Posts tagged with "Easton"

Placement in Appropriate Programs

Special education students are entitled to a free appropriate public education (otherwise known as “FAPE”), that must be tailored to the individual student. However, schools are not required to provide optimum programming – just “appropriate” programming. One federal judge has likened the difference between optimum and appropriate programming to that between a “Cadillac” and a “serviceable Chevrolet.” See Doe v. Bd. of Ed. of Tullahoma City Schools, 9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1993). However, if a particular service is required for the student’s special education needs, as evaluated, then the service must be provided without regard to how much it costs.

Sometimes, public schools simply do not offer the services that your child’s special education needs require. At this point, it may be possible to place your child in an appropriate private school and seek reimbursement from your school district for the associated costs. In order to do this, you must request a due process hearing and prove to an impartial hearing officer that not only does the private school meet your child’s educational needs, but that the school district failed to provide your child with a FAPE in a timely manner. Furthermore, you must comply with relevant statutory and regulatory requirements or your reimbursement award may be denied or reduced. Significantly, one misstep in this process can mean losing your right to reimbursement – there are time limitations and notice requirements to comply with, and it is important to know all the details before a parent unilaterally places a child privately. Our experienced attorneys will make themselves available to guide and assist you in making a quick and efficient determination of the most effective plan of action for your family, while protecting your rights under applicable regulations.

Fairfield High School Racial Bias Charged

Alleging racial discrimination, three minority students at Fairfield High School — arrested in February after a fight broke out in the school parking lot — plan to sue the town, claiming they were singled out base upon their “ethnicity and national origin.” Continue Reading

Special Education Law: Evaluation and Identification

Children identified as having disabilities have different rights from other students. Accordingly, the identification process is a very important step. It begins with a referral sent to the student’s school district – specifically, a written request for an evaluation of whether the child is eligible for, and needs, special education services. This request can be made by the child’s parent, school personnel, or another appropriate person (such as a physician or a social worker).

Once the school district receives a referral, it must convene a planning and placement team (“PPT”) to review the referral, determine whether further evaluation is necessary and, ultimately, decide whether the child requires special education services. If the PPT requests further evaluation of your child, such evaluation will be conducted at the school district’s expense. Once the PPT has made its determination, you have the right to request an independent educational evaluation (“IEE”) of your child if you disagree with the PPT’s decision. If, after the IEE, you still disagree with the PPT, you may request a hearing in accordance with State Department of Education regulations. Our attorneys will work with your family to determine the best course of action and to protect your child’s educational rights, while ensuring compliance with applicable federal, state and local regulations.

Defeating Governmental Immunity: Navigating the Uphill Climb

Lawsuits against the State of Connecticut or its local municipalities are notoriously difficult to pursue from a legal perspective, in large part due to various statutory protections and administrative hurdles put in place by the legislature.  For example, a plaintiff seeking to initiate a personal injury case against her own town must adhere to strict time limitations and procedural requirements in order to have her case successfully get into court and survive the scrutiny of a judge, well before she ever comes close to having a “day in court” before a jury of her peers.

Unless the site of a plaintiff’s injury falls within one of a few narrow exceptions (such as an injury on a “public highway,” which would invoke the protections and mechanisms of Connecticut’s “highway defect statute,” or Connecticut General Statutes Section 13a-149), a plaintiff is entitled only to proceed against a state or municipality under the Political Subdivision Liability Statute (Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-557n).

Section 52-557n, however, contains its own pitfalls for prospective plaintiffs.  The statute provides that a town or political subdivision may be liable for negligent acts of its employees, officers, or agents except if such actions or omissions constitute criminal conduct or willful misconduct, or, significantly, if such negligent acts or omissions require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the job responsibility.

The latter part of this test is key – and is a gold mine for municipalities (and their lawyers) seeking to invoke the governmental immunity doctrine and escape liability for the negligence of its employees, even if such negligence is established by an injured person.  What the provision states, in plain language, is that a town may well be free and clear from liability if the task that was performed negligently was a task that required an exercise of judgment on the part of the town employee.

