Posts tagged with "Stamford"

Special Education Discipline and Interim Educational Settings

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Children that require special education and related services must comply with a school district’s student code of conduct. That being said, the disciplinary procedures that apply are somewhat distinct from those used with non-special education students. In an article posted previously, I described the expulsion process for special education students in more general terms – today, let’s narrow that focus.

Special Education Discipline Process

If your special education child faces disciplinary action, his or her planning and placement team (PPT), of which you may be a member, will schedule a meeting to conduct a “manifestation determination.” In other words, the PPT will figure out whether “your child’s behavior was caused by or had a direct and substantial relationship to his or her disability.”[1] The PPT will also figure out whether the school district failed to implement your child’s individualized education program (IEP), thus prompting the misbehavior. The manifest determination must be conducted no later than ten (10) days after a decision to change your child’s placement.[2]

If the PPT concludes that your child’s behavior did not result from his or her disability, he or she will be disciplined consistent with that received by any other student who behaved in the same way. However, if the PPT establishes either that the behavior “was a manifestation of his or her disability or was due to a failure to implement his or her IEP,”[3] the PPT must perform a functional behavioral assessment (assessment) as well as create and implement a behavioral intervention plan (plan).[4]

The assessment is used to gather information that may shed light on why your child acted the way he or she did, as well as “identify strategies to address your child’s behavior.”[5] In turn, the plan should be designed in a way so as to teach your child how to properly behave, as well as deter and eliminate negative behaviors.

Long-Term Placement in an IES

It is important to keep in mind, however, that your child could be removed from his or her current placement and into an interim educational setting (IES). In most instances, this alternative placement must not exceed ten (10) days and is determined by your child’s IEP. In limited situations, however, your school district may decide to place your child in an IES for upwards of forty-five (45) days. This is without regard to the results of the PPT’s manifestation determination. The three circumstances where this may occur are as follows:

  • Your child carried or possessed a weapon to school or to a school-sponsored activity.
  • Your child knowingly possessed or used an illegal drug, or sold or solicited the sale of a controlled substance on school grounds or at a school-sponsored activity.
  • Your child inflicted serious bodily injury upon a fellow student, staff member, or any other person while on school grounds or at a school-sponsored activity.
What if I disagree with my child’s placement?

If you, as a parent, disagree with any decision relating to the above, you have the right to file for a due process hearing.[6] Unless you and the school district agree to otherwise, your child will remain in the IES until either the placement expires or a post-hearing decision is rendered.[7] Your local education agency must hold the hearing within twenty (20) days of the filing, and the hearing officer must render a decision within ten (10) days after the hearing.[8] Furthermore, the hearing officer has authority to your child’s regular placement if he or she “determines that removal was not valid or your child’s behavior was a manifestation of his or her disability.”[9]

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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Because of the potentially adverse and significant impact a suspension or expulsion can have on a student’s future, it is imperative to seek the advice of an experienced school law practitioner. The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., assist clients in Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, and Westport. Should you have any questions regarding school discipline, special education, or other education law matters, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut (located in Fairfield County), by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.

 

[1] “Advocating on Your Child’s Behalf: A Parent’s Guide to Connecticut School Law,” by Joseph C. Maya, Esq.,, pp.31.

[2] 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(e).

[3] See Footnote 1.

[4] 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(f)(1)(i)-(ii).

[5] See Footnote 1.

[6] 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(a).

[7] 34 C.F.R. § 300.533.

[8] 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(2).

[9] See Footnote 1.

What is the Process for Expelling a Special Education Student?

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Expulsion Process in Special Education

If you are the parent of a child that qualifies for special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), it is imperative that you understand that an entirely different set of rules applies.

“Connecticut school districts are obligated to provide special education and related services to children five years of age or older until the earlier of either high school graduation or the end of the school year in which your child turns twenty-one years of age.”[1] A special education child’s misconduct does not obviate the school district’s statutory duty. Therefore, before an expulsion hearing occurs, the child’s planning and placement team (PPT), which includes the parent(s), will schedule a meeting to determine whether or not the child’s misbehavior was caused by his or her disability. How the question is answered will impact the PPT’s course of action.

