Posts tagged with "law"

BEWARE THE CASUAL EMPLOYEE COMPLAINT!

The United States Supreme Court had overturned long-standing law in the Federal Districts of Connecticut and New York with respect to employee claims of retaliation for registering a complaint with an employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“Act”). In this case note, we will tell you how the law changed, and how employers should adopt changes in policy and procedure to protect themselves from a new and difficult-to-defend source of employment-related liability.

Fair Labor Standards Act

 

 The Fair Labor Standards Act was passed in 1938 and subsequently amended by the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The Act sets forth employment rules concerning minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime pay. The Act contains an anti-retaliation provision prohibiting the discharge of or discrimination against any employee who has “filed any complaint” related to the Act. In 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (whose jurisdiction includes Connecticut and New York) decided
Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993). There the Court held that “[t]he plain language of this [anti-retaliation] provision [of the Act] limits the cause of action to retaliation for filing formal complaints, instituting a proceeding, or testifying, but does not encompass complaints made to a supervisor.” Id. at 55. Such was the settled law within this Circuit until March 22, 2011, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2417 (2011).
Kasten v. Genesee Hospital

In 
Kasten, the Supreme Court conducted a thorough exegesis of the phrase “filed any complaint” in the context of whether the statutory language included oral, as well as written complaints, and whether oral complaints thereby constituted protected conduct under the Act’s anti-retaliation provision. The case involved an employee who complained orally to his supervisor about the physical placement of time clocks so as to deprive workers of compensable time. The employee was fired soon after his complaint. The Supreme Court found the text of the statute to be inconclusive as to its meaning and harkened back to the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt and pre-World War II census data to further divine the Act’s legislative intent. The Supreme Court ultimately concluded: “[t]o fall within the scope of the anti retaliation provision, a complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection. This standard can be met, however, by oral complaints, as well as by written ones.” Kasten at * 23. Left unanswered by the Court, however, is the actual level of clarity and detail required to elevate some employee “letting off steam” (e.g., to a supervisor at a Friday night, after-work happy hour) to the protected activity of “filing of a complaint.” Turning the already murky waters opaque, the Court offered this guidance: “[t]he phrase ‘filed any complaint’ contemplates some degree of formality, certainly to the point where the recipient has been given fair notice that a grievance has been lodged and does, or should, reasonably understand the matter as part of its business concerns.”
Dangers to Employers
Lurking behind the Court’s holding is the spectre of an employee dismissed for cause suddenly recalling his prior oral complaint to his supervisor about violations of the Act, thus playing his anti-retaliation “get out of jail free” card. While the Supreme Court paid lip service to the requirement that an employer be given “fair notice” (albeit orally) of a claimed violation of the Act, it “[left] it to the lower courts to decide whether Kasten [the plaintiff-employee] will be able to satisfy the Act’s notice requirement.”
Id. at * 27. As of this point, there is no such lower court advice to depend upon, but there are steps an employer can now take to reduce its exposure to a fabricated, after-the-fact claim of employer retaliation.
Employer Protections
Employee Handbooks or Company Policies and Procedures Manuals should be amended to require that all employee complaints to supervisors or management be written (even if anonymous) on a form prescribed by the employer and delivered to a specific location (e.g., suggestion box) or a designated member of management. A sample form should be appended to the Handbook or Manual as an Exhibit, and a supply of forms should be made readily (but discretely) available to employees. The Company needs to establish a usual, customary, and accepted practice of addressing only written employee complaints, irrespective of their subject, seriousness, or source. The complaint forms should be numerically serialized upon receipt and logged in so that there is no question as to whether or when it was received. In this way, the company can argue that the absence of such a written complaint form raises a rebuttable presumption that no such complaint was ever made. It will thus deprive a discharged employee of the opportunity after he is fired to conjure up a “stealth” retaliation claim based upon a “phantom” oral complaint.
In the meantime, supervisors and management should be made aware that seemingly innocuous oral complaints from employees about wages and hours are sufficient to trigger the anti-retaliation provision of the Act and should be investigated and acted upon.
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The Attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. regularly draft or review Employee Handbooks and advise employers on the full spectrum of employment law and employer-employee relations. For additional information, call at (203) 221-3100 or contact JMaya@mayalaw.com.
 

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Connecticut School Districts and Bullying: What Can Parents Do?

I was greeted this morning with a very unfortunate email.  The email concerned bullying in Westport Schools and included a heart wrenching video of an 8th grade girl claiming to be a victim of bullying in Westport schools. (http://patch.com/A-gcKG) It is just not enough to feel sorry for this victim of bullying, we need to question the effectiveness of the current law and policies in place to avoid the tragic consequences that other towns have dealt with because their students were victims of bullying.

