Posts tagged with "motion to dismiss"

Where Defendant Evaded Responsibility Prior to Start of Probation, Termination of Accelerated Rehabilitation Was Not Warranted

In a recent criminal law matter, the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, Geographical Area 20 at Norwalk granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss the State’s action seeking termination of his participation in an accelerated rehabilitation program (Program).

In this case, the defendant was charged for several crimes, including reckless driving, operation of a motor vehicle with the intent to harass or intimidate, and operating under suspension. The defendant sought entry into the Program on August 4, 2004, but five days later, he was charged with evasion of responsibility, a violation of General Statutes § 14-224(b). On September 1, 2004, the defendant was granted participation in the Program and subsequently pled guilty to evading responsibility the following May. However, the State asked the Superior Court to terminate the defendant’s participation in the Program because he pled guilty during the probationary period.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56(e), criminal defendants may seek entry into accelerated pretrial rehabilitation. The purpose of this Program is for criminal defendants to earn and assert the right to have their charges dismissed, so long as they satisfactorily complete the probationary period without violating any general or special conditions imposed. An example of a general condition, as found in this case, is not violating any state or federal criminal law. In his motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that the actions underlying the charge to which he pled guilty occurred on August 9, 2004, before the probationary period began on September 1, 2004. As such, he could not have violated the general conditions of his probation. The Superior Court agreed with the defendant, and further noted that “a violation of probation occurs when the probationer’s criminal conduct arises during the probationary period.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the motion to dismiss was granted.

Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

Being Asleep at the Wheel of a Parked, but Running, Vehicle Constitutes “Operation” Under State DUI Law

In a recent criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut considered whether a driver, who was asleep in the driver’s seat of his car while it was still running, operated a motor vehicle under Connecticut’s DUI law.

This case arose from an incident that occurred after midnight on December 24, 2005. Officers found the defendant asleep in the driver’s seat of his motor vehicle while the engine was still running. After waking the defendant and observing him as visibly intoxicated, the officers administered the standard field sobriety tests, all of which the defendant failed. The defendant was arrested, and at the police department, he submitted to two chemical alcohol tests, which revealed the defendant’s blood alcohol content as more than twice the legal limit.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) of alcohol, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 14-227a. He filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he was not operating his car. Rather, “he merely was asleep in his motor vehicle on a cold night with the motor running only to provide heat and power to run the radio.” However, the court denied the motion, and the defendant entered into a conditional plea of nolo contendere. Such a conditional plea reserves a defendant’s right to appeal. After sentencing, the defendant appealed, arguing that the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss was improper.

Under Connecticut case law, “operation” of a motor vehicle does not require that the vehicle actually be driven. Rather, “the insertion of a key into the ignition is an act… which alone or in sequence will set into motion the motive power of the vehicle.” Thus, simply putting the key into the ignition “constitute[s] operation of a motor vehicle within the meaning of § 14-227a(a).” This proposition has been upheld, for example, even when the operator is unconscious in the driver’s seat while the engine is running. In this case, the Appellate Court found that the defendant operated his car because he was in the driver’s seat of his vehicle with the engine turned on; it did not matter, for purposes of “operation,” that he was asleep at the time. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the Appellate Court affirmed judgment.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

Court Suppresses Evidence After MTAPD Illegally Arrested DUI Suspect, Citing Jurisdictional Limitations

This April, the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Norwalk granted a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence collected after officers with the Metropolitan Transit Authority Police Department (MTAPD) illegally arrested him. However, the court declined to suppress evidence gathered prior to the arrest.

In this case, two MTAPD officers (officers) were traveling along I-95 North in Westport at 2:20am when they witnessed a motor vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed in the leftmost lane. This vehicle repeatedly forced other cars into the center lane, drove over the left solid white line, and abruptly crossed into the other lanes. The officers initiated a traffic stop, though the vehicle stopped partially in an entrance ramp onto I-95. One of the officers approached the passenger side of the vehicle and saw the defendant as the only occupant. When instructing the defendant to move his car to a safer location, the officer observed the strong odor of alcohol and the defendant’s bloodshot eyes. After backup was requested, the officers asked the defendant for his identification, but he instead spontaneously stated that his license was suspended.