If the answer is “yes,” expulsion will not be pursued. Rather, the PPT will reevaluate the child and potentially modify his individualized education program (IEP) “to address the misconduct and to ensure the safety of other children and staff in the school.”[2] If, instead, the answer is “no,” the standard expulsion procedures[3] are followed. However, an AEP that is consistent with the child’s special educational needs must be provided by the school for the duration of the expulsion.[4]

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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Because of the potentially adverse and significant impact a suspension or expulsion can have on a student’s future, it is imperative to seek the advice of an experienced school law practitioner. The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., assist clients in Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, and Westport. Should you have any questions regarding school discipline or other education law matters, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut (located in Fairfield County), by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.

 

[1] “Advocating on Your Child’s Behalf: A Parent’s Guide to Connecticut School Law,” by Joseph C. Maya, Esq., at pp.8-9.

[2] Connecticut General Statutes § 10-233d(i).

[3] See Connecticut General Statutes § 10-233d(a).

[4] Connecticut General Statutes § 10-233d(i).

Alternative Educational Programs for Expelled Students

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Expulsions in Connecticut Schools

The Connecticut legislature has authorized the expulsion of a student if his or her conduct, be it committed on or off school grounds, violates a publicized board of education rule, seriously disrupts the educational process, or places into danger other persons or property.[1] The expulsion may last from anywhere between ten (10) days to one calendar year,[2] which no doubt leaves parents concerned that their child may fall behind his or her peers. However, barring specific exceptions, schools must provide an alternative education program (AEP) to an expelled student.

Constituting and Implementing an AEP

There is very little guidance as to what constitutes an AEP. One statute states, “Such alternative may include, but shall not be limited to, the placement of a pupil who is at least sixteen years of age in an adult education program.”[3] One State Department of Education regulation focuses on home tutoring obligations.[4] That being said, boards of education have wide discretion in deciding what qualifies as an AEP and may provide one even where they are not obligated to do so.[5]

However, the circumstances under which AEPs are granted are clear-cut and fall into three age-based categories. If the student is less than sixteen (16) years of age, the school has a duty to provide an AEP at no cost to the parents.

An AEP must also be provided to students aged sixteen (16) and seventeen (17), unless 1) the student was previously expelled; 2) the expulsion was for possession of a firearm, deadly weapon, dangerous instrument, or martial arts weapon while on school grounds or at a school-sponsored activity; or 3) the expulsion was for the sale or distribution of a controlled substance on school grounds or at a school-sponsored activity. Finally, if the student is above age eighteen (18), the school has no duty to provide an AEP unless he or she is a special education student.

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

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Because of the potentially adverse and significant impact a suspension or expulsion can have on a student’s future, it is imperative to seek the advice of an experienced school law practitioner. The attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C., assist clients in Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, and Westport. Should you have any questions regarding school discipline or other education law matters, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut (located in Fairfield County), by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.

[1] Connecticut General Statutes § 10-233d.

[2] Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1989).

[3] Connecticut General Statutes § 10-233d(d).

[4] Connecticut State Regulations § 10-76d-15.

[5] Connecticut General Statutes § 10-233d(d).

Proxy/Alter Ego Liability for Sexual Harassment

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Liability in Workplace Sexual Harassment

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (that includes Connecticut and New York) addressed for the first time whether the so-called Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense is available when an alleged sexual harassment attacker holds a sufficiently high position within an organization so as to be considered the organization’s proxy or alter ego.  The Second Circuit joined the other Circuits that have considered the issue in concluding that under those circumstances, the affirmative defense was unavailable to the employer.

By way of background, Faragher/Ellerth held that a company could escape vicarious liability for sexual harassment by taking certain steps directed toward reporting and eradicating sexual harassment in the workplace.  Left open was the issue of the employer’s direct liability where the actor was deemed to be the proxy/alter ego of the company.  Under that doctrine, an employer is liable in its own right for wrongful harassing conduct, as opposed to being vicariously liable for the actions of company agents.

A Company’s Proxy or Alter Ego

But who is the company’s proxy or alter ego?  Prior cases clearly place the company president and other sufficiently senior corporate officers within that category, and refer to “that class of an organization’s officials who may be treated as the organization’s proxy.”  Understandably, the courts do not want to draw a bright line around who may be considered an employer proxy, so that unusual cases can be determined on their peculiar facts without being constrained by particular titles.

All that is required is for the supervisor to occupy a sufficiently high position in the management hierarchy of the company for his actions to be imputed to the company.  When the official’s unlawful harassment is thus automatically charged to the employer, it cannot raise the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, even if the harassment did not result in an adverse employment action.

