Posts tagged with "driving under the influence"

U.S. Supreme Court to Tackle Nonconsensual, Warrantless Blood Draws

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Missouri v. McNeely (11-1425) and its ruling on warrantless blood draws has impacted the criminal justice community and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Katz v. United States

In the pivotal U.S. Supreme Court case Katz v. United States, the justices stated, “Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.”[1] The compulsory administration of a blood test “plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure.”[2] Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable… subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”[3]

One such recognized exception is exigent circumstances, which “refers to those situations in which law enforcement agents will be unable or unlikely to effectuate and arrest, search or seizure, for which probable cause exists, unless they act swiftly and, without seeking prior judicial authorization.”[4]

Case Background

McNeely involved a traffic stop turned DUI investigation, followed by the compulsory administration of a blood test against the defendant’s wishes. This scenario was previously expounded upon by the Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, which permitted the warrantless taking of blood samples in light of “‘special facts’ that might have caused the officer to reasonably believe he was faced with an emergency situation in which the delay in obtaining a warrant would threaten the destruction of evidence.”[5] Concerning special facts in that case:

The threat of evidence destruction was caused by the fact that the percentage of alcohol in a person’s blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops and because there was an accident requiring time to be taken to both transport the defendant to the hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident.[6]

Court Ruling

However, the Court in McNeely characterized the facts as “a routine DWI case” where there were “no other ‘special facts’ of exigency.”[7] As such, “[i]n routine DWI cases, in which no ‘special facts’ exist other than the natural dissipation alcohol in the blood, a warrant must be obtained before [a nonconsensual blood draw occurs].”[8] Thus, on Supreme Court review, McNeely presents the following constitutional inquiry: “police authority to take a blood sample from a driver who allegedly was drunk, when the officer has no warrant but wants to act quickly because of the chemical fact that alcohol in the blood dissipates over time.”

Indeed, I previously discussed a Superior Court of Connecticut case addressing this very scenario following a deadly automobile accident. During a motion to suppress a blood toxicology report, the State made the same argument set forth by Missouri – “evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol level would have been lost if not obtained within a reasonable time”[9] – and equally failed because “the record [did] not contain any information that supports the finding that an exigency actually existed.”[10] How the Supreme Court decides on this question will undoubtedly have a widespread impact on police investigations involving intoxicated drivers.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut (located in Fairfield County), by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.

[1] United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

[2] Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).

[3] State v. Aviles, 277 Conn. 281, 293 (2006).

[4] Id.

[5] Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).

[6] Id.

[7] State  v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 74 (Mo. 2012).

[8] Id.

[9] State v. D’Andrea, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3381  (2006).

[10] Id.

Lower Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Termination of Cross-Examination, Since Evidence Was Not Relevant in Suppression Hearing

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OMVUI Case Background

In a criminal law matter, the defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) in violation of § 14-227a(a)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the arrest due to lack of probable cause, and a hearing was held. The State asked the arresting officer, who was their only witness, to describe his police training and what happened on the night of the defendant’s arrest. The prosecutor asked the officer questions related to his return to the defendant’s vehicle after the initial traffic stop.

However, the court interjected, stating this line of questioning was beyond the scope of the motion. The prosecutor agreed, and defense counsel began his cross-examination, repeatedly asking about the officer’s training. The court once more interrupted, stating the officer’s training and what occurred beyond the initial stop concerned questions of fact for the jury. Although defense counsel vehemently objected, he did not make a proffer “of other evidence he wanted to adduce during the cross-examination.”

The Right to a Cross-Examination 

The motion to suppress was denied and the defendant was subsequently convicted following a jury trial. On appeal, the defendant argued, in part, that the court abused its discretion when it cut off his counsel’s cross-examination during the suppression hearing. He stated that he was entitled to a “full and fair cross-examination of the state’s sole witness,” and the court’s action constituted a deprivation of his Sixth Amendment protections.

The right of confrontation is a cornerstone principle of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. A criminal defendant has a right to cross-examination, which “requires that the defendant be allowed to present the [fact finder] with facts from which it could appropriately draw inferences relating to the witness’ reliability.” In other words, during cross-examination, the defendant has the opportunity through counsel to expose a witness’ motive, interest, bias, or prejudice.

However, a defendant is not permitted to present “every piece of evidence he wishes,” and courts generally have considerable discretion in controlling matters discussed during cross-examination. When a defendant claims a violation of his right to cross-examine, a reviewing court will consider: “The nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial.”

