Posts tagged with "CT"

DSUE: The Deceased Spouse’s Unused Exclusion

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What is DSUE?

Many individuals have no idea what the DSUE is. Well, it is a fairly simple term when you break it down. Every individual gets an exclusion amount for estate and gift taxes that is adjusted for inflation, last year it was $5,250,000. That means that on death, or during life, an individual can devise, bequeath, or gift up to that amount without generating any tax liability. (Gifts must be under the annual exclusion amount of $14,000 in order to not be subjected to a 40% tax).

If you are married, you and your spouse can combine your exclusion amounts or, when one spouse passes away with some of their exclusion left, the other spouse may use that. This is called portability and the unused amount is called the deceased spouse’s unused exclusion (DSUE for short).

An Example of DSUE

For example, imagine you and your spouse have used none of your exclusion amounts. Now, one spouse passes away and their estate is $2,250,000. The deceased spouse’s estate will not be subject to estate tax because they had an exclusion amount of $5,250,000 in 2013. Therefore, the spouse had $3,000,000 left after their estate was settled. If the surviving spouse or their executor makes the election, they may use the remaining $3,000,000 from their deceased spouse’s estate in addition to their $5,250,000. This means they can exclude up to $8,250,000 from estate, gift, and generation skipping transfer tax. The DSUE is thus “portable.”

While no estate planner relies on portability (because the government can change the law at any time), it is definitely a useful tool for those with large enough estates to utilize it. In 2013, the government set forth legislation to make portability “permanent” for the foreseeable future.

For more on the DSUE and portability see this article: Lewis Saret, Estate Tax Portability – Date DSUE Amount May Be Taken Into Account, Forbes, Jan. 14, 2014.

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If you have any questions related to DSUE or other matters of estates and trusts, please do not hesitate to contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. at (203) 221-3100 or JMaya@Mayalaw.com to schedule a free initial consultation.

2014 Estate & Gift Tax Limits Adjusted For Inflation

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Starting in 2014, people who have done some estate planning and made the maximum tax-free transfers to their families (and those thinking about doing it) can take another crack at it. Beginning January 1st 2014, the amount folks can pass on during life (and at their death) completely free from federal estate tax will increase by an additional $90,000.

Using the Consumer Price Index data for the most recent month and the preceding 11 months, the tax experts at Research Institute of America calculated and reported increases for 2014 to a number of tax limits including the income where the various marginal tax brackets apply, the standard deduction amounts, the personal exemption amount, and a number of other items. They also calculated adjusted amounts for the various estate tax and gift tax limits that will apply in 2014.

  • Gift tax limits rise in 2013
  • 2013 tax rules that can save you money
  • Reducing taxes on IRA payouts
Limits Affecting Tax Free Gifts

Here are a few of the new limits that affect tax free gifts made in 2014:

Unified estate and gift tax exclusion amount. For gifts made and estates of decedents dying in 2014, the exclusion amount will be $5,340,000 (up from $5,250,000 for gifts made and estates of decedents dying in 2013).

This means that in 2014, each person has a credit that can be used to offset the estate tax on a taxable estate of up to $5.34 million of assets. The practical application of this is that individuals can make gifts during life or transfers at death of up to this new higher limit and pay no federal estate tax. Also, new last year is that spouses may combine their unused individual credit amounts and pass on assets free of estate tax on a taxable estate of up to $10.68 million at the death of the second spouse, assuming none of these credits were used during their lifetimes.

Estate Limit Changes

Other estate limits that change in 2014 include:

Generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax exemption. The exemption from GST tax will be $5,340,000 for transfers in 2014 (up from $5,250,000 for transfers in 2013).

Increased annual exclusion for gifts to non-citizen spouses. For gifts made in 2014, the annual exclusion for gifts to non-citizen spouses will be $145,000 (up from $143,000 for 2013).

Foreign earned income exclusion. The foreign earned income exclusion amount increases to $99,200 in 2014 (up from $97,600 in 2013).

Gift tax annual exclusion. For gifts made in 2014, the gift tax annual exclusion will be $14,000 (same as for gifts made in 2013). Generally the amount that can be given to any individual each year that is excluded from the gift tax is $14,000 per person per year. In 2014, this amount is projected to remain at $14,000 per person as the amount that may be gifted annually free from the gift tax. Parents may also use the technique of “gift splitting” or combining gifts to a child, whereby they can each make a gift of $14,000, for a total amount of tax free gifts made of $28,000 to a single person or child each year.