The result is a settling of the law in the Connecticut federal court; the Faragher/Ellerth defense is unavailable when the alleged harasser is the employer’s proxy or alter ego.  Both employers and employees now know better where they stand.

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The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County. Should you have any questions about Title VII and workplace discrimination or any other employment law matter, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut, by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.

A Quick Guide to Separation Agreements and Severance Packages

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Separation Agreements

Today’s report on the lagging unemployment numbers serves as a stark reminder that the state of the economy, though on the upturn, continues to move at a slow pace and that unemployment is a very real problem facing too many people.  Attorneys in our Westport office continue to see a high number of Separation Agreements and severance packages by employees who have been laid off.  What those employees should know is that experienced employment law attorneys, such as those at Maya Murphy, P.C., can review those agreements to negotiate an enhancement or increase of the benefits received.

Because there is no such thing as a standardized severance package, each and every term is crucial and should be carefully scrutinized.  As such, no employee should feel obligated to sign a Separation Agreement and return it to his or her employer without subjecting it to further review and negotiation by employment attorneys with a wide breadth of knowledge in the field.

Severance Packages 

Severance pay refers to a voluntary offer of payment from an employer to an employee who has recently been laid off.  No law requires an employer to offer a terminated employee a severance package.  However, employers offer severance packages, among other reasons, to maintain goodwill with past and future employees, to prevent employees from appropriating trade secrets, customer lists, and other proprietary information, and to ensure that employees refrain from engaging in professional associations with competing companies or businesses, or “non-competition agreements,” a separate issue on which Maya Murphy attorneys are well-versed.

It is crucial to remember that the time in which to respond to and agree to a severance agreement can be very limited, often to no more than one or two weeks, meaning it is in a terminated employee’s best interest to consult with an attorney as soon as possible after receipt of an agreement.

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In sum, it is vital to have an attorney experienced in employment law take the lead on reviewing your Separation Agreement, negotiating with your company or business, and vigorously advocating on your behalf.  Should you be confronted with a Separation Agreement, contact an attorney at our Westport office at 203-221-3100.

Enforcing a Non-Compete Agreement in a Medical Partnership

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Fairfield County Bariatrics and Surgical Associates, P.C. v. Ehrlich, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 568
Employment Background

Doctors Neil and Craig Floch created Floch Surgical Associates in 1999 in Norwalk, Connecticut to provide medical and surgical services to patients.  They decided to gear their practice toward bariatric surgery and hired Dr. Timothy Ehrlich, a board-certified general surgeon and graduate of Louisiana State University School of Medicine, in 2002.  He was granted surgical privileges at Norwalk Hospital and St. Vincent’s Hospital (in Bridgeport, CT) and operated as the only member of the medical group to perform bariatric surgeries exclusively.  On January 1, 2006, the two Floch doctors and Dr. Ehrlich formed Fairfield Bariatrics and Surgical Associates, P.C. (FCB).

Each doctor became a third shareholder in the professional corporation and signed identical employment agreements that outlined the compensation schedule, termination protocols, and included a non-compete agreement.  The non-compete prohibited each doctor, for two years after termination, from practicing general medicine/surgery within fifteen miles of FCB’s main office in Norwalk and barred performing bariatric procedures at hospitals located in Stamford, Norwalk, Greenwich, Danbury, and Bridgeport.

Doctors Neil and Craig Floch voted to terminate Dr. Ehrlich in July 2009 and notified him of the decision in a letter dated July 30, 1999.  They justified his termination by claiming that he repeatedly “misrepresented the group” and had lost his surgical privileges at Norwalk Hospital due to non-compliance with the hospital’s Trauma Service requirements.

Violating the Restrictive Covenant

Dr. Ehrlich proceeded to form his own limited liability company, Ehrlich Bariatrics LLC, on October 22, 2009 and opened offices in Waterford and Trumbull.  Both of these municipalities are located outside of the prohibited area created by the non-compete agreement but he also continued to perform operations at St. Vincent’s Hospital in Bridgeport, an activity expressly prohibited by the restrictive covenant.

FCB sued Dr. Ehrlich in Connecticut court and requested that the court enforce the provisions outlined in the non-compete agreement dated January 1, 2006.  The court found in favor of FCB, determined that Dr. Ehrlich had violated a valid non-compete agreement, and enforced the provisions of the covenant not to compete.

