Posts tagged with "proprietary information"

Covenants Not To Compete in Franchise Agreements

Covenants Not To Compete in Franchise Agreements
Pirtek USA, LLC v. Zaetz, 408 F.Supp.2d 81

Pirtek USA, LLC was a franchise company that operated as a business system “consisting of the sale, assembly and installation of industrial and hydraulic hoses, fixed tube assemblies and related components and services”. Pirtek entered into a Franchise Agreement with Mr. Irwin Zaetz in September 1999 to license him to operate a Pirtek business. The agreement contained a non-compete clause that prohibited Mr. Zaetz from operating or working for a competing business within a limited geographical area for a two-year period after the termination of the franchise agreement. Pirtek and Mr. Zaetz terminated their franchise agreement on April 22, 2005 and the parties went their separate ways. Pirtek was able to sell that particular franchise to another party, Ms. Ashely Geddes, while Mr. Zaetz and his son proceeded to operate their own business, Hose Medic. This new company provided many of the same services as Pirtek franchises and covered the same general geographical area. Additionally, the registered address for Hose Medic was the same one Mr. Zaetz used to register his franchise with Pirtek.
Pirtek alleged that Mr. Zaetz used his son’s company as a front to avoid the enforcement of the covenant not to compete. More specifically, the company alleged that Mr. Zaetz used Pirtek’s proprietary information to help his son base the new company on the Pirtek business model. Pirtek sued Mr. Zaetz in federal court and requested that the court issue a temporary injunction to prevent further contractual violations while the court tried the case. The court denied its request and refused to issue a temporary injunction.
Pirtek sued on three accounts, claiming that Mr. Zaetz breached the non-compete by 1) operating a competing hose installation and repair business, 2) infringing on its intellectual property rights, and 3) violating several post-termination provisions of the franchise agreement. The court found that Pirtek did not meet the burden of proof necessary to show that Mr. Zaetz was in breach of the non-compete. Pirtek asserted that their business interests were threatened by Mr. Zaetz’s use of the words “hose”, “assembly”, and a graphic of a cog when advertising and discussing the new company. This, according to this court, was an unfounded assertion because the words were too general to create confusion among consumers and negatively affect Pirtek’s business operations. Pirtek was not able to establish that it had suffered any hardship or was likely to do so in the future if an injunction was not issued. Imminent harm, according to the courts, is a requisite factor for granting a temporary injunction, and a court is not obligated to grant one if this crucial factor is missing.
The court pointed out however that the denial of the temporary injunction did not necessary mean that Pirtek would not be able to obtain a permanent injunction later. It counseled Pirtek that later stages of litigation could result in the enforcement of the covenant. It noted that Pirtek had some strong evidence to present and use in subsequent stages of the case but that its current request must be denied because it “failed to demonstrate irreparable harm”.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Covenants Not To Compete in Franchise Agreements

Covenants Not To Compete in Franchise Agreements
Pirtek USA, LLC v. Zaetz, 408 F.Supp.2d 81