I previously blogged about the revisions to Connecticut’s law against bullying in 2008.  Under Connecticut General Statute section 10-222d, the law requires “any overt acts by a student or group of students directed against another student with the intent to ridicule, harass, humiliate or intimidate the other student while on school grounds, at a school sponsored activity or on a school bus, which acts are committed more than once against any student during the school year.” In addition to definitional changes, the statute requires:

  1.  teachers and other staff members who witness acts of bullying to make written notification to school administrators;
  2. prohibits disciplinary actions based solely on the basis of an anonymous report of bullying;
  3. requires prevention strategies as well as interventions strategies;
  4. requires that parents of a student who commits verified acts of bullying or against whom such bullying occurred be notified by each school and be invited to attend at least one meeting;
  5. requires school to annually report the number of verified acts of bullying to the State Department of Education (DOE);
  6. no later than February 1, 2009, boards must submit the bullying policies to the DOE;
  7. no later than July 1, 2009, boards must include their bullying policy in their school district’s publications of rules, procedures and standards of conduct for school and in all of its student handbooks, and
  8.  effective July 1, 2009, boards must now provide in-service training for its teacher and administrators on prevention of bullying.

Westport responded to the requirements of this statute with a comprehensive bullying policy which can be found on the school district’s website under the tab for parents, and then selecting policies.  Here is the direct link to the policy: (http://www2.westport.k12.ct.us/media/policies/prohibition_against_bullying_5131.911_revised_8.25.2008.pdf)

Armed with Connecticut’s law and Westport’s policy, what should we do as parents, community members, and professionals?  I do not profess to have the answers but at a minimum, we should discuss this with our children, question the school administrators, guidance staff and teachers. Together we should challenge ourselves to make a difference using the channels available to us.  There are ways that we can help to effectuate change before it is too late.  If you know of a child affected by bullying, please act on their behalf.  Not every student will post a video to tell you this is happening. If the school is not addressing the bullying in a meaningful way to eradicate the conduct, legal redress is available and the courts will readily intervene.

If you have any questions please feel free to contact me by telephone in the Firm’s Westport office at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at SMaya@Mayalaw.com. Attorney Maya is a partner at Maya Murphy, P.C. Her practice is limited to Education Law and Trusts and Estates.

NYC Expands Law to Ensure Employers Provide Adequate Accomodations to Pregnant Employees

According to Day Pitney LLP, on January 30, an expansion to the New York City Human Rights Law to include pregnancy discrimination will go into effect. Under the new law, NYC employers with four or more employees will have a duty to provide reasonable accommodations to pregnant women and those who suffer medical conditions related to pregnancy and childbirth. Examples of reasonable accommodations listed in the bill include assistance with manual labor, bathroom breaks, disability leave for a reasonable period of time arising from childbirth, breaks to facilitate increased water intake and periodic rest breaks for those who stand for long periods of time.

The Legislative Intent section of the bill suggests that when an employee requests a reasonable accommodation in order to maintain a healthy pregnancy, it generally is not reasonable for the employer to place that employee on an unpaid leave of absence. Although the New York City Commission on Human Rights and the New York courts have not yet interpreted or applied this new law, the Legislative Intent section suggests that employers may have a duty to accommodate pregnant employees with medical restrictions by providing such employees modified job duties, assistance to perform certain job duties or alternative job duties.

An employer is required to provide such accommodations that would permit the employee to perform the “essential requisites of the job,” unless (i) the employer is unaware that the employee is pregnant, has given birth or has a related medical condition; (ii) providing the accommodation will result in an undue hardship for the employer; or (iii) the employee would not be able to perform the essential requisites of the job even with the accommodation.

NYC employers will be required to provide written notice of these new pregnancy and childbirth accommodation rights to new employees at the start of their employment and to existing employees within 120 days of the law’s effective date of January 30, 2014. In addition to providing each individual employee with written notice of these rights, employers also should post in a conspicuous location the poster provided by the New York City Commission on Human Rights. The poster is available here.

Employees who believe their employers have violated the new law will have the ability to file a claim with the New York City Commission on Human Rights or pursue a private right of action in court without first exhausting administrative remedies. Remedies for violating the law include back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney fees and costs.

