Posts tagged with "guilty plea"

Lower Court Erred in Denying Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Enhanced Sentence Because the Persistent Offender Provision Was Inapplicable

In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut agreed with a defendant that he was improperly sentenced as a repeat offender under General Statutes § 14-227a(g) and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate.

Case Details

In this case, the defendant was arrested on three separate occasions over the span of approximately three weeks. He was charged with three counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) in violation of § 14-227a, and each case was docketed in a different jurisdiction: Waterbury, Meriden, and Bristol. The defense counsel and Waterbury prosecutor reached a plea agreement, under which the defendant would be sentenced as a first-time offender twice and a second-time offender once.

However, the Meriden prosecutor would not transfer his case unless the defendant first pled guilty. On December 15, 2008, the defendant entered a guilty plea in the Meriden case, which was then transferred to Waterbury for purposes of sentencing. The Bristol case was transferred as well.

The Court’s Decision

On December 22, 2008, counsel submitted a new plea agreement to the court. Under its terms, the defendant would be sentenced as a first-time offender once (in the Meriden case) and a second-time offender on the other two counts. The defendant entered guilty pleas on January 12, 2009. The defendant, with support from the State, filed a motion to vacate the pleas and sentences, arguing that the pleas were improperly and illegally entered.

The court denied this motion, and the defendant sought remedy with the Appellate Court, arguing that he should have been sentenced as a first-time offender for all three cases. He noted that “he cannot be subjected to the enhanced penalty… because his conviction in the Meriden case occurred after the conduct underlying the violations of § 14-227a in the Waterbury and Bristol cases.”

General Statutes § 14-227a(g) allows for enhanced penalties for repeat offenders in OMVUI cases. In State v. Burns, the Supreme Court of Connecticut determined that for this section to be applicable, a defendant “must [first] have been convicted under § 14-227a and later must have violated the statute.”

In this case, the defendant was not convicted of OMVUI in the Meriden case “at the time of the commission of the second and third violations in the Waterbury and Bristol cases.” Instead, the defendant was sentenced in all three matters on the same date. As such, the Appellate Court found that the persistent offender provision did not apply, and the trial court erred when it did not grant the defendant’s motion to vacate.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

In Case Where Employee Abused Her Position to Embezzle Substantial Funds, Modification of Sentence Was Denied

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

In a criminal law matter, the Sentence Review Division (Division) of the Superior Court of Connecticut affirmed the sentence of a petitioner who abused her position and embezzled funds from her employer.

Case Background

In this case, the petitioner had a criminal history involving embezzlement, larceny, forgery, and substance abuse. Despite knowledge of this past, the director of a non-profit organization hired the petitioner as its bookkeeper and office manager to give her a chance at an honest living. In this position, the petitioner had “unfettered access” to financial accounts belonging to the organization and director.

Subsequently, various employees at the organization complained they were not being timely paid, and the director discovered not just an IRS tax lien on the organization’s assets, but a $20,000 unauthorized withdrawal from her personal account. Police investigated these financial irregularities and questioned the petitioner, and found that she had stolen at least $134,000.

Trial and Outcome

At trial for larceny in the first degree, the defendant entered into a guilty plea. She asked that her sentence be fully suspended and she be allowed to participate in an alternative to incarceration plan, but the court instead imposed twelve years of incarceration. The petitioner sought downward modification, arguing that her sentence was inappropriate and disproportionate compared to those who committed similar crimes. She asserted that she “cooperated with the police investigation, [was] contrite, willing to make restitution and was employed at the time of sentencing.”

The State opposed modification due to the defendant’s history of committing similar crimes. It noted how the defendant embezzled funds from a former employer, for which she received a five-year suspended sentence, and then violated her probation. The organization’s director also objected, stating that the sentence was proper because the petitioner “abused her position of trust, is unrepentant, and has caused a great deal of suffering.”

The Division declined to reduce the sentence, finding that under applicable statutes, it was neither inappropriate nor disproportionate. Indeed, the twelve-year sentence was within the parameters of the guilty plea, and the Division agreed with the trial court that “[i]t would stand justice on its head if I were to give you another suspended sentence after you already had one.”

When faced with a charge of larceny, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Guilty Plea Found Invalid Where Defendant Was Left in Dark Regarding What Constitutes a Larceny and Robbery

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

In a criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut reversed and remanded a case where the defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into a plea agreement.

