice in Fairfield, a location clearly within fifteen miles of the identified OptiCare offices.  The company sought to enjoin him from performing general ophthalmic surgeries at Bridgeport Hospital, also located within the geographical restrictions, but did not ask the court to prevent him from performing the three rare surgeries since he was the only doctor on staff at the hospital with the requisite expertise and knowledge to perform them.  Dr. Musto however argued before the court that the restrictions contained in the agreement were unreasonable and the court should deny OptiCare’s request for their enforcement.

The Court’s Decision

The court held that the non-compete agreement was in fact reasonable and granted OptiCare’s request for its enforcement.  The court granted the request, stating, “Where the context of the covenant not to compete is the sale of the good will of an established business, the courts recognize that enforcement of the covenant is necessary to prevent the seller from depriving the buyer of the value of the transaction”.  When OptiCare acquired Dr. Musto’s professional corporation, it purchased the asset of continued patronage from people who had been patients of that practice, and the court concluded that OptiCare was entitled to protection of this valuable asset.

When determining whether a restrictive covenant is reasonable, the court must determine if it affords more than fair and just protection to the party in whose favor it operates without unduly interfering with public interest.  The eighteen-month duration was deemed reasonable because it was short enough not to cause any unwarranted or extreme hardships on Dr. Musto’s ability to start another practice.  Additionally the court concluded that the fifteen-mile restriction was reasonable because it was not a distance greater than what was necessary to protect the good will asset that OptiCare acquired from Mr. Musto and his partners.

If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at

Defining “Marketing” in Connecticut Non-Compete Agreements

Express Scripts, Inc. v. Sirowich, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3444
Case Background

Ms. Patricia Sirowich worked as a broker at Express Scripts, Inc. (ESI) offering pharmacy benefit management products and services to employers, unions, and third-party administrators.  ESI had Ms. Sirowich sign a contract in connection with her employment with the company wherein she agreed to a restrictive covenant.  The March 1, 1990 document contained a non-compete agreement that prohibited her from marketing services similar to ESI’s for a competitor for two years to any ESI client in New England (defined as Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island).

Ms. Sirowich voluntarily terminated her employment with ESI on December 31, 2000 and started her own company, Pharmacy Benefit Intermediary (PBIrx).  In response to her actions at her new company, ESI alleged that Ms. Sirowich “marketed competitive products and services to its clients in violation of the parties’ non-competition agreement”.  In particular, ESI alleged that Ms. Sirowich marketed products to Diversified Group Brokerage and Group insurance, two of its clients.

The Court’s Decision

ESI sued Ms. Sirowich for breach of the non-compete agreement and sought to enjoin further violations through December 31, 2002.  Ms. Sirowich claimed that she had not violated the covenant because her activities were not marketing, but merely introducing clients to National Medical Health Card (NMHC), a direct competitor of ESI.  She claimed that she did not do any presentation or consummate the sale between the parties.  The court however rejected Ms. Sirowich’s defenses and held that she had indeed violated the covenant by marketing similar products as ESI, triggering the lawful enforcement of the agreement.

“Marketing”, according to the court, included not only the actual sale of products/services but also any efforts to promote and effectuate a sale of products/services.  Facilitating a deal through arranging a meeting between prospective parties amounted to “marketing” as prohibited in the non-compete agreement.  The court held that “the entire thrust of the defendant’s [Sirowich’s] efforts was the replacement of pharmacy benefit management services and products of the plaintiff [ESI] with those of its competitor [NMHC]”.

The general purpose of a non-compete agreement is to prevent former employees from using privileged information and favored relationships with clients acquired during their time as an employee of the company to the disadvantage of the company upon termination.  This case is a prime example of legitimate reasons for the enforcement of the agreement in order to safeguard the operations of the employer from the detrimental actions of a former employee.

