Posts tagged with "Fairfield County"

Federal Court Found Form U-4 and FINRA Rules to Constitute a Sufficient Basis for an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties

Lawrence R. Gilmore v. Scott T. Brandt, 2011 WL 5240421 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2011).

In a case before the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Lawrence Gilmore (“Gilmore”) filed a motion to confirm the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award in his favor, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 9.  Scott Brandt (“Brandt”) responded by filing a motion to vacate the FINRA award pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10.  The court granted Gilmore’s motion to confirm the award, entered judgment for the award, and denied Brandt’s motion to vacate the award.

Case Details

The dispute underlying the FINRA arbitration began when Brandt, a representative of Lighthouse Capital Corporation, suggested that Gilmore invest $92,000 in Diversified Lending Group, Inc. (“DLG”).  Gilmore made the investment, which was quickly decimated.  Gilmore alleged that DLG was a Ponzi scheme and filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA.  Rather than seek a stay of arbitration, Brandt contested the issue of arbitrability by appending a statement of jurisdictional objection to his FINRA Arbitration Submission Agreement and raising jurisdictional objections throughout the arbitration proceedings.

FINRA appointed a panel of arbitrators to hear the matter, however, the arbitration panel did not directly address Brandt’s jurisdictional challenge.  In December 2010, the panel issued an arbitration award in Gilmore’s favor for compensatory damages of $106,024.68, post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees.

Arbitrability of a Dispute

In his motion for vacatur, Brandt argued that he never entered into an arbitration agreement with Gilmore; therefore, their dispute should not have been subjected to arbitration. The district court found that Brandt had sufficiently preserved his objection to arbitrability, and that it fell to the court to decide whether the dispute was in fact arbitrable.

Because arbitration is entirely a matter of contract, a party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute that it has not agreed to submit to arbitration. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995).  When Brandt first sought to be licensed to sell securities, he executed a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (“Form U-4”), which contained a section agreeing “to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of [FINRA].”

The court determined that the agreement embodied in Brandt’s Form U-4 would constitute an agreement to arbitrate the dispute with Gilmore only if FINRA rules required this dispute to be arbitrated.

FINRA Rule 12200

FINRA Rule 12200 is a broad provision that generally applies to any customer dispute arising in connection with the business activities of a FINRA member.  Specifically, FINRA Rule 12200 requires that a dispute must be arbitrated under the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure if: (1) arbitration is required by written agreement or requested by a customer; (2) the dispute is between a customer and a FINRA member or associated person; and (3) the dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the FINRA member or associated person.

By submitting his Statement of Claim to FINRA for arbitration, Gilmore was clearly requesting arbitration of the dispute.  The district court found that Gilmore was in a customer relationship with Brandt because Brandt had induced him to invest in DLG.

The Court’s Decision

Additionally, the district court found that Gilmore’s claims related to Brandt’s recommendation of an investment in particular securities fell within the class of disputes reasonably regulated by FINRA.  Therefore, the district court determined that FINRA Rule 12200 required the dispute between Gilmore and Brandt be submitted to arbitration.  Because of this result, Brandt’s U-4 Form was determined to be his agreement to submit to arbitration of the dispute.

Because the arbitration panel had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, the award decision is entitled to deference by the federal court.  9 U.S.C. § 9-11.  Because Brandt provided no argument that satisfied the statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), the court granted Gilmore’s motion for confirmation of the arbitration award of compensatory damages of $106,024.68, with interest, and attorneys’ fees.


Should you have any questions relating to FINRA or arbitration issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya of Maya Murphy, P.C. in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Court Enforces Non-Compete Clause Against Real Estate Agent

Century 21 Access America v. McGregor-Mclean, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3239

Century 21 Access America is a national real estate company that employed Ms. Tori McGregor-Mclean as a real estate agent in its Bridgeport, CT office from July 2003 to June 16, 2004.  Her employment contract, dated July 7, 2003, contained a non-compete clause that prohibited her for a two-year period following termination from engaging in competing business activities within a fifteen-mile radius of 3850 Main Street, Bridgeport, CT.  Ms. McGregor-Mclean voluntarily terminated her employment on June 16, 2004 and began to work for Buyer’s Capitol Real Estate, a company located outside of the fifteen-mile radius in Stamford, CT.

