Posts tagged with "probate of an estate"

Deroy v. Estate of Baron, 136 Conn. App. 123, 43 A.2d 759 (2012)   

In a case involving testamentary capacity, Defendant Jeanne Baron appealed from the judgments of the Superior Court denying the admission of a will executed by her mother, Edith Baron, because of lack of capacity.  The Probate Court originally received two documents purporting to be the decedent’s will, one executed on February 12, 2002 and the other on July 3, 2002.   The will executed on July 3, 2002 was admitted by the Probate Court.  On appeal, the Superior Court concluded that Edith Baron was “incompetent” when she executed the will on July 3, 2002.

In reviewing the Superior Court decision, the Appellate Court found that the incorrect standard was applied for testamentary capacity.  The standard does not require the testator to be able to understand “complex” financial transactions.  Rather, the mental capacity necessary to make a will under Connecticut law is a lower standard.  An individual may have the capacity to make a will even if they are generally incapable of business transactions.

“To make a valid will, the testatrix must have had mind and memory sound enough to know and understand the business upon which she was engaged, that of the execution of a will, at the very time she executed it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted)  Sanzo’s Appeal from Probate, 133 Conn. App. 42, 50, 35 A. 3d 203 (2012); see also Atchison v. Lewis, 131 Conn. 218, 219-20, 38 A.2d 673 (1944).  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

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Should you have any questions relating to wills, trusts, estates or probate issues generally, please feel free to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, managing partner in the firm’s Westport, Connecticut office in Fairfield County by telephone at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at jmaya@mayalaw.com.

Bender v. Bender, 292 Conn. 896; 975 A.2d 636 (2009)

The plaintiffs filed a complaint in Superior Court for specific performance and damages for breach of contract against the defendants, the executors of the Estate of Edward Stebner (the “Estate”).  The complaint arose out of a contract entered into by the plaintiffs and the defendants for the plaintiffs’ purchase of real property from the Estate.  The plaintiffs tendered a deposit in accordance with the contract but the defendants subsequently indicated that they were unwilling to complete the transaction.  The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for damages but entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their claim for specific performance of the contract.

The defendants appealed claiming that res judicata barred the plaintiffs from pursuing the breach of contract claim and bringing an action for specific performance in Superior Court because the Probate Court had denied the petition brought by the plaintiffs for specific performance of the contract.  Also, the defendants argued that the action should not have proceeded without the residuary beneficiaries of the decedent as named in the will, that the contract was invalid and that the contract could be avoided under several defenses.

The Supreme Court concluded that res judicata did not bar the action because the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-98(a)(3) over the claims brought in the Superior Court.  In addition, the Superior Court correctly ordered specific performance because the defendants had authority to sell the property as executors of the Estate pursuant to a valid contract that could not be avoided.  Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the action could proceed without the residuary beneficiaries.  Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.

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Should you have any questions relating to wills, trusts, estates or probate issues generally, please feel free to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, managing partner in the firm’s Westport, Connecticut office in Fairfield County by telephone at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at jmaya@mayalaw.com.

In an Appellate Court decision, the court upheld an award of $211,000 in fiduciary and attorney’s fees after probate of a highly disputed estate. The award was challenged by one of the three beneficiaries of the estate who claimed the award was excessive and inconsistent with the widely relied on Hayward factors set out by the Connecticut Supreme Court. Plaintiff also urged the court to adopt a new rule limiting the fiduciary and attorney’s fees that can be collected from an estate to an amount proportionate to the size of the estate. The court disagreed with the contention and declined to adopt such a rule.

Case Details

The plaintiff and challenger of said fees was the daughter of the decedent. The other two beneficiaries in this probate were the two sons of the decedent. None of these siblings had a good relationship with the other and there was constant disputes among them about how to best administer the estate. Ultimately, the court determined it was their constant bickering that resulted in the huge amount of attorney fees that in light of the situation could have been much more.

This probate case “involved more contentiousness, disputes, arguments, correspondence, pleadings, memoranda of law and judicial hearings than any other decedent’s estate” in the judge’s 30 years on the bench. The defendants’ expert witness, who reviewed the materials that detailed the requests the siblings made of Gallant(the defendant), testified that “the contentiousness [between the beneficiaries is] at a level I have only seen once in some forty-four years of this work.”