Credit: Basil Sitaras

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The Best Employment Lawyers in Connecticut and New York

Discrimination
Employment Discrimination Lawyers in New York and Connecticut
State and national laws protect employees from being subjected to discriminatory treatment and termination in the workplace because of the employee’s gender, race, age, national origin, religion, pregnancy, sexual orientation, or disability. If you have reason to believe that you have experienced discrimination on the job, you should contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. right away. Mr. Maya has a national reputation for successfully handling employment discrimination matters. He can be contacted via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com or by dialing (203) 221-3100 in Connecticut or (212) 682-5700 in New York.

Laws Protect Employees from Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
These laws also protect employees from sexual harassment , a hostile work environment, and from being touched in an offensive manner in the workplace by supervisors, coworkers, or even clients. Employees have a right to stop discriminatory conduct in the workplace. If an employee tries to stop that conduct or notifies a supervisor that discriminatory conduct has occurred, that employee also has protection, under state and national laws, from retaliation by the supervisor or employer. In fact, any person who complains to his or her superior or employer has protection from the law against retaliation by his or her employer. If you feel you might be a victim of racial, gender, or sexual discrimination on the job, you should contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at JMaya@Mayalaw.com or by dialing him at (203) 221-3100 or (212) 682-5700. Let our experience guide you and protect your legal rights at work.
Serving Stamford, Greenwich, Norwalk and surrounding communities including Darien, New Canaan, Westport, Wilton & Weston; the greater Bridgeport area including Fairfield, Stratford, Monroe & Redding; the greater Danbury area including Ridgefield, Newtown & Bethel; and the communities surrounding Milford and New Haven. We also serve all of Westchester and New York Counties.

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Federal Court Found Form U-4 and FINRA Rules to Constitute a Sufficient Basis for an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties

Federal Court Found Form U-4 and FINRA Rules to Constitute a Sufficient Basis for an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties

Lawrence R. Gilmore v. Scott T. Brandt, 2011 WL 5240421 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2011).

In a recent case before United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Lawrence Gilmore (“Gilmore”) filed a motion to confirm the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award in his favor, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 9. Scott Brandt (“Brandt”) responded by filing a motion to vacate the FINRA award pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10. The court granted Gilmore’s motion to confirm the award, entered judgment for the award and denied Brandt’s motion to vacate the award.

The dispute underlying the FINRA arbitration began when Brandt, a representative of Lighthouse Capital Corporation, suggested that Gilmore invest $92,000 in Diversified Lending Group, Inc. (“DLG”). Gilmore made the investment, which was quickly decimated. Gilmore alleged that DLG was a Ponzi scheme and filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA. Rather than seek a stay of arbitration, Brandt contested the issue of arbitrability by appending a statement of jurisdictional objection to his FINRA Arbitration Submission Agreement and raising jurisdictional objections throughout the arbitration proceedings. FINRA appointed a panel of arbitrators to hear the matter; however, the arbitration panel did not directly address Brandt’s jurisdictional objection. In December 2010, the panel issued an arbitration award in Gilmore’s favor for compensatory damages of $106,024.68, post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees.

In his motion for vacatur, Brandt argued that he never entered into an arbitration agreement with Gilmore; therefore, their dispute should not have been subjected to arbitration. The district court found that Brandt had sufficiently preserved his objection to arbitrability, and that it fell to the court to decide whether the dispute was in fact arbitrable.

Because arbitration is entirely a matter of contract, a party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute that it has not agreed to submit to arbitration. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995). When Brandt first sought to be licensed to sell securities, he executed a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (“Form U-4”), which contained a section agreeing “to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of [FINRA].” The court determined that the agreement embodied in Brandt’s Form U-4 would constitute an agreement to arbitrate the dispute with Gilmore only if FINRA rules required this dispute to be arbitrated.

FINRA Rule 12200 is a broad provision that generally applies to any customer dispute arising in connection with the business activities of a FINRA member. Specifically, FINRA Rule 12200 requires that a dispute must be arbitrated under the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure if: (1) arbitration is required by written agreement or requested by a customer; (2) the dispute is between a customer and a FINRA member or associated person; and (3) the dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the FINRA member or associated person. By submitting his Statement of Claim to FINRA for arbitration, Gilmore was clearly requesting arbitration of the dispute. The district court found that Gilmore was in a customer relationship with Brandt because Brandt had induced him to invest in DLG. Additionally, the district court found that Gilmore’s claims related to Brandt’s recommendation of an investment in particular securities fell within the class of disputes reasonably regulated by FINRA. Therefore, the district court determined that FINRA Rule 12200 required the dispute between Gilmore and Brandt be submitted to arbitration. Because of this result, Brandt’s U-4 Form was determined to be his agreement to submit to arbitration of the dispute.