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on August 20, 2004. A man robbed a bank at knifepoint, securing $15,000 in cash, before escaping in a vehicle driven by the defendant. Police soon located the duo along with the stolen money. The defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree and larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48, 53a-134(a)(2), and 53a-122.

Guilty Plea Made Unknowingly

On February 21, 2006, the defendant sought to enter a guilty plea to these charges. During a plea canvass conducted by the judge, the defendant stated that her defense attorney did not discuss the nature and elements of the charges she faced: “No, I don’t think I heard about what the state had to prove.” The defense attorney did not refute this contention, and the court did not seek from the defendant’s attorney “any assurance that he had, in fact, explained to the defendant the elements of the crimes to which she was pleading guilty.”

Though the court adequately read to the defendant the elements of conspiracy, it failed to properly set out the elements of both larceny and robbery. Nonetheless, the court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea and sentenced her to twelve years of incarceration, suspended after seven years, with five years of probation. The defendant appealed, arguing that she did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into her plea agreement.

When a defendant decides to plead guilty, he or she waives numerous constitutional rights, such as the right to a trial by jury. Therefore, a critical due process requirement is that a guilty plea must be made knowingly and voluntarily, which includes apprising the defendant not just of the rights being waived but also the essential criminal elements of the charges faced. Defense counsel is “generally presumed to have informed the defendant of the charges against him,” though this presumption may be overcome if the record shows that counsel failed to so inform. Should this presumption not apply, proper waiver may still be established if the court itself explained all of the elements.

Court’s Ruling

In this case, the Appellate Court found that the record showed “some positive suggestion that the defendant’s attorney had not informed the defendant of the elements of the crimes to which she was pleading guilty.” It noted that during the canvass, the defendant said she did not know what the State had to prove, and her counsel did not counter this statement. As such, the presumption was not applicable.

The Appellate Court further held that the trial court failed to apprise the defendant of the essential elements of larceny and robbery. Though the court did read to the defendant what first-degree larceny and first-degree robbery encompassed, but failed to explain what acts constituted a robbery or larceny under Connecticut law. Therefore, the case was reversed and remanded with directions to the lower court to withdraw the guilty pleas.

When faced with a charge of conspiracy, larceny, or robbery, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

In Case Where Employee Abused Her Position to Embezzle Substantial Funds, Sentence Modification Was Denied

Superior Court of Connecticut: Sentence Review Division

In a criminal law matter involving sentence modification, the Sentence Review Division (Division) of the Superior Court of Connecticut affirmed the sentence of a petitioner who stole money from her employer.

Case Details

In this case, the petitioner had a criminal history involving embezzlement, larceny, forgery, and substance abuse. Despite knowledge of this past, the director of a non-profit organization hired the petitioner as its bookkeeper and office manager to give her a chance at an honest living. In this position, the petitioner had “unfettered access” to financial accounts belonging to the organization and director. Subsequently, various employees at the organization complained they were not being timely paid, and the director discovered not just an IRS tax lien on the organization’s assets, but a $20,000 unauthorized withdrawal from her personal account. Police investigated these financial irregularities and questioned the petitioner, and found that she had stolen at least $134,000.

The Trial

At trial for larceny in the first degree, the defendant entered into a guilty plea. She asked that her sentence be fully suspended and she be allowed to participate in an alternative to incarceration plan, but the court instead imposed twelve years of incarceration. The petitioner sought downward modification, arguing that her sentence was inappropriate and disproportionate compared to those who committed similar crimes. She asserted that she “cooperated with the police investigation, [was] contrite, willing to make restitution and was employed at the time of sentencing.”

The State opposed modification due to the defendant’s history of committing similar crimes. It noted how the defendant embezzled funds from a former employer, for which she received a five-year suspended sentence, and then violated her probation. The organization’s director also objected, stating that the sentence was proper because the petitioner “abused her position of trust, is unrepentant, and has caused a great deal of suffering.”

The Division declined to reduce the sentence, finding that under applicable statutes, it was neither inappropriate nor disproportionate. Indeed, the twelve-year sentence was within the parameters of the guilty plea, and the Division agreed with the trial court that “[i]t would stand justice on its head if I were to give you another suspended sentence after you already had one.”