Take the hypothetical example of a plaintiff who was injured when she slipped on ice on the front steps of City Hall.  The evidence suggests that the maintenance workers either knew or should have known that ice had built up on the steps, that they were expecting the public to be walking in and out of the building, and that someone clearly “dropped the ball” in making sure that the ice was scraped off and that salt or sand was applied generously to the area.  Instead, nothing was done, nothing was scraped, no sand or salt was used, no warning signs were posted, and the ice remained for several business days before this plaintiff came along and fell on her very first visit to City Hall.

Even with these simplified facts (which appear at first blush to be quite damaging to the City), the City will surely investigate the existence of any policy, procedure, and practice of those maintenance workers who were assigned to the front steps of the building.  In this case, the City will attempt to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “judgment” and “discretion” of the City employees were required to be exercised to keep those steps free of snow and ice.  On the contrary, a plaintiff will seek to demonstrate that the actions (or omissions) of the City workers were “ministerial” – that is, the workers had a clear directive to do something (e.g. to clear the ice at certain times, in a certain manner, with no exercise of judgment) and yet they failed to carry out that task, resulting in the plaintiff’s injury.

When the proverbial dust settles, if no clear, articulated policy existed to clear the steps, to inspect the steps on a scheduled basis, or to take preventative measures against ice buildup, a municipal defendant in this instance would likely argue (perhaps successfully) that the maintenance workers were required not to follow any protocol, but only to “use their judgment and discretion” in determining what needed to be kept safe and clear for pedestrian traffic.

An unknowing plaintiff (or perhaps an inexperienced attorney) who advances her case against a town believing that a jury would be shocked if there is no snow removal policy might find herself equally shocked when or if it is determined that any negligence was of a “discretionary” nature and governmental immunity therefore applies, subject to other very narrow legal exceptions not discussed here.

A savvy plaintiff, in discovery and at the very outset of the lawsuit, might request that the town admit, under oath and in writing, to the existence of a clear and articulated policy (even if it is unwritten) with regard to the safety issue which resulted in her injury.  While towns (and their attorneys) are often eager to show that preventative measures are and were in place, in this instance, they may well eliminate – as a matter of law – their own sacred protection of governmental immunity at trial.  With a valid legal admission of a clear and articulated policy, a municipal defendant is effectively hamstrung – it cannot simultaneously admit to the existence of a policy and directive while claiming that its employees were simply exercising their own judgment.  Dramatically and emphatically, the curtain of governmental immunity draws away, paving the way for a plaintiff to reach the eyes and ears of a jury.

An injured person seeking legal assistance as against the state or a municipality faces a virtual hornet’s nest of obstacles and legal entanglements.  A trusted, informed advocate is essential to place such a claim in the best possible legal position.  The invitation is open to consulting with attorneys at our firm who are experienced in this type of civil litigation.

If you have questions regarding any personal injury matter, contact Joseph Maya at 203-221-3100 or by email at JMaya@MayaLaw.com.

Connecticut Non-Compete Prohibits Client Solicitation in Investment Services Industry

In Robert J. Reby & Co. v. Byrne, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2115, Mr. Patrick Byrne worked at Robert J. Reby & Co., a financial firm in Danbury, Connecticut, as a registered investment advisor from June 2005 to July 2005.  The company advises high net worth individuals and families in the areas of trusts, wealth management, and taxation.  Mr. Byrne signed an employment contract with Robert J. Reby & Co. wherein it contained a non-compete agreement that stipulated he be prohibited from soliciting the company’s clients or disclosing any of its confidential information in the event of his termination.  Following Mr. Byrne’s short employment with Robert J. Reby & Co. he began to work at Aspetuck Financial Management, LLC, a wealth management firm based in Westport.   Robert J. Reby & Co. alleged that Mr. Byrne solicited its clients for his new firm, Aspetuck, in direct violation of the non-compete agreement.  Mr. Byrne countered that the provisions of the non-compete were unreasonable in the sense that it placed an excessive restraint on his trade and prevented him from pursuing his occupation.