Because the arbitration panel had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, the award decision is entitled to deference by the federal court. 9 U.S.C. § 9-11. Because Brandt provided no argument that satisfied the statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), the court granted Gilmore’s motion for confirmation of the arbitration award of compensatory damages of $106,024.68, with interest, and attorneys’ fees.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA or arbitration issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Federal Court Found Form U-4 and FINRA Rules to Constitute a Sufficient Basis for an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties

Federal Court Found Form U-4 and FINRA Rules to Constitute a Sufficient Basis for an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties

Lawrence R. Gilmore v. Scott T. Brandt, 2011 WL 5240421 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2011).

In a recent case before United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Lawrence Gilmore (“Gilmore”) filed a motion to confirm the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration award in his favor, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 9. Scott Brandt (“Brandt”) responded by filing a motion to vacate the FINRA award pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10. The court granted Gilmore’s motion to confirm the award, entered judgment for the award and denied Brandt’s motion to vacate the award.

The dispute underlying the FINRA arbitration began when Brandt, a representative of Lighthouse Capital Corporation, suggested that Gilmore invest $92,000 in Diversified Lending Group, Inc. (“DLG”). Gilmore made the investment, which was quickly decimated. Gilmore alleged that DLG was a Ponzi scheme and filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA. Rather than seek a stay of arbitration, Brandt contested the issue of arbitrability by appending a statement of jurisdictional objection to his FINRA Arbitration Submission Agreement and raising jurisdictional objections throughout the arbitration proceedings. FINRA appointed a panel of arbitrators to hear the matter; however, the arbitration panel did not directly address Brandt’s jurisdictional objection. In December 2010, the panel issued an arbitration award in Gilmore’s favor for compensatory damages of $106,024.68, post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees.

In his motion for vacatur, Brandt argued that he never entered into an arbitration agreement with Gilmore; therefore, their dispute should not have been subjected to arbitration. The district court found that Brandt had sufficiently preserved his objection to arbitrability, and that it fell to the court to decide whether the dispute was in fact arbitrable.

Because arbitration is entirely a matter of contract, a party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute that it has not agreed to submit to arbitration. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995). When Brandt first sought to be licensed to sell securities, he executed a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (“Form U-4”), which contained a section agreeing “to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of [FINRA].” The court determined that the agreement embodied in Brandt’s Form U-4 would constitute an agreement to arbitrate the dispute with Gilmore only if FINRA rules required this dispute to be arbitrated.

FINRA Rule 12200 is a broad provision that generally applies to any customer dispute arising in connection with the business activities of a FINRA member. Specifically, FINRA Rule 12200 requires that a dispute must be arbitrated under the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure if: (1) arbitration is required by written agreement or requested by a customer; (2) the dispute is between a customer and a FINRA member or associated person; and (3) the dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the FINRA member or associated person. By submitting his Statement of Claim to FINRA for arbitration, Gilmore was clearly requesting arbitration of the dispute. The district court found that Gilmore was in a customer relationship with Brandt because Brandt had induced him to invest in DLG. Additionally, the district court found that Gilmore’s claims related to Brandt’s recommendation of an investment in particular securities fell within the class of disputes reasonably regulated by FINRA. Therefore, the district court determined that FINRA Rule 12200 required the dispute between Gilmore and Brandt be submitted to arbitration. Because of this result, Brandt’s U-4 Form was determined to be his agreement to submit to arbitration of the dispute.

Because the arbitration panel had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, the award decision is entitled to deference by the federal court. 9 U.S.C. § 9-11. Because Brandt provided no argument that satisfied the statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), the court granted Gilmore’s motion for confirmation of the arbitration award of compensatory damages of $106,024.68, with interest, and attorneys’ fees.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA or arbitration issues, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County, Connecticut at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Litigating Non-Compete Agreements in Connecticut

In Connecticut, the breach of an employment agreement by an employer is a recognized defense to the enforcement of a covenant not to compete. The breach must be material. For example, if the employee were promised a bonus or stock options and the employer refused to honor the promise. In order for the breach to effectively waive the non-compete restriction, the employee must timely object to the breach by the employer, otherwise the breach is waived. For more information, or to discuss an employment contract, non-compete, stock options, or bonus situation with an attorney, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at JMaya@Mayalaw.com or (203) 221-3100.

