Posts tagged with "divorce decree"

Can I Stipulate in My Divorce for There to Be No Unmarried Cohabitation While Our Child Is Present in Connecticut?

You may include a morality clause in your divorce decree if you so choose.  The court is generally most concern with the best interests of the child involved in the divorce.  For this reason, a court is only likely to agree to such a clause if it is shown to be in the best interests of the child.  As my colleagues have stated, the issue may become whether the clause is enforceable once it has been violated.  Again, this will depend on what is in the best interest of the child.  If a court finds this request unreasonable and to have no impact on the child it will likely be unenforceable.

If you have any questions regarding divorce in Connecticut, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at (203) 221-3100 or e-mail him directly at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Can I Stipulate in My Divorce for There to Be No Unmarried Cohabitation While Our Child Is Present in Connecticut?

You may include a morality clause in your divorce decree if you so choose.  The court is generally most concern with the best interests of the child involved in the divorce.  For this reason, a court is only likely to agree to such a clause if it is shown to be in the best interests of the child.  As my colleagues have stated, the issue may become whether the clause is enforceable once it has been violated.  Again, this will depend on what is in the best interest of the child.  If a court finds this request unreasonable and to have no impact on the child it will likely be unenforceable.

If you have any questions regarding divorce in Connecticut, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at (203) 221-3100 or e-mail him directly at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

My Child Has Been Moved Out-of-State and May Be Suffering from Abuse, What Should I Do?

If you believe that your child is the victim of abuse you should contact the Department of Children and Families (DCF) and the authorities immediately to report the abuse.  If your child is no longer living in Connecticut DCF may not be able to assist because they are a Connecticut resource.  It would be beneficial to contact a similar resource in whatever state your child is currently residing in.

Further, if your child has been moved out of Connecticut, their residency has been affected.  Jurisdiction will depend on where your child is currently residing.  Regardless of where your child has been relocated to, your divorce decree will still be valid in Connecticut and should be recognized in every state.  You may need to register your Connecticut divorce decree in the new state as an out-of-state judgment in order to have it enforced.

This is a complex issue as you are now possibly dealing with court systems in two different states.  A family attorney will be able to educate you on your rights and options in this situation.  If you have any questions related to family law in Connecticut, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at (203) 221-3100 or e-mail him directly at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

My Child Has Been Moved Out-of-State and May Be Suffering from Abuse, What Should I Do?

If you believe that your child is the victim of abuse you should contact the Department of Children and Families (DCF) and the authorities immediately to report the abuse.  If your child is no longer living in Connecticut DCF may not be able to assist because they are a Connecticut resource.  It would be beneficial to contact a similar resource in whatever state your child is currently residing in.

Further, if your child has been moved out of Connecticut, their residency has been affected.  Jurisdiction will depend on where your child is currently residing.  Regardless of where your child has been relocated to, your divorce decree will still be valid in Connecticut and should be recognized in every state.  You may need to register your Connecticut divorce decree in the new state as an out-of-state judgment in order to have it enforced.

This is a complex issue as you are now possibly dealing with court systems in two different states.  A family attorney will be able to educate you on your rights and options in this situation.  If you have any questions related to family law in Connecticut, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at (203) 221-3100 or e-mail him directly at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Undistributed Income of a Spendthrift Trust is Excluded from Alimony Determinations

Taylor v. Taylor, 978 A.2d 538 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009)