Century 21 did not have a problem with her new employment because the office was located outside of the prohibited area but issues arose when Ms. McGregor-Mclean began accepting listings within the fifteen-mile radius.  Century 21 sued Ms. McGregor-Mclean in Connecticut state court for violation of the non-compete clause and requested that the court issue an injunction to enforce the agreement.

The Court’s Decision

The court found that Ms. McGregor-Mclean’s activities with her new real estate agency were in fact violations of the non-compete agreement and it ordered that the provisions be enforced.  The plain language of the non-compete clause stipulated that Ms. McGregor-Mclean was prohibited from carrying out any direct or indirect competing business activities within the defined fifteen-mile radius.  She was in breach of the agreement because she accepted five listings within the prohibited area – it is inconsequential as a matter of law that her office was located outside of the fifteen-mile radius.

Under the agreement, she was prohibited from having a physical business presence and transacting individual deals within the defined area.  The court identified the unlawful breaches of the non-compete clause, concluded that the agreement was valid and reasonable, and issued an injunction to enjoin Ms. McGregor-Mclean from further violations of the covenant not to compete.


The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

ERISA Claim Challenges Vague Language of FINRA Arbitration Award in order to Include Back Pay as Benefits-Eligible Compensation

Ronald A. Roganti  v .Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, et el, 2012 WL 2324476 (S.D.N.Y.  June 18, 2012)

In a case before the Southern District of New York, Ronald Roganti (“Roganti”), a former employee of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”), asserted claims under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (“SOX”), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (“ERISA”). Both claims challenge MetLife’s denial of Roganti’s request that a 2010 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award be treated as benefits-eligible compensation.  MetLife moved to dismiss both claims on several grounds.  The court granted MetLife’s motion with respect to the SOX claim and denied the motion with respect to the ERISA claim.

Case Background

The underlying dispute in this case arose during Roganti’s employment with MetLife, which lasted from 1971 to 2005.  In 1999, Roganti began to voice concerns regarding allegedly-suspect business practices at MetLife and continued to do so until he terminated his employment in 2005.   Roganti claimed that throughout that time period, MetLife repeatedly disregarded his complaints and actively retaliated against him, including undermining his authority within the business subsets he oversaw and reducing his compensation with the specific purpose of reducing his pension benefits.

In July 2004, Roganti filed his initial Statement of Claim with the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) to arbitrate his disputes with MetLife.  FINRA, the successor to NASD, appointed a panel of three arbitrators to adjudicate four claims brought by Roganti: (1) the breach of contract claim, based on MetLife’s reduction of Roganti’s compensation; (2) violation of SOX retaliation provisions, based on MetLife’s retaliation against Roganti for reporting questionable business practices; (3) for the value of services rendered by Roganti; and (4) for violating ERISA, on the theory that, in reducing Roganti’s compensation, MetLife also sought to reduce his pension benefits.

In August 2010, the FINRA panel held that MetLife was liable to Roganti for $2,492,442.07 in “compensatory damages … above [MetLife’s] existing pension and benefit obligation to Claimant.” The arbitral award explain neither how the arbitrators arrived at this sum nor for what the award was intended to compensate Roganti. FINRA Docket Number 04-04876.

Benefits Claim

On March 24, 2011, Roganti filed a benefits claim with MetLife, in its capacity as the Plan Administrator, asking that the arbitral award be treated as compensation for income which MetLife had improperly denied him, and that the award be factored into the calculation of the benefits which he was entitled to under his pension plan with MetLife. MetLife denied the request for three reasons.

First, only income of current employees was benefits-eligible; therefore, since Roganti was not employed by MetLife when he received the award, it did not qualify as benefits-eligible compensation.  Second, FINRA broadly termed the award as “compensatory damages” rather than stating it was compensation for lost income.  Finally, the FINRA award did not indicate to which years of Roganti’s employment the award applied; therefore, even if the award represented unpaid income, it would be impossible for MetLife to determine concretely how the award should affect Roganti’s pension benefits. Roganti appealed this decision to MetLife, and MetLife again denied his claim.  Subsequently, Roganti filed SOX and ERISA claims in federal district court.

Because Roganti’s current SOX and ERISA claims are based on the 2011 denial of pension benefits, the court determined that these have not already been dispositioned by the 2010 FINRA arbitration.  Therefore, the court denied MetLife’s motions to dismiss both claims on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  However, because Roganti did not exhaust administrative remedies before filing his SOX claim in federal district court, the court determined that his SOX claim must be dismissed.