The court held that the non-compete agreement between Mr. Byrne and Robert J. Reby & Co. contained reasonable terms and was enforceable.  It failed to see any merits in Mr. Byrne’s claim that the agreement was too broad and created an insurmountable occupational hardship.  The provisions of the agreement only restricted a very small segment of Mr. Byrne’s occupational activities.  The terms he agreed to only prevented him from soliciting the specific and limited group of people that were clients of Robert J. Reby & Co..  The court held that the covenant was not a pure anti-competitive clause because it did not prevent him from engaging in the investment services industry as a whole.  This limited scope with regard to the prohibition levied upon Mr. Byrne caused the agreement to be reasonable and therefore enforceable.

The court also took time to discuss the public policy behind finding the non-compete agreement enforceable and establishing the legitimacy of the agreement.  Companies, according to the court, have a legitimate interest in protecting their business operations by preventing former employees from exploiting or appropriating the goodwill of its clients that it developed at its own, and not the employees’, expense.

If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment contract, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Court Uses Connecticut Law to Supersede Massachusetts Law in Application of Non-Compete Agreement

In Custard Insurance Adjusters v. Nardi, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1003, Mr. Robert Nardi worked at Allied Adjustment Services’ Orange, CT office beginning in September 1982 as the vice president of marketing, overseeing the adjustment of claims for insurance companies and self-insurers.  The company had Mr. Nardi sign non-compete and confidentiality agreements as a term of his employment.  The agreements established that he could not solicit or accept claims within a fifty-mile radius of Allied’s Orange office for a period of two years following his termination.  The agreements further specified that the names and contact information of Allied’s clients were the company’s confidential property.  The choice of law provision stated that Massachusetts law would be controlling (Allied had its headquarters in Massachusetts).  On September 1, 1997, Allied sold its business and all its assets, including its non-compete agreements, to Custard Insurance Adjusters.  Mr. Nardi became increasingly worried about future employment at Custard when the company restructured its compensation format, allegedly decreasing his annual income by 25%.  At this point, Mr. Nardi began to inquire about employment at other companies and in particular contacted Mr. John Markle, the president of Mark Adjustment, with whom he had a previous professional history.  He also arranged meetings between Mr. Markle and four other current Custard employees to discuss switching companies.  While the companies are competitors in the insurance industry, Mark’s business was restricted to the New England region while Custard operated nationally.  Custard terminated Mr. Nardi and asked the court to enforce the non-compete agreement.

The court first sought to tackle the issue of the choice of law provision since it designated Massachusetts law as controlling but this lawsuit was brought in Connecticut state court.  The court asserted its authority over the issue and case because it could not ascertain any “difference between the courts of Connecticut and Massachusetts in their interpretation of the common law tort breach of fiduciary obligation brought against a former officer of a corporation”.  The court emphasized that above all else, the legal issue at hand was that of contractual obligations and a company’s business operations.  It asserted its authority in this respect by stating it believed “that the Massachusetts courts interpret the tort of tortious interference with contractual and business relationships the same way our [Connecticut’s] courts do”.  Additionally, the court cited that the application of Massachusetts law would undermine Connecticut’s policy to afford legal effect to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) and Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), two-state statutes used by Custard to sue Mr. Nardi.

Next, the court addressed the enforceability of the non-compete agreement signed by Mr. Nardi and Allied.  Mr. Nardi contended that the provisions of the agreement were only binding upon the signatory parties (himself and Allied) and that Custard lacked the authority to enforce its provisions.  He asked the court to deny Custard’s request to enforce the non-compete because it was “based on trust and confidence” between the signatory parties and “was thus not assignable”.  The court rejected this train of thought because the non-compete explicitly contained an assignability clause and it held that the non-compete covenant was properly and legally transferred to Custard under Massachusetts law.