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Appellate Court of Connecticut agreed that the court erred in determining that what happened after the initial traffic stop was a question for the jury and thus outside the scope of the suppression hearing. Nonetheless, it found that the court did not abuse its discretion because the officer’s training was not relevant and the defense counsel proffered no other evidence he sought to discuss during cross-examination.

In addition, counsel had ample opportunity at trial to extensively cross-examine the officer, but “nothing in it… could have affected the validity of the court’s ultimate ruling on the motion to suppress.” Because the evidence of the officer’s training was not relevant, the defendant’s confrontations rights were not violated. Therefore, the lower court properly excluded the evidence.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport, CT office at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

When ATVs are Driven on Public Highways, They Are “Motor Vehicles” for Purposes of State Suspension Laws

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In a criminal law matter, the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed a trial court’s revocation of a defendant’s probation after he operated his all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on public roads while his driver’s license was suspended.

Case Background

In this case, the defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence as a third-time offender. He was sentenced to three years’ incarceration, execution suspended after one year, with three years’ probation. The following conditions of probation were imposed: a general condition prohibiting the violation of any state criminal statute, and a special condition prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle with a suspended license.

The Department of Motor Vehicles permanently suspended the defendant’s driver’s license due to his history of suspensions. The defendant served the one unsuspended year in jail, then began his probation. Before the term expired, he received two criminal citations after he operated an ATV in the travel lanes of town roads. Therefore, he was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license in violation of CGS § 14-215, as well as violation of probation.

A probation revocation hearing was held, where the trial court determined that the defendant violated the general and special conditions. His probation was revoked, and he was ordered to serve the remaining two years of his suspended sentence. The defendant appealed, arguing that CGS § 14-215(c) was unconstitutionally vague with respect to application to ATV usage. As he emphasized, “a person of ordinary intelligence could not reasonably have been expected to know that the term ‘motor vehicle’ included an ATV.”

Unconstitutionally Vague Statute

Everyone is presumed to know the law, and ignorance is no excuse from criminal punishment. However, laws must be drafted so that “ordinary people understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” So long as the meaning of the statute can be fairly ascertained, it won’t be struck down as void for vagueness. In this case, the burden rested with the defendant to “demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [CGS § 14-215(c)], as applied to him, deprived him of adequate notice of what conduct the statute proscribed or that he fell victim to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”

CGS § 14-215(c) makes it a crime for a person to operate a motor vehicle while their driver’s license is under suspension. This statute is located in Chapter 248, which defines “motor vehicle” as including “all vehicles used on public highways.” In CGS § 14-212(9), “vehicle” is synonymous with “motor vehicle,” so the Supreme Court opined that if an ATV qualifies as a vehicle, it is a motor vehicle for purposes of the suspension law. The Court considered the definitions of ATV under other statutes, which use the language “a self-propelled vehicle” and “motorized vehicle.” CGS §§ 14-379 and 23-26a. Thus, for purposes of CGS § 14-215(c), an ATV was a motor vehicle when used on a public highway.

The Court’s Decision

With this statutory framework in mind, the Supreme Court determined that the defendant failed to meet his burden. Rather, CGS § 14-215(c) “affords a person of ordinary intelligence with fair warning that he is prohibited from operating an ATV on a public highway while his license is suspended.” The Court found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and the trial court did not err in revoking the defendant’s probation.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or operation under suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport, CT office at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Court Denies DUI Convict’s Request for Declaratory Judgment; License Suspensions Complied with Applicable Statutes

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In a criminal law matter, a Superior Court of Connecticut found in favor of the defendant Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) after the plaintiff unsuccessfully asserted his claims of equal protection and due process violations following his license suspensions.

Case Details

In this case, the plaintiff was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) of alcohol in violation of Connecticut General Statutes (CGS) § 14-227a. Police notified the DMV of the arrest, who held an administrative license suspension hearing. The hearing officer found that the plaintiff refused to submit to a chemical alcohol test, among three other considerations, and pursuant to CGS § 14-227b(i), ordered that the plaintiff’s driver’s license be suspended for six months.

The plaintiff fully served this administrative suspension before pleading guilty to OMVUI. In connection with this criminal conviction, the DMV ordered that the plaintiff’s driver’s license be suspended for twelve months in accordance with CGS § 14-227a(g). Plaintiff’s counsel requested a “credit” of six months in light of the administrative suspension, but the DMV denied this request. DMV practice allows administrative and criminal suspensions to run concurrently for whatever period of overlap exists, as long as they arose from the same incident. However, it is not DMV policy to issue credits against new suspensions when prior ones have already been fully served.