Credit: Ray Martin

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If you have any questions related to estates and trusts, please do not hesitate to contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. at (203) 221-3100 or JMaya@Mayalaw.com to schedule a free initial consultation.

A Summary of Sexual Harassment Workplace Policies in Connecticut

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Unfortunately, many instances of sexual harassment in the workplace go unreported, due either to a fear of retaliation or uncertainty as to whether the conduct constituted sexual harassment.  Whatever the case, no employee should feel demeaned in any way while on the job.  The following provides an overview of the various laws and regulations concerning sexual harassment in Connecticut, and the various steps employers must take to ensure compliance with the law.

First and foremost, even before consulting an attorney, anyone with questions or concerns relating to human rights or discrimination issues in Connecticut should consult Connecticut’s Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO), which states that its mission “is to eliminate discrimination through civil and human rights law enforcement and to establish equal opportunity and justice for all persons within the state through advocacy and education.”  The site provides valuable resources and links.  With regard to sexual harassment, the site contains a step-by-step guide on what to do if you feel you have been the victim of sexual harassment.

The Commission gets its authority from Connecticut General Statute § 46a-54, which grants the Commission the authority to “require an employer having three or more employees to post in a prominent and accessible location information concerning the illegality of sexual harassment and remedies available to victims of sexual harassment,” and second, “to require an employer having fifty or more employees to provide two hours of training and education to all supervisory employees [ . . . ].”  The statute further provides that the training and education “shall include information concerning the federal and state statutory provisions concerning sexual harassment and remedies available to victims of sexual harassment.”

What is sexual harassment?

By way of reference, sexual harassment refers to “any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any conduct of a sexual nature.”

Employers with 3+ Employees

The information that is required of an employer having three or more employees includes, but is not limited to:

  • The statutory definition of sexual harassment and examples of different types of sexual harassment;
  • Notice that sexual harassment is prohibited by the State of Connecticut’s Discriminatory Employment Practices Law and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act;
  • The remedies available to a victim of sexual harassment, which can include but are not limited to:
    • Cease and desist orders;
    • Back pay;
    • Compensatory damages; and
    • Hiring, promotion or reinstatement;
  • Notice that the harasser may be subject to civil and/or criminal penalties;
  • The contact information for the CHRO;
  • A statement that Connecticut law requires that a formal written complaint be filed with the Commission within 180 days of the date when the alleged harassment occurred;
  • A large bold-faced notice stating, “Sexual Harassment is Illegal.”
Employers with 50+ Employees

An employer with fifty or more employees, in addition to the aforementioned requirements, must provide two hours of specialized sexual harassment training, which “shall be conducted in a classroom-like setting, using clear and understandable language and in a format that allows participants to ask questions and receive answers.”  The statute provides a long list of the specific topics that an employer can and should include in the training.

It is the hope that the above provides a concise, easy to understand the policies that an employer must abide by when it comes to sexual harassment.  If you feel that you have been the victim of sexual harassment, or even if you are not sure, you should consult with an attorney experienced in employment law.  The attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. regularly represent employees throughout the Fairfield County and New York City regions, and are ready to advocate on your behalf.  If you have questions or want to schedule a consultation, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@mayalaw.com.

Court Enforces Non-Compete Clause Against Real Estate Agent

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Century 21 Access America v. McGregor-Mclean, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3239

Century 21 Access America is a national real estate company that employed Ms. Tori McGregor-Mclean as a real estate agent in its Bridgeport, CT office from July 2003 to June 16, 2004.  Her employment contract, dated July 7, 2003, contained a non-compete clause that prohibited her for a two-year period following termination from engaging in competing business activities within a fifteen-mile radius of 3850 Main Street, Bridgeport, CT.  Ms. McGregor-Mclean voluntarily terminated her employment on June 16, 2004 and began to work for Buyer’s Capitol Real Estate, a company located outside of the fifteen-mile radius in Stamford, CT.

Century 21 did not have a problem with her new employment because the office was located outside of the prohibited area but issues arose when Ms. McGregor-Mclean began accepting listings within the fifteen-mile radius.  Century 21 sued Ms. McGregor-Mclean in Connecticut state court for violation of the non-compete clause and requested that the court issue an injunction to enforce the agreement.