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Litigating Non-Compete Agreements in Connecticut

In Connecticut, the breach of an employment agreement by an employer is a recognized defense to the enforcement of a covenant not to compete. The breach must be material. For example, if the employee were promised a bonus or stock options and the employer refused to honor the promise. In order for the breach to effectively waive the non-compete restriction, the employee must timely object to the breach by the employer, otherwise the breach is waived. For more information, or to discuss an employment contract, non-compete, stock options, or bonus situation with an attorney, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at JMaya@Mayalaw.com or (203) 221-3100.

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FINRA Arbitration Awards Employer Over $500,000 for Promissory Notes Accelerated by Employee’s Termination

In the Matter of the Arbitration between Claimants Morgan Stanley Smith Barney and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney FA Notes Holdings, LLC v. Respondent Robert W. Hathaway (2012 WL 2675417)

In a recent Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration, a sole FINRA arbitrator held that an employee is liable to satisfy his indebtedness on promissory notes, including interest, to his employer upon termination of employment.

In this case, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney (“MSSB”) and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney FA Notes Holdings, LLC, alleged that Robert W. Hathaway (“Hathaway”) was in breach of two promissory notes executed while he was employed by MSSB. In its arbitration filing, MSSB claimed the principal balances due under both notes, per diem interest for both notes, and costs of collection and arbitration. This matter proceeded pursuant to Rule 13806 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure because Hathaway neither filed a Statement of Answer nor appeared at the hearing.

On or about March 8, 2008, Hathaway executed the first promissory note with MSSB for $729,560, at an interest rate of three-percent per annum, to be repaid in nine consecutive annual installments beginning on March 19, 2009. The terms of the note included an agreement to pay all costs and expenses of collection, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. On or about June 9, 2009, Hathaway executed the second promissory note for $75,257.83 at an interest rate of 2.25-percent per annum, to be repaid in eight consecutive annual installments beginning on June 9, 2010.

On or about September 19, 2011, Hathaway’s employment at MSSB ended. MSSB alleged that termination of employment triggered acceleration of the promissory notes and made a demand for immediate re-payment. Hathaway failed and refused to satisfy the indebtedness.

After considering the pleadings and the submissions, the sole arbitrator decided that Hathaway was liable for the principal balance due under each promissory note. Hathaway was also liable for per diem interest accruing from the date employment was terminated through the date of payment on each note. Finally, Hathaway was to reimburse MSSB for non-refundable portion of its initial claim filing fee. The final award to MSSB totaled $542,816.00.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA, arbitration or employment issues generally, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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FINRA Arbitration Awards Employer Over $500,000 for Promissory Notes Accelerated by Employee’s Termination

In the Matter of the Arbitration between Claimants Morgan Stanley Smith Barney and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney FA Notes Holdings, LLC v. Respondent Robert W. Hathaway (2012 WL 2675417)

In a recent Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration, a sole FINRA arbitrator held that an employee is liable to satisfy his indebtedness on promissory notes, including interest, to his employer upon termination of employment.

In this case, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney (“MSSB”) and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney FA Notes Holdings, LLC, alleged that Robert W. Hathaway (“Hathaway”) was in breach of two promissory notes executed while he was employed by MSSB. In its arbitration filing, MSSB claimed the principal balances due under both notes, per diem interest for both notes, and costs of collection and arbitration. This matter proceeded pursuant to Rule 13806 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure because Hathaway neither filed a Statement of Answer nor appeared at the hearing.

On or about March 8, 2008, Hathaway executed the first promissory note with MSSB for $729,560, at an interest rate of three-percent per annum, to be repaid in nine consecutive annual installments beginning on March 19, 2009. The terms of the note included an agreement to pay all costs and expenses of collection, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. On or about June 9, 2009, Hathaway executed the second promissory note for $75,257.83 at an interest rate of 2.25-percent per annum, to be repaid in eight consecutive annual installments beginning on June 9, 2010.

On or about September 19, 2011, Hathaway’s employment at MSSB ended. MSSB alleged that termination of employment triggered acceleration of the promissory notes and made a demand for immediate re-payment. Hathaway failed and refused to satisfy the indebtedness.

After considering the pleadings and the submissions, the sole arbitrator decided that Hathaway was liable for the principal balance due under each promissory note. Hathaway was also liable for per diem interest accruing from the date employment was terminated through the date of payment on each note. Finally, Hathaway was to reimburse MSSB for non-refundable portion of its initial claim filing fee. The final award to MSSB totaled $542,816.00.

Should you have any questions relating to FINRA, arbitration or employment issues generally, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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