ERISA Claims

Roganti made two claims under ERISA, which creates a private right of action to enforce the provisions of a retirement benefits plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  First, he alleged that the FINRA arbitral award compensated him for unpaid wages that resulted from MetLife’s retaliation against him.  Second, he argued that because the award constituted back pay, it must be taken into account in calculating his pension benefits.  The court determined that central to both claims is the issue of whether the FINRA arbitration award constitutes back pay to compensate Roganti for services rendered while he was a MetLife employee, which would properly be included in pension benefits calculations.

The Court’s Decision

Neither the brevity of the FINRA arbitration award nor Roganti’s statement of claims to FINRA provided the court with sufficient clarity to resolve the factual issue of exactly what the award represented. The court, therefore, construed the ambiguity in the award language in the light most favorable to Roganti.  The court concluded that he had met his burden and denied MetLife’s motion to dismiss the ERISA claim.

Because the three-month timeframe to seek clarification from a FINRA arbitration panel pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 12 had elapsed, the court ordered the ERISA Plan Director to closely review the arbitral record, in the context of the evidence offered and arguments made by both sides at the arbitration, to determine whether or not the award represented back pay for Roganti.  The court found it unacceptable that the initial denials of benefits were based on the terse language of the arbitration award, rather than a more detailed analysis as to what the award amounts represented.


Should you have any questions relating to FINRA, employment, compensation or benefits issues please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya of Maya Murphy, P.C. in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Lower Court Erred in Denying Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Enhanced Sentence Because the Persistent Offender Provision Was Inapplicable

In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut agreed with a defendant that he was improperly sentenced as a repeat offender under General Statutes § 14-227a(g) and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate.

Case Details

In this case, the defendant was arrested on three separate occasions over the span of approximately three weeks. He was charged with three counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) in violation of § 14-227a, and each case was docketed in a different jurisdiction: Waterbury, Meriden, and Bristol. The defense counsel and Waterbury prosecutor reached a plea agreement, under which the defendant would be sentenced as a first-time offender twice and a second-time offender once.

However, the Meriden prosecutor would not transfer his case unless the defendant first pled guilty. On December 15, 2008, the defendant entered a guilty plea in the Meriden case, which was then transferred to Waterbury for purposes of sentencing. The Bristol case was transferred as well.

The Court’s Decision

On December 22, 2008, counsel submitted a new plea agreement to the court. Under its terms, the defendant would be sentenced as a first-time offender once (in the Meriden case) and a second-time offender on the other two counts. The defendant entered guilty pleas on January 12, 2009. The defendant, with support from the State, filed a motion to vacate the pleas and sentences, arguing that the pleas were improperly and illegally entered.

The court denied this motion, and the defendant sought remedy with the Appellate Court, arguing that he should have been sentenced as a first-time offender for all three cases. He noted that “he cannot be subjected to the enhanced penalty… because his conviction in the Meriden case occurred after the conduct underlying the violations of § 14-227a in the Waterbury and Bristol cases.”

General Statutes § 14-227a(g) allows for enhanced penalties for repeat offenders in OMVUI cases. In State v. Burns, the Supreme Court of Connecticut determined that for this section to be applicable, a defendant “must [first] have been convicted under § 14-227a and later must have violated the statute.”

In this case, the defendant was not convicted of OMVUI in the Meriden case “at the time of the commission of the second and third violations in the Waterbury and Bristol cases.” Instead, the defendant was sentenced in all three matters on the same date. As such, the Appellate Court found that the persistent offender provision did not apply, and the trial court erred when it did not grant the defendant’s motion to vacate.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya of Maya Murphy, P.C. in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Enforceability of Non-Solicitation Agreement for Potential Clients of Former Employer

Webster Financial Corporation v. McDonald, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 169

USI Insurance Services of Connecticut, Inc., formerly Webster Insurance, Inc., employed Mr. William McDonald as a senior vice president at its Westport, CT office.  The company had Mr. McDonald sign an employment agreement dated February 11, 2003 that contained non-compete and non-solicitation clauses in the event of his termination.  The agreement prohibited Mr. McDonald from soliciting any of USI’s contacts that had been clients or potential clients in the twelve months prior to his termination and established a geographical limit of twenty-five miles within USI’s Westport office.

As for the time limitation, the covenant was applicable for the great period of two years following Mr. McDonald’s termination or as long as he received benefits from a deferred compensation plan.  Mr. McDonald resigned on September 21, 2007 and began to work at Shoff Darby, Inc., an industry competitor well within the prohibited twenty-five mile radius of USI’s Westport office.  At his new firm, Mr. McDonald proceeded to solicit and sell insurance products to USI’s former and current clients.  Additionally, he contacted several USI employees and urged them to leave the company to seek employment with Shoff Darby.