The Court’s Decision

The court found that Ms. McGregor-Mclean’s activities with her new real estate agency were in fact violations of the non-compete agreement and it ordered that the provisions be enforced.  The plain language of the non-compete clause stipulated that Ms. McGregor-Mclean was prohibited from carrying out any direct or indirect competing business activities within the defined fifteen-mile radius.  She was in breach of the agreement because she accepted five listings within the prohibited area – it is inconsequential as a matter of law that her office was located outside of the fifteen-mile radius.

Under the agreement, she was prohibited from having a physical business presence and transacting individual deals within the defined area.  The court identified the unlawful breaches of the non-compete clause, concluded that the agreement was valid and reasonable, and issued an injunction to enjoin Ms. McGregor-Mclean from further violations of the covenant not to compete.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

ERISA Claim Challenges Vague Language of FINRA Arbitration Award in order to Include Back Pay as Benefits-Eligible Compensation

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Ronald A. Roganti  v .Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, et el, 2012 WL 2324476 (S.D.N.Y.  June 18, 2012)

In a case before the Southern District of New York, Ronald Roganti (“Roganti”), a former employee of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”), asserted claims under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (“SOX”), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (“ERISA”). Both claims challenge MetLife’s denial of Roganti’s request that a 2010 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award be treated as benefits-eligible compensation.  MetLife moved to dismiss both claims on several grounds.  The court granted MetLife’s motion with respect to the SOX claim and denied the motion with respect to the ERISA claim.

Case Background

The underlying dispute in this case arose during Roganti’s employment with MetLife, which lasted from 1971 to 2005.  In 1999, Roganti began to voice concerns regarding allegedly-suspect business practices at MetLife and continued to do so until he terminated his employment in 2005.   Roganti claimed that throughout that time period, MetLife repeatedly disregarded his complaints and actively retaliated against him, including undermining his authority within the business subsets he oversaw and reducing his compensation with the specific purpose of reducing his pension benefits.

In July 2004, Roganti filed his initial Statement of Claim with the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) to arbitrate his disputes with MetLife.  FINRA, the successor to NASD, appointed a panel of three arbitrators to adjudicate four claims brought by Roganti: (1) the breach of contract claim, based on MetLife’s reduction of Roganti’s compensation; (2) violation of SOX retaliation provisions, based on MetLife’s retaliation against Roganti for reporting questionable business practices; (3) for the value of services rendered by Roganti; and (4) for violating ERISA, on the theory that, in reducing Roganti’s compensation, MetLife also sought to reduce his pension benefits.

In August 2010, the FINRA panel held that MetLife was liable to Roganti for $2,492,442.07 in “compensatory damages … above [MetLife’s] existing pension and benefit obligation to Claimant.” The arbitral award explain neither how the arbitrators arrived at this sum nor for what the award was intended to compensate Roganti. FINRA Docket Number 04-04876.

Benefits Claim

On March 24, 2011, Roganti filed a benefits claim with MetLife, in its capacity as the Plan Administrator, asking that the arbitral award be treated as compensation for income which MetLife had improperly denied him, and that the award be factored into the calculation of the benefits which he was entitled to under his pension plan with MetLife. MetLife denied the request for three reasons.

First, only income of current employees was benefits-eligible; therefore, since Roganti was not employed by MetLife when he received the award, it did not qualify as benefits-eligible compensation.  Second, FINRA broadly termed the award as “compensatory damages” rather than stating it was compensation for lost income.  Finally, the FINRA award did not indicate to which years of Roganti’s employment the award applied; therefore, even if the award represented unpaid income, it would be impossible for MetLife to determine concretely how the award should affect Roganti’s pension benefits. Roganti appealed this decision to MetLife, and MetLife again denied his claim.  Subsequently, Roganti filed SOX and ERISA claims in federal district court.

Because Roganti’s current SOX and ERISA claims are based on the 2011 denial of pension benefits, the court determined that these have not already been dispositioned by the 2010 FINRA arbitration.  Therefore, the court denied MetLife’s motions to dismiss both claims on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  However, because Roganti did not exhaust administrative remedies before filing his SOX claim in federal district court, the court determined that his SOX claim must be dismissed.

