Posts tagged with "self-incrimination"

DUI Suspect Did Not Have Right to be “Selectively Silent;” Rebuttal Inquiry Did Not Violate Constitutional Protections

The Appellate Court of Connecticut considered whether a prosecutor’s line of inquiry violated a defendant’s due process rights against self-incrimination under the state and federal constitutions.

The Incident

This case arose from an incident that occurred at 1:22am on April 9, 2008. A state trooper was on routine patrol along I-95 in Fairfield, CT, when he received a report of an erratic driver in his vicinity. He promptly located the vehicle in question, which was driving only 35mph in a 55mph zone. In addition, the trooper saw the vehicle swerve multiple times and nearly strike a guardrail.

Therefore, the trooper initiated a traffic stop. While interacting with the driver, who was later identified as the defendant, the trooper made the following observations: bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and the distinct odor of alcohol. The trooper spotted a plastic cup with a tan liquid in the center console, but the defendant would not answer any questions regarding it.

The trooper asked the defendant to exit the vehicle and administered three field sobriety tests. The defendant was then arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) and transported to state police barracks located in Bridgeport, CT. There, he agreed to submit to two breathalyzer tests, both taken within two hours of the defendant operating his car and with results over the legal limit. The defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and presented with questions from a motor vehicle supplemental form (A44 form): the defendant answered some, but refused to answer others regarding alcohol and food consumption.

The Trial

Before trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the admission of the A44 form, citing his constitutional right against self-incrimination, but the court denied the motion. At trial, the State conducted an “offer of proof” through the trooper regarding the A44 form, and the defendant objected, but the form was admitted into evidence. On cross-examination, defense counsel engaged the trooper in a line of questioning regarding the defendant’s cooperation in answering questions from the form.

On redirect, the State asked whether the trooper inquired about the amount the defendant had to drink, and the defense objected on the ground of self-incrimination. The State argued that “the line of questioning had been opened by the defendant,” and the court agreed and overruled the objection. The defendant was subsequently found guilty by a jury and he appealed his conviction, arguing in part that his due process rights were violated by admission of the A44 form and related questioning during trial.

When one party engages a witness in a particular subject during examination at trial, he or she “cannot object if the opposing party later questions the witness on the same subject.” This is known as “opening the door” to rebuttal. Where a defendant has been advised of his Miranda rights, he does not also have the right to be “selectively silent.” Thus, the right against self-incrimination is inapplicable to a factual scenario where a defendant so advised chooses to answer some questions but “selectively declines to answer several others.”

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Appellate Court found that when the defense asked the trooper questions related to the defendant’s cooperation regarding the A44, the State had every right to follow up with questions on redirect evidencing the unresponsive answers. As the Court stated, “The defendant cannot reap the benefits of inquiry into one subject and expect the state’s questioning within the same scope to be held impermissible.” Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion when the court allowed the State’s inquiry on redirect regarding the defendant’s refusal to answer questions related to alcohol and food consumption. After addressing additional grounds for appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed judgment in its entirety.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

Superior Court Denies Motions to Suppress in DUI Case, Finding Defendant’s Constitutional Rights Were Not Violated

Case Background

This case arose from an incident that occurred on April 6, 2008. A police officer received word from dispatch that a restaurant drive-thru employee called in to report a customer, the defendant, who appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. The officer was given specific information about the vehicle and told that this was the third such report received. The officer promptly located the defendant’s vehicle and initiated a traffic stop.

When the officer approached the vehicle, he observed beer cans on the back floor of the defendant’s car in plain sight. Some of these were empty, and all were seized as evidence. After additional officers arrived on the scene, they conducted field sobriety tests and then arrested the defendant and brought her to police headquarters.

There, the officers advised the defendant of her Miranda rights and had her review a Notice of Rights form, which included information regarding implied consent and the chemical alcohol test refusal. The defendant was told she could call an attorney, but she was unable to successfully make contact with one. After fifteen minutes passed, officers advised the defendant that she had to decide whether or not to take the test, so she refused.

The Charges

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OMVUI) of alcohol in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. She moved to suppress statements she made as well as evidence collected from the motor vehicle stop and during a search of her car. In support of her motions, the defendant argued that police violated her rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures, and generally police must have a warrant to conduct a search. However, there are four recognized, narrow exceptions where the warrantless search of a vehicle is reasonable, including “when there was probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband or evidence pertaining to a crime.” Officers may seize contraband that it finds in plain view, and “such observations give rise to probable cause justifying a search of the vehicle.”

The Fifth Amendment, in part, prohibits compelled self-incrimination. The well-known recitation of Miranda warnings stem from the construction of this Amendment, and two conditions are required before an officer must invoke this warning: custody and interrogation. Waiver of Miranda rights must be made knowingly and voluntarily, which must be proven by the State by the preponderance of the evidence.

Under Connecticut law, in an action where a defendant is charged with OMVUI, the jury may draw permissive inferences from the fact that the defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. In addition, identifiable citizen informants are presumptively reliable, and officers are justified when they assume that the informant is providing truthful information. Because of the pervasive state interest in preventing drunk driving, officers do not have to wait for the defendant to drive erratically or cause an accident before pulling them over.

The Court’s Decision

In this case, the Superior Court of Connecticut adjudicating the case denied all of the defendant’s motions. It found that police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant, based on the information provided by the restaurant employee, an identifiable citizen informant. The seizure of the beer cans, which were in plain view, was permissible. In addition, because there was no interrogation at the police station, the defendant was not compelled to incriminate herself. Rather, pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b(b), police officers have the explicit authority to request that a defendant arrested for OMVUI sub.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence), an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.