In a case before the Appellate Court of Connecticut, an ex-wife appealed a trial court ruling that reduced her ex-husband’s alimony obligations on the basis of her status as the beneficiary of a supplementary spendthrift trust. The appellate court reversed the trial court ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In April 2002, the couple’s forty-year marriage was dissolved. The judgment of dissolution contained provisions that required the ex-husband to pay $5,000 per month to his ex-wife as alimony, and that permitted the court to take a second look at the alimony obligation on the ex-husband’s 65th birthday or upon the death of his father, which ever occurred first. In 2006, after both events occurred, the ex-husband filed a motion to modify his alimony obligation. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the ex-wife was an income beneficiary of a trust in which the settlor’s primary intent was to provide generously for her care and maintenance, commonly known as a “spendthrift trust.” The court also found that this trust earned more than enough income to provide for the ex-wife’s care and maintenance without any invasion of the principal. On the basis of its findings regarding the ex-wife’s status as a trust beneficiary, the court granted the ex-husband’s motion and modified the ex-wife’s alimony to $1 per year, retroactive to the date the motion was served. The ex-wife appealed the trial court decision.

According to Connecticut case law, a court’s role in the construction of a trust instrument is to determine the meaning of what the grantor stated in the trust instrument and not to speculate upon what the grantor intended to state in the instrument. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Lyman, 148 Conn. 273, 278-79, 170 A.2d 130 (1961). Expressed intent must control the court’s interpretation of the instrument. Therefore, the plain language of the trust instrument itself, rather than extrinsic evidence of actual intent, is determinative of the grantors’ intent. Cooley v. Cooley, 32 Conn.App. 152, 159, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 901 (1993) (citing Heffernan v. Freedman, 177 Conn. 476, 481, 418 A.2d 895 (1979). The provisions of the trust of which the ex-wife was a beneficiary classify it as a supplementary spendthrift trust: “[T]he trustees shall pay to or for the benefit of [the ex-wife]… so much of the net income thereof as the Trustees, in their sole discretion, deem advisable for the comfortable maintenance of said child.”

In the case of a spendthrift trust which provided the beneficiary with only such sums as the trustee deems necessary for the beneficiary’s support, no title passes in the income passes to the beneficiary until the beneficiary receives a distribution from the trust. Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 35–36, 47 A.2d 865 (1946), quoting Reilly v. State, 119 Conn. 508, 512, 177 A. 528 (1935). Therefore, the appellate court determined that, until the ex-wife receives a distribution from her supplementary spendthrift trust, the undistributed trust income cannot be considered for the purposes of determining an alimony award. Furthermore, a court can only control the exercise of discretion by the trustee of a spendthrift trust when an abuse of discretion has occurred. Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social Services, 179 Conn. 83, 89, 425 A.2d 553 (1979). In the instant case, there has been no claim that the trustees have abused their discretion in not making distributions to the ex-wife.

In examining the provisions of the ex-wife’s spendthrift trust, the appellate court concluded that the trial court improperly interpreted the provisions of the trust agreement when, in effect, it assumed that the trustees were obligated to distribute income to the ex-wife, in her capacity as trust beneficiary. The court could not compel the trustees to make income payments and consider the unreceived income in modifying the alimony order. Furthermore, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to consider the undistributed trust assets as income to the ex-wife when the court considered and applied the statutory factors for the determination of alimony. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-82. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly applied the law when it ordered the ex-wife’s alimony to be reduced because it could not reduce alimony based on a finding that the supplementary spendthrift trust earned enough to provide for the ex-wife’s support.

Because the appellate court agreed that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly crafting an order that tacitly compelled the trustees to make distributions of the trust to the ex-wife, the appellate court reversed the trial court ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with the law.

Should you have any questions relating to trusts or other personal asset protection issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Susan Maya, at SMaya@Mayalaw.com or 203-221-3100, and Attorney Russell Sweeting, at RSweeting@Mayalaw.com or 203-221-3100, in the Maya Murphy office in Westport, Fairfield County, Connecticut.
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Our family law firm in Westport Connecticut serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton. We have the best divorce attorneys and family attorneys in CT on staff that can help with your Connecticut divorce or New York divorce today.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to a divorce law attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100. We offer free divorce consultation as well as free consultation on all other familial matters. Divorce in CT and divorce in NYC is difficult, but education is power. Call our family law office in CT today.