The court stated that the challenging party (Dr. Ehrlich for this case) bore the burden of proof to demonstrate that the agreement was unenforceable.  He asserted that he had not been properly terminated and that the agreement itself was unreasonable, and therefore unenforceable.  The court rejected both of these arguments and concluded that the agreement was valid and enforceable.

Improper Termination Argument

Dr. Ehrlich advanced the unconvincing argument that he was the victim of improper termination because the shareholders meeting at which the vote was taken to terminate his employment was not properly noticed pursuant to the corporation’s by-laws.  He essentially contended that the “lack of notice renders his termination a nullity”.

The court however disagreed with Dr. Ehrlich because a physician whose termination is being voted on is not entitled to cast a vote.  The lack of voting power for this matter meant that his presence was not required and he was not entitled to notice of the special shareholders meeting where the vote was taken.  The court ultimately concluded that Doctors Neil and Craig Floch had taken the proper and necessary steps in accordance with the corporation’s by-laws to terminate Dr. Ehrlich’s employment with FCB.

Unreasonable Provisions Argument

Next, Dr. Ehrlich unsuccessfully contended that the agreement contained unreasonable provisions and therefore the court was not obligated or permitted to order its enforcement.  Discerning the reasonableness of a non-compete agreement required the court to balance the competing needs of the parties as well as the needs of the public.

Furthermore, the challenging party must show that the provisions are unreasonable in scope.  First, the court established that FCB did in fact have a legitimate business interest that necessitated protection.  The company was entitled to protect potential new patients within a reasonably limited market area.  FCB was only concerned with future patients and did not seek to prevent Dr. Ehrlich from providing follow-up services to current or past patients.

Enforcing the Non-Compete Agreement

Next, the court addressed and cited a variety of case law that showed Connecticut courts’ history of enforcing non-compete agreements when they protect against “something other than mere competition”, including the use of customer lists, impaired of purchased good will, confidential data/trade secrets, use of information concerning potential clients in a limited area, or some other advantage the former employee acquired while working for the plaintiff company.  The court found that Dr. Ehrlich had greatly benefitted from his association with FCB and that his continued actions would negatively affect the reputation and business operations of his former employer.

Lastly, the court took time to address the differences between non-compete agreements for an employer-employee relationship and those for partnerships.  It held that since there was not unequal bargaining power or impaired ability to earn a living, the provisions were not unreasonable in scope.

The court noted that Dr. Ehrlich’s offices in Trumbull and Waterford did not violate the agreement and there were numerous hospitals located outside the prohibited area where he could find employment as a board certified surgeon specializing in bariatrics.  He had actually received encouragement from several doctors to apply for privileges at permissible hospitals, including the Hospital of St. Raphael in New Haven.

In light of Dr. Ehrlich violating a legally binding non-compete agreement that protected a legitimate business interest, the court ordered the enforcement of the restrictive covenant.

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The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Failure to Warn Case Against Generic Ibuprofen

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A federal appeals court has reinstated a lawsuit against the maker of a generic brand of ibuprofen. The lawsuit is on behalf of a child who suffered liver damage after taking the drug as prescribed after surgery. The case holds generic drug makers to the same labeling standard as makers of patented drugs. The case alleges failure to warn of ibuprofen risks by the drug maker. The court says the duty to warn applies to generic drug makers.

Drug Label Failed to Warn of Known Risk

Ibuprofen is a popular over-the-counter painkiller. The lawsuit says the drug is known to cause liver failure under some circumstances. The label contained no warnings about this potential side effect.

In 2009 the Supreme Court ruled drug makers can be sued for failing to warn of the risks of a medication even though the FDA has approved package or label warnings. This ruling makes clear the same standard applies to makers of the generic forms of the drug. Failure to warn is one of the main theories of product liability law.

By now everyone should be clear on the risks of liver damage associated with the two common aspirin alternatives. The FDA instructed drug makers to limit the amount of acetaminophen in prescription painkillers like oxycodone and hydrocodone. As this case shows, what you don’t know can hurt you.