ERISA Claims

Roganti made two claims under ERISA, which creates a private right of action to enforce the provisions of a retirement benefits plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  First, he alleged that the FINRA arbitral award compensated him for unpaid wages that resulted from MetLife’s retaliation against him.  Second, he argued that because the award constituted back pay, it must be taken into account in calculating his pension benefits.  The court determined that central to both claims is the issue of whether the FINRA arbitration award constitutes back pay to compensate Roganti for services rendered while he was a MetLife employee, which would properly be included in pension benefits calculations.

The Court’s Decision

Neither the brevity of the FINRA arbitration award nor Roganti’s statement of claims to FINRA provided the court with sufficient clarity to resolve the factual issue of exactly what the award represented. The court, therefore, construed the ambiguity in the award language in the light most favorable to Roganti.  The court concluded that he had met his burden and denied MetLife’s motion to dismiss the ERISA claim.

Because the three-month timeframe to seek clarification from a FINRA arbitration panel pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 12 had elapsed, the court ordered the ERISA Plan Director to closely review the arbitral record, in the context of the evidence offered and arguments made by both sides at the arbitration, to determine whether or not the award represented back pay for Roganti.  The court found it unacceptable that the initial denials of benefits were based on the terse language of the arbitration award, rather than a more detailed analysis as to what the award amounts represented.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA, employment, compensation or benefits issues please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya of Maya Murphy, P.C. in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Lower Court Erred in Denying Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Enhanced Sentence Because the Persistent Offender Provision Was Inapplicable

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut agreed with a defendant that he was improperly sentenced as a repeat offender under General Statutes § 14-227a(g) and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate.

Case Details

In this case, the defendant was arrested on three separate occasions over the span of approximately three weeks. He was charged with three counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) in violation of § 14-227a, and each case was docketed in a different jurisdiction: Waterbury, Meriden, and Bristol. The defense counsel and Waterbury prosecutor reached a plea agreement, under which the defendant would be sentenced as a first-time offender twice and a second-time offender once.

However, the Meriden prosecutor would not transfer his case unless the defendant first pled guilty. On December 15, 2008, the defendant entered a guilty plea in the Meriden case, which was then transferred to Waterbury for purposes of sentencing. The Bristol case was transferred as well.

The Court’s Decision

On December 22, 2008, counsel submitted a new plea agreement to the court. Under its terms, the defendant would be sentenced as a first-time offender once (in the Meriden case) and a second-time offender on the other two counts. The defendant entered guilty pleas on January 12, 2009. The defendant, with support from the State, filed a motion to vacate the pleas and sentences, arguing that the pleas were improperly and illegally entered.

The court denied this motion, and the defendant sought remedy with the Appellate Court, arguing that he should have been sentenced as a first-time offender for all three cases. He noted that “he cannot be subjected to the enhanced penalty… because his conviction in the Meriden case occurred after the conduct underlying the violations of § 14-227a in the Waterbury and Bristol cases.”

General Statutes § 14-227a(g) allows for enhanced penalties for repeat offenders in OMVUI cases. In State v. Burns, the Supreme Court of Connecticut determined that for this section to be applicable, a defendant “must [first] have been convicted under § 14-227a and later must have violated the statute.”

In this case, the defendant was not convicted of OMVUI in the Meriden case “at the time of the commission of the second and third violations in the Waterbury and Bristol cases.” Instead, the defendant was sentenced in all three matters on the same date. As such, the Appellate Court found that the persistent offender provision did not apply, and the trial court erred when it did not grant the defendant’s motion to vacate.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya of Maya Murphy, P.C. in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Is a No-Contest Clause Right for Your Will?

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In order to discourage disappointed heirs from disputing your estate plan, you can include a “no-contest” provision that automatically cancels an heir’s inheritance if he or she challenges the distribution of your assets in any way. You are not obligated to leave property to anyone. The original reasoning for the no-contest provision was to intimidate any heir who may consider contesting a will or trust, thereby securing his or her cooperation.

“No-contest” clauses can be broad or narrow, and may even disinherit people who challenge transfers made outside your will (through a trust or beneficiary designation).

A Relevant Case

Of course, you cannot make a bequest of property you don’t own, but you can often provide in a will that a beneficiary will only receive your bequest if they abandon their rights in some other property. In a case, a court was asked to decide whether a refusal to abandon such rights would constitute a “will contest” that would void other gifts.

