Posts tagged with "implied consent"

Jury Properly Instructed by Trial Court Regarding Inferences From Breath Test Refusal

Case Details

In a criminal law matter, the defendant was the subject of a traffic stop at 12:40am on April 29, 2005. University police believed that he was driving under the influence based on his erratic driving, a suspicion confirmed by the defendant’s slurred speech, red glassy eyes, the smell of alcohol in his car, and failed field sobriety tests. The defendant was arrested and transported to university police headquarters.

After being advised of his rights and the implied consent to take a breath test, the defendant stated he would not consent until he contacted an attorney. “The defendant repeatedly stated that he would not do anything without an attorney,” so police recorded the refusal. However, the defendant later requested to take the breathalyzer test, but officers would not administer it. They stated it was too late; however, if the officers administered the test at the time of this request, it would have occurred within the two-hour statutory window.

The OMVUI Charges

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. Following the close of evidence at trial, the court proposed the following jury instruction: based on the evidence, if the jury concluded that the defendant refused to take the breathalyzer test, it could draw reasonable inferences stemming from that fact. The defendant requested that the jury instruction include “consciousness of innocence” language about the officers’ refusal to conduct the test after the defendant requested it, and to draw any reasonable inference from that fact as well.

The court denied the request and the defendant was found guilty of OMVUI. He appealed the conviction, stating, in part, that the jury instruction improperly focused on his refusal without enough emphasis on his later request to submit. Therefore, he claimed the court “improperly deprived him of a theory of defense” and the jury instruction was “imbalanced in favor of the state.”

Jury Instruction

The Supreme Court of Connecticut has stated that for a defendant to be entitled to a theory of defense instruction, he or she must assert a recognized legal theory. Likewise, our appellate court has “repeatedly refused to apply the consciousness of innocence principle to jury instructions regarding consciousness of guilt,” and as such is not a recognized legal theory. In this case, the Appellate Court of Connecticut found that because the proposed language from the defendant encompassed this very scenario, he was not entitled to a theory of defense instruction.

When a court considers a challenge to a jury instruction that does not give rise to constitutional implications, the charge is “considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts.” The instruction need only be correct in law (in light of the facts of the case) and not mislead the jury. In this case, the trial court properly instructed the jury that it first had to actually find that the defendant refused to submit to the breathalyzer test before it could draw any inferences from a refusal.

“The court told the jury it must consider all of the evidence… [T]he instruction… did not instruct the jury that it could not consider the defendant’s request to submit to the test. … [It] did not inform the jury that it could draw a negative inference from a refusal to take a Breathalyzer test.” Instead, the trial court “merely informed the jury that it could draw an inference from [the defendant’s] refusal.” After addressing additional arguments on appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Superior Court Denies Motions to Suppress in DUI Case, Finding Defendant’s Constitutional Rights Were Not Violated

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on April 6, 2008. A police officer received word from dispatch that a restaurant drive-thru employee called in to report a customer, the defendant, who appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. The officer was given specific information about the vehicle and was told that this was the third report received. The officer promptly located the defendant’s vehicle and initiated a traffic stop.

When the officer approached the vehicle, he observed beer cans on the back floor of the defendant’s car in plain sight. Some of these were empty, and all were seized as evidence. After additional officers arrived on the scene, they conducted field sobriety tests and then arrested the defendant and brought her to police headquarters.

There, the officers advised the defendant of her Miranda rights and had her review a Notice of Rights form, which included information regarding implied consent and the chemical alcohol test refusal. The defendant was told she could call an attorney, but she was unable to successfully make contact with one. After fifteen minutes passed, officers advised the defendant that she had to decide whether or not to take the test, so she refused.

The Charges

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) of alcohol in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. She moved to suppress statements she made as well as evidence collected from the motor vehicle stop and during a search of her car. In support of her motions, the defendant argued that police violated her rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures, and generally police must have a warrant to conduct a search. However, there are four recognized, narrow exceptions where the warrantless search of a vehicle is reasonable, including “when there was probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband or evidence pertaining to a crime.” Officers may seize contraband that it finds in plain view, and “such observations give rise to probable cause justifying a search of the vehicle.”

The Fifth Amendment, in part, prohibits compelled self-incrimination. The well-known recitation of Miranda warnings stem from the construction of this Amendment, and two conditions are required before an officer must invoke this warning: custody and interrogation. Waiver of Miranda rights must be made knowingly and voluntarily, which must be proven by the State by the preponderance of the evidence.

Under Connecticut law, in an action where a defendant is charged with OMVUI, the jury may draw permissive inferences from the fact that the defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. In addition, identifiable citizen informants are presumptively reliable, and officers are justified when they assume that the informant is providing truthful information. Because of the pervasive state interest in preventing drunk driving, officers do not have to wait for the defendant to drive erratically or cause an accident before pulling them over.

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Superior Court of Connecticut adjudicating the case denied all of the defendant’s motions. It found that police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant, based on the information provided by the restaurant employee, an identifiable citizen informant. The seizure of the beer cans, which were in plain view, was permissible. In addition, because there was no interrogation at the police station, the defendant was not compelled to incriminate herself. Rather, pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b(b), police officers have the explicit authority to request that a defendant arrested for OMVUI sub.