Equal Protection Violation

The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment, arguing that the DMV’s actions were unconstitutional. He first alleged that the DMV policy violated equal protection because it “confers a benefit on those able to serve some or all of their suspensions concurrently, while denying that benefit to those who must serve them consecutively.” The plaintiff further contended that his procedural due process rights were violated because the DMV did not advise him of the practice, thus depriving him of being able to make an informed decision regarding when to plead guilty.

Equal protection directs that similarly situated people be treated alike. This clause is implicated when a statute “either on its face or in practice, treats persons standing in the same relation to it differently.” The threshold inquiry for a reviewing court is whether a petitioner is “similarly situated for purposes of the challenged government action.” However, the equal protection clause does not prohibit a government entity from treating those who are not similar in a dissimilar manner.

In this case the Superior Court found that the plaintiff was similarly situated to drivers who have completed one suspension when the other is imposed, not drivers who were serving one suspension when subject to a second. Because the plaintiff failed to meet his burden proving dissimilar treatment, his equal protection claim failed.

Establishing a Due Process Violation

To establish a due process violation, a plaintiff must prove “1) that he has been deprived of a property interest cognizable under the due process clause; and 2) that deprivation occurred without due process of law.” In this case, the Court readily agreed that deprivation of a driver’s license clearly satisfies the first prong, but the plaintiff’s claim failed with respect to the second element. The suspensions were imposed in accordance to guidelines set forth in CGS §§ 14-227a and 14-227b, and the plaintiff did not provide any support for “for the proposition that the [DMV] was obligated to give him notice of the [DMV’s] practice.” Therefore, the plaintiff’s due process claim also failed, and his request for declaratory judgment was denied.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport, CT office at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Lower Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Termination of Cross-Examination, Since Evidence Was Not Relevant in Suppression Hearing

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OMVUI Case Background

In a criminal law matter, the defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) in violation of § 14-227a(a)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the arrest due to lack of probable cause, and a hearing was held. The State asked the arresting officer, who was their only witness, to describe his police training and what happened on the night of the defendant’s arrest. The prosecutor asked the officer questions related to his return to the defendant’s vehicle after the initial traffic stop.

However, the court interjected, stating this line of questioning was beyond the scope of the motion. The prosecutor agreed, and defense counsel began his cross-examination, repeatedly asking about the officer’s training. The court once more interrupted, stating the officer’s training and what occurred beyond the initial stop concerned questions of fact for the jury. Although defense counsel vehemently objected, he did not make a proffer “of other evidence he wanted to adduce during the cross-examination.”

The Right to a Cross-Examination 

The motion to suppress was denied and the defendant was subsequently convicted following a jury trial. On appeal, the defendant argued, in part, that the court abused its discretion when it cut off his counsel’s cross-examination during the suppression hearing. He stated that he was entitled to a “full and fair cross-examination of the state’s sole witness,” and the court’s action constituted a deprivation of his Sixth Amendment protections.

The right of confrontation is a cornerstone principle of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. A criminal defendant has a right to cross-examination, which “requires that the defendant be allowed to present the [fact finder] with facts from which it could appropriately draw inferences relating to the witness’ reliability.” In other words, during cross-examination, the defendant has the opportunity through counsel to expose a witness’ motive, interest, bias, or prejudice.

However, a defendant is not permitted to present “every piece of evidence he wishes,” and courts generally have considerable discretion in controlling matters discussed during cross-examination. When a defendant claims a violation of his right to cross-examine, a reviewing court will consider: “The nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial.”

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Appellate Court of Connecticut agreed that the court erred in determining that what happened after the initial traffic stop was a question for the jury and thus outside the scope of the suppression hearing. Nonetheless, it found that the court did not abuse its discretion because the officer’s training was not relevant and the defense counsel proffered no other evidence he sought to discuss during cross-examination.

In addition, counsel had ample opportunity at trial to extensively cross-examine the officer, but “nothing in it… could have affected the validity of the court’s ultimate ruling on the motion to suppress.” Because the evidence of the officer’s training was not relevant, the defendant’s confrontations rights were not violated. Therefore, the lower court properly excluded the evidence.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport, CT office at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Appellate Court Declines to Review DUI Convict’s Unpreserved Claims

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved claims of instructional error and evidentiary impropriety.

Case Background

In this case, the defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI), in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 14-227a(a)(1), along with other charges. At trial, the State called to the witness stand an optometrist (witness), who was also an expert in field sobriety testing. The prosecutor posed a hypothetical and asked the witness whether, based on the facts given, he would believe the person was under the influence.