Mr. Nardi based a substantial portion of his defense on the claim that Custard violated, and therefore invalidated, the agreement when it modified his compensation format.  He alleged that he was the victim of unjustified reductions in his professional responsibilities and compensation following Custard’s acquisition of Allied in 1997.  Mr. Nardi however was still an executive at the new company despite a reduction in rank and he himself had expressed excitement about becoming an executive at a national, instead of a regional, company.

The court ultimately found the non-compete to be valid and enforceable, therefore granting Custard’s request for injunctive relief.  It assessed the facts of the case and Mr. Nardi’s current position to amend the time restriction of the agreement, however.  Taking into account that he was starting a family and had a young child in conjunction with estimates that the full restrictions could amount to a 60-70% loss of business for Mr. Nardi, the court reduced the time limitation from two years to six months.  The court concluded that while the provisions were reasonable at face value, they could have unforeseen consequences that would have severely impaired Mr. Nardi’s ability to make a living in order to provide for his family.

If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Legitimate Signature is Required for Enforcement of Non-Compete Agreement

In Stay Alert Safety Services, Inc. v. Fletcher, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1915, Mr. Christopher Fletcher began to work at United Rentals, Inc., a North Carolina company in the traffic safety and control industry, starting in February 2003.  He signed an employment agreement upon accepting the job offer wherein the agreement contained a non-compete provision.   According to the restrictive provisions, he was prohibited from working at a competing company located within two hundred miles for a period of two years after his termination.  The company felt it needed to protect its legitimate interests due to Mr. Fletcher’s access to its customer lists, cost information, and pricing schemes.  Mr. Fletcher’s employment was terminated on June 8, 2004, and he proceeded to start a new company, Traffic Control, with his wife.  He essentially performed the same services as he had previously in connection with his employment at United Rentals.

Stay Alert Safety Services, Inc., a company with headquarters in Greenwich, Connecticut, acquired United Rentals in January 2005 and its legal department concluded that Mr. Fletcher and other employees’ non-compete agreements were assignable and could be transferred to the possession of Stay Alert.  Stay Alert sued Mr. Fletcher in Connecticut state court for breach of the non-compete agreement and asked the court to enforce the restrictive covenant that he had signed with United Rentals.

The Superior Court sitting in Bridgeport found in favor of Stay Alert and ordered the enforcement of the non-compete agreement.  It held that the agreement’s provisions were reasonable given the circumstances of the case and that Stay Alert was entitled to injunctive relief because of the contractual breach.  Mr. Fletcher argued that he had not actually signed the non-compete agreement and therefore its restrictions were not applicable.  The court rejected this argument and noted that Mr. Fletcher’s signature appeared on page six of the employment agreement right above his typed name.  He claimed that it was not his signature so the court called in a handwriting expert to ascertain whether it was in fact his signature.  The expert, Dr. Marc Seiter, concluded that it was Mr. Fletcher’s signature and the court agreed with this finding.  A signed employment agreement coupled with reasonable provisions meant that the restrictive covenant was valid and enforceable.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. If you have questions regarding non-compete agreements or any employment matter, contact Joseph Maya at 203-221-3100 or by email at JMaya@MayaLaw.com.

Policy of Enforcing Connecticut Non-Compete Agreements to Protect Employer’s Interests

Torrington Creamery, Inc. v. Davenport, 126 Conn. 515 pertains to a dispute regarding a non-compete agreement between an employer and employee in the dairy products industry in 1940.  While this case is by no means recent, it is a seminal case that lays the groundwork for the policy of enforcing non-compete agreements in Connecticut on the grounds of protecting the employer’s interest.  Specifically, this is one of the first Connecticut cases to address the enforceability of a company’s non-compete agreements when another company acquires it.