When a testator died, he left a complex estate plan that included a will, a trust, and beneficiary designations for his retirement account. The testator’s wife legally owned part of his retirement account and other “community property.” The testator’s will and trust required his wife to abandon her “community property” rights in order to receive benefits worth $2.65 million from her husband’s trust.

The wife filed a special petition with the court, asking whether she would be viewed as “contesting” the estate plan if she sought to enforce her community property rights. The wife claimed that her husband had mistakenly transferred some community assets to his own trust, and she was merely trying to correct the mistake.

On appeal, the Court ruled that the wife’s challenges would constitute a “contest.” Therefore, she had to decide whether to assert her “community property” rights (and thus receive only her share of community property, and nothing from her husband’s trust) or simply accept the provisions of the trust and will (thus sacrificing her “community property” rights).

Implications of Including a No-Contest Clause

This case illustrates an important issue. If you make a mistake in your estate plan, a “no-contest” clause in a will or trust may prevent your heirs from correcting the mistake. On the other hand, if you don’t include a “no-contest” clause, an heir might contest your estate plan, thus delaying the distribution of your assets, and frustrating your goals. There are many such issues with Estate Planning that require careful planning and expertise to avoid.

In most cases, a “no-contest” clause does make sense. However, as the example in this article illustrates, you want to be careful when doing your estate plan in order to avoid unnecessary problems for your heirs. Seeking competent advice is more often than not well worth the price paid.

If you have any questions regarding no-contest clauses or other matters involving estates and trusts, please do not hesitate to contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. at (203) 221-3100 or JMaya@Mayalaw.com to schedule a free initial consultation.

Discrimination Against Spanish-Speaking Worker

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A former saleswoman for the Baccarat store on Madison Avenue was awarded $500,000 by a Federal jury after she testified that the company president complained about her Puerto Rican accent, barred her from speaking Spanish to a co-worker, and finally dismissed her from her job selling crystal and china because of her ethnic origins. Although the saleswoman, Erma Rivera, now 59, had contended that Baccarat Inc. was seeking a more youthful workforce, the jury in Federal District Court in Manhattan did not find that age discrimination played a role in her dismissal in July 1995.

Losing the job was devastating to Ms. Rivera, who joined Baccarat in October 1986 after selling Haviland porcelain for 15 years, said her lawyer, Joseph C. Maya. “She had spent 25 years of her life teaching newlyweds how to set a place setting and about fine china,” he said. “She loved the company.”

Ms. Rivera, who lives in Queens and is now employed by a department store bridal registry on Long Island, a job she struggled to find after losing her position at Baccarat, according to Mr. Maya – was unwilling to be interviewed. Her current job pays her about $21,000 a year, much less than she received at Baccarat, where her salary was in the mid-$50,000 range, her lawyer said.

Case Details

Ms. Riviera’s troubles at Baccarat did not begin until Mr. Negre was installed, her lawyer said. She testified that Mr. Negre once called her into his office and told her that he did not like her accent, Mr. Maya said.  He said that testimony at the weeklong trial showed that Ms. Rivera, the mother of five children, had an exemplary record at the store and had never prompted a complaint from a customer in her nine years on the sales force.

In a letter introduced into evidence, a former store manager, J.D. Watts, described her as “the top sales person during my three-year tenure at Baccarat.” “She is fluent in Spanish and is extremely effective when dealing with South American and other Spanish-speaking customers,” Mr. Watts wrote.

Baccarat’s lawyer, Jeffrey H. Daichman, said that Ms. Rivera was one of five employees fired at roughly the same time because the company’s new president, Jean-Luc Negre, wanted to improve the store’s performance and introduce “a more positive dynamic and energetic attitude toward dealing with customers.” Mr. Negre also made the decision to make the store more inviting by moving it a half-block to a corner site at 59th Street and Madison Avenue, Mr. Daichman said.

After being named president of the company in 1999, Mr. Negre made seven visits to the store and found the sales force sitting at desks and slow to greet customers, Mr. Daichman said. Ms. Rivera “was not singled out” and was not criticized for speaking with an accent.

National Origin Discrimination

Mr. Daichman acknowledged that Ms. Rivera was ordered to refrain from speaking Spanish to a co-worker in the presence of customers. He said the policy was instituted after a customer complained. “It’s just a matter of common sense,” he said. “If the customer is not Spanish-speaking, don’t talk another language. That’s rude.”
There was no evidence other than her own testimony about national origin discrimination. “Baccarat has a diverse sales force that includes a Brazilian employee who speaks Spanish as well as Portuguese and three sales people 50 or older,” he said.