Defense counsel objected, arguing that the question was beyond the witness’s area of expertise. However, the court overruled, stating that the witness had “additional qualifications beyond the optometry field.” In addition, the court instructed the jury that they could find the defendant guilty if he was “driving while impaired,” though defense counsel did not object to this charge.

The defendant was subsequently convicted on all counts and appealed. He argued, for the first time, that the trial court’s jury instruction was deficient because it “dilut[ed] the state’s burden of proof.” Furthermore, the defendant claimed that the court improperly allowed a witness to express an opinion “with regard to an ultimate issue in the case.”

When a party raises a claim for the first time not at trial but instead on appeal, the Appellate Court is limited to review “under either the plain error doctrine… or the doctrine set forth in State v. Golding.” If a party fails to brief or argue either doctrine, the Court will decline to afford such review. In addition, “[a]ppellate review of evidentiary rulings is ordinarily limited to the specific legal [ground] raised by the objection of trial counsel.”

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Appellate Court declined to review both of the defendant’s claims. It reasoned that the defendant did not submit a written request to change the jury instruction, nor did defense counsel object when it was given. With respect to the witness’s testimony, defense counsel objected to the specific hypothetical question posed as being beyond the witness’ expertise. However, on appeal, the defendant presented a different ground for appeal, and extraordinary circumstances did not exist as to permit review of the unpreserved claim.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

State Supreme Court Addresses Whether DMV License Suspensions Constitute “Convictions” That Bar Subsequent OMVUI Prosecutions

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In a criminal law matter, the Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld a lower court’s ruling that an administrative license suspension does not constitute a “conviction” under our statutes for purposes of double jeopardy protections.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on January 13, 2006. Police officers pulled over the defendant under suspicion that he was driving under the influence, and arrested him after he failed several field sobriety tests. The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) in violation of Connecticut General Statutes (CGS) § 14-227a. The Department of Motor Vehicles held an administrative hearing and the hearing officer ordered that the defendant’s driver’s license be suspended for ten months.

The defendant moved to dismiss all charges against him. He argued that “he already had been ‘convicted’ of the same offense in the administrative proceedings,” so to prosecute him for OMVUI would amount to double jeopardy in violation of state and federal constitutional protections. The trial court denied his motion, stating that an administrative license suspension under CGS § 14-227b was not a punishment, thus the defendant’s rights against double jeopardy were not violated by subsequent prosecution for OMVUI. The defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere before promptly appealing his conviction.

Double Jeopardy Protections

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “No person shall… be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Double jeopardy, as it is commonly referred to, encompasses several protections, including against “a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.” Connecticut does not have an explicit comparable statute, though double jeopardy protections are implicit through our due process statutes.

Our courts have determined that civil or administrative sanctions that serve “a legitimate remedial purpose” and are “rationally related to that purpose” do not constitute double jeopardy violations, even if the sanction has an attendant deterrent or retributive effect. In essence, “prosecutions or convictions for double jeopardy purposes arise only from proceedings that are essentially criminal.”

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed cases under which administrative hearings were found “sufficiently remedial” so as to not bar subsequent prosecution. In looking into the legislative history of CGS § 14-227b, the Court noted that the “principle purpose [of the statute] was to protect the public by removing potentially dangerous drivers from the state’s roadways.” License suspension hearings subsequent to OMVUI arrests facilitate that purpose.

Additionally, the language of CGS §§ 14-227b and 14-1 (21), which defines “conviction,” do not reveal an intent that “an administrative suspension forecloses future criminal proceedings against the defendant for the same offense.” The Supreme Court was thus not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the suspension was a criminal “conviction” that would bar an OMVUI prosecution, and the judgment was affirmed.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Appellate Court Declines to Review Defendant’s Evidentiary Claims for Failure to Provide Meaningful Analysis of Harm in DUI Conviction

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut considered a defendant’s evidentiary claims when he appealed his operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) conviction.

Case Details

This case arose from an incident that occurred after midnight on December 2, 2005. A Greenwich police officer saw the defendant driving erratically on Route 1: he was swerving and drifting between lanes, sped up and slowed down for no apparent reason, and struck a bright orange traffic cone. The officer initiated a traffic stop, and in conversing with the defendant made the following observations: the defendant smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot glossy eyes, and appeared confused or non-responsive to her questions.

The defendant stated he could not remember where he was coming from, whether he had anything to drink, and if he did, when he started and stopped as well as how much he consumed. When asked to exit the vehicle, the defendant had difficulty maintaining balance. The officer attempted to perform three field sobriety tests: the defendant failed the first two, and refused to take the third because of an alleged right ankle injury. The defendant was arrested and transported to the police department, where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.