The High Brook Corporation employed Mr. Preston Davenport as a farm manager and superintendent beginning in 1932 at its Torrington, Connecticut location.  The company produced and distributed dairy products in the towns of Torrington, Litchfield, Winsted, Thomaston, New Milford, New Preston, and Greenwich, all towns in western or southwestern Connecticut.  High Brook changed its name to The Sunny Valley Corporation in March 1938 and on April 15, 1938, had Mr. Davenport sign an employment contract.  The contract specified that Mr. Davenport would receive a fixed compensation with no set duration and that he would be subject to several restrictive covenants.  A non-solicitation clause prohibited Mr. Davenport from soliciting, either directly or indirectly, Sunny Valley or its successor’s customers for a period of two years.  Meanwhile, a non-compete clause prohibited Mr. Davenport from engaging in the dairy production and distribution industry in the towns where Sunny Valley operated.  Another clause in the employment agreement stipulated that a court’s invalidation of a portion of the agreement would not affect the legally binding nature of the other provisions.  Sunny Valley sold its operations and assets to Torrington Creamery, Inc. in October 1938 and the company discharged Mr. Davenport from employment on October 18, 1938.  He proceeded to start his own dairy production and distribution business in February 1939 in the towns of Torrington and Litchfield.

Torrington Creamery sued Mr. Davenport to enforce the duration and geographical limitations of the restrictive covenant he had signed with Sunny Valley Corporation.  The Superior Court in Litchfield County found in favor of Torrington Creamery, Mr. Davenport appealed the decision, and the case went on to the Connecticut Supreme Court where it affirmed the lower court’s decision.  The Supreme Court found the terms of the non-compete agreement to be reasonable and necessary for the protection of Torrington Creamery’s business interests.  The notion of “protecting an employer’s business interests” is a driving force and major policy concern when deciding whether to enforce a non-compete agreement under Connecticut law.  Restrictive covenants become valuable assets of the employer and courts generally hold that the employer is entitled to the right to safeguard these assets.  Equally as important, the court held that the employer benefits contained in a restrictive covenant can be assigned to a purchaser in the event of the sale of the business and its assets.  Thus, when a company acquires another company, it gains the legal authority to enforce the acquired company’s valid non-compete agreements.  Courts view restrictive covenants as valuable business assets that provide for the necessary protection of the employer and any successor company.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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When is A Non-Compete Geographical Limitation Unreasonable?

In Braman Chemical Enterprise, Inc. v. Barnes, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3753, Ms. Valerie Barnes worked as an exterminator for Braman Chemical Enterprises, Inc. from November 5, 1990, to April 26, 2006.  On October 24, 1990, in preparation for Ms. Barnes beginning to work, the parties executed a non-compete agreement titled “Restriction Against Other Employment After Termination of Work With Braman Chemical Enterprises, Inc.” where it stated that Ms. Barnes was prohibited from working at any branch of a pest control business within fifty miles of the Hartford City Hall for a period of six months.  The company provided pest control services to commercial and residential customers in approximately ninety percent of Connecticut’s towns and cities.  Ms. Barnes worked the majority of her career with Braman servicing the area defined as east of New Haven, west of Guilford, south of Meriden, and north of the Long Island Sound.  She received training for her operator’s license while employed by Braman but obtained her supervisor’s license on her own time and at her own expense.

On April 26, 2006, Ms. Barnes voluntarily terminated her employment at Braman and formed a Connecticut limited liability company called “Bug One, LLC” based in Hamden that provided substantially identical services as her previous employer.  Braman sued Ms. Barnes in Connecticut state court to enforce the non-compete and enjoin her from further violations of the restrictive covenant’s provisions.  Ms. Barnes asserted that the geographical limitation in the agreement was unreasonable and provided an unnecessary amount of protection for Braman.

