FAIRFIELD — Three minority students at Fairfield High School – arrested after a brawl last February in the school’s parking lot –plan to sue the town, claiming they were singled out for arrest because of their race and ethnicity. Continue Reading
In a New York District decision earlier this year, a student’s cause of action under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act against the Monroe-Woodbury School District was denied because it did not show deliberate indifference in response to the student’s claim of student-to-student sexual harassment.
Parents on behalf of their fifteen year old daughter brought suit against Monroe–Woodbury Central School District pursuant to Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that she was deprived of an educational environment free from sexual harassment as required by federal law.
Beginning in January 2010, when she was in the eighth grade, the student was subjected to teasing, taunting, and physical bullying by other students, which she reported to her guidance counselor. She was sexually assaulted by a male classmate who requested a handjob and subsequently ran her hands over the genital area of his pants and attempted to shove her hands down his pants. As a result of the incident, the student alleges that she was subjected to more taunting and name-calling by other students and in response began to engage in self- injurious behavior by cutting herself. When she began attending Monroe–Woodbury High School in September, another student and friend of the first continued to harass her and in November sexually assaulted her by pinning her against a locker and pushing his hands down her pants and blouse, touching her genital area and breast. The student began missing school frequently to avoid continued harassment. At some point she confided in her guidance counselor that her absenteeism and self-injurious behavior was the result of the persistent teasing and the two incidents of sexual assault by her classmates.
The School District recommended that she attend the GO Program, an out-of-district academic program, to which her parents agreed. After her first day there, CF reported to her parents that she was uncomfortable with this placement because the students there were “in many cases, not attending their regular high schools due to serious disciplinary records and incidents.” When her parents again met with the principal, they requested that their daughter be transferred to another public school to continue her high school education. The principal refused saying there were no other options besides the GO program.
The parent brought suit alleging the school failed to: (1) initiate an investigation upon the parents’ verbal complaint; (2) conduct a prompt, equitable, and thorough investigation of the charges; (3) ensure that immediate corrective action be taken, including subjecting the offending individuals to appropriate disciplinary measures; and (4) inform CF of her right to pursue legal remedies.
Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Title IX contains an implied private right of action for plaintiffs who bring suit against educational institutions that receive federal funding, and liability may be imposed upon a school district if it is found to be in violation of this law.
Title IX funding recipients may be held liable for student-on-student harassment if the plaintiff can establish damages only where the school district: (1) was deliberately indifferent; (2) to sexual harassment; (3) of which it had actual knowledge; (4) that was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprived the victim of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school. A showing of deliberate indifference requires that the school had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment and either responded in a “clearly unreasonable manner in light of the known circumstances,” or responded with remedial action only after a “lengthy and unjustified delay.”
The Court rejected the plaintiff’s assertions that the GO Program was an “inappropriate” placement for her because it did not provide her with a “regular high school environment.” Saying even if it was inappropriate, “Title IX simply does not require recipient school districts to provide students with a ‘regular high school environment.’ Title IX does not prescribe any particular educational experience at all. Rather, Title IX merely prohibits schools from excluding anyone, on the basis of sex, from participating in an educational program that receives federal assistance; or denying the benefits of such programs on the basis of sex; or subjecting anyone in such programs to discrimination on the basis of sex.” Finding that the school did not cause the discrimination and the School District took some remedial action (not clearly unreasonable under the circumstances) in response to the student’s complaints, the Court dismissed the action.
Bullying and harassment in school should never be tolerated. The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable education law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. Should you have any questions about bullying, student harassment, school liability or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut, by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.
 KF ex rel. CF v. Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 12 CIV. 2200 ER, 2013 WL 177911 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2013)
 Compl.¶¶ 10-11
 Compl.¶¶ 12-13
 Compl.¶¶ 14
 Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
 Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282, 1293 (11th Cir.2007)
 Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 751 (2d Cir.2003)
 KF ex rel. CF v. Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist.
Here in Connecticut and across the nation, employees from all walks of life routinely face unlawful discriminatory practices and treatment in the workplace. Depending on the nature of the claim, he or she may file civil lawsuits under Title VII (which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin) or the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA).
However, employees need to keep in mind that before they seek recourse with the courts, they must first exhaust all of their administrative remedies. “The exhaustion requirement exists to afford the administrative agency the opportunity to investigate, mediate, and take remedial action.” Failure to do so will result in dismissal of the case (see, for example, this previously-discussed case).