Pirtek USA, LLC was a franchise company that operated as a business system “consisting of the sale, assembly and installation of industrial and hydraulic hoses, fixed tube assemblies and related components and services”. Pirtek entered into a Franchise Agreement with Mr. Irwin Zaetz in September 1999 to license him to operate a Pirtek business. The agreement contained a non-compete clause that prohibited Mr. Zaetz from operating or working for a competing business within a limited geographical area for a two-year period after the termination of the franchise agreement. Pirtek and Mr. Zaetz terminated their franchise agreement on April 22, 2005 and the parties went their separate ways. Pirtek was able to sell that particular franchise to another party, Ms. Ashely Geddes, while Mr. Zaetz and his son proceeded to operate their own business, Hose Medic. This new company provided many of the same services as Pirtek franchises and covered the same general geographical area. Additionally, the registered address for Hose Medic was the same one Mr. Zaetz used to register his franchise with Pirtek.
Pirtek alleged that Mr. Zaetz used his son’s company as a front to avoid the enforcement of the covenant not to compete. More specifically, the company alleged that Mr. Zaetz used Pirtek’s proprietary information to help his son base the new company on the Pirtek business model. Pirtek sued Mr. Zaetz in federal court and requested that the court issue a temporary injunction to prevent further contractual violations while the court tried the case. The court denied its request and refused to issue a temporary injunction.
Pirtek sued on three accounts, claiming that Mr. Zaetz breached the non-compete by 1) operating a competing hose installation and repair business, 2) infringing on its intellectual property rights, and 3) violating several post-termination provisions of the franchise agreement. The court found that Pirtek did not meet the burden of proof necessary to show that Mr. Zaetz was in breach of the non-compete. Pirtek asserted that their business interests were threatened by Mr. Zaetz’s use of the words “hose”, “assembly”, and a graphic of a cog when advertising and discussing the new company. This, according to this court, was an unfounded assertion because the words were too general to create confusion among consumers and negatively affect Pirtek’s business operations. Pirtek was not able to establish that it had suffered any hardship or was likely to do so in the future if an injunction was not issued. Imminent harm, according to the courts, is a requisite factor for granting a temporary injunction, and a court is not obligated to grant one if this crucial factor is missing.
The court pointed out however that the denial of the temporary injunction did not necessary mean that Pirtek would not be able to obtain a permanent injunction later. It counseled Pirtek that later stages of litigation could result in the enforcement of the covenant. It noted that Pirtek had some strong evidence to present and use in subsequent stages of the case but that its current request must be denied because it “failed to demonstrate irreparable harm”.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Difference in Job Responsibilities and Knowledge Prevents Breach of Non-Compete Agreement

Tyco Healthcare Group v. Ross, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49867
Difference in Job Responsibilities and Knowledge Prevents Breach of Non-Compete Agreement
Tyco Healthcare, through its subsidiary Covidien (a medical device manufacturer and distributor), employed Mr. Adam Ross as a design engineer in the company’s research and development division from November 14, 2006 to March 18, 2011. As part of his employment contract, Mr. Ross signed an “Employee Agreement regarding Confidential Information, Inventions, and Conflicting Employment” that specified that Mr. Ross could not divulge, in any capacity, any of Covidien’s confidential information that he was privy to during the time of his employment. He additionally agreed to not seek for or engage in employment with an industry competitor for two years after the termination of his employment. Mr. Ross began searching for a new job in 2010 and applied to Intuitive Surgical upon seeing a public advertisement. Mr. Ross was up front with Intuitive about the non-compete agreement and went so far as to engage an outside attorney for questions he had in relation to the non-compete agreement. Intuitive hired Mr. Ross as a design engineer in its Milford, CT office and he began his new job on March 21, 2011, a mere three days after leaving the employ of Covidien.
At this point, Covidien filed suit against Mr. Ross but stated that it was open to other solution besides litigation. Its main concern was the confidential industry information that Mr. Ross possessed because of his years at Covidien but it also wanted to enforce the two-year prohibition on employment with a competitor. The company submitted several proposals to avoid litigation: 1) asked Intuitive to refrain from hiring Mr. Ross, 2) was willing to retain Mr. Ross as an employee, 3) compensate Mr. Ross in the event he was not able to find employment as an engineer at a non-competitor. Mr. Ross and Intuitive ultimately turned down all of these offers, resulting in Covidien commencing further litigation activity. Covidien asked the court to restrain Mr. Ross from being employed at Intuitive or divulging any trade secrets acquired at Covidien.
The District Court of Connecticut found that the non-compete between Mr. Ross and Covidien was in fact enforceable on the grounds that it contained reasonable provisions and did not overly disadvantage one party. In addition to a valid and enforceable non-compete agreement, Covidien must be able to show breach in order for its request to be granted, and as such, the court turned to the issue of whether or not there was a breach of this agreement. In this matter, the court found that Mr. Ross did not breach the non-compete agreement despite gaining employment at a competitor of Covidien. This legal discussion focused on the fine details and responsibilities of the jobs at Covidien and Intuitive, concluding with the court emphasizing the differences. The projects, responsibilities, technology, and knowledge required/used/gained by the two jobs were so different that, according the court, there was not convincing evidence that Mr. Ross would be “performing ‘similar services’ at Intuitive, or that he will inevitably use and disclose confidential and proprietary information, in violation of his non-compete agreement”.
This decision demonstrates that upon close examination of very fine employment details, a court will not always find breach of a non-compete in light of gaining employment with a direct competitor of the previous employer and signatory to the non-compete agreement.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Application of FINRA Rules & Regulations for Bank’s Non-Compete Agreement

