Posts tagged with "corroborative evidence"

Superior Court Denies Defendant’s Motions to Suppress Confession, Citing Sufficient, Independent Corroborating Proof

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In a criminal law matter, a Superior Court of Connecticut considered a defendant’s motions to suppress a confession and evidence arguing insufficiency of the evidence to establish that he was the driver a DUI-related incident.

Case Details

This case arose from an incident that occurred after midnight on January 16, 2009. While responding to a two-car accident in front of Foxwoods Casino, a state trooper came across a one-car accident along the away. The defendant was walking around the car and appeared confused and dazed. No one else was in the vicinity besides other vehicles passing by.

The trooper noticed that the defendant smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot glassy eyes, and was unsteady on his feet. The defendant stated he was the driver of the vehicle, and explained that while driving, an oncoming car crossed into his lane. To avoid a head-on collision, the defendant swerved off the road and hit a rock. He admitted to consuming seven glasses of wine while at Foxwoods.

The trooper observed that the defendant’s car was steaming and hissing, indicating the accident had recently occurred. There was heavy front-end damage, as well as debris next to a large rock along the side of the road, consistent with the damage to the car. The trooper conducted field sobriety tests, all of which the defendant failed. The defendant was placed under arrest and brought to the state trooper barracks, where he underwent blood alcohol tests at 12:58am and 1:50am. The defendant registered a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .135 and .121, respectively, both above the legal limit of 0.08.

The Charges

The defendant was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) in violation of § 14-227a. He filed a motion to suppress his confession that he was the driver, as well as a motion to suppress the results of the field sobriety and blood alcohol tests administered to him after the accident. The defendant argued that there was insufficient corroborative evidence to establish that he operated the car, meaning his confession was inadmissible. In addition, he argued that the State did not present evidence to establish the blood alcohol tests were administered within the two-hour statutory window after operation.

When a defendant makes a “naked extrajudicial confession of guilt,” this on its own is not sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction unless supported by corroborative evidence. Such evidence need not be direct evidence, but may be circumstantial in nature as well. If, however, the crime charged does not involve a specific harm, loss, or injury, such as OMVUI, it “is [only] necessary … to require the Government to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the [defendant’s] statement.” Finally, chemical tests measuring BAC must be taken within two hours after operation of the motor vehicle occurs.

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Superior Court found sufficient independent proof, in the form of the trooper’s observations, to corroborate the truthfulness of the defendant’s assertion that he was the driver of the vehicle. In addition, the evidence supported the conclusion that the accident happened very recently: as the court wrote, “the accident could not have gone undetected for any substantial length of time.” In addition, since the trooper did not start his shift until 12:00am, and the second chemical blood alcohol test was administered at 1:50am, it was proper to conclude that the tests were taken prior to the expiration of the two-hour statutory window.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion Allowing Police to Pull Over Intoxicated Driver

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut upheld a trial court’s decision that police officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to pull over a defendant they believed was driving under the influence of alcohol.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred at approximately 10:30pm on July 16, 2006. Two citizens (informants) were driving in their car when they observed a dark SUV driven poorly by the defendant. They decided to follow, and then called police because they were concerned for the safety of the public and the defendant. The informants provided dispatch with a description of the defendant’s vehicle, the direction he was traveling, and the following observations: he frequently swerved and crossed the center yellow line, weaved in and out of the travel lane, and nearly collided with another vehicle.

Dispatch relayed this information to a nearby patrol car, which saw the defendant’s car stopped at a green light and driving only 15 miles per hour (mph) in a 40mph zone. After spotting the informants pointing to the defendant’s vehicle, the officers pulled him over. The defendant was later charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) of alcohol in violation of State law.

Motion to Suppress Evidence

The defendant submitted a motion to suppress evidence, which the trial court denied. It found that officers had at least “reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol,” given the informants’ information and the police officers’ personal observations. The defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere, and upon conviction and sentencing, he appealed. The defendant argued that the record did not have enough corroborative evidence to establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion to pull him over. He further argued that the trial court improperly found that the stop was based, in part, on the police officers’ observations of his erratic driving.

When a police officer conducts an investigatory stop or seizure, he must have a “reasonable and articulable suspicion at the time the seizure occurred.” To determine whether such suspicion exists, a reviewing court will determine whether the trial court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, and whether the conclusion based on those findings was legally correct. This decision relies on the totality of the circumstances, and the facts of a case are reviewed objectively.

In the context of citizen informants, our State Supreme Court has held that there are situations involving an anonymous tip which, with police corroboration, “exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop.” Identifiable citizen informers are presumptively reliable because they can easily be located and held accountable if they provide false information to police.

The Court’s Decision 

In this case, the Appellate Court stated that in determining whether the police officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion, the trial court did not have to rely on only their observations. It noted that the trial court declared the informants to be “identifiable citizen informant[s],” a finding with which the Appellate Court did not disagree. The Court described the extensive corroboration of the informants’ information by police officers, and noted that the police were “not required to wait for erratic driving or an accident to occur before pulling over the defendant.” Therefore, the Court found the presence of reasonable and articulable suspicion, and that the trial court did not commit clear error in their findings.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.