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of larceny, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Where Defendant Created Multiple Problems for Representation, Court Determined Counsel Did Not Render Ineffective Assistance

In a recent criminal law matter, a Superior Court of Connecticut denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus where petitioner could not successfully argue ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

In this case, the petitioner pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter, operation under suspension, and evading responsibility. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he faced fifteen years incarceration, execution suspended after four years, with five years’ probation. The petitioner asked that sentencing be briefly postponed to “[allow him] to get his affairs in order.” The request was granted, though the trial court stressed the ramifications for failure to appear at sentencing.

The petitioner did not appear at court on the rescheduled sentencing date, and a warrant was issued for felony failure to appear, which has a maximum potential sentence of five years. Soon thereafter, the petitioner was brought before the court on this warrant, and defense counsel negotiated a plea agreement with the State: a two-year non-suspended sentence to be served consecutively to the original sentence. When the court initiated a plea canvass, the petitioner stated, “I want to know if I can try my case over because I’m not guilty for this, ma’am.” The judge declined to accept the guilty plea and continued the matter.

At the next court date, the State withdrew the two-year sentence and instead sought the imposition of three years. The petitioner accepted this new agreement and was sentenced to fifteen years incarceration, execution suspended after seven years, with five years probation. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.

When a court considers an ineffective assistance claim, it applies a two-part test from Strickland v. Washington: deficient performance and prejudice to the outcome of the case. A habeas petition can be denied on either ground. “There is no constitutional right for a defendant to enter into a plea agreement with the state.” Courts are free to accept or reject a plea agreement, and such decisions will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. However, a court is within its discretion to deny an agreement “when there is even the slightest manifestation of a hesitance or a reluctance on part of a defendant to enter into a plea.”

In this case, the Superior Court determined that defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance, but instead pointed to the petitioner as “his own worst enemy.” As the Court explained, the petitioner “grossly complicated” his defense counsel’s representation: he failed to appear at court, then “created a problem with that plea canvass by indicating he did not want to plead guilty because he didn’t commit the offense.” In addition, the State was not obligated to enter into a plea agreement with the petitioner, and that it took back the initial two-year agreement was not illegal. Furthermore, the Superior Court determined that the judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to accept the plea agreement, noting that “he would have been remiss had he not done so.” Therefore, the Superior Court denied the writ of habeas corpus petitioner.

Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

Lower Court Erred in Denying Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Enhanced Sentence Because the Persistent Offender Provision Was Inapplicable

In a recent criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut agreed with a defendant that he was improperly sentenced as a repeat offender under General Statutes § 14-227a(g) and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate.

In this case, the defendant was arrested on three separate occasions over the span of approximately three weeks. He was charged with three counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) in violation of § 14-227a, and each case was docketed in a different jurisdiction: Waterbury, Meriden, and Bristol. The defense counsel and Waterbury prosecutor reached a plea agreement, under which the defendant would be sentenced as a first-time offender twice and a second-time offender once. However, the Meriden prosecutor would not transfer his case unless the defendant first pled guilty. On December 15, 2008, the defendant entered a guilty plea in the Meriden case, which was then transferred to Waterbury for purposes of sentencing. The Bristol case was transferred as well.

On December 22, 2008, counsel submitted a new plea agreement to the court. Under its terms, the defendant would be sentenced as a first-time offender once (in the Meriden case) and a second-time offender on the other two counts. The defendant entered guilty pleas on January 12, 2009. The defendant, with support from the State, filed a motion to vacate the pleas and sentences, arguing that the pleas were improperly and illegally entered. The court denied this motion, and the defendant sought remedy with the Appellate Court, arguing that he should have been sentenced as a first-time offender for all three cases. He noted that “he cannot be subjected to the enhanced penalty… because his conviction in the Meriden case occurred after the conduct underlying the violations of § 14-227a in the Waterbury and Bristol cases.”

General Statutes § 14-227a(g) allows for enhanced penalties for repeat offenders in OMVUI cases. In State v. Burns, the Supreme Court of Connecticut determined that for this section to be applicable, a defendant “must [first] have been convicted under § 14-227a and later must have violated the statute.” In this case, the defendant was not convicted of OMVUI in the Meriden case “at the time of the commission of the second and third violations in the Waterbury and Bristol cases.” Instead, the defendant was sentenced in all three matters on the same date. As such, the Appellate Court found that the persistent offender provision did not apply, and the trial court erred when it did not grant the defendant’s motion to vacate.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.