Application of FINRA Rules & Regulations for Bank’s Non-Compete Agreement
Webster Bank, N.A. v. Cahill, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1672

Webster Bank is a regional commercial bank with business operations in lower New England that employed Mr. Daniel Cahill from April 11, 2995 to February 12, 2009. He was hired as a teller in the bank’s Bristol, CT office and was promoted to a financial consultant in 2001 to work for Webster Investment Services, the securities division of Webster Bank. The bank entered into a corporate arrangement with UVEST in 2007 and Mr. Cahill (and similar employees) had to sign a dual employment agreement. The contract detailed the terms of his employment and contained multiple restrictive covenants. Mr. Cahill was prohibited from engaging in competing business activities within twenty-five miles of his base of operations for one year following his termination and was subject to an indefinite non-disclosure clause for Webster and UVEST’s confidential and proprietary information.

Mr. Cahill faxed in a letter of resignation to Webster on February 12, 2009 and the next day began working for RBC Bank in its Hartford, CT office where he essentially performed the same duties as he done during his employment with Webster. Webster sued Mr. Cahill in Connecticut state court for the enforcement of the restrictive covenants contained in the dual employment agreement. Mr. Cahill admitted that RBC was a direct competitor of Webster, that his new office is within the twenty-five mile radius prohibited area, that he had taken with him a list of 2,900-3,000 Webster customers, and had send solicitation letter on RBC’s stationary to all of those customers. Of these solicitations, 350-400 accounts transferred their assets to RBC, amounting to a loss of approximately $5 million in assets under management for Webster.

Mr. Cahill admitted that he violated the terms of the dual employment contract but argued that the court should not enforce the non-compete agreement because he was a “licensed and registered securities dealer and a financial representative”, and therefore the rules and regulations of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) governed and he had done nothing wrong. He contended that under FINRA regulations, in an agreement referred to as the “Protocol”, he was permitted to take a copy of the customer list when he moved from Webster to RBC. These regulations permit taking a copy of names, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses but not account numbers. The court found the assertion that it lacked jurisdiction unpersuasive and noted that FINRA was not controlling since neither Webster Bank nor UVEST were signatory members of the “Protocol”.

The court concluded that it did have jurisdiction over the case and next looked to whether the non-compete agreement was valid and enforceable under Connecticut law. Webster had a legitimate business interest that the court held warranted protection in the form of an injunction to restrict Mr. Cahill’s activities. An injunction, according to the court, was necessary to maintain the status quo and protect the interests of the parties involved in the legal dispute. The court held that the restrictions were reasonable in scope and did not overtly favor one party over the other. After establishing a need for an injunction and the reasonableness of the restrictions, the court ordered the enforcement of the non-compete agreement.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Change in Business Services/Products Doesn’t Invalidate a Non-Compete Agreement

Change in Business Services/Products Doesn’t Invalidate a Non-Compete Agreement

DiscoveryTel SPC, Inc. v. Pinho, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2683