By: Arthur Buono

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At Maya Murphy, P.C., our experienced team of personal injury attorneys is dedicated to achieving the best results for individuals and their families and loved ones whose daily lives have been disrupted by injury.  Our personal injury attorneys assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and throughout Fairfield County. If you have any questions relating to a personal injury claim or would like to schedule a free consultation, please contact our Westport office by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com

Four-Prong Test Applied to Enforce Non-Compete Provision in a Franchise Agreement

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Money Mailer Franchise Corporation v. Wheeler, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2260
Case Details

Mr. Douglas Wheeler entered into a Franchise Agreement with Money Mailer Franchise Corporation on February 28, 2003, wherein he was assigned a mailing territory comprised of thirteen zip codes in Fairfield and New Haven counties.  Money Mailer was a business that franchised a system of providing direct mail order advertising and related services.  The Franchise Agreement contained a non-compete covenant.

The non-compete prohibited Mr. Wheeler from engaging “in any Competitive Activities with the Territory [his thirteen zip codes] or within the territory of any other “Money Mailer” franchise then in operation” for a period of two years following termination.  This essentially obligated Mr. Wheeler to not engage in any competing business enterprise within fifty miles of any Money Mailer franchise.

Mr. Wheeler sold his franchise to Mr. Javier Ferrer on October 31, 2007 for $130,000.  He executed an additional non-compete agreement in connection with this transaction wherein he promised not to compete for three years following the closing of the deal.  In February 2008, he began to work as an Independent Contractor for Direct Advantage, a direct competitor engaged in the same business(es) as Money Mailer.

Money Mailer sued Mr. Wheeler for breach of the Franchise Agreement and requested that the court enforce the provisions contained in the non-compete agreement.  Mr. Wheeler acknowledged that he was involved in the exact same business addressed and prohibited in the non-compete agreement and admitted to soliciting several of Money mailer’s previous and current customers.

The Court’s Decision

The Connecticut state court granted Money Mailer’s request for injunctive relief and ordered the enforcement of the restrictive covenant.  The court stated that the purpose of injunctive relief was to preserve the status quo of the parties until the case was definitively decided.

It further noted the relevant standard of review for granting a request for an injunction and specified four factors: 1) no adequate remedy at law, 2) plaintiff would experience irreparable harm if the request was not granted, 3) plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits of the case, and 4) an injunction would sustain the balance of the parties’ equities.  The court concluded that Money Mailer’s case met all of these requisite factors and its complaint warranted relief in the form of a temporary injunction.

The court concluded that an injunctive order was necessary to balance the parties’ interests during the legal proceedings and that the temporary injunction would essentially restore the parties to their relative positions before the alleged violation of the non-compete agreement.  Money Mailer was able to demonstrate that Mr. Wheeler’s actions had a detrimental impact its business interests.

Additionally, the court found that Money Mailer was likely to prevail on the merits of its complaint, specifically citing that Mr. Wheeler’s own testimony provided abundant evidence of activities that should trigger the enforcement of the restrictive covenant.  For these enumerated reasons, the court granted Money Mailer’s request for an injunction restraining Mr. Wheeler from further violations of the non-compete provisions contained in the Franchise Agreement executed between the parties in 2003.

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The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Nightclub Owners Agree to $4.2 Million Settlement in Wrong-Way Crash Case

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Case Background

The parents of Connecticut College student Elizabeth Durante reached a settlement in their wrongful death lawsuit against the owners of the Ultra 88 nightclub at Mohegan Sun Thursday for $4.2 million.

Durante, a 20-year-old aspiring medical student, had recruited fellow students for a humanitarian mission to Uganda during spring break in March 2009 and was en route to the airport when she was killed in a wrong-way collision on Interstate 395 that was caused by an intoxicated nightclub patron Daniel Musser.

Durante’s parents, Keith and Kathleen Durante of Islip, N.Y., had sued the club’s Boston-based owners, Plan B LLC, and the Lyons Group, and its permittee, Patrick Lyons, claiming the nightclub had acted recklessly and negligently.

The Durantes and attorneys involved in the case agreed they would not comment publicly on the settlement, the details of which were put on the record Thursday afternoon by Hartford Superior Court Judge William H. Bright Jr.

The Settlement

The judge released a jury that had listened to two days of evidence in the case before the parties agreed to the $4.2 million figure. In reaching the settlement in state court, the Durantes also agreed to release the nightclub backers from a case that is pending in Mohegan tribal court, according to a court transcript.