At 2:45am a State trooper (trooper) arrived on the scene, and the MTAPD officers conducted several field sobriety tests, all of which the defendant failed. The defendant was placed under arrest by the officers, who transported him to Westport’s police department for a breathalyzer test. At this point, the trooper was no longer involved. At the police department, the defendant refused to submit to a breath test, and was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI). However, he moved to suppress all evidence, arguing it was inadmissible because the officers illegally arrested him, and filed a motion to dismiss.

Police officers have the power to arrest within their respective jurisdictions, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-1f(c). MTAPD officers are considered Railroad Police Officers, and their enforcement powers are generally limited to railroad property (except in the case of pursuit). An arrest made outside the statutory parameters is illegal, and the typical remedy is to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal arrest. The purpose of this exclusionary rule is to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial. However, an illegal arrest does not outright bar a State from pursuing charges against a defendant, and evidence may still be admissible if acquired “by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”

In this case, the Superior Court wrote that because I-95 is not railroad property, and the officers were not effectuating their jurisdictional arrest powers as authorized under statute, they did not have authority to arrest the defendant. Therefore, the arrest in this case was illegal, and the Court agreed that all evidence obtained after the defendant was taken into custody, including his refusal to submit to a breath test, could be suppressed. However, the Court found that the evidence obtained prior to arrest was admissible. The MTAPD officers initiated an investigatory stop, which did not violate § 54-1f(a), and the presence of the trooper, whose jurisdiction includes interstate highways like I-95, rendered administration of the field sobriety tests proper. Therefore, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, and denied his motion to dismiss.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

Superior Court Denies Motion to Dismiss, Tape Recording of DUI Suspect’s Phone Call to Attorney Was Not Prejudicial State Intrusion

In a recent criminal law matter, a Superior Court of Connecticut determined that the recording of a one-sided conversation between the defendant and his attorney was not a prejudicial intrusion into attorney-client protections, and as such the Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

This case arose from an incident that occurred on the evening of March 25, 2010. A police officer on route patrol observed the defendant driving his motor vehicle on the Berlin Turnpike in Wethersfield, CT. The officer suspected that the defendant was driving under the influence, so he initiated a traffic stop and administered several field sobriety tests. The defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a, advised of his Miranda rights, and transported to the police station.

The defendant was placed in a booking room specific to OMVUI cases. Pursuant to its own policy, the department records everything that goes on in this room. As the officer in this case later testified, “[U]ntil the processing is complete, police policy requires the officer to keep visual observation of the defendant ‘so they don’t put anything in their mouth.’” The officer gave the defendant a notice of rights, which included information about the results of or the refusal to submit to a chemical alcohol test, and stated the defendant could contact an attorney. The defendant made telephone contact with an attorney, and police recorded the defendant’s side of this conversation, which at times was either muffled or inaudible.

After the phone call was completed, the defendant refused to take the Breathalyzer test. The officer did not use the contents of the tape in his investigation, nor did it influence the charges brought against the defendant. In addition, upon learning of the tape’s existence, the prosecutor advised defense counsel that the State also would not use it; indeed, the tape was not introduced into evidence. However, the defendant moved to dismiss the case, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the tape recording constituted an impermissible State invasion of the attorney-client relationship.

Under the Sixth Amendment, any communication between an attorney and his client “made in confidence for the purpose of seeking legal advice” is protected by the attorney client privilege. However, this is no reasonable expectation of confidentiality if the statements are made in the presence of a third party. Therefore, a reviewing court must consider whether or not an invasion by the State into this privilege was “so prejudicial to warrant dismissal of the charges.” There is a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, which can be overcome if the prosecutor presents clear and convincing evidence that the intrusion was nor prejudicial to the outcome of the case. In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court of Connecticut admitted that the Sixth Amendment is automatically violated where there is “mere unintentional intrusion into privileged information containing trial strategy.”