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Post Petition Divorce Property Settlement May Not Impact Spouses’ Homestead Exemptions in Bankruptcy Court

In re Gasztold, 11-21287, 2011 WL 5075440 (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 25, 2011)

In re Gasztold, 11-21287 ASD, 2011 WL 3607903 (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 16, 2011)

In two related cases before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut, the Bankruptcy Court upheld a debtor-wife’s right to claim a homestead exemption in the primary residence that she owned and occupied as of the bankruptcy petition date, even though the post-petition divorce decree required the debtor-husband to buy out her interest in the residence.

In April 2011, the debtor-husband and debtor-wife jointly filed a petition for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. The debtors listed their jointly owned marital residence as a real property asset. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.§ 522(b)(3), they claimed personal exemptions in accordance with Connecticut state law, including a homestead exemption of $125,900 for the unencumbered fair market value of marital residence. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-352b(t).

In May 2011, after filing the bankruptcy petition, the debtors divorced. The property settlement under the state court judgment of dissolution provided that the debtor-husband obtain financing and pay the debtor-wife $62,950 for the value of her one-half interest in the marital residence and, upon payment, the debtor-wife quitclaim her interest in the property to the debtor-husband. The settlement further provided that if the debtor-husband was unable to obtain financing, the couple would sell the property and divide the proceeds.

In August 2011, the Chapter 7 trustee filed an objection to the debtor-wife’s claim of a homestead objection. The trustee also filed a motion to compel filing of a supplemental schedule by the debtor-wife to capture the cash payment from her husband that was ordered in the property settlement to liquidate her interest in the residence.

In Connecticut, any “natural person” is entitled to claim an exemption for his homestead up to $75,000, which is calculated based on the fair market value of the property less the amount of any statutory or consensual lien. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52–352b(t) (2009). A “homestead” is defined as “owner-occupied real property … used as a primary residence.” Id. at § 52–352a (e) (2005) Case law has further refined this definition to establish three requirements for real property to constitute an individual’s statutory homestead: (1) the individual must “own[ ]” the subject real property within the meaning of Section 52–352a as of the relevant time; (2) the individual must “occup[y] ” the subject real property within the meaning of Section 52–352a as of the relevant time; and (3) the subject real property must be “used as a primary residence” within the meaning of Section 52–352a as of the relevant time. In re Kujan, 286 B.R. 216, 220–21 (Bankr.D.Conn.2002); see also KLC, Inc. v. Trayner, 426 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Kujan as “setting out ‘homestead’ requirements for invocation of homestead exemption”).

The Bankruptcy Court established that the “relevant time” for determining entitlement to an exemption is the date that the bankruptcy petition was filed. At that time, the debtor-wife owned the property, occupied the property, and used the property as her primary residence. Therefore, her interest in the property satisfied the requirements for her to be entitled to a homestead exemption. Because this entitlement existed as of the petition date, the Bankruptcy Court overruled the Chapter 7 trustee’s objection to the debtor-wife’s homestead exemption.

The Chapter 7 trustee also argued that the cash payment to the debtor-wife required by the property settlement after the petition date was a new asset and, therefore, must be included in the debtor-wife’s estate. According to the federal bankruptcy code, the estate subject to bankruptcy proceedings includes any interest in property that would have been property of the estate “if such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the petition, and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after such date…as a result of a property settlement agreement with the debtor’s spouse, or of an interlocutory or final divorce decree. 11 U.S.C. § 541. However, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that the cash payment that the debtor-wife received to liquidate her interest in the marital residence was not a new asset acquired after the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings; the court characterized this payment as the proceeds of her exempt interest in the marital residence, which had been included and subsequently withdrawn from the estate. The property settlement did not alter the net value of the debtor-wife’s post-petition assets and liabilities, only the form of such interests. The Bankruptcy Court concurred with the majority of courts, holding that property exempted from the estate after the petition date does not re-enter the estate as a result of having changed form, even if the property in its new form may not be entitled to a state law exemption. Although the Connecticut exemption statutes initially determine whether, as of the petition date, a debtor’s interest in property is exempt from the claims of pre-petition creditors, the federal bankruptcy code protects the exempt property from these claims. 11 U.S.C. § 502. Because the settlement agreement did not add assets to the debtor-wife’s estate, the Bankruptcy Court denied the Chapter 7 trustee’s motion to compel a supplemental filing.