New London attorneys Robert I. Reardon Jr. and Kelly E. Reardon represented the Durantes. Attorneys Scott Behman, Frank Ganz and Domenick Secundo from the Wallingford law firm Behman Hambelton represented the club and its backers.

Musser, then a sailor stationed at the Naval Submarine Base in Groton, had been drinking at Ultra 88 for several hours before he drove the wrong way out of the casino in the early morning hours of March 7, 2009. Musser’s car collided head-on near Exit 79A on I-395 with a van carrying Durante and seven other students to Logan Airport.

Pretrial Settlement Discussion

Pretrial settlement talks were unsuccessful, so the sides selected a jury and testimony began Tuesday in Hartford Superior Court. Bartender Sarah Webster, who sold Musser several drinks at the nightclub before calling security to eject him for lewd behavior, had been on the witness stand for several hours when the settlement talks resumed.

Musser, who had a 0.13 blood alcohol level following the crash and is serving a 75-month sentence for second-degree manslaughter, was slated to testify on Friday had the trial continued.

Three other students and the van driver had also sued Ultra 88 and had settled their lawsuits during jury selection. The Durantes had initially sued Mohegan tribal officials, but a judge ruled they had sovereign immunity.

In late 2009, following the deaths of Durante and two others that occurred after patrons left the casino under the influence of alcohol, the tribe said it was expanding its measures to prevent drunken driving.

By Karen Florin, theday.com

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At Maya Murphy, P.C., our experienced team of personal injury attorneys is dedicated to achieving the best results for individuals and their families and loved ones whose daily lives have been disrupted by injury.  Our personal injury attorneys assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and throughout Fairfield County. If you have any questions relating an auto accident, wrongful death claim or would like to schedule a free consultation, please contact our Westport office by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com

Five Things You Need to Know About Connecticut Separation Agreements

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As a result of the state of the economy, in general, and in Fairfield County, in particular, we in the Westport, Connecticut office of Maya Murphy, P.C. have seen a spate of Separation Agreements brought to us by recently terminated employees.  Our experienced employment-law attorneys review and critique these Agreements, and often advocate on behalf of our clients to enhance a separation package.

Here are five things you need to know about Separation Agreements:

  1. They are here and more may be on the way. 

    Companies are scrutinizing their bottom lines to try to increase profits, decrease expenses, and improve share value or owner’s equity.  If sales can’t be increased or cost-of-goods-sold decreased, one alternative is to cut personnel.  Often senior (and more highly paid) employees are let go in favor of younger (i.e., “cheaper”) employees, thereby also raising the specter of an age discrimination claim (a topic deserving of its own post).

  2. They are complex. 

    For an employee over the age of 40, a federal statute known as the “Older Workers Benefit Protection Act” requires that your Separation Agreement contain certain provisions, including a comprehensive release of all claims that you might have against your employer.  The statute also gives you specific time periods to review the Agreement prior to signing, and even to rescind your approval after you have signed.  It is not uncommon to have Separation Agreements exceed 10 pages in length.  All of the language is important.

  3. They are a minefield. 

    Separation Agreements frequently contain “restrictive covenants,” usually in the form of confidentiality, non-solicitation, and non-competition provisions.  These can have a profound effect on your ability to relocate to another position and have to be carefully reviewed and analyzed to avoid potentially devastating long-term consequences after the Agreement has been signed and the revocation period has expired.

  4. They are not “carved in stone.”

    Although many companies ascribe to a “one size fits all” and a “take it or leave it” policy with regard to Separation Agreements, such is not necessarily the case.  Often, Maya Murphy employment attorneys can find an “exposed nerve” and leverage that point to obtain for a client more severance pay, longer health benefits, or some other perquisite to ease the client’s transition into a new job with a new employer.  Every case is factually (and perhaps legally) different and you should not assume that your severance package should be determined by those that have gone before you.

  5. You need an advocate.

    You need an experienced attorney to elevate discussion of your Separation Agreement above the HR level.  HR directors have limited discretion and are tasked with keeping severance benefits to an absolute minimum.  Maya Murphy’s goal is to generate a dialogue with more senior management to drive home the point that a particular client under certain circumstances is equitably entitled to greater benefits than initially offered.

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If you find yourself in the unfortunate position of having been presented with a Separation Agreement, you should contact an experienced employment law attorney in our Westport, Connecticut office by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.