Enforcing the Agreement 

USI sued Mr. McDonald and asked the court to enforce the provisions of the restrictive covenant.  Mr. McDonald presented two defenses to the court, arguing that the agreement was overly broad and therefore unenforceable.  He claimed that the prohibition of potential clients and the potential unlimited duration made the non-compete agreement unreasonable and unenforceable.

USI asserted the validity of the agreement and emphasized to the court that it contained a “blue pencil” provision that authorized the court to amend the time and/or geographical limitation in order to comply with Connecticut law.  Mr. McDonald countered this argument stating that this legal procedure would require the court to essentially rewrite the non-compete contract, an act forbidden under Connecticut law.

The Court’s Decision

The court found in favor of USI with regard to the issue of the agreement’s enforceability with its holding stating, “taking the covenant as whole, nothing on the face of the contract renders the covenant unenforceable as a matter of law”.  While deliberating about the claim that the prohibition on potential clients was unreasonable, the court stated that there is no direction or precedent from the Connecticut Appellate Courts and that the Superior Courts throughout the state were divided on the issue.

This court took the approach used in Cuna Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Butler (2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1623) that such limitations on potential clients are reasonable so long as they are “readily identifiable and narrowly defined”.  The court concluded that the potentially unlimited applicable duration of the agreement was not “per se unreasonable” because the agreement as a whole contained several other definitive restrictions such as the twenty-five mile radius from the Westport office and the limited group of clients for the anti-solicitation clause.


If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Gender Wage Gap in Connecticut

The Gender Wage Gap Task Force in Connecticut issued its report last month with both findings and recommendations on continued disparities between what men and women, on average, earn. In doing so, it recognized that there are multiple factors that are responsible for the gap in its view. It paints a far more complicated picture of the wage gap than some politicians suggest. As it detailed:

Understanding this inequity is not a simple matter. Many factors contribute to the overall wage gap including education and skills, experience, union membership, training, performance, hours worked and the careers women and men choose. However, even after these factors are controlled for, an estimated wage gap of 5-10% remains. The task force has identified six key contributors to the gender wage gap in Connecticut: unconscious bias, occupational segregation, lower starting salaries and positions for women, women’s slower career advancement, the existence of a glass ceiling and a lack of support for working families.

Reasons for the Wage Disparity

Mara Lee, from the Hartford Courant, does a nice job recapping some of the key findings. Her take?

The report says that researchers have determined there are two reasons for that disparity: women don’t negotiate salary offers as often as men, and there may be subtle biases among bosses, even ones they don’t realize they have.

The report gives an example of a study of students graduating from Carnegie Mellon with master’s degrees, which found that 57 percent of men negotiated salary offers and 7 percent of women did. The men’s salaries were 7.6 percent higher than the women. And that $4,000 was almost the exact amount more that people who negotiated were paid compared to those who didn’t.

What might we see as a result of the report?

There are a number of recommendations, but surprisingly few of them touch on changes to the legal system.

First, it suggests that Connecticut “align” its Family Medical Leave Act with the federal Family Medical Leave Act by expanding it to include companies with 50 or more employees.

If the General Assembly does take that up, legislators should consider narrowing the differences between the two statutes. For example, Connecticut gives employees 16 weeks of leave over a 24 month period, instead of the federal 12 weeks of leave every twelve months, which can be confusing at times and leads to strange results that allow employees to get 16 weeks of leave the first year and then another 12 weeks during the second year — far more than just the 16 weeks first contemplated under Connecticut law.

The report also recommends supporting paid leave programs, like those in New Jersey and California. Connecticut is currently studying various proposals.

Employers in Connecticut should remain cognizant of both the issues that this report raises and the legislative developments that may arise from it as a result.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, place contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Contents provided by: Daniel Schwartz of http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/

Enforcing a Non-Compete Agreement to Protect Software Company’s Confidential Information

Weseley Software Development Corporation v. Burdette, 977 F. Supp. 137

Mr. Wesley Burdette worked for Weseley Development Corporation first as a Logistics Analyst and then as a Senior Logistics Analyst from May 1993 to September 16, 1996.  Weseley was a software development company based in Shelton, Connecticut whose focus product was a transportation and logistics management program referred to as TRACS (Tactical Routing and Consolidation System).  Mr. Burdette played a significant role in the development and testing of TRACS versions 3.0 and 3.1.  He worked with “customers and potential customers to evaluate, develop, tailor, and implement Weseley’s products” during his approximately three years of employment.

