Posts tagged with "Ellerth"

Proxy/Alter Ego Liability for Sexual Harassment

Liability in Workplace Sexual Harassment

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (that includes Connecticut and New York) addressed for the first time whether the so-called Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense is available when an alleged sexual harassment attacker holds a sufficiently high position within an organization so as to be considered the organization’s proxy or alter ego. The Second Circuit joined the other Circuits that have considered the issue in concluding that under those circumstances, the affirmative defense was unavailable to the employer.

By way of background, Faragher/Ellerth held that a company could escape vicarious liability for sexual harassment by taking certain steps directed toward reporting and eradicating sexual harassment in the workplace. Left open was the issue of the employer’s direct liability where the actor was deemed to be the proxy/alter ego of the company. Under that doctrine, an employer is liable in its own right for wrongful harassing conduct, as opposed to being vicariously liable for the actions of company agents.

A Company’s Proxy or Alter Ego

But who is the company’s proxy or alter ego? Prior cases clearly place the company president and other sufficiently senior corporate officers within that category, and refer to “that class of an organization’s officials who may be treated as the organization’s proxy.” Understandably, the courts do not want to draw a bright line around who may be considered an employer proxy, so that unusual cases can be determined on their peculiar facts without being constrained by particular titles.

All that is required is for the supervisor to occupy a sufficiently high position in the management hierarchy of the company for his actions to be imputed to the company. When the official’s unlawful harassment is thus automatically charged to the employer, it cannot raise the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, even if the harassment did not result in an adverse employment action.

The result is a settling of the law in the Connecticut federal court; the Faragher/Ellerth defense is unavailable when the alleged harasser is the employer’s proxy or alter ego. Both employers and employees now know better where they stand.

–

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. Should you have any questions about Title VII and workplace discrimination or any other employment law matter, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C. in Westport, Connecticut by telephone at (203) 221-3100 or by email at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

US Supreme Court Establishes Employer Friendly Definition of “Supervisor” for Employer Liability for Title VII Employment Discrimination

Vance v. Ball State University, 520 U.S. (2013)

The United States Supreme Court decided two very closely watched employment law cases interpreting harassment and discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The first case decided 5-4 in favor of the employer, Vane v. Ball State University [1], addressed a question left open by two previous Supreme Court cases[2], who qualifies as a “supervisor” so as to hold an employer vicariously liability under Title VII for an employee’s unlawful harassment or discrimination?

Case #1

In this case, Maetta Vance, an African-American woman, was employed as a full-time catering assistant with Ball State University. She initially filed internal complaints with BSU and charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging racial harassment and discrimination by a fellow employee, Davis, a white woman and catering specialist employed in the same division as Vance.

The situation persisted causing Vance to file a lawsuit in 2006 claiming that she had been subjected to a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. While the parties agreed that Davis did not have the authority to fire, hire, promote, or transfer Vance, in her capacity as a lead caterer, Davis controlled the day to day duties of Vance. In her complaint, she alleged that Davis was her supervisor and that BSU was liable for Davis’ creation of a racially hostile work environment.

The plaintiff, Vance, argued that a person is a “supervisor” if he/she has authority to control someone else’s daily activities and evaluate performance. The employer argued that a “supervisor” must have more power, such as the ability to take a tangible actions including: “hiring, firing, demoting, promoting, transferring or disciplining” the employee.[3]

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, an employer’s liability for harassment and discrimination depends on the status of the harasser. If the harassing employee is the victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.[4] However, if the harassing employee is the victim’s supervisor different rules apply.

Case #2

In two companion cases from 1998, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. Boca Raton, the Supreme Court held that an employer is strictly liable under Title VII for discrimination or harassment by an employee who is a “supervisor” where the harassment amounts to tangible employment actions.

Where there is no adverse employment action, the employer is still vicariously liable for the supervisor’s hostile work environment unless the employer can establish as an affirmative defense that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided.[5] Under this framework, therefore, it matters whether the harasser is a “supervisor” or simply a co-worker.

Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Alito’s opinion adopted the rule proposed by the employer, holding that for purposes of this Title VII rule, to be a “supervisor,” a person must have the power to take a “tangible employment action” against the victim.[6]

That is, he must be able to “effect a ‘significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”[7] The employer was entitled to win the case because Vance had not adequately shown that the person who discriminated against her was a supervisor under the Court’s definition.

Takeaway

Thus, for the purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, “an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s unlawful harassment only when the employer has empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim,” such as significant change in employment status, responsibilities, or changes in benefits.[8]

–

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. Should you have any questions about Title VII and workplace discrimination or any other employment law matter, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut, by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.

[1] Vance v. Ball State University, 520 U.S. ___ (2013)

[2] Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 524 U. S. 742 (1998), Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775 (1998),

[3] 2008 WL 4247836, *12 (quoting Hall v. Bodine Elect. Co., 276 F. 3d 345, 355 (CA7 2002)

[4] Vance v. Ball State University, 520 U.S. ___ (2013)

[5] Faragher, at 807; Ellerth, at 765.

[6] Vance v. Ball State University, 520 U.S. ___ (2013)

[7] Vance v. Ball State University, 520 U.S. ___ (2013); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761

[8] Vance v. Ball State University, 520 U.S. ___ (2013)