If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at

Non-Compete Agreement Restrictions in Connecticut Funeral Services Industry

Sagarino v. SCI State Funeral Services, Inc., 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1384
Case Background

Mr. Robert Sagarino’s mother sold the entire amount of stock in Donald D. Sagarino Funeral Home, Inc. to SCI Connecticut Funeral Services, Inc. for $700,000 and an additional $375,000 for the real estate where the business was located. SCI purchased the company with the condition that Mr. Sagarino and other employees execute a five-year employment contract and a fifteen-year non-compete agreement.  Mr. Sagarino signed his agreement on June 15, 1999, wherein he agreed not to operate or work for a funeral home service company for fifteen years within a thirty-mile radius of SCI’s newly acquired Donald D. Sagarino Funeral Home.  As consideration for the restrictive covenant, SCI agreed to pay Mr. Sagarino a total of $65,000 in one hundred twenty installments of $541.67.

Mr. Sagarino was terminated however on July 29, 1999 when he admitted to consuming alcohol while on the job.  In early 2000, Mr. Sagarino opened C.R. Sagarino Funeral Home approximately two miles from SCI’s funeral home.  SCI alleged that he advertised and sought clients from the same community that Douglas D. Sagarino had traditionally served and sued him to prevent further violations of the non-compete agreement executed in connection with the acquisition of Douglas D. Sagarino Funeral Home.

The Defense

Mr. Sagarino however presented a defense that the non-compete agreement was unreasonable and its terms were therefore unenforceable.  The party that challenges the enforceability of a contract ultimately bears the burden of proving to the court that it is unreasonable and unenforceable.  The court found in favor of SCI however, concluding that Mr. Sagarino had indeed breached a valid restrictive covenant and that SCI had successfully shown it suffered irreparable harm from the contractual breach.  A major component of the court’s decision was that the parties executed the agreement at the time of the sale of a business, creating a situation where it added great value to the business.

The Court’s Decision

The court held that the restrictions in the non-compete agreement were adequate to protect the good will purchased by SCI in its acquisition of Donald D. Sagarino Funeral Home and not unreasonable so as to severely disadvantage Mr. Sagarino upon his termination with the company.  The fifteen-year duration was reasonable provided the nature of the funeral services industry.  The customer return frequency in the industry is typically nine years, a timeframe that makes the fifteen-year duration a reasonable restriction for a non-compete between the parties.  The court also held that the thirty-mile geographical restriction was reasonable in light of the funeral services industry and its business trends.

The necessity of a non-compete in this case emanates from the funeral home name having a strong reputation in the local Italian-American community to which it catered its services.  Business in the funeral home industry is highly dependent upon personal relationships and the family name connected with the business operations.  The vast majority of clients are return customers or referrals from previous clients.  The thirty-mile restriction in the non-compete covers the area where Donald D. Sagarino Funeral Home’s clients have historically been located.  The court once again referenced the nature and business trends of the funeral services industry to conclude that the thirty-mile restriction was both reasonable and enforceable.

If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at

Court Enforces Non-Compete Agreement for Niche Water Purification Company

KX Industries, L.P. v. Saaski, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2444
Case Background

Mr. Bruce Saaski worked for KX Industries, L.P., a manufacturer and distributor of solid carbon block water filters, from December 1993 to April 24, 1996, as the company’s Technical Support Manager.  His employment agreement with KXI contained several restrictive covenants that prohibited him from using or disclosing confidential and proprietary information without the prior written consent of KXI, maintaining personal copies of the company’s confidential information, or working for an industry competitor.  The “industry competitor” restriction applied for one year after Mr. Saaski’s termination but the covenants pertaining to KXI’s confidential information were indefinite.

Mr. Saaski terminated his employment with KXI and began to work at Water Safety, a direct competitor, shortly thereafter.  Additionally, he failed to return copies of confidential information to KXI’s management upon his termination.  KXI sued Ms. Saaski for violation of the non-compete agreement he signed as part of his employment contract and sought a court injunction to enforce its provisions.  Ms. Saaski presented several arguments to the court as to why the agreement was not valid or enforceable.