Based on common law, Connecticut statutory law and federal bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Court determined that the debtor-wife’s ownership, occupation and use of the marital residence prior to filing the bankruptcy petition was sufficient to entitle her to a homestead exemption for this interest and, once exempted from the bankruptcy estate, this interest could not re-enter the estate even if it changed form from real property to cash.

Should you have any questions relating to marital, bankruptcy or asset protection issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Susan Maya, at SMaya@Mayalaw.com or 203-221-3100, and Attorney Russell Sweeting, at RSweeting@Mayalaw.com or 203-221-3100, in the Maya Murphy office in Westport, Fairfield County, Connecticut.
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Our family law firm in Westport Connecticut serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton. We have the best divorce attorneys and family attorneys in CT on staff that can help with your Connecticut divorce or New York divorce today.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to a divorce law attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100. We offer free divorce consultation as well as free consultation on all other familial matters. Divorce in CT and divorce in NYC is difficult, but education is power. Call our family law office in CT today.

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Court Decides Issue of First Impression Regarding Payment of College Expenses

In a recent decision, a Connecticut Superior Court addressed an issue of first impression regarding the payment of college expenses, namely whether the Connecticut Superior Courts have the authority to enter an educational support order for a child that has reached the age of majority when entering a child support order for a minor child. The parties in this particular case were married in Chile and had two children before obtaining a divorce (also in Chile) in 1991. The Chilean divorce decree did not contain any provisions regarding child support or the payment of college expenses.

The parties subsequently moved to the United States, and in February 2012, the children’s mother filed a motion requesting that the father pay child support for their minor son and also contribute toward the cost of their older daughter’s college expenses. When the mother filed the motion, the parties’ son was fourteen and the parties’ daughter was eighteen.

Generally speaking, C.G.S.A. § 46b-56c authorizes a court to issue an educational support order requiring a parent to provide support for a child or children to attend for up to a total of four full academic years an institution of higher education or a private occupational school for the purpose of attaining a bachelor’s or other undergraduate degree, or other appropriate vocational instruction. The statute provides that a court, on motion or petition of a parent, may enter an educational support order at the time of entering: a decree of dissolution, legal separation or annulment; an order for support pendente lite; a support order where parents of a minor child live separately; or a judgment of paternity. However, the statute also provides that, “On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entering an order pursuant to any other provision of the general statutes authorizing the court to make an order of support for a child…” As the Court in this case explained, at any of those points, “[a]n educational support order may be entered with respect to any child who has not attained twenty-three years of age . . .”

In the aforementioned case, the Court held that the provisions of §46b-56c clearly provide that an educational support order may be entered with respect to any child who has not attained twenty-three years of age at the time the court enters an order of support pursuant to any provision of the General Statutes. According to the Court, nothing in the plain language of §46b-56c(b)(4) requires that the educational support order be issued for the same child for whom the support order is being entered. Additionally, nothing in the statutory language suggests that the court’s authority to enter an educational support order for a child that has reached the age of majority is limited in cases where a parent’s younger child qualifies for support.

Should you have any questions regarding educational support orders, or divorce matters in general, please feel free to contact Attorney Michael D. DeMeola, Esq. He can be reached in the firm’s Westport office at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at mdemeola@gmail.com.