He gave Weseley his two weeks notice on August 29, 1996 and planned to switch companies to work for Manugistics for the marketing and sales of its product titled MTP.  Management reminded Mr. Burdette of the non-compete clause in his employment agreement that he had signed.

The most important covenants that he signed in conjunction with his employment contract were those not to compete or disclose confidential information.  The agreement was signed on January 14, 1995 after Mr. Burdette was allowed time to consult with an attorney regarding any and all of the agreement’s provisions.  The non-compete clause stipulated that he could not work for a competitor for a period of six months following his termination with Weseley or disclose confidential information for an indefinite period of time.

The company sued Mr. Burdette to enforce the non-compete and asked the court to enjoin him from further employment with Manugistics.  Mr. Burdette countered that the agreement was unenforceable because its provisions were unreasonable and that Weseley had only signed the agreement once litigation began.

The Court’s Decision

The court found in favor of Weseley and enforced the non-compete covenant, enjoining Mr. Burdette from working for Manugistics for a period of six months as stated in the language of the agreement.  It validated the agreement because there was adequate consideration in the form of “continued employment, an articulated paid vacation entitlement, a new entitlement to severance benefits, and stock options”.  Furthermore, it found the limitations to be reasonable such that they fairly balanced Weseley’s desire to protect its business and Mr. Burdette’s desire to still be able to pursue his career.

It was paramount that the court protected the company’s interests since Mr. Burdette had a great deal of access to proprietary research & development information that could have severely disadvantaged Weseley should Mr. Burdette have shared the information with Manugistics.  Although the court stated that there was no evidence that he had already disclosed confidential information, it held that he would inadvertently draw upon his knowledge gained while employed at Weseley and eventually disclose some amount, however small it may be, in the course of his new employment with Manugistics.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Sexual Harassment Under Connecticut Law

Under the Connecticut Discriminatory Employment Practices Act, codified at Connecticut General Statute 46a-60(a)(8), it shall be a discriminatory practice “[f]or an employer [. . .] to harass any employee, person seeking employment or member on the basis of sex or gender identity or expression.  ‘Sexual harassment shall, for the purposes of this section be defined as any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any conduct of a sexual nature when (A) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (B) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (C) such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.”[1]

Sexual harassment can include actions ranging from suggestive or lewd remarks to unwelcome hugs, touches, or kisses, to retaliation for complaining about sexual harassment.  Furthermore, sexual harassment can happen by a male or a female, to a male or a female.  And the harasser does not need to be the victim’s supervisor – harassment can come from a co-worker or agent.

There are outlets in Connecticut to turn to, should you find yourself with questions about sexual harassment.  Sometimes a victim may not be sure if unwanted attention rises to the level of sexual harassment.  The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities provides valuable information on sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace, including step-by-step guides on how to proceed if you are the victim of such harassment.  If the situation requires legal action, please contact an experienced employment law attorney.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. We at Maya Murphy frequently litigate employment claims in both state and federal courts.  Should you have any questions about sexual harassment or any other employment law matter or to schedule a consultation, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut, by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.


[1] Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-60(a)(8).

IRS 2014 Pension Plan Limitations

On October 31, 2013, the IRS announced the following cost-of-living adjustments to certain dollar limitations applicable to employee pension benefit plans for 2014:

  • The annual benefit limit for defined benefit plans is increased from $205,000 to $210,000.
  • The annual addition limit for defined contribution plans is increased from $51,000 to $52,000.
  • The annual limit with respect to the exclusion for elective deferrals to a 401(k), 403(b) or 457 plan remains unchanged at $17,500.
  • The annual limit on annual contributions to an individual retirement account (“IRA”) remains unchanged at $5,500. The dollar limit for catch-up contributions to an IRA remains unchanged at $1,000.
  • The annual limit on compensation that can be taken into account under a qualified retirement plan is increased from $255,000 to $260,000.
  • The dollar limit for defining key employees in a top-heavy plan is increased from $165,000 to $170,000.
  • The dollar amount for determining the maximum account balance in an employee stock ownership plan (“ESOP”) subject to a five-year distribution period is increased from $1,035,000 to $1,050,000. The dollar amount used to determine the lengthening of the five-year distribution period is increased from $205,000 to $210,000.
  • The dollar limit for catch-up contributions for anyone 50 and older remains unchanged at $5,500, while the limit applicable to those participants under SIMPLE plans and SIMPLE IRAs remains unchanged at $2,500.
  • The limitation used in the definition of highly compensated employee remains unchanged at $115,000.