Furthermore, employees must pay attention to statutory time restrictions for filing administrative charges under Title VII and CFEPA:
To sustain a claim for unlawful discrimination under Title VII in a deferral state such as Connecticut, a plaintiff must file administrative charges with the EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunities Commission] within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory acts. … CFEPA requires that a complainant file the administrative charge with the CCHRO [Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities] within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.
Courts are particularly cognizant of these requirements and endorse “strict adherence… [as] the best guarantee of the evenhanded administration of the law.” As a result, the time bar will begin running for each individual adverse employment action against the employee on the date it occurred. Failure to timely file a claim may prevent it from being reviewed by the EEOC or CCHRO.
However, employees often endure discriminatory practices over a prolonged period of time, so even if alleged conduct falls outside of the charging period, it may be reviewable. An important exception to strict adherence is the continuing violation exception, which involves incidents occurring both within and outside the time bar. A continuing violation occurs “where there is proof of specific ongoing discriminatory policies or practices, or where specific and related instances of discrimination are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice.”
As an employee, it is imperative that you understand Connecticut’s statutory scheme surrounding hiring, evaluation, and termination processes, as well as the requirements for filing a lawsuit under State and federal anti-discrimination law. The attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C., assist clients in Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, and Westport. If you have any questions regarding any employment law matter, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut (located in Fairfield County), by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.
 Stewart v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 762 F.2d 193, 198 (2d. Cir. 1985).
 Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d 133, 136 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000).
 Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-82e.
 Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980).
 Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1994).
Most people who have lived for some period of time here in Connecticut are amply familiar with the Lady Huskies and Lady Vols fierce decade-long rivalry. Before regular season matches discontinued five years ago, these games were the highlight of the season. Thus, fans have come to form a love-hate relationship with Pat Summitt, Head Coach of the Lady Vols who has the most wins of any (both male and female) NCAA basketball coach. It came as a shock to hear on April 18, 2012, after thirty-eight years of coaching, Summitt would be retiring from her post after being diagnosed with early-onset dementia-Alzheimer’s disease just before the start of the 2011-2012 season. “I’ve loved being the head coach at Tennessee for 38 years, but I recognize that the time has come to move into the future and to step into a new role,” explained Summitt.
As it turns out, the decision may not have been entirely that of Summitt.
In a recently released affidavit, Summitt revealed that on March 14, 2012, she met with the University of Tennessee (UT) Athletics Director David Hart, who informed her that she would no longer be the coaching the Lady Vols. Summitt further explained:
This was very surprising to me and very hurtful as that was a decision I would have liked to have made on my own at the end of the season after consulting with my family, doctors, colleagues, and friends and not be told this by Mr. Hart. I felt this was wrong.
UT spokeswoman Margie Nichols denied allegations that Summitt was forced out of her position. “It’s absolutely not true… It was Pat’s idea to become the head coach emeritus. I think she made that really clear at her press conference earlier this year.” Regardless, this leaves many asking: was Summitt forced to resign because of her disability?
Under Connecticut law, employees enjoy a very comprehensive statutory scheme (found here) prohibiting discriminatory practices in the workplace. Unless the employer and its agents (such as administration or management) have a “bona fide occupational qualification or need,” it is a violation of the General Statutes:
To refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness.
In addition, employees enjoy federal protection of their rights through such legislation as the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Family Medical Leave Act, to name just a few.
Discrimination on the basis of disability or another protected class is unfortunately a common occurrence in the workplace, but its prevalence in no way makes it lawful. If you are a teacher, coach, or any employee and you find yourself being the target of adverse employment action on any of the above bases, it is imperative that you consult an experienced and knowledgeable school or employment law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding employment discrimination or other education law or employment law matters, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut (located in Fairfield County), by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.
 “Pat Summitt’s Early-Onset Dementia: Lady Vols Coach Resigns Less Than A Year After Diagnosis.” Published April 18, 2012. Accessed October 5, 2012: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/18/pat-summitt-dementia-early-onset-alzheimers-memory_n_1435380.html
 “Affidavit of Coach Pat Head Summitt.” Accessed October 5, 2012: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/452632-pat-summitts-affidavit.html
 “Pat Summitt Affidavit: Ex-Tennessee Coach Initially Felt Forced Out Of Job Over Early-Onset Dementia,” by Steve Megargee. Published October 3, 2012. Accessed October 5, 2012: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/04/pat-summitt-affidavit-tennessee-coach-job_n_1937730.html
 Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-60(a). Accessed October 5, 2012: http://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap814c.htm#Sec46a-60.htm
Alleging racial discrimination, three minority students at Fairfield High School — arrested in February after a fight broke out in the school parking lot — plan to sue the town, claiming they were singled out base upon their “ethnicity and national origin.” Continue Reading
SEPTEMBER 20 @ 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM
Lauren A. Jacobson, Esq. and Robert G. Brody, Esq. will be presenting “New Laws Impacting Connecticut Employers – What you Need to Know” for the Fairfield County Bar Association.