In 2002, DiscoveryTel SPC hired Mr. Ismael Pinho as its chief financial officer (CFO) as an at will employee. The parties later executed an employment agreement on December 27, 2004 that would go into effect January 1, 2005. The employment contract modified Mr. Pinho’s employment from at will to a one-year automatic renewable basis and outlined his salary, incentive bonuses, vacation, personal days, insurances, severance package, and several restrictive covenants. Mr. Pinho was prohibited from directly or indirectly competing with DiscoveryTel by being involved in the purchase and/or sale of international voice and traffic data systems during the term of the employment agreement or during any period for which he was receiving severance pay. Additionally, the agreement stated that he was bound by an indefinite non-disclosure clause pertaining to DiscoveryTel’s confidential and proprietary information. In between 2004 and 2010, DiscoveryTel experienced a corporate reorganization and shifted its focus and the services it provided. By 2010, it was no longer engaged in the purchase and/or sale of international voice and data traffic but instead facilitated the sale of telephone traffic.
Mr. Pinho informed the president of DiscoveryTel in a May 21, 2010 letter that he had accepted a position with World Telecom Exchange Communications, LLC (WTEC) and would be starting at the new company on June 1, 2010. DiscoveryTel brought suit and requested that the court grant its request for an injunction to prevent any violations of the restrictive covenants in connection to Mr. Pinho’s new employment. Mr. Pinho did not have an issue with the non-disclosure clause in the employment contract but asserted that his mere employment with WTEC was not a violation of the non-compete agreement. He contended that the agreement did not prohibit working for a competitor but rather specifically from “being involved in ‘any business relating to the purchase and sale of international voice and data traffic’”. He went on to argue that engaging in this sector of the industry should not violate a non-compete agreement because DiscoveryTel was no longer engaged in that specific industry activity. Additionally, he argued that the agreement had inadequate consideration and was therefore unenforceable.
The court found these arguments unconvincing however and granted DiscoveryTel’s request for injunctive relief and restrained Mr. Pinho from working for WTEC until December 31, 2010 (the end of the current employment term) in order to prevent further violations of the non-compete agreement. It looked to the modification in the nature of Mr. Pinho’s employment (from at will to a contract renewable on an annual basis) and enhanced benefits (mainly the introduction of a severance package) in the employment agreement to conclude that there was sufficient consideration. Finally, the court analyzed whether Mr. Pinho’s activities as an employee of WTEC violated the covenant, taking into account DiscoveryTel’s reorganization and shift in focus. The court ultimately held that Mr. Pinho had indeed violated the non-compete agreement by working at WTEC and that a mere change in business services/products did not render the non-compete agreement invalid or release Mr. Pinho from its obligations.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Implied Duty to Not Disclose Trade Secrets and Exceptions to the Rule

Implied Duty to Not Disclose Trade Secrets and Exceptions to the Rule

Booth Waltz Enterprises v. Kimlingen, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2682

Booth Waltz Enterprises was an automotive and industrial lubricant distributor based in Hartford, Connecticut that transacted with auto dealers, fleet owners, and public entities. Mr. Kevin Kimlingen worked for Booth Waltz as a sale representative from April 2000 to October 2003. Booth Waltz’s management was impressed by Mr. Kimlingen’s practice of “rolling”, the art of convincing his customers to follow him to a new employer. He “rolled” forty-five accounts to Booth Waltz within his first month at the company. Booth Waltz took advantage of Mr. Kimlingen’s talents to acquire many new clients when the company hired him but it was very cognizant that it would have to take measures to protect its interests given his history of mobility and “rolling” within the industry. In the summer of 2003, Booth Waltz prepared a non-solicitation agreement for its employees to better regulate the activities of its sales staff. Mr. Kimlingen expressed great reluctance to sign the restrictive covenant when he received it in October 2003 and Booth Waltz assumed he resigned from its employ when he failed sign the agreement or attend a mandatory staff meeting.
Mr. Kimlingen began to work for U.S. Lubes, a direct industry competitor, and he began “rolling” his Booth Waltz accounts to his new employer. Booth Waltz sued Mr. Kimlingen in Connecticut state court and sought injunctive relief to prevent any further solicitations of its customers. Booth Waltz argued that although Mr. Kimlingen may not have breached an actual restrictive covenant, his actions violated the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which by default prohibited certain competitive activities. The company argued that the customer lists Mr. Kimlingen took with him to his new employer was Booth Waltz’s sensitive and proprietary information. Former employees may compete with a former employer in the absence of a non-compete agreement, but her or she is still bound by a duty to not disclose trade secrets or confidential information acquired during his or her employment to the detriment of the former employer.
The court ultimately held that Mr. Kimlingen did not violate a covenant or implied duty by “rolling” clients from Booth Waltz to U.S. Lube. The vast majority of these account had long-standing relationships with Mr. Kimlingen that pre-dated his employment with Booth Waltz. The court concluded that these customer relationships were not property of Booth Waltz and the company had no authority or legal right to label the contact information as its proprietary information. The court noted, “in the absence of a covenant not to compete, an employee who possessed the relevant customer information prior to the former employment is free to use the information in competition with the employer after termination of the employment relationship” (Restatement (Third), Unfair Competition § 42, comment f).
The court denied Booth Waltz’s request for an injunctive in light of no legally binding restrictive covenant or an implied duty.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Court Amends Time Restriction for Engineering Firm Non-Compete Agreement

