Posts tagged with "intimidation"

In Sexual Harassment Claims, Court Will Consider the Totality of the Circumstances

In Sexual Harassment Claims, Court Will Consider the Totality of the Circumstances

 By: Michael D. DeMeola, Esq.

Working in a hostile environment can be a very traumatic experience.  Indeed, victims of sexual harassment often experience a pattern of mistreatment over an extended period of time.  This may include physical or verbal abuse, and often includes overtly gender-specific conduct as well as behavior which on its face appears to be gender neutral (behavior that while abusive, when considered independently, may appear to have nothing to do with one’s gender).  When considering whether a victim of sexual harassment is entitled to judicial redress, it is important to take both types of conduct into account.  In fact, when considering a claim brought under Title VII, a court will consider the totality of the circumstances, including both facially gender-specific behavior as well as behavior that is facially gender-neutral.

Generally speaking, Title VII prohibits, “discrimination against any individual with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s… sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  Title VII is not limited to “’economic” or “tangible” discrimination, however.  The phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993).  As the Court explained in Harris, Title VII is violated, “When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,” Id.  Importantly, an employer is presumed to be responsible where the perpetrator of the harassment was the plaintiff’s supervisor. See, e.g., Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1998).

In determining whether an environment is “hostile” or “abusive,” the Court in Harris stated that one must consider all the circumstances surrounding the alleged discrimination. 510 U.S. at 23.  This may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. The effect on the employee’s psychological well-being is also relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. Notably, while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required. Id.  Because the analysis of severity and pervasiveness looks to the totality of the circumstances, the crucial inquiry focuses on the nature of the workplace environment as a whole.  To that end, a plaintiff who herself experiences discriminatory harassment need not be the target of other instances of hostility in order for those incidents to support her claim. Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 2000).

It is fairly well settled that to prevail on a claim of hostile work environment based on gender discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that the abuse was indeed based on his or her gender. See, e.g., Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 621 (2d Cir. 2001).  However, facially neutral incidents may be included among the “totality of the circumstances” that courts consider. Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 378 (2d Cir. 2002).  In determining whether facially sex-neutral incidents were part of a pattern of discrimination on the basis of gender the Court may consider, for example, whether the same individual engaged in multiple acts of harassment, though some may have been overtly sexual and some not. Id.  In Raniola, supra, the Court concluded that, given proof of instances of overt gender hostility by the supervisor of the female plaintiff, a rational juror could have permissibly inferred that his entire alleged pattern of harassment against her was motivated by her gender, even though some of the harassment was not facially sex-based. Thus, the relevant circumstances in Raniola included not only offensive sex-based remarks, but also one facially gender-neutral threat of physical harm by the supervisor who had made the remarks.

In Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corporation, 609 F. 3d 537 (2d Cir 2010), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adhered to this principle.  In that case, the plaintiff, an administrative assistant in the defendant’s engineering department, brought suit under Title VII alleging that the department manager sexually harassed her.  The plaintiff alleged that in addition to constantly staring at her and making suggestive advances, the manager also threatened her with physical harm.  For example, the manager allegedly told the plaintiff he wished she was dead, saying, “I’d like to see you in your coffin.”  Additionally, on six occasions, the manager allegedly told the plaintiff he wanted to choke her.  In overturning the trial Court’s decision which effectively dismissed the plaintiff’s case, the Appellate Court explained, “…the court should not have excluded from consideration [the plaintiff’s] testimony as to [the manager’s] stated desires to choke her, to see her in a coffin, and to kill her.”  According to the court, one could permissibly infer that the manager’s harsh treatment of the plaintiff was the result of his spurned advances and that the facially gender-neutral threats he directed at the plaintiff were, in fact, because of her sex.

Attorney DeMeola is an associate in Maya Murphy, P.C.’s Litigation Department, practicing primarily in the areas of Labor/Employment Law and Civil Litigation.  He can be reached by telephone in the Firm’s Westport office at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at mdemeola@mayalaw.com.

 

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Defendant’s Actions Evidenced Bigotry and Bias Toward Homosexuals; Intimidation Conviction Upheld

In a recent criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut affirmed a defendant’s conviction for intimidation based on bigotry or bias, because the evidence established that he possessed the specific intent to intimidate or harass the victim based on actual or perceived homosexuality.

This case arose from an incident that occurred on September 12, 2005. The victim and defendant were homeless and lived in tents at a wooded campsite. That afternoon, they drank alcohol at a park with an unidentified man (man), who implied that he was homosexual. When the victim and defendant returned to the campsite, the defendant stated he did not want “fags” in their area, particularly the man. The two spent the evening drinking and got into an argument when the victim began undressing. The defendant claimed the victim must be a “fag” because “[o]nly a fag would take his clothes off in front of another man” and because he was spending time with the man.

A fight ensued, lasting at least ten minutes, when the defendant poured a bottle of vodka on the victim and tried to light him on fire. Unsuccessful in this attempt, the defendant then threatened to burn the victim with gasoline before leaving the campsite. The victim went to a local soup kitchen for help, and gave police a sworn statement about what occurred. The defendant was subsequently arrested and signed a waiver of rights before making both oral and written statements, in which he repeatedly used the word “fag.”

A jury found the defendant guilty of attempt to commit assault in the second degree, threatening in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the second degree, intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree, and disorderly conduct. The defendant appealed, arguing in part that there was insufficient evidence that he committed intimidation. He claimed that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had “the requisite specific intent to intimidate or harass [the victim] because of [the victim’s] actual or perceived sexual orientation.”

Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-181k(a) prohibits acts in which a person specifically intends to intimidate or harass another person on the basis of actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity. “Specific intent involves a ‘conscious objective to cause [a] result,’” and is often inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant’s verbal or physical conduct.

The Appellate Court found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant possessed the required specific intent to violate § 53a-181k(a). Based on his oral and written statements, the jury could infer a bias toward homosexuals as well as his question as to whether the victim was homosexual as well. He stated he did not want homosexuals at the campsite and then accused the victim of being a “fag” before fighting him. In addition, the defendant attempted to set the victim on fire, and threatened a second attempt to do so. Therefore, “the jury could have inferred that the defendant acted with intent to harass or to intimidate [the victim] because of his actual or perceived sexual orientation.” Thus, the judgment was affirmed.

When faced with a charge of assault, threatening, or intimidation, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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