Posts tagged with "remote starter"

Criminal Law Update: Drug Analysis Must Be Supported By Live Testimony

The United States Supreme Court ruled that criminal laboratory analysis may not be used at trial unless the laboratory analyst actually responsible for preparing the report physically appears to give testimony in court and to be subjected to cross-examination.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause gives criminal defendants the right to challenge the validity of chemical analyses proffered by prosecutors by examining a live witness who would be compelled to appear at trial.

Prosecutors argue that the landmark decision adds a significant burden to the government’s ability to prosecute crimes in which lab reports are routinely submitted with little or no supporting testimony.

By contrast, the majority decision notes that convenience is not the measure of constitutionality, pointing out that “the confrontation clause may make the prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination.”

If you have questions about drug analysis or a criminal matter, do not hesitate to contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at our Westport, CT office at (203) 221-3100 or for a free consultation. 

State Supreme Court Tackles Question of “Operation” of Remotely Started Vehicles

In a criminal law matter, State v. Cyr, 291 Conn. 49, 967 A.2d 32 (2009), the Supreme Court of Connecticut was faced with the question of what acts constitute operation of motor vehicles, so as to fall within the purview of the State’s statutory prohibition against operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI).

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred in the early hours of February 28, 2005. A police officer noticed the defendant and a passenger sitting in their vehicle in a parking lot near a local bar. The officer approached and spoke to the defendant, at which point he detected the odor of alcohol emanating from inside the vehicle. After the defendant failed a series of field sobriety tests, he was placed under arrest and charged with OMVUI.

The defendant pled not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he was not operating his car. Rather, he claimed that a car which has been started using a remote starter cannot be operated until the ignition key is actually inserted and turned. The court was not persuaded and denied this motion, as well as a subsequent motion to dismiss. The defendant pled nolo contendere, and upon the entry of conviction, he filed an appeal.

The Appeal

The Appellate Court reversed judgment, stating that this scenario fell outside the meaning of “operation” under State law. It found that the state failed to provide sufficient evidence indicating the defendant “had undertaken an act that alone or in sequence [with other acts would] set in motion the motive power of the vehicle.” (Internal quotation omitted) The State appealed this decision, arguing that the definition of “operation” was broad and meant to include acts such as those in this case. The defendant countered that he started the engine outside the vehicle and he could not operate it because the key was not in the ignition.

OMVUI in Connecticut

General Statutes § 14-227a is Connecticut’s OMVUI statute. A person commits this offense when he or she operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of either drugs or alcohol. The statute, however, does not define “operate,” and its legislative history provides no insight. Therefore, the Supreme Court looked to case law, which has held the following:

A person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of [the] statute, when in the vehicle he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle.

State v. Swift, 125 Conn. 399, 403 (1939) (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court believed that the State legislature meant “operating” to encompass a wider spectrum of conduct than “driving” would. Furthermore, under State v. Haight, the court wrote, “Each act, in sequence with other steps, will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle. … Each act therefore constitutes operation of the vehicle…” 279 Conn. 551, 553 (2006).

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Supreme Court found the above principles applicable to the facts presented. The defendant “clearly undertook the first act in a sequence of steps necessary to set in motion the motive power of a vehicle that has been equipped with a remote starter.” The Court was not persuaded that a person must be in their vehicle first in order to perform an act that constituted operation. It considered the lack of the key in the ignition as a “temporary impediment” to the movement of a remotely started vehicle. Therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed and the case remanded.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at