In this case, the Superior Court reviewed the content of the one-sided phone call and determined that there was nothing of strategic value discussed, such as the credibility of trial witnesses, potential evidence, what to focus on during witness examinations, or specific arguments or defenses. Rather, from the conversation we learn that the defendant was concerned with his probation status, whether to take the Breathalyzer test, the implications of a refusal, and his wife’s reaction to the arrest. Therefore, the Court found the defendant was not prejudiced by the State intrusion and denied his motion to dismiss.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

Mini-Motorcycles are “Motor Vehicles” For Purposes of Statute Prohibiting Operation Under Suspension

In a recent criminal law matter, the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield, Geographical Area 2 at Bridgeport considered whether a mini-motorcycle was a motor vehicle for purposes of General Statutes § 14-215, the state’s operation under suspension law.

This case arose from an incident that occurred on October 6, 2007. The defendant was previously convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) on March 20, 2007, and his license was suspended for one year. However, on the date in question, the defendant was driving a mini-motorcycle on a public highway in Fairfield. Because his license was still suspended, the defendant was charged with violating Chapter 248 § 14-215(c), which “prohibits a person whose license is under suspension from operating a motor vehicle.” The defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that a mini-motorcycle was not a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the statute. He claimed that because § 14-215 refers to Chapter 246 § 14-1, which under subsection 50 explicitly excludes mini-motorcycles from its definition of “motor vehicle,” he was not operating a motor vehicle under suspension.

The court in State v. Knybel faced a nearly identical factual scenario and argument as those in the present case, and it engaged in a comprehensive discussion regarding competing definitions of “motor vehicle.” In essence, the Knybel court wrote that the definition used in Chapter 248 is broader so as to include all “vehicles” used within the various chapters of the General Statutes. Therefore, the Knybel court concluded “it is clear that the [more limited] definition of the term ‘motor vehicle’ in § 14-1,” which is found in a different chapter, does not apply to § 14-215(c).

With these principles in mind, the Superior Court rejected the defendant’s argument. The Court wrote that § 14-215 specifically defined “motor vehicle” to include “all vehicles used on the public highway.” Thus, the Court held that a mini-motorcycle is a motor vehicle for purposes of the operation under suspension statute, and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or operation under suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Information Seeking Increased Penalty Denied

In a recent criminal law matter, a Superior Court of Connecticut entertained a defendant’s motion to dismiss a Part B information submitted by the State that sought to increase the penalty for his present DUI conviction based on a previous one.

In 2008, the defendant was convicted under New Hampshire’s statute criminalizing driving with an elevated alcohol content. The defendant requested that the conviction be reduced from a Class B Misdemeanor to a Violation, and the court granted this motion in January 2009. On June 27, 2009, the defendant was convicted in Connecticut of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI). Because the defendant had a prior conviction for a similar offense, the State submitted a Part B information seeking enhanced penalties. The defendant moved to dismiss the information.

General Statutes § 14-227a penalizes operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence. A person is guilty of this crime if they operate a motor vehicle “(1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such person has an elevated blood alcohol content.” New Hampshire’s law is markedly similar: a person cannot drive or attempt to drive “(a) while such person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any controlled drug … (b) while such person has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.” NHRSA § 265-A:2.

Connecticut’s statutes also provide for enhanced penalties for multiple convictions of OMVUI. As required by § 14-227a(g), the essential elements of the two crimes must be substantially the same. In this case, the Superior Court found that the essential elements of the Connecticut and New Hampshire statutes were indeed substantially the same. It stated that the defendant placed an improper emphasis on the distinction between the terms “misdemeanor” and “violation,” noting that what matters is the “function and purpose” of the statutes. Because the Connecticut legislature intended to deter people from driving under the influence, it did not matter what label was applied. Therefore, the defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

Tenured Teacher’s Wrongful Termination Claims Dismissed for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

This past June, the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford granted a school district’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit by a terminated teacher, who claimed he was fired because of his disability. Rather than reaching the merits of the case, the Court stated it lacked jurisdiction. This case illuminates the importance for teachers and staff to first exhaust all administrative remedies, including enumerated appeals processes, before seeking recourse with the courts.