About the Program
The Connecticut General Assembly recently enacted a number of significant employment laws at the end of its recent regular and special sessions that will dramatically affect our state. This program will highlight the most prominent legislation passed, and provide important updates on what employers need to know. Topics will include, among others:
- Mandatory Salary Range Disclosure for Applicants and Employees
- New Sex Wage Discrimination Standard: Moving from “Equal” to “Comparable” Work
- Covid Recall-by-Seniority Law for Certain Employees Laid Off in the Hotel, Food Service and Building Service Industries
- New Workplace Rules for Regulating Recreational Marijuana
- New Breastfeeding Guidelines
- The CROWN ACT- “Creating A Respectful And Open World For Natural Hair” – Protection Again Discrimination Based on Race-Based Hair Styles
Click here to register.
A Bronx school employee is suing the Board of Education for $100 million for employment discrimination – saying she was denied a transfer, even though officials knew she was being harassed by her boss. Continue Reading
The city’s Board of Education settled a discrimination and retaliation lawsuit brought by a former Bronx School Board employee last week for $100,000. Continue Reading
In Robert J. Reby & Co. v. Byrne, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2115, Mr. Patrick Byrne worked at Robert J. Reby & Co., a financial firm in Danbury, Connecticut, as a registered investment advisor from June 2005 to July 2005. The company advises high net worth individuals and families in the areas of trusts, wealth management, and taxation. Mr. Byrne signed an employment contract with Robert J. Reby & Co. wherein it contained a non-compete agreement that stipulated he be prohibited from soliciting the company’s clients or disclosing any of its confidential information in the event of his termination. Following Mr. Byrne’s short employment with Robert J. Reby & Co. he began to work at Aspetuck Financial Management, LLC, a wealth management firm based in Westport. Robert J. Reby & Co. alleged that Mr. Byrne solicited its clients for his new firm, Aspetuck, in direct violation of the non-compete agreement. Mr. Byrne countered that the provisions of the non-compete were unreasonable in the sense that it placed an excessive restraint on his trade and prevented him from pursuing his occupation.
The court held that the non-compete agreement between Mr. Byrne and Robert J. Reby & Co. contained reasonable terms and was enforceable. It failed to see any merits in Mr. Byrne’s claim that the agreement was too broad and created an insurmountable occupational hardship. The provisions of the agreement only restricted a very small segment of Mr. Byrne’s occupational activities. The terms he agreed to only prevented him from soliciting the specific and limited group of people that were clients of Robert J. Reby & Co.. The court held that the covenant was not a pure anti-competitive clause because it did not prevent him from engaging in the investment services industry as a whole. This limited scope with regard to the prohibition levied upon Mr. Byrne caused the agreement to be reasonable and therefore enforceable.
The court also took time to discuss the public policy behind finding the non-compete agreement enforceable and establishing the legitimacy of the agreement. Companies, according to the court, have a legitimate interest in protecting their business operations by preventing former employees from exploiting or appropriating the goodwill of its clients that it developed at its own, and not the employees’, expense.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment contract, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.
