Estes v. Crowley, FSTCV114021004S, 2011 WL 5841857 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2011)
In a case before the Superior Court of Connecticut, a judgment creditor objected to the debtor’s claim of exemption for a bank account that was standing in the name of a family living trust. The court sustained the objection and denied the exemption.
In July 2011, a judgment was entered for Karl Estes, as the custodian of the Karl G. Estes IRA, (“judgment creditor”) against Timothy Crowley (“debtor”). The Superior Court of Connecticut issued an execution that was served upon the bank where the debtor maintained a “High Yield Consumer Savings Account” in the name of his family living trust. The total balance of the account was removed toward satisfying the judgment, in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-367b(c) (2009). The debtor then filed a claim of exemption, classifying the account as a “private pension, trust, retirement or medical savings account” under Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-321a, 52-352b(m) (2009).
According to the living trust agreement establishing the debtor’s family living trust, the debtor and his wife were both grantors and trustees of the trust. The trust was for the benefit of the two grantors and their children. The trust was divided into two grantor’s separate shares, one for each grantor, and each share consisted of an undivided one-half beneficial interest in the trust assets.
During the lives of both grantors, all distributions of income and principal from the trust estate would be made one-half from each grantor’s separate share. During their joint lifetimes, the trustees had the power to pay to or apply all or part of the principal and income of each grantor’s separate share for the benefit of each grantor. The majority of the funds in the family living trust were from an IRS refund issued in connection with the debtor and his wife’s joint federal income tax return.
Exemption of Assets
Connecticut law exempts any “assets or interests of an exemptioner in, or payments received by the exemptioner from, a plan or arrangement described in Section 52-321a.” Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52–352b(m). However, the statute that describes which assets are unavailable to creditors, Conn. Gen. Stat. §52–321a, limits the definition to trusts or other instruments that were established as part of retirement plans or other plans qualified under various sections of the Internal Revenue Code.
Such plans are “conclusively presumed to be a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under the laws of this state.” Id. The court found that the family living trust at issue was not a plan or arrangement described by the relevant statutes and, therefore, was not entitled to exemption from a judgment creditor on these bases.
In the alternative, the debtor argued that even if the family living trust was not entitled to exemption, the income could not be subjected to claims of creditors based on Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-321(a). This statute states that non-exempt income can be subject to the claims of creditors of a beneficiary only “if the property has been given to trustees to pay over the income to any person without provision for accumulation or express authorization to the trustees to withhold the income.” The debtor argued that, given the powers of the trustees as defined in the living trust agreement, the trust income could not be subjected to the claims of creditors; therefore, the income must be exempt.
The Court’s Decision
The court reached the opposite conclusion and held that the cited statute does not apply to the living trust at issue, because it was a discretionary trust established by grantors for their own benefit. As a matter of public policy, this family living trust cannot enjoy the exemption afforded to a spendthrift trust; and as a matter of statutory interpretation, the exceptional provisions governing the liability of the income of trust find to creditors does not apply to the income of this trust. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52–321(a).
Connecticut common law has interpreted the statutory predecessor of Section 52-321(a) to mean that a trust created by a person for his own benefit cannot qualify as a “spendthrift trust” that is beyond the reach of his creditors. See Greenwich Trust Company v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211, 219 (1942). The income generated by such a trust is also not protected from the just claims of creditors. Id. at 222.
The court denied the debtor’s claim of exemption, and permitted the amount removed from the bank account standing in the name of the family living trust to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment held by the judgment creditor.
Should you have any questions relating to living trusts or other personal asset protection issues, please do not hesitate to contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. at (203) 221-3100 or JMaya@Mayalaw.com to schedule a consultation today.