The teacher was a tenured physical education teacher at a public middle school in Norwalk when he allegedly became the target of continuous, inappropriate harassment and threats made by the school principal. The teacher sought therapy and was diagnosed with a chronic traumatic stress disorder, and the licensed therapist suggested that he seek reassignment to another school district. The teacher informed the school district of this recommendation, though he was denied a transfer to a physical education teacher position at another school within the district. Approximately one year later, the teacher was discharged and filed a lawsuit, alleging, in part, wrongful termination on the basis of mental disability discrimination.

The school district filed a motion to dismiss these counts, arguing that the teacher “failed to exhaust his administrative and statutory remedies pursuant to the Teacher Tenure Act, General Statutes § 10-151.”[1] Therefore, the school district argued, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the teacher’s claims. The teacher countered that a § 10-151 was not the only remedy he could seek: rather, he could bring his wrongful discharge course of action under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, or CFEPA. In addition, the teacher asserted that exhaustion was not required because “it would have been futile for him to pursue his claims with the board of education.”[2]

Connecticut courts have consistently found that “[a] tenured teacher’s challenge of an allegedly wrongful discharge, is governed by and limited to the statutory appeal process provided by § 10-151(e)… Thus, the plaintiff cannot pursue a separate tort claim for wrongful discharge. Instead, she is limited by the available administrative remedies under § 10-151.”[3] Thus, a court will not have jurisdiction unless the tenured teacher exhausted his administrative remedies or an exception to the exhaustion doctrine applies.[4]

The administrative remedies of § 10-151 can be outlined as follows:

  1. Prior to termination: written notice that termination is being considered must be given to the tenured teacher
  2. Within 7 days of receipt of notice in #1: teacher must file written request asking for reasons for termination
  3. Within 7 days of receipt of request in #2: written statement outlining the reasons must be supplied to the tenured teacher
  4. Within 20 days of receipt of statement from #3: teacher must file a written request for a hearing
  5. Within 15 days of receipt of request in #4: the hearing must be held

After the teacher received the written statement with the reasons for termination, he did not file a written request for a hearing. He asserted that he was:

[A]dvised by my attorney that the Norwalk [t]eachers [u]nion [p]resident, who was about to retire, was unsupportive of teachers in the [s]chool [d]istrict and would not assist them in termination hearings, would not bring grievances on their behalf and would not cooperate in terms of designating a teacher representative to the impartial hearing panel. Thus, I was advised by [my attorney] that a hearing pursuant to [s]ection 10-151(d) would be futile.[5]

However, the Court was not persuaded on the teacher’s futility claim, which is a valid exception the exhaustion rule, because he failed to demonstrate that it “would have been futile for him to request a § 10-151(d) hearing.” The purpose of this hearing is “to resolve the question of whether any of the asserted grounds for termination is supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing.”[6] In this case, “if the plaintiff had requested the hearing afforded to him pursuant to § 10-151(d), he could have presented evidence demonstrating that the defendants sought to fire him for an illegal and discriminatory reason.”[7] Therefore, his tactical decision amounted to a deliberate decision to not avail himself of the statutory recourse available to him, and “[h]is failure to request a hearing and to pursue his available remedies is thus fatal to his present cause of action.”[8] The Superior Court thus granted the school district’s motion to dismiss the wrongful discharge claims.

As a teacher, it is imperative that you understand Connecticut’s statutory scheme surrounding hiring, evaluation, and termination processes. Should you have any questions regarding these or other education law matters, you should seek the counsel of an experienced school law practitioner. Please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut (located in Fairfield County), by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.


[1] Diaco v. Norwalk Public School District, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1544 at 6.

[2] Id. at 12.

[3] Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 730 (1993).

[4] Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456, 464 (1998); Niestemki v. Ramos, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06-5001386 (November 20, 2008, Bellis, J.)

[5] Id. at 21, n.8.

[6] Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra. 246 Conn. 468-69.

[7] Diaco v. Norwalk Public School District, supra, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1544 at 22.