The court rejected his assertions however and found in favor of KXI, granting their request for enforcement of the non-compete and confidentiality covenants. Mr. Saaski attacked the non-compete on the basis that its lacked consideration, arguing that there existed a prior employment agreement obligating KXI to employ him for a two-year period.

The Court’s Decision

The court held that Mr. Saaski did not present adequate evidence to prove the existence of a prior employment agreement and pointed to the language of the December 1993 agreement to show that Mr. Saaski gave consideration for the agreement when he agreed to the restrictive covenants contained therein. Furthermore, Mr. Saaski contended that the restrictions were unreasonable because they were overly broad in scope, specifically referring to the prohibition on working for a company “similar to” or in “competition with” KXI.

To determine if this language was in fact overly broad the court heard testimony from KXI’s Chief Executive Officer where he stated that there were only four competitors that the non-compete applied to: Honeywell, Culligan, Multipure, and Water Safety, Mr. Saaski’s new employer.  The court found this to be restricted in scope and not overly broad to disproportionately favor KXI’s interests.  The restriction applied only to a small section of the water purification industry and KXI’s CEO provided a plethora of companies that Mr. Saaski could work for without violating the non-compete agreement.

The court found the overall non-compete and confidentiality covenants to be reasonable and concluded that they did not place excessive restriction on Mr. Saaski’s ability to pursue his occupation and earn a living.  Accordingly, the court found in favor of KXI and enforced the provisions of the non-compete agreement.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at

Two-Prong Test for Temporary Injunction for Breach of Non-Solicitation Agreement

Integrated Corporate Relations, Inc. v. Bidz, Inc., 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2212
Case Background

Integrated Corporate Relations, Inc. was a Westport-based parties relations and public consulting firm that contracted with Bidz, Inc., a California corporation, to perform various investor relations services.  The agreement between the companies contained a non-solicitation clause that prohibited Bidz from soliciting, hiring, or otherwise engaging any of Integrated’s personnel during the agreement and for one year following its termination.  Integrated stated that this was their standard practice with clients in order to protect its legitimate business interests and the resources it had spent to develop its business model.  It also claimed that it incurs a hardship when an employee leaves because it must find a suitable replacement.

Integrated hired Mr. Andrew Greenebaum in 2003 as an at-will employee at the company’s Los Angeles office to work as a Senior Managing Director where he was the primary manager of Bidz’s account.  Mr. Greenebaum worked in this capacity until his resignation on February 27, 2009 at which point he founded his own company, Addo Communications, Inc. with another former Integrated employee.  Bidz terminated its business relationship with Integrated on March 30, 2009 and shortly thereafter contracted with Mr. Greenebaum and Addo for investor relations services.

Granting Temporary Injunction

Integrated sued Bidz when it learned of this new business relationship and claimed that Bidz had violated the non-solicitation agreement in their contract.  The company requested equitable relief and called for the enforcement of the restrictive covenant.  Integrated requested a temporary injunction while the case was being decided in order to prevent further violations of the agreement.  The court’s holding in this case pertains to the issue of whether to grant a temporary injunction.

The court outlined that the primary purpose of a temporary injunction is to “preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be finally determined after a hearing on the merits”.  Connecticut courts will generally grant temporary injunctions when the moving party: 1) demonstrates “it is likely to succeed on the merits of its case” and 2) that it will “suffer immediate and irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted”.  The court concluded that Integrated failed to meet either of these requirements and denied the company’s request for a temporary injunction.

The Court’s Decision

The court concluded that Integrated lacked a meritorious claim regarding a breach of the employment contract by Bidz contracting with one of its former employees.  The non-solicitation agreement in question is one between a consulting company and a client, not between a company and its employee(s).  Integrated failed to present any case from any jurisdiction in the United States where a court recognized this business arrangement as an interest that warranted legal protection.