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Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act Applies to Property Distributed by a Divorce Decree

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act Applies to Property Distributed by a Divorce Decree

Canty v. Otto, 41 A.3d 280 (Conn. 2012)

In a recent case before the Connecticut Supreme Court, the former wife of a convicted felon appealed a trial court ruling granting prejudgment relief to the administratrix of a homicide victim’s estate by challenging the administratrix’s right to recover against her as a creditor under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”). The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court ruling.

In early 2007, the local and state police began to investigate the former wife’s husband in connection with the disappearance of a woman with whom he had been involved outside of the marriage. In mid-April, the husband transferred $8,000 from a joint marital account to an account that was held solely in his wife’s name. Within a week of the transfer, the police found the remains of the missing woman on a Connecticut property that was co-owned by the husband and his son. After this discovery, the husband and wife went together to the Department of Motor Vehicles to transfer title to a jointly owned vehicle solely to the wife, and traveled to Massachusetts to transfer title in residential property to the wife. The husband made these transfers without valuable consideration. Within a week of completing the property transfers, the wife contacted an attorney to file a dissolution action, which was commenced the same day and filed within a week. Pursuant to the dissolution action, a notice of lis pendens was filed against the husband’s interest in two Connecticut properties. Afterward, the estate of the deceased woman commenced a wrongful death action against the husband. In May 2007, the state arrested him and charged him with one count of murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence.

In June 2007, after a full hearing on the wrongful death action, the administratrix of the deceased woman’s estate obtained a prejudgment order against the husband in the amount of $4.5 million. During this hearing, the trial court found probable cause to believe that the former wife did not truly intend to divorce her husband but rather intended to conspire with him to obtain a judgment of dissolution that would shield his assets from the victim’s estate. The trial court also found that the husband transferred assets shortly before the commencement of the dissolution action with specific intent to defraud his creditors, among which was the estate of the deceased. Finally, the court found that the former husband had encouraged and facilitated his former wife’s institution of a dissolution action against him and did not seriously contest those proceeding in order to ensure that most or all of his assets could not be reached by the deceased’s estate in the wrongful death action.

The administratrix moved to intervene in the couple’s dissolution action to assert her rights as a creditor of the husband; the motion was denied and later dismissed on appeal. In June 2008, the trial court issued a judgment of dissolution which included the division of marital property. The former wife received all of the real property, and the former husband received an automobile, some shares of stock and the remaining balance of his retirement funds. The former husband was convicted of murder in November 2008.

After the judgment in the wrongful death hearing, the administratrix filed an action against the former wife to recover against her under the UFTA and applied for a prejudgment remedy. In February 2010, the trial court hearing the motion for a prejudgment remedy concluded that there was probable cause to show that the assets transferred from the husband to the wife through the dissolution action were fraudulent actions. In doing so, that court adopted the prior decision of the trial court, concluded that a dissolution judgment would be subject to a claim under the UFTA and awarded a prejudgment remedy in the amount of $670,000. The former wife filed a motion for reconsideration in which she alleged that the amount of the prejudgment remedy was higher than the amount alleged to have been transferred. In April 2010, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it agreed with the former wife that her one-half interest in the marital property could not be the subject of a fraudulent transfer and reduced the amount of the prejudgment remedy to $552,000.

The former wife appealed. She contended that the administratrix, as a creditor of her debtor spouse, cannot collect the debt from her, the non-debtor spouse, by bringing an action under the UFTA, Conn. Gen. Sta. §§ 52-552a et seq. The former wife first claimed that the distribution of marital assets in a dissolution decree was an equitable determination as to which portion of the marital estate each party was entitled and not a transfer as defined in the UFTA. The former wife alleged that characterizing the distribution as a transfer and allowing the administratrix to bring a claim under the UFTA would disturb the distribution that was carefully crafted by the trial court and would create further complications for distributing marital property. Second, the former wife alleged that the trial court’s determination that the dissolution was undertaken with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the estate of Smith was clearly erroneous and was not supported by evidence in the record. Finally, the former wife alleged that the administratrix was improperly attempting to obtain a modification of a marital property distribution, which was prohibited under Connecticut law governing the assignment of property pursuant to a dissolution decree and modification of such judgments.