Keywords: anti-compete, excessive restraint, financial form, goodwill, investment adviser, investment service industry, legitimacy, new firm, occupational hardship, prohibition, pursuing occupation, former employer, previous employer, job responsibilities, binding, classified information, commercial operations, competing, compete, directly, employer’s interest, indirectly, internet-based, protect, reasonable, restricting disclosures, restricting disclosures, similar products, burden of proof, direct competitor, disclosure of trade secrets, employment contract, enforceability, geographic limitations, headquarters, improper competition, injunction, management responsibilities, non-compete covenant, radius, sales representative, time limitations, unreasonable provisions, attorney, attorneys, employment attorneys, bonus, bonuses, companies, company, connecticut, customary practices, Darien, departing employees, directors, employee, employer, employment law, employment at-will, at-will, legal counsel, executives, New York, Fairfield, Fairfield County, Norwalk, Westport, Weston, Easton, Bridgeport, Stamford, Stratford, severance package, Greenwich, harassment, discrimination, hiring, human resources, job offers, lawyer, lawyers, leaving company, leverage, Maya Murphy, negotiated, negotiating severance packages, negotiation, New Canaan, non-compete, non-competition, non-disparagement, non-solicitation, offer, offer agreement, offer letter, P.C., payroll, position, represent, representation, salary, salaries, senior management, manager, separation agreement, severance agreements, severance letters, severance package, termination, vacation, vesting, vesting of stock options, law firm, public interest, monopoly, start own business, voluntary, voluntarily left, mediation, burdensome, excessive, geographical, occupation, practice, territorial, violation, restrictive, proprietary knowledge, scope, narrow, broad,
In Custard Insurance Adjusters v. Nardi, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1003, Mr. Robert Nardi worked at Allied Adjustment Services’ Orange, CT office beginning in September 1982 as the vice president of marketing, overseeing the adjustment of claims for insurance companies and self-insurers. The company had Mr. Nardi sign non-compete and confidentiality agreements as a term of his employment. The agreements established that he could not solicit or accept claims within a fifty-mile radius of Allied’s Orange office for a period of two years following his termination. The agreements further specified that the names and contact information of Allied’s clients were the company’s confidential property. The choice of law provision stated that Massachusetts law would be controlling (Allied had its headquarters in Massachusetts). On September 1, 1997, Allied sold its business and all its assets, including its non-compete agreements, to Custard Insurance Adjusters. Mr. Nardi became increasingly worried about future employment at Custard when the company restructured its compensation format, allegedly decreasing his annual income by 25%. At this point, Mr. Nardi began to inquire about employment at other companies and in particular contacted Mr. John Markle, the president of Mark Adjustment, with whom he had a previous professional history. He also arranged meetings between Mr. Markle and four other current Custard employees to discuss switching companies. While the companies are competitors in the insurance industry, Mark’s business was restricted to the New England region while Custard operated nationally. Custard terminated Mr. Nardi and asked the court to enforce the non-compete agreement.
The court first sought to tackle the issue of the choice of law provision since it designated Massachusetts law as controlling but this lawsuit was brought in Connecticut state court. The court asserted its authority over the issue and case because it could not ascertain any “difference between the courts of Connecticut and Massachusetts in their interpretation of the common law tort breach of fiduciary obligation brought against a former officer of a corporation”. The court emphasized that above all else, the legal issue at hand was that of contractual obligations and a company’s business operations. It asserted its authority in this respect by stating it believed “that the Massachusetts courts interpret the tort of tortious interference with contractual and business relationships the same way our [Connecticut’s] courts do”. Additionally, the court cited that the application of Massachusetts law would undermine Connecticut’s policy to afford legal effect to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) and Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), two-state statutes used by Custard to sue Mr. Nardi.
Next, the court addressed the enforceability of the non-compete agreement signed by Mr. Nardi and Allied. Mr. Nardi contended that the provisions of the agreement were only binding upon the signatory parties (himself and Allied) and that Custard lacked the authority to enforce its provisions. He asked the court to deny Custard’s request to enforce the non-compete because it was “based on trust and confidence” between the signatory parties and “was thus not assignable”. The court rejected this train of thought because the non-compete explicitly contained an assignability clause and it held that the non-compete covenant was properly and legally transferred to Custard under Massachusetts law.
Mr. Nardi based a substantial portion of his defense on the claim that Custard violated, and therefore invalidated, the agreement when it modified his compensation format. He alleged that he was the victim of unjustified reductions in his professional responsibilities and compensation following Custard’s acquisition of Allied in 1997. Mr. Nardi however was still an executive at the new company despite a reduction in rank and he himself had expressed excitement about becoming an executive at a national, instead of a regional, company.
The court ultimately found the non-compete to be valid and enforceable, therefore granting Custard’s request for injunctive relief. It assessed the facts of the case and Mr. Nardi’s current position to amend the time restriction of the agreement, however. Taking into account that he was starting a family and had a young child in conjunction with estimates that the full restrictions could amount to a 60-70% loss of business for Mr. Nardi, the court reduced the time limitation from two years to six months. The court concluded that while the provisions were reasonable at face value, they could have unforeseen consequences that would have severely impaired Mr. Nardi’s ability to make a living in order to provide for his family.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.