This, according to this court, meant that Integrated lacked a legitimate business interest that a temporary injunction would be necessary to protect.  Additionally, Integrated failed to present evidence that Bidz had actually “solicited” Mr. Greenebaum and purposefully induced him to terminate his employment with Integrated.  The court used these two factors to hold that that Integrated would most likely not succeed on the merits of its case.


The facts of the case also led the court to conclude that Integrated would not experience imminent and irreparable harm if it failed to issue an injunction.  The court held that this was requisite for granting a temporary injunction and commented “Connecticut law supports a distinctly moderated level of proof required to establish the elements of irreparable harm”.  Even though Connecticut courts require only a “moderated level of proof”, the moving party must demonstrate some degree of imminent, irreparable harm.  The only loss that Integrated could demonstrate was that two employees terminated their employment and started their own company.  They were both at-will employees however and could have done so at any point in time, regardless of Bidz’s action.

In conclusion, the court held that Integrated failed to meet the requirements that would warrant a temporary injunction against Bidz to prevent it from transacting with Mr. Greenebaum and his company Addo.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at

Court Enforces Non-Compete for Breach Within the Courier Services Industry

Express Courier Systems, Inc. v. Brown, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3784

Express Courier Systems, Inc. was a company that provided courier services to large hospitals, laboratories, and other medical facilities throughout New England, New York, and New Jersey.  The company provided high-efficiency route planning, dispatch services, monitored courier performance, and analyzed customer feedback.  One of the company’s biggest accounts was with Stamford Hospital with whom it had a contract since 2000.  Express Courier generally recruited its couriers through Contractor Management Services, LLC (CMS), an independent third-party human resources firm. Express Courier employed Misters Seymour Brown, Chip Joseph, and Moses Stephenson as independent contractors from 1999, 2002, and 2005 respectively, as couriers in connection with its agreement with Stamford Hospital.

Violating the Employment Agreements

In December 2005, the company required that these employees register and become members of CMS if they wished to continue to provide services as independent contractors.  As part of the registration process with CMS to continue their employment with Express Courier, the three employees signed non-compete agreements that prohibited them from working at a company providing the same or similar services within the “Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area of the Eastern Seaboard” to an entity that was a client in the preceding six months for a one-year period following termination.  Additionally, the agreements stated that Express Courier was entitled to injunctive relief in the event of a breach of the non-compete agreements.

Stamford Hospital informed Express Courier in September 2006 that it was terminating its services except for those associated with the hospital’s laboratory.  At the same time, Misters Seymour, Joseph, and Stephenson informed Express Courier that they had accepted positions with Xerox.  The employees said that the offers were “too good to refuse” and that their last days would be September 30, 2006.

All three men began to work for Xerox on October 1, 2006 where their positions were very similar to their previous ones at Express Couriers and they were paid to perform very similar services.  Express Courier saw these actions as clear violations of the non-compete agreements and sued its three former employees in Connecticut state court where it sought an injunction enforcing the provisions of the restrictive covenants.

The Court’s Ruling

All three defendants claimed that their work as Xerox employees was vastly different from the services they provided as Express Courier employees but the court rejected this argument and concluded that they were performing the same services as they had done while still employed by Express Couriers.  The court established that there was a clear breach of the agreements’ provisions but next had to determine if the provisions were in fact reasonable, a requirement for enforcement under Connecticut law.

The restrictive covenants, according to the court provided Express Courier with a reasonable degree of protection while simultaneously not preventing the former employees from securing future employment.  The Eastern Seaboard is a large geographical area but even this restriction was severely limited by only applying to Express Courier’s clients in the six months prior to an employee’s termination.

In light of a clear breach of the non-compete agreements and a finding that they contained reasonable restrictions, the court found in favor of Express Courier and granted the company’s request for injunctions enjoining the former employees from providing services to Stamford Hospital in connection with their new employment with Xerox.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at