Employers who sponsor qualified retirement plans should review their administrative and payroll procedures to make sure the new limits are reflected as they must operate their plans in accordance with the new limits. The failure to do so could result in plan disqualification. Additionally, individual contributions that exceed the IRA limits may be subject to an excise tax.

Credit: Frank Rubinetti

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, place contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

IRS Issues Proposed Regulations on Dependent Care Expenses

The IRS has issued proposed regulations under Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) 21 regarding dependent care assistance expenses. (Code Section 21 defines when a dependent care expense qualifies for the dependent care tax credit.) For Dependent Care Assistance Plan (“DCAP”) sponsors, these regulations are important because they provide much-needed clarity with respect to what constitutes a qualifying expense under a DCAP.

A dependent care assistance expense will qualify for reimbursement under a Dependent Care Assistance Plan (“DCAP”) if the expense meets the definition of an employment-related “dependent care assistance” expense under Code Section 21(b)(2). This requires, among other things, that the individual has an “employment-related” purpose in paying for the expense – in other words, the individual must incur the expense so that he or she can be gainfully employed.

Proposed Regulations

The highlights of the proposed regulations are as follows:

Pre-Kindergarten Programs, Nursery Schools, and Specialty Day Camps Qualify as Dependent Care Assistance Expenses

The expenses of pre-school and other pre-kindergarten programs now qualify as dependent care assistance expenses.

The cost of kindergarten, and other educational programs above the kindergarten level, may not be considered dependent care assistance expenses since such programs have an educational purpose. However, the cost of after-school programs for children above kindergarten age may qualify as a dependent-care assistance expense.

Day Camps/Specialty Day Camps. The full cost of day camps, including specialty day camps that specialize in one particular activity such as soccer or computers, now qualify as a dependent-care assistance expense. (Overnight camp expenses still do not qualify since they are not considered employment-related expenses.)

“Indirect Expenses,” Transportation Expenses, and a Caregiver’s Room and Board now qualify as dependent-care assistance expenses

Transportation Expenses – to and from a day camp or an after-school program not on school premises – now qualify as a dependent-care assistance expense.

“Indirect Expenses.” Indirect expenses are expenses that relate to, but are not directly for the care of a dependent. Examples of qualifying indirect expenses include application fees, agency fees, and deposits may qualify if they are paid to obtain care for the dependent. Let’s say Jane places a deposit with Pre-School A to reserve a place for her child and subsequently decides to send her child to a different pre-school. By doing this, Jane forfeits her deposit with Pre-School A. The forfeited deposit does not qualify as a dependent-care assistance expense.

Room and Board. The cost of providing room and board to a caregiver may be considered an employment-related expense and therefore qualify as a dependent-care assistance expense.

Payments to Most Relatives for “Dependent Care” Do Not Qualify as Dependent-Care Assistance Expenses

The proposed regulations clarify that an individual’s payments to his or her child, spouse, or the dependent child’s parent (who is not the individual’s spouse), do not qualify as a dependent-care assistance expense.

However, if an individual pays his parent to care for his dependent children, those payments may qualify as a dependent-care assistance expense as long as the parent cannot be characterized as the individual’s dependent under Code Section 151.

Temporary Absences and Part-Time Work

Expenses Incurred During a Temporary Absence May Qualify as a Dependent-Care Assistance Expense. Prior to the proposed regulations, this was not the case. However, under the proposed regulations, an expense may qualify as a dependent-care assistance expense even if it is incurred while the individual is temporarily absent from work, for example, due to vacation or sickness. Although the proposed regulations have not specified the maximum duration of the absence, in two examples they note that expenses incurred during a two-day absence will qualify while expenses incurred during a four-month absence will not.

Part-Time Employees

If the part-time employee is required to pay for dependent care on a periodic basis, such as weekly or monthly, which includes both worked days and non-worked days, the entire cost of day care may constitute a dependent-care assistance expense. If, however, the part-time employee pays for dependent care on a daily basis, he or she can treat as dependent-care assistance expenses only those expenses incurred while he or she was at work.

Credit: Stefanie Kastrinsky


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