[8] LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 83-84 (1986).

Student Speech Rights in the Information Age

For nearly twenty years, the First Amendment framework chiseled out by the Tinker[1]-Fraser[2]-Hazelwood[3] trilogy worked wonders in establishing whether student speech could be regulated. Though students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”[4] school administrators have the authority to curtail or prohibit various forms of speech: that which would materially and substantially disrupt a classroom, is plainly offensive, or promotes illegal drug use. Educators may also exert editorial control over school-sponsored expressive activities, such as a school newspaper written by students.

As my colleague Bob, succinctly wrote, these cases were “once thought to provide parents and teachers with a viable and stable framework for reconciling student rights of free speech with educators’ rights to maintain good order and discipline.”[5] Technology, which we insist makes life easier, instead simply made things more clouded and ushered in a new battleground for student speech litigation.

Today, students are connected to each other through email, instant messaging, blogs, social networking sites, and text messages. An email can be sent to dozens or hundreds of other students by hitting ‘send.’ A blog entry posted on a site such as livejournal.com can be instantaneously viewed by students, teachers, and administrators alike. Off-campus speech can become on-campus speech with the click of a mouse.[6]

Thus, what happens when a student, who is neither on school grounds nor at a school-sponsored event, engages in speech critical of school administration? Does the school have authority to punish the student? The Second Circuit held the in the affirmative: quoting a decision rendered only two years earlier, the Court condoned discipline for speech or expressive conduct made off school grounds if the conduct “would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment”[7] should the expression reach school grounds.[8]

Findings in other cases, however, are setting up the issue of disciplining off-campus student speech for a day in the U.S. Supreme Court, in large part due to conflicting decisions in the Appellate Courts.[9] Most recently on September 6, 2012, the United States District Court of the District of Minnesota, located in 8th Circuit, denied a defendant school district (and the defendant administrators) its motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed by a student who was punished for her off-campus speech.

In that case, using her personal computer at home, the student wrote on her own Facebook wall that she hated a school monitor because she “was mean to me.” For this, school administrators gave a warning. When the student thereafter posted a message that stated, “I want to know who the f%$# [sic] told on me,” again using her personal computer at home, she received a one-day suspension and was prohibited from attending a school-sponsored ski trip. Characterizing these posts as “a far cry from the statements made by the students in cases in which courts have approved of school intervention,” the District Court found that these statements “were not likely to cause a substantial disruption to the school environment.”[10]

While the foundations of student speech regulations are not yet set, it is important for students to realize that any electronic communication they send could potentially be viewed by anyone. All it takes is the recipient hitting the “Forward” button to send to unknown parties or “tattletaling” to a teacher or school administrator. As such, “[a]ny off-campus electronic communication relating or referring to students, teachers, administrators, or school activities has the potential to result in school discipline” and exclusion from participation in school activities.[11]

As a parent, controlling or monitoring your child’s electronic communications has become a highly difficult, if not impossible, task to fully accomplish. This is why it is imperative that you speak to your child about the ramifications of sending out messages they have no way to capture back and which may inadvertently come to the attention of school officials. Nonetheless, if your child is facing disciplinary action for off-campus conduct or speech, it is important that you are aware of your rights and consult an experienced school law practitioner.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

Should you have any questions about school discipline or other education law matters, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut (located in Fairfield County), by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.


[1] Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

[2] Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

[3] Hazelwood School District et al. v. Kuhlmeier et al., 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

[4] Tinker, supra at 506.

[5] “Advocating on Your Child’s Behalf: A Parent’s Guide to Connecticut School Law,” by Joseph C. Maya, Esq., Esq, at 83.

[6] Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F.Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D. Conn. 2009), aff’d in part and rev’d in part 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 8441 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2011).

[7] Wisniewski v. Board of Education, 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007).

[8] Doninger, supra at 217.

[9] Compare Doninger, supra, with J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11947 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011) and Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11994 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011).