In Connecticut, the UFTA requires three elements for a creditor to claim recovery: (1) the debtor made a transfer or incurred an obligation; (2) the transfer is made after the creditor’s claim arose; and (3) the debtor made the transfer with the actual intent to “hinder, delay or defraud” the creditor. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52–552e. UFTA defines the term “transfer” very broadly, including “every mode … voluntary or involuntary…of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-522b(12). Such a transfer is fraudulent under the UFTA if the creditor’s claim arose before the transfer was made and the debtor made the transfer with requisite actual intent. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552e.

The Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of the UFTA supports the conclusion that distribution of property in a dissolution decree is a transfer under the UFTA. The federal bankruptcy code defines “transfer,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D), using terminology similar to the UFTA, and bankruptcy courts characterize property settlements pursuant to divorce decrees as transfers of property. The court further supported this conclusion with reference to the statute governing assignment of property and conveyance of title in dissolution actions, Conn. Gen. Stat § 46b-81, which uses terms such as “assign,” “pass title,” “vest title,” and “conveyance.” Case law in other jurisdictions expressly rejects the allegation that characterizing the distribution of assets in a dissolution decree as a transfer would disturb the court’s equitable determination. The Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning and policy considerations stated by the California Supreme Court: “[i]n view of this overall policy of protecting creditors, it is unlikely that the [l]egislature intended to grant married couples a one-time-only opportunity to defraud creditors by including the fraudulent transfer in [a marital separation agreement].” Mejia v. Reed, 74 P.3d 166 (Cal. 2003). Therefore, the court concluded that the distribution of property in the divorce decree was a transfer that could be subject to a UFTA claim.

The Connecticut UFTA sets forth a series of factors which a court may consider in determining “actual intent” to fraudulently transfer property. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-522e(b). These factors include whether the debtor retained possession or control over the property after the transfer, whether the debtor had been threatened with a suit before the transfer was made, whether the transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets, and whether the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonable equivalent to the value of the assets transferred. A person’s intent to defraud is to be inferred from his conduct under the surrounding circumstances, and is an issue for the trier of fact to decide. State v. Nosik, 715 A.2d 673 (Conn. 1998).

In her application for prejudgment remedy, the administratrix alleged the conveyance of the Massachusetts property and the entire divorce proceeding were undertaken with intent to shelter assets; the timing of these acts, occurring so quickly after the husband became a suspect in the disappearance of the deceased, offered a reasonable inference of fraudulent intent. According to Connecticut law, in a hearing on an application for prejudgment remedy, the trial court need only make a finding of probable cause, which is a bona fide belief in the existence of facts essential under law for the action. Based on the evidence in the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court finding of probable cause was not an abuse of its discretion. Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly determined that probable cause existed that the husband commenced the dissolution action with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the administratrix. These findings, combined with the determination that the property settlement under the divorce decree constituted a transfer, permitted the administratrix to bring her claim for prejudgment relief against the former wife.

The Supreme Court additionally noted that the administratrix was not seeking to set aside the dissolution decree, but rather attach certain assets that were transferred to the former wife as a result of the decree. A financial order is severable when it is not interdependent with other orders and is not improperly based on a factor that is linked to other factors. Therefore, her claim was not an improper attempt to modify a court judgment in contravention of Connecticut law.

Therefore, Supreme Court determined that the trial court properly granted the administratrix’s application for a prejudgment remedy.

Should you have any questions relating to marital proceedings or personal asset protection issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Susan Maya, at SMaya@Mayalaw.com or 203-221-3100, and Attorney Russell Sweeting, at RSweeting@Mayalaw.com or 203-221-3100, in the Maya Murphy office in Westport, Fairfield County, Connecticut.

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