OMVUI Charges

The defendant was charged with OMVUI, and at trial, a podiatrist testified that the defendant suffered from a problem with his gait so as to interfere with his ability to perform field sobriety tests. However, the court was not persuaded that this affected his performance on all of the tests, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. On appeal, the defendant claimed that evidence related to the field sobriety tests was improperly admitted, and that once this evidence was eliminated from consideration, there was insufficient evidence to convict.

To be convicted of OMVUI, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Evidentiary challenges are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Even if a trial court improperly admits evidence, the defendant must still show that the error caused harm before a judgment will be reversed. When a defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the reviewing court will consider all of the evidence presented at trial.

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Appellate Court declined to discuss the merits of the defendant’s claims that evidence was improperly admitted because he failed to provide “any meaningful analysis of harm” with respect to the trial court’s rulings. Since the defendant did not give this analysis, the Court “could not conclude that the admission of the subject evidence had any bearing on the trial’s outcome.” In addition, the Court found ample evidence to support a conviction for OMVUI, noting it did not have to rely only on evidence the defendant conceded was properly admitted. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Plaintiffs Contend Intoxilyzer Results Do Not Comply With Connecticut Statutes, but State DMV and Superior Court Disagree Leave a Reply

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In a criminal law matter, a Superior Court of Connecticut dismissed the appeals of four plaintiffs who were challenging their license suspensions, unconvinced that a device used to measure blood alcohol content (BAC) did not comply with statutory regulations.

Case Background 

In this case, the plaintiffs submitted to BAC tests administered using an Intoxilyzer machine and each had readings over the legal limit of 0.08. As such, they were charged with operating a motor vehicle with an elevated BAC in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a(a)(2), a per se statute. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended their licenses and the plaintiffs appealed, contesting the validity of the Intoxilyzer results. A hearing was held before the court, and the appeals were remanded to the DMV Commissioner.

During the remand hearing, the hearing officer found that the Intoxilyzer measures the amount of alcohol present on a person’s breath on a “weight-per-volume basis.” The machine itself does not have the ability to convert this number to a “weight-by-weight” figure, though this can be accomplished through extrapolation. The appeals were dismissed, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court. They argued that § 14-227b(o) of the per se statute requires that BAC be measured by weight in the context of administrative license suspension, and because the Intoxilyzer instead measures BAC by volume, the results were not valid.

BAC Measurement

Under § 14-227a(d), the Connecticut legislature clearly envisioned that a person’s BAC could be measured by breath. Indeed, the Superior Court reviewed case precedent which “implicitly approved” Intoxilyzers and held that a BAC measurement from breath is “an ‘equivalent’ of the blood alcohol content measure of blood.” These cases prompted the legislature to amend the criminal regulations “to permit equivalent measurements of [BAC] by the Intoxilyzer.” By extension, the per se regulations permit equivalent measurements because “the per se regulations piggyback on the criminal regulations.” Therefore, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeals.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

DMV License Suspension Hearings Are Limited in Scope, State Appellate Court Rejects Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Claim

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In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut considered whether lack of recertification by an officer administering chemical analysis tests following a DUI arrest renders, as invalid, a hearing officer’s conclusions based on the results of these tests.

Case Details

This case arose from an incident that occurred on November 1, 2008. The plaintiff was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) held an administrative hearing, where two chemical analysis tests, which revealed a blood alcohol content more than twice the statutory limit, were admitted along with other evidence. After considering four statutory criteria, the DMV commissioner ordered that plaintiff’s driver’s license be suspended for a period of ten months, as well as a lifetime disqualification from operating a commercial motor vehicle.

The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the test results were inadmissible because the police officer who administered the tests “had failed to undergo a review of his proficiency in the operation of the breath test device within twelve months since his last review,” which took place in August, 2006. The court was not persuaded and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, and the plaintiff appealed once more.

Suspending a Driver’s License

When a DMV hearing officer considers a request to suspend a driver’s license, he or she is limited to four statutory criteria set forth in General Statute § 14-227b(g). The officer will consider whether the driver in question operated the motor vehicle and either refused or consented to a test or analysis within two hours of the operation, and if the results indicated an elevated blood alcohol content.

In addition, the officer must establish whether probable cause to arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence existed, and if the driver was arrested. No other evidence will be considered for purposes of this administrative hearing. In a prior case, the State Supreme Court found that “lack of recertification as required by the regulations does not prevent the commissioner’s consideration of and reliance on the officer’s report.” Since this was the grounds for appeal by the plaintiff, the Appellate Court affirmed judgment.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.