Court Amends Time Restriction for Engineering Firm Non-Compete Agreement
Maintenance Technologies International, LLC v. Vega, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 136

Maintenance Technologies International, LLC (MTI) was a Milford, Connecticut based company that offered highly specialized engineering maintenance services to clients. The company employed Mr. Daniel Vega as an engineer from February 25, 2002 to October 7, 2005. His responsibilities for this position included conducting vibration analysis, infrared thermography, motor testing, and laser alignment. He signed a covenant not to compete as part of his employment agreement with the company. The restrictive covenant prohibited Mr. Vega, for a period of two years following termination, from engaging in competing business activities within one hundred fifty miles of MTI’s current principal place of business. The agreement further stated that he could not own any stock in a competing business located within one hundred fifty miles of MTI’s principal place of business.
Mr. Vega informed his superiors that he would be voluntarily terminating his employment with the company due to family related issues and his personal ambition to finish his master’s degree in theology. Once he quit MTI however, he began to work for Schultz Electric Co., a competing company with major offices in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. MTI’s management interpreted this move as a violation of the non-compete agreement executed when Mr. Vega’s employment with the company started and sued him in Connecticut state court. The company requested that the court enforce the provisions of the restrictive covenant in order to prevent any further violations of the agreement. The court found in favor of MTI, granted the company’s request for an injunction, but amended the time restriction to be only one year, instead of the two-year period as stipulated in the agreement.
In reaching its decision, the court assessed whether MTI had a legitimate interest that needed protection and whether the restrictions in the non-compete agreement were reasonable in scope. The court recognized that the company spent a great deal of resources on training its employees and this created a valid interest according to the court. Furthermore, the employees were on the front lines with regard to the business relationships with MTI’s customer and had direct access to proprietary and confidential information. The court held that a company’s employees and customer relationships are its most valuable assets and are worthy of protection under Connecticut law. Injunctive relief, therefore, was reasonably necessary for the fair protection of the employer’s business interests.
Next, the court examined whether the specific restriction contained in the agreement were reasonable in scope. The court held that they amounted to a reasonable and legitimate restriction of Mr. Vega’s ability to work. They provided an adequate amount of protection to MTI while not overreaching and unnecessarily restricting Mr. Vega’s ability to secure future employment. The limitations still allowed many viable career options for Mr. Vega. The court did however slightly amend the time restriction. It was concerned that the full two years could prove to be “somewhat inequitable” and reduced the restriction to one year, instructing the parties that they could submit arguments prior to the expiration of the one year regarding a potential extension to the full two years as stipulated in the covenant not to compete.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Inadequate Evidence to Prove Indirect Solicitation

Inadequate Evidence to Prove Indirect Solicitation
PCRE v. Unger, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1129