The court found Ms. Barnes’ argument to be meritorious and denied Braman’s request to enforce the agreement.  A non-compete agreement is analyzed in its entirety but a single unreasonable provision can be sufficient to invalidate the entire agreement and prevent enforcement.  Connecticut courts have traditionally tended to apply greater scrutiny to a non-compete agreement that creates a general restriction on a geographical area than agreements that focus simply on doing business with the employer’s clients.  Employers are legally allowed to protect themselves in a “reasonably limited market area” but may not overreach to the degree that the restriction prevents the former employee from practicing his or her trade in order to make a living.  While Braman contended that the geographical limitation was reasonably tailored to meet its legitimate business needs, the court held that the provision went well beyond the “fair protection of plaintiff’s [Braman’s] interests”.  The geographical area of fifty miles from Hartford City Hall placed an unreasonable restraint on trade for Ms. Barnes.  The court notes that the prohibited area covered roughly two million potential customers and an area of 7,850 square miles, covering parts of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York.  To put this in perspective, the entire state of Connecticut is only 5,018 square miles.  This area as defined in the non-compete agreement was thus an unreasonable limitation and sufficient cause to invalidate the entire agreement.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Connecticut Federal Court Applies Louisiana Law to Enforce Non-Compete to Protect Confidential Information

In United Rentals, Inc. v. Myers, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25287, United Rental, Inc. was a Delaware corporation with principal business operations in Connecticut that employed Ms. Charlotte Myers in its Shreveport, Louisiana office from May 20, 2002, to March 7, 2003.  She signed an employment agreement with United Rentals on her first day of work that contained non-compete and confidentiality clauses that prohibited employment for a period of twelve months at any competing company located within one hundred miles of a United Rentals location where she worked.  The restrictive covenants further stated that the state and federal courts in Fairfield County, Connecticut would have jurisdiction in the event that legal proceedings ensued.  Upon her voluntary termination from United Rentals, Ms. Myers began to work at Head & Enquist Equipment, Inc., a competitor, at an office located approximately ten miles away from the United Rentals’ Shreveport office.  United Rentals contacted her to remind her of the restrictive covenants and her obligations under them but she continued her employment with Head & Enquist.  United Rentals sued Ms. Myers in Connecticut federal court for breach of the non-compete and confidentiality agreements and sought a court injunction to enforce their provisions.  The court found in favor of United Rentals and granted its request to enforce the non-compete agreement.

Ms. Myers presented various arguments to the court to persuade it to deny enforcement of the agreement, but the court ultimately found in favor of United Rentals.  She argued that Louisiana law should be controlling in the legal dispute, and further asserted that Louisiana law does not permit “choice of law” clauses in employment agreements.  The court investigated Ms. Myers’ contention and explained that the proper procedure to determine if a “choice of law” clause is permissible is to consult the law of the state being selected, in this case, that of Connecticut.  Connecticut law however cannot be the “choice of law” state when there is another state with a “materially greater interest…in the determination of the particular issue”.  The court held that Louisiana did in fact have a greater interest in the dispute and thus Louisiana law was applicable and controlling for the case.

Although Louisiana law is less than favorable to United Rentals with regard to “choice of law” clauses, it still recognizes that parties are entitled to a remedy in connection with a violation of a confidentiality agreement “if the material sought to be protected is in fact confidential”.  Courts generally view the disclosure of confidential information as sufficient evidence for a company to establish that it would suffer irreparable harm if an injunction were not granted.  During her employment with the company, Ms. Myers was exposed to and had access to United Rentals’ trade secrets, contract details, customer data, financial information, and marketing plans/strategies.  The court held that this was clearly sensitive and confidential information, the content of which entitled United Rentals to protection in the form of a court-ordered injunction.

The court held for United Rentals despite applying Louisiana law in response to Ms. Myers’ justified assertion that this specific “choice of law” provision was not valid.  Although Louisiana law shuns “choice of law” provisions in non-compete agreements, it does support injunctions when it is necessary and proper for a company to protect its confidential business information.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.