[10] R.S. et al v. Minnewaska Area School District No. 2149 et al, Civ. No. 12-588 (MJD/LIB). Accessed October 3, 2012: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/minnesota/mndce/0:2012cv00588/124914/28/

[11] Maya and Bob, supra at 92.

Appellate Court Upholds Initial Custody Determination by State Trial Court for Child Born Out-of-State

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

Earlier this year, the Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected respondent parents’ claims that the state trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate their minor child as neglected and commit the child to the custody of the petitioner, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (hereinafter commissioner).

Prior to this case, the respondent mother (hereinafter mother) had her parental rights terminated as to one child, and her twin daughters were committed to the care of the commissioner. The child at issue in this case was born in Worchester, Massachusetts, and the mother stated her attorney “told her to come to Massachusetts so that Connecticut [would] not be legally able to remove the child from her custody.” A few days later, the commissioner sought and obtained an order of temporary custody, and the child was removed from the Massachusetts hospital and placed in foster care in Connecticut. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss this order, and their motion was granted because the child was not, and had never been, within this State at the time the order was requested.

The commissioner filed an application for a second order of temporary custody and neglect petition, which was granted because the child lived in a foster care placement located in Connecticut since just after birth. The order was sustained based on the doctrine of predicative neglect, and the child was committed to custody of the commissioner. The parents appealed this determination, contending that under Connecticut’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the case.

The Appellate Court discussed the purpose of the UCCJEA, and stated that this act “is the enabling legislation for the court’s jurisdiction.” The Appellate Court agreed that the trial court had jurisdiction to make the initial child custody determination, particularly because Massachusetts did not qualify for jurisdiction. In addition, the Appellate Court outlined the trial court’s factual findings that the parents were residence of Willimantic, Connecticut, which included but was not limited to both parents listing a Willimantic address with the court. Equally noteworthy was that in their appellate briefs, the parents did not challenge these factual findings. Therefore, the Appellate Court affirmed judgment.

Whether advancing or defending a motion to modify custody or visitation, a parent is best served by consulting with an experienced family law practitioner. Should you have questions regarding matrimonial matters, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.
________________________________________________________________________________
Our family law firm in Westport Connecticut serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton. We have the best divorce attorneys and family attorneys in CT on staff that can help with your Connecticut divorce or New York divorce today.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to a divorce law attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100. We offer free divorce consultation as well as free consultation on all other familial matters. Divorce in CT and divorce in NYC is difficult, but education is power. Call our family law office in CT today.

Keywords: divorce attorney ct, divorce attorneys in ct, divorce attorneys ct, divorce attorney Connecticut, Connecticut divorce attorney, divorce attorney, divorce attorneys NYC, ct lawyers, Connecticut family attorney, divorce lawyer in ct, free divorce consultation, free consultation family law, divorce in ct, free consultation family law, Connecticut divorce lawyer, divorce attorney for men, divorce attorney for women, free divorce attorney, divorce lawyers in ct, ct divorce laws, ct divorce attorney, family law firm, divorce attorney Fairfield, attorneys in Connecticut, family law office, ct divorce mediation, best divorce attorney in ct, lawyers in ct, uncontested divorce, divorce lawyer nyc, Connecticut divorce laws, best divorce attorney, divorce attorney Hartford, new haven divorce attorney, divorce, lawyer, attorney, law firm ct, law office, legal advice in ct, ct divorce attorneys, family attorney, domestic violence rights, Connecticut, marital property rights, CT divorce mediation, legal separation Connecticut, child custody laws, child support litigation, contested, uncontested, annulments, alimony, mediator, spouse, spousal support law, asset division, visitation right, premarital agreements, prenup, prenuptial agreement, prenup NY, restraining orders, appeals, custody modifications, legal separation CT, prenup in CT, custody in CT, filing divorce in CT, filing, lawyers, attorneys, family law in CT, family in NY, Connecticut divorce attorney, divorce law NY, matrimonial law CT, custody NY, child custody CT, property division in CT, dissolution of marriage in CT, marriage, divorce NY, New York divorce, visitation in CT, visitation rights in CT, post marital agreements, divorce law firm CT, divorce law firm NY

Continue Reading