Ms. Adele Unger worked for Prudential Reality and signed an employment agreement with the company at the start of her employment that contained a non-compete clause. The restrictive covenant prohibited her for a period of one year following termination from directly or indirectly influencing any Prudential Reality employee to sever his or her employment/association with the company or any of its subsidiaries. Upon termination from Prudential, Ms. Unger began to work as a real estate agent for Paul Breunich and William Pitt Real Estate, LLC. She notified the company’s President and Chief Financial Officer (Mr. Paul Breunich) of the existence of the restrictive covenant with her former employer and that she was legally prohibited from recruiting Prudential agents to work for the company. Mr. Breunich, in connection with his management positions, solicited/recruited agents for offices where the office manager was a signatory to a non-compete agreement with a former employer. Ms. Unger did not solicit any agent from her former employer or furnish her new company with any information but Mr. Breunich did contact several Prudential agents to inquire if they were interested in switching companies. Prudential sued Ms. Unger and her new employer for violation of the restrictive covenant, alleging that Mr. Breunich’s actions constituted an indirect solicitation by Ms. Unger, a business activity expressly prohibited in the employment agreement.
The court denied Prudential’s request for injunctive relief and held that Ms. Unger had not directly or indirectly violated the restrictive covenant contained in the employment agreement. The parties did not dispute that Mr. Breunich contacted and solicited Prudential agents, but the court did find any evidence that Ms. Unger provided him with any information to assist in his solicitations. There was no conscious disregard for the restrictive covenant by Ms. Unger, in either a direct or an indirect manner. It would be an entirely different case if Ms. Unger’s superiors had solicited Prudential agents based on proprietary information she gained while working for her former employee, but this was not at all the circumstances of the case. Prudential was not able to present adequate and convincing evidence that Ms. Unger had in any way violated the restrictive covenant and as such, the court denied the company’s request for an injunction against Ms. Unger.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Requisite Proof to Demonstrate Irreparable Harm in Connection to Breach of Non-Compete

Requisite Proof to Demonstrate Irreparable Harm in Connection to Breach of Non-Compete
VBrick Systems, Inc. v. Stephens, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45835

VBrick Systems, Inc. was a Delaware corporation with primary business operations based in Wallingford, Connecticut that provided networked streaming video products and services. The company employed Mr. Robert Stephens as its Army Federal Territory Manager from July 2005 until April 1, 2008 when he tendered his resignation from the company and began to work at Optibase, Inc as its Director of Federal Sales. Optibase is a direct competitor that also sells networked video products and services to government, military, and private sector customers.
Mr. Stephens traveled to Connecticut after he was hired by VBrick to attend a training session at the company’s headquarters and signed an employment agreement that contained non-compete and non-disclosure clauses. In the agreement, he agreed to refrain from working at a competing company during an eighteen-month period after his termination from VBrick. The non-disclosure covenant stipulated that Mr. Stephens be legally obligated to maintain the confidential nature of VBrick’s business operations and information that he had access to during his employment with the company. The employment agreement stated that Connecticut law would govern any legal disputes but failed to enumerate any geographical limitations for the restrictive covenants.
VBrick alleged that Mr. Stephens breached the covenants by accepting a position with a competitor within eighteen months of his termination and by using VBrick’s proprietary information in his role as an Optibase employee. VBrick sued in federal court and requested that the court enforce the provisions contained in the restrictive covenants. The court ultimately found in favor of Mr. Stephens and denied VBrick’s request for injunctive relief. The court found that VBrick did not meet the burden of proof to demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable harm if the court did not issue an injunction.
The court held that VBrick failed to present adequate and convincing evidence that Mr. Stephens actually possessed or had access to any of its trade secrets or confidential information. He had familiarized himself with the products he was marketing and selling by using the company’s training programs and corporate website, both of which are accessible by the public. Additionally, VBrick did not convince the court that Mr. Stephens’ action as an Optibase employee had “affected or will significantly affect VBrick’s sales or revenues”. This meant that VBrick was unable to show that it had been adversely affected by Mr. Stephens’ actions or that it was likely to be in the future. VBrick’s testimony offered evidence to the contrary when it stated before the court that its sales and revenues remained strong despite Mr. Stephens’ termination and the national economic downturn. In light of inadequate evidence to show that Mr. Stephens’ action at Optibase created an imminent danger for VBrick’s business operations, the court had no option but to deny VBrick’s request for injunctive relief.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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