Posts tagged with "statute"

Decision Suggests Educational Support Orders May Not Be Applied Retroactively

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A case decided by the Connecticut Appellate Court, suggests Educational Support orders entered pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-56c may not be entered retroactively.  In Kleinman v. Chapnick, 131 Conn. App. 812 (2011), the parties had two children who were over the age of eighteen and enrolled as full-time college students.  During the divorce proceedings, the parties’ older daughter was a senior and their younger daughter was a freshman.  In February 2010, after the parties entered into a final agreement on custody and visitation, a two-day trial ensued regarding financial issues.

As part of its decision, the Court ordered the husband to pay 100 percent of the statutory expenses for the education of the parties’ younger daughter beginning with the 2010-2011 school year.  As the Court did not enter an order with respect to the 2009-2010 school year, the wife filed a Motion to Clarify, Correct and/or Reargue.  The Court subsequently heard the wife’s motion, but declined to change its position.

On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court found that the husband made voluntary payments for the 2009-2010 school year that exceeded his statutory obligation under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c.  More importantly, however, the Court held that Section 46b-56c contains no language authorizing retroactive application, pointing out that various provisions contained within the statute suggest that it is intended to apply prospectively only.  In a footnote, the Court further explained that child support orders cannot be retroactive, and an order for post-majority educational support is in fact an order for child support for college education.

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Should you have any questions regarding educational support in the context of divorce proceedings, please feel free to contact Joseph Maya and the other attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. at (203) 221-3100 or JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Special Education Law – Relevant Terms

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Within the realm of Special Education Law there are several relative terms one should be familiar with. Below are some of these key terms.

Applied Behavior Analysis (“ABA”):

An intensive, structured teaching program in which behaviors to be taught are broken down into simple elements. Each element is taught using repeated trials where the child is presented with a stimulus; correct responses and behaviors are rewarded with positive reinforcement, while when incorrect responses occur, they are ignored and appropriate responses are prompted and rewarded.

Alternative Assessment:

The use of assessment strategies, such as performance assessment and portfolios, to replace (or supplement) the assessment of a special education student by standard machine-scored multiple-choice tests.

Assistive Technology:

Refers to any piece of equipment, product, system, or other item that is used to increase, maintain or improve the functional capabilities of an individual with a disability.

Behavior Intervention Plan (“BIP”):

Refers to a plan, strategies, program or curricular modifications, and supplementary aids and supports, which are positive in nature (not punitive) and are developed by the PPT to teach a child appropriate behaviors and minimize behaviors that impede learning.

Extended School Year (“ESY”):

This refers to special education and related services that a school provides to a student beyond the normal school year and/or the normal school day, at no additional cost to parents, in accordance with the child’s IEP.

Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”):

Each special education student is entitled to a free, appropriate public education. It is defined as special education and related services that are provided at public expense and under public supervision and direction, without charge to the student. “Related services” include, but are not limited to, transportation, physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech pathology, and psychological services, among others.

A special education student’s FAPE must meet state and federal requirements, and be provided in accordance with the child’s IEP. In Connecticut, children must be provided a FAPE from age three through the end of the school year in which the child reaches the age of twenty-one (or until the child has graduated from high school with a regular diploma, whichever is first to occur).

Functional Behavior Assessment (“FBA”):

Refers to an assessment of the reasons why a child behaves the way he or she does, given the nature of the child and what is happening in the environment. It describes a process for collecting data to determine the possible causes behind certain behaviors in order to identify strategies to address those behaviors.

Identification:

Refers to the decision that a child is eligible for special education services.

Independent Educational Evaluation (“IEE”):

Refers to an evaluation of a special education student performed by a professional who is not employed by the school district. If you disagree with the PPT’s evaluation of your child, you may request an independent educational evaluation. The school district must either pay for the cost of the IEE, or prove to a due process hearing officer that its own PPT evaluation is in fact appropriate. Of course, parents may obtain an IEE for their child at their own expense at any time. When presented with the results of the IEE, the PPT must consider the findings, but is not bound to adopt them.

Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”):

This refers to a written education program developed for an individual child with a disability. It is developed by a multi-disciplinary team of school professionals and the child’s parents and is reviewed and updated at least once per school year. The IEP describes the child’s present performance and learning needs, as well as detailing which services will be necessary at what time, for how long, and by whom those services will be provided.

Least Restrictive Environment (“LRE”):

A child with a disability must, to the maximum appropriate extent, be educated with children who are not disabled, in a general education class in the school that the child would attend if he or she did not have a disability requiring special education services. A child with a disability should not be removed from the general educational setting unless the nature and severity of that child’s disability is such that education in the general class with the use of supplemental aids and services cannot be satisfactorily achieved.

Manifestation Determination:

If a school seeks to change the placement of a child with a disability because that child behaved in a way that violated the school’s code of conduct, then a “manifest determination” must be made, to determine whether the behavior complained of is caused by the child’s disability.

