Posts tagged with "special condition"

Where Defendant Evaded Responsibility Prior to Start of Probation, Termination of Accelerated Rehabilitation Was Not Warranted

In a recent criminal law matter, the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, Geographical Area 20 at Norwalk granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss the State’s action seeking termination of his participation in an accelerated rehabilitation program (Program).

In this case, the defendant was charged for several crimes, including reckless driving, operation of a motor vehicle with the intent to harass or intimidate, and operating under suspension. The defendant sought entry into the Program on August 4, 2004, but five days later, he was charged with evasion of responsibility, a violation of General Statutes § 14-224(b). On September 1, 2004, the defendant was granted participation in the Program and subsequently pled guilty to evading responsibility the following May. However, the State asked the Superior Court to terminate the defendant’s participation in the Program because he pled guilty during the probationary period.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56(e), criminal defendants may seek entry into accelerated pretrial rehabilitation. The purpose of this Program is for criminal defendants to earn and assert the right to have their charges dismissed, so long as they satisfactorily complete the probationary period without violating any general or special conditions imposed. An example of a general condition, as found in this case, is not violating any state or federal criminal law. In his motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that the actions underlying the charge to which he pled guilty occurred on August 9, 2004, before the probationary period began on September 1, 2004. As such, he could not have violated the general conditions of his probation. The Superior Court agreed with the defendant, and further noted that “a violation of probation occurs when the probationer’s criminal conduct arises during the probationary period.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the motion to dismiss was granted.

Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When ATVs are Driven on Public Highways, They Are “Motor Vehicles” for Purposes of State Suspension Laws

In a recent criminal law matter, the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed a trial court’s revocation of a defendant’s probation after he operated his all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on public roads while his driver’s license was suspended.

In this case, the defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence as a third-time offender. He was sentenced to three years’ incarceration, execution suspended after one year, with three years’ probation. The following conditions of probation were imposed: a general condition prohibiting the violation of any state criminal statute, and a special condition prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle with a suspended license. The Department of Motor Vehicles permanently suspended the defendant’s driver’s license due to his history of suspensions. The defendant served the one unsuspended year in jail, then began his probation. Before the term expired, he received two criminal citations after he operated an ATV in the travel lanes of town roads. Therefore, he was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license in violation of CGS § 14-215, as well as violation of probation.

A probation revocation hearing was held, where the trial court determined that the defendant violated the general and special conditions. His probation was revoked, and he was ordered to serve the remaining two years of his suspended sentence. The defendant appealed, arguing that CGS § 14-215(c) was unconstitutionally vague with respect to application to ATV usage. As he emphasized, “a person of ordinary intelligence could not reasonably have been expected to know that the term ‘motor vehicle’ included an ATV.”

Everyone is presumed to know the law, and ignorance is no excuse from criminal punishment. However, laws must be drafted so that “ordinary people understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” So long as the meaning of the statute can be fairly ascertained, it won’t be struck down as void for vagueness. In this case, the burden rested with the defendant to “demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [CGS § 14-215(c)], as applied to him, deprived him of adequate notice of what conduct the statute proscribed or that he fell victim to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”

CGS § 14-215(c) makes it a crime for a person to operate a motor vehicle while their driver’s license is under suspension. This statute is located in Chapter 248, which defines “motor vehicle” as including “all vehicles used on public highways.” In CGS § 14-212(9), “vehicle” is synonymous with “motor vehicle,” so the Supreme Court opined that if an ATV qualifies as a vehicle, it is a motor vehicle for purposes of the suspension law. The Court considered the definitions of ATV under other statutes, which use the language “a self-propelled vehicle” and “motorized vehicle.” CGS §§ 14-379 and 23-26a. Thus, for purposes of CGS § 14-215(c), an ATV was a motor vehicle when used on a public highway.

With this statutory framework in mind, the Supreme Court determined that the defendant failed to meet his burden. Rather, CGS § 14-215(c) “affords a person of ordinary intelligence with fair warning that he is prohibited from operating an ATV on a public highway while his license is suspended.” The Court found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and the trial court did not err in revoking the defendant’s probation.

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or operation under suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.