Mr. Daichman said the company would ask the Federal magistrate who presided over the case, James C. Francis, to set aside the verdict or order a new trial. The jury found that the company discriminated against Ms. Rivera and awarded her $125,000 in compensatory damages and $375,000 in punitive damages.

The New York Times Metro Section
By Terry Pristin – February 10, 1998

Enforcing a Non-Compete Agreement to Protect Software Company’s Confidential Information

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Weseley Software Development Corporation v. Burdette, 977 F. Supp. 137

Mr. Wesley Burdette worked for Weseley Development Corporation first as a Logistics Analyst and then as a Senior Logistics Analyst from May 1993 to September 16, 1996.  Weseley was a software development company based in Shelton, Connecticut whose focus product was a transportation and logistics management program referred to as TRACS (Tactical Routing and Consolidation System).  Mr. Burdette played a significant role in the development and testing of TRACS versions 3.0 and 3.1.  He worked with “customers and potential customers to evaluate, develop, tailor, and implement Weseley’s products” during his approximately three years of employment.

He gave Weseley his two weeks notice on August 29, 1996 and planned to switch companies to work for Manugistics for the marketing and sales of its product titled MTP.  Management reminded Mr. Burdette of the non-compete clause in his employment agreement that he had signed.

The most important covenants that he signed in conjunction with his employment contract were those not to compete or disclose confidential information.  The agreement was signed on January 14, 1995 after Mr. Burdette was allowed time to consult with an attorney regarding any and all of the agreement’s provisions.  The non-compete clause stipulated that he could not work for a competitor for a period of six months following his termination with Weseley or disclose confidential information for an indefinite period of time.

The company sued Mr. Burdette to enforce the non-compete and asked the court to enjoin him from further employment with Manugistics.  Mr. Burdette countered that the agreement was unenforceable because its provisions were unreasonable and that Weseley had only signed the agreement once litigation began.

The Court’s Decision

The court found in favor of Weseley and enforced the non-compete covenant, enjoining Mr. Burdette from working for Manugistics for a period of six months as stated in the language of the agreement.  It validated the agreement because there was adequate consideration in the form of “continued employment, an articulated paid vacation entitlement, a new entitlement to severance benefits, and stock options”.  Furthermore, it found the limitations to be reasonable such that they fairly balanced Weseley’s desire to protect its business and Mr. Burdette’s desire to still be able to pursue his career.

It was paramount that the court protected the company’s interests since Mr. Burdette had a great deal of access to proprietary research & development information that could have severely disadvantaged Weseley should Mr. Burdette have shared the information with Manugistics.  Although the court stated that there was no evidence that he had already disclosed confidential information, it held that he would inadvertently draw upon his knowledge gained while employed at Weseley and eventually disclose some amount, however small it may be, in the course of his new employment with Manugistics.

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The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Sexual Harassment Under Connecticut Law

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Under the Connecticut Discriminatory Employment Practices Act, codified at Connecticut General Statute 46a-60(a)(8), it shall be a discriminatory practice “[f]or an employer [. . .] to harass any employee, person seeking employment or member on the basis of sex or gender identity or expression.  ‘Sexual harassment shall, for the purposes of this section be defined as any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any conduct of a sexual nature when (A) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (B) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (C) such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.”[1]

Sexual harassment can include actions ranging from suggestive or lewd remarks to unwelcome hugs, touches, or kisses, to retaliation for complaining about sexual harassment.  Furthermore, sexual harassment can happen by a male or a female, to a male or a female.  And the harasser does not need to be the victim’s supervisor – harassment can come from a co-worker or agent.

There are outlets in Connecticut to turn to, should you find yourself with questions about sexual harassment.  Sometimes a victim may not be sure if unwanted attention rises to the level of sexual harassment.  The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities provides valuable information on sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace, including step-by-step guides on how to proceed if you are the victim of such harassment.  If the situation requires legal action, please contact an experienced employment law attorney.

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The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. We at Maya Murphy frequently litigate employment claims in both state and federal courts.  Should you have any questions about sexual harassment or any other employment law matter or to schedule a consultation, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut, by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.

[1] Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-60(a)(8).