Positive Behavior Supports (“PBS”):

Refers to an approach to addressing challenging behaviors, and includes: functional assessment of the behavior; organizing the environment; teaching skills; rewarding positive behaviors; anticipating situations; and redesigning interventions as necessary.

Planning and Placement Team (“PPT”):

Refers to a group of professionals who represent each of the teaching, administrative and pupil personnel staffs at a special education student’s school, and who, with the student’s parents, are equal participants in the decision-making process to determine the specific educational needs of the student. The PPT, along with the parents, develops, reviews and revises a student’s IEP; the PPT also reviews referrals to special education, determines if the child needs to be evaluated, decides what evaluations the child will have, and determines whether the child is eligible for special education services.

Stay Put:

Refers to the requirement that a special education student must stay in his or her current program or placement during the course of a due process hearing. This provision may be modified upon agreement by both the parent and the school district.

The attorneys of Maya Murphy P.C. are well practiced in the realm of Special Education Law. Should you have questions regarding Special Education Law matters, contact managing partner Joseph C. Maya at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com for a free initial consultation.

Defeating Governmental Immunity: Navigating the Uphill Climb

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Lawsuits against the State of Connecticut or its local municipalities are notoriously difficult to pursue from a legal perspective, in large part due to various statutory protections and administrative hurdles put in place by the legislature.  For example, a plaintiff seeking to initiate a personal injury case against her own town must adhere to strict time limitations and procedural requirements in order to have her case successfully get into court and survive the scrutiny of a judge, well before she ever comes close to having a “day in court” before a jury of her peers.

Unless the site of a plaintiff’s injury falls within one of a few narrow exceptions (such as an injury on a “public highway,” which would invoke the protections and mechanisms of Connecticut’s “highway defect statute,” or Connecticut General Statutes Section 13a-149), a plaintiff is entitled only to proceed against a state or municipality under the Political Subdivision Liability Statute (Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-557n).

Section 52-557n, however, contains its own pitfalls for prospective plaintiffs.  The statute provides that a town or political subdivision may be liable for negligent acts of its employees, officers, or agents except if such actions or omissions constitute criminal conduct or willful misconduct, or, significantly, if such negligent acts or omissions require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the job responsibility.

Governmental Immunity

The latter part of this test is key – and is a gold mine for municipalities (and their lawyers) seeking to invoke the governmental immunity doctrine and escape liability for the negligence of its employees, even if such negligence is established by an injured person.  What the provision states, in plain language, is that a town may well be free and clear from liability if the task that was performed negligently was a task that required an exercise of judgment on the part of the town employee.

Take the hypothetical example of a plaintiff who was injured when she slipped on ice on the front steps of City Hall.  The evidence suggests that the maintenance workers either knew or should have known that ice had built up on the steps, that they were expecting the public to be walking in and out of the building, and that someone clearly “dropped the ball” in making sure that the ice was scraped off and that salt or sand was applied generously to the area.

Instead, nothing was done, nothing was scraped, no sand or salt was used, no warning signs were posted, and the ice remained for several business days before this plaintiff came along and fell on her very first visit to City Hall.

Arguments for the Plaintiff vs. the City

Even with these simplified facts (which appear at first blush to be quite damaging to the City), the City will surely investigate the existence of any policy, procedure, and practice of those maintenance workers who were assigned to the front steps of the building.  In this case, the City will attempt to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “judgment” and “discretion” of the City employees were required to be exercised to keep those steps free of snow and ice.

On the contrary, a plaintiff will seek to demonstrate that the actions (or omissions) of the City workers were “ministerial” – that is, the workers had a clear directive to do something (e.g. to clear the ice at certain times, in a certain manner, with no exercise of judgment) and yet they failed to carry out that task, resulting in the plaintiff’s injury.

When the proverbial dust settles, if no clear, articulated policy existed to clear the steps, to inspect the steps on a scheduled basis, or to take preventative measures against ice buildup, a municipal defendant in this instance would likely argue (perhaps successfully) that the maintenance workers were required not to follow any protocol, but only to “use their judgment and discretion” in determining what needed to be kept safe and clear for pedestrian traffic.

How to Approach Cases Against a State or Local Municipality

An unknowing plaintiff (or perhaps an inexperienced attorney) who advances her case against a town believing that a jury would be shocked if there is no snow removal policy might find herself equally shocked when or if it is determined that any negligence was of a “discretionary” nature and governmental immunity therefore applies, subject to other very narrow legal exceptions not discussed here.

A savvy plaintiff, in discovery and at the very outset of the lawsuit, might request that the town admit, under oath and in writing, to the existence of a clear and articulated policy (even if it is unwritten) with regard to the safety issue which resulted in her injury.  While towns (and their attorneys) are often eager to show that preventative measures are and were in place, in this instance, they may well eliminate – as a matter of law – their own sacred protection of governmental immunity at trial.

With a valid legal admission of a clear and articulated policy, a municipal defendant is effectively hamstrung – it cannot simultaneously