The plaintiff’s expert witness conceded that the extensive quarreling among the siblings made settling the estate “a very difficult matter,” and that one of the strategies defendant used to try to quell the siblings’ animosity was to directly and unequivocally tell them the truth: their constant quarreling was resulting in fees that were diminishing the estate.

Despite this forewarning by the defendant lawyer, the plaintiff still sought to challenge the awarded fee. It was her firm belief that an attorney could not collect such a large amount of an estate. In actuality, the estate was worth over 1.2 million dollars and his fee constituted just 1/6th of the estate. This left more than 1 million to be dispersed between the three children.

Determining Reasonable Compensation

In analyzing the issues claimed by the Plaintiff the Appellate Court reviewed the Hayward factor analysis made by the trial court who awarded the fee. First, the court stated it is well understood that “under [Connecticut] law an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian is entitled to a reasonable compensation for his services, depending upon the circumstances of the case.” Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. at 384, 119 A. 341.

Further, in Hayward, our Supreme Court set forth nine factors for the trial court to consider when determining the reasonableness of such compensation: (1) the size of the estate; (2) the responsibilities involved; (3) the character of the work required; (4) the special problems and difficulties met in doing the work; (5) the results achieved; (6) the knowledge, skill and judgment required of and used by the executors; (7) the manner and promptitude with which the estate has been settled; (8) the time and service required; and (9) any other circumstances which may appear in the case and are relevant and material to this determination. Id., at 384–85, 119 A. 341.

The Decided Compensation

After the determination of those factors, the trial court decided the figure of $211,000 was reasonable. In reviewing that decision “[t]he test is, has the court exercised a reasonable discretion, or, in other words, is its exercise so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Hayward v. Plant, supra, 98 Conn. at 382, 119 A. 341.

“This standard applies to the amount of fees awarded … and also to the trial court’s determination of the factual predicate justifying the award…. Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion…. [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.”

Factual Backing of the Award

There was much factual information that supported the trial court’s decision. At trial, the plaintiff conceded that the billing records submitted by the defendants to the Probate Court accurately reflected the work that the defendants performed, but she advanced an argument that much of that work was unnecessary and could have been avoided had Gallant been more decisive in his actions with regard to the estate. Her primary argument was that Gallant’s inability to sell the Bahamian property(which amount to about half of the estate) in a timely fashion and the erosion that occurred on the property during the time the property was for sale support a reduction of fiduciary and attorney’s fees under Hayward’s results and promptitude factors.

The court, however, was presented with evidence of the siblings’ contentiousness and litigious nature, and determined that “an extensive amount of time was spent by Gallant in dealing with issues raised by the beneficiaries.” Among the myriad issues created by the beneficiaries included bickering about the listing price of the Bahamian property. Therefore, the award did have factual backing and could have been anticipated by plaintiff due to the siblings constant issues with how to best settle the estate.

The Court’s Decision

So, with regard to the question of whether the court used the proper legal standard, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court made an independent determination after a two day trial. It produced a written memorandum of decision, which provided in part: “When applying the standards set forth in Hayward v. Plant, the court finds that the fees charged by the defendants are reasonable under the unusual circumstances presented here.” Therefore, there was no error in the legal standard applied by the court.

Next, the Appellate Court addressed the plaintiff’s contention that a new rule should be adopted that limited attorney and fiduciary fees to a reasonable proportion of the estate. In declining to adopt such a rule the court stated that “size of the estate is one of the factors our Supreme Court set forth in Hayward, and as such, it should be considered by a court in determining whether fiduciary and attorney’s fees are reasonable. It is, however, one of nine factors. Elevating it to the dispositive level suggested by the plaintiff would run afoul of the sound holistic approach to reasonableness our Supreme Court set forth nearly a century ago.”

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Our estate planning firm in Westport Connecticut serves clients with will, trust, and estate law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton. We have the best probate attorneys in CT on staff that can help with your Connecticut or New York estate today.

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