Posts tagged with "fair trial"

Jury Instruction Was “Accurate,” Not Misleading: Appeals Court Affirms Evading Responsibility Judgment

Leave a reply

In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected a defendant’s claim that the trial court’s jury instruction regarding the elements of evasion of responsibility was misleading.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on the night of July 16, 2001, in Bridgeport, CT. The defendant consumed six beers in three and a half hours before and while eating dinner. He left the restaurant in his truck and approached the same intersection as the victim, who was on a motorcycle. Without signaling, the defendant turned into the victim’s path, and despite significant effort to avoid a collision, the victim struck the back end of the truck. The victim was thrown from his motorcycle and died from his injuries.

A witness observed the accident and later testified that “the truck then stopped, the defendant stepped out of the truck, looked, got back in and took off.” Police pursued the defendant, who stopped only after he was forced to by a second police cruiser. The defendant was visibly intoxicated, and blood alcohol tests produced readings of 0.172 and 0.167, over twice the legal limit.

The Appeal

The defendant was charged with second-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter with a motor vehicle, and evading responsibility, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes (CGS) §§ 53a-56(a)(1), 53a-56b(a), and 14-224(a), respectively. At trial, the defendant testified that “while he was turning left, after giving a signal, he felt an impact toward the rear of his truck, saw nothing and thought someone had hit his vehicle and driven off.” The defendant was convicted on the second two counts. He appealed his conviction, arguing, in part, that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury regarding the elements of evading responsibility. Specifically, he claimed:

1)      The court misled the jury by using the word “prevent” rather than “unable” with respect to reporting requirements of CGS § 14-224(a).

2)      The court improperly instructed the jury that it had to find that “some outside force caused the defendant to be unable to report the information,” rather than “the defendant’s being unable to report for any cause or reason.”

3)      The court did not instruct the jury that the defendant was legally excused from the remaining statutory requirements because he was arrested while seeking assistance for the victim.

The Court’s Decision

The Appellate Court was not persuaded by any of these arguments. Because the defendant did not draw a sufficient distinction between the use of “prevent” and “unable,” the court’s use of the first word was harmless. The Court reiterated that CGS § 14-224(a) does not provide any legal excuse for failing to stop. As the legislative history indicates, “failure to stop immediately cannot be cured at some later time by an operator reporting the incident to police.”

As such, a reasonable jury could find that the defendant did not immediately stop and render assistance to the victim following the collision, and by leaving the scene he was not satisfying his duties under the statute. The Appellate Court found that the jury instruction, as given, was proper and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

–

When faced with a charge of evading responsibility, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Despite Prosecutorial Impropriety, Closing Argument Comment Did Not Deprive Defendant of a Fair Trial

Leave a reply

In a previous article, I discussed how the Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected a defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly admitted allegedly prejudicial evidence. This article focuses on the defendant’s second claim on review: prosecutorial impropriety.

Case Details

As previously noted, the defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) of alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. At trial, the State admitted into evidence an A-44 form, which is used by police when they report an arrest related to OMVUI. This form indicated that the defendant “refused to perform” two field sobriety tests, but on direct examination, the officer who filled out this form stated that no field sobriety tests were performed because the defendant appeared too intoxicated to safely perform them.

On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the disparity, and during closing arguments repeatedly highlighted the discrepancy to call into question the witness’s credibility. In its rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated that the A-44 form was a standardized form voted on by the Connecticut legislature. However, this cited evidence that was never entered into the record, though defense counsel did not object when the statement was made.

When the defendant appealed his conviction, his second ground for appeal was that the prosecutor’s statement during closing arguments constituted an impropriety that deprived him of a fair trial. He argued that “the state impermissibly bolstered [the officer’s] testimony by improperly referring to evidence that was not in the record during closing argument.”

Assessing Claims of Prosecutorial Impropriety

A reviewing court applies a two-step process when assessing a claim of prosecutorial impropriety. First, the court must determine whether an impropriety even occurred. Although counsel are generally allowed “generous latitude” with respect to their arguments, a prosecutor may forcefully argue his case so long as it is done so fairly based on facts within the evidence and attendant inferences. In this case, the Appellate Court concluded that the prosecutor’s statement amounted to an impropriety. He made reference to evidence that was not admitted, and because “the comment amounts to unsworn testimony… [it was] not proper in closing argument.”

However, the inquiry does not stop at a mere finding of impropriety. In the second step, the court must consider “whether that impropriety, or the cumulative effect of multiple improprieties, deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.” The court will consider the following six factors in the context of the entire trial:

[T]he extent to which the impropriety was invited by defense conduct, the severity of the impropriety, the frequency of the impropriety, the centrality of the impropriety to the critical issues in the case, the effectiveness of the curative measures adopted and the strength of the state’s case.

The Court’s Findings

State v. Jordan, 117 Conn. App. 160, 164 (2009). In this case, the Appellate Court only found the first factor in the defendant’s favor. It noted that the comment was not sufficiently egregious and only occurred once. In addition, attribution to the legislature is not a central issue in an OMVUI case, and the court instructed the jury that counsel’s arguments were not evidence and thus could not be considered. The defendant provided no evidence that the jury disregarded this instruction. Finally, the State’s OMVUI case was sufficiently strong with ample supporting evidence. Therefore, the Appellate Court found that despite the impropriety, the comment did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

–

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Court Suppresses Evidence After MTAPD Illegally Arrested DUI Suspect, Citing Jurisdictional Limitations

Leave a reply

This April, the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Norwalk granted a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence collected after officers with the Metropolitan Transit Authority Police Department (MTAPD) illegally arrested him. However, the court declined to suppress evidence gathered prior to the arrest.

Case Background

In this case, two MTAPD officers (officers) were traveling along I-95 North in Westport at 2:20am when they witnessed a motor vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed in the leftmost lane. This vehicle repeatedly forced other cars into the center lane, drove over the left solid white line, and abruptly crossed into the other lanes. The officers initiated a traffic stop, though the vehicle stopped partially in an entrance ramp onto I-95.

One of the officers approached the passenger side of the vehicle and saw the defendant as the only occupant. When instructing the defendant to move his car to a safer location, the officer observed the strong odor of alcohol and the defendant’s bloodshot eyes. After backup was requested, the officers asked the defendant for his identification, but he instead spontaneously stated that his license was suspended.

At 2:45am a State trooper (trooper) arrived on the scene, and the MTAPD officers conducted several field sobriety tests, all of which the defendant failed. The defendant was placed under arrest by the officers, who transported him to Westport’s police department for a breathalyzer test. At this point, the trooper was no longer involved. At the police department, the defendant refused to submit to a breath test, and was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI). However, he moved to suppress all evidence, arguing it was inadmissible because the officers illegally arrested him, and filed a motion to dismiss.

Enforcement Powers of Officers

Police officers have the power to arrest within their respective jurisdictions, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-1f(c). MTAPD officers are considered Railroad Police Officers, and their enforcement powers are generally limited to railroad property (except in the case of pursuit). An arrest made outside the statutory parameters is illegal, and the typical remedy is to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal arrest.

The purpose of this exclusionary rule is to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial. However, an illegal arrest does not outright bar a State from pursuing charges against a defendant, and evidence may still be admissible if acquired “by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Superior Court wrote that because I-95 is not railroad property, and the officers were not effectuating their jurisdictional arrest powers as authorized under statute, they did not have authority to arrest the defendant. Therefore, the arrest in this case was illegal, and the Court agreed that all evidence obtained after the defendant was taken into custody, including his refusal to submit to a breath test, could be suppressed.

However, the Court found that the evidence obtained prior to arrest was admissible. The MTAPD officers initiated an investigatory stop, which did not violate § 54-1f(a), and the presence of the trooper, whose jurisdiction includes interstate highways like I-95, rendered administration of the field sobriety tests proper. Therefore, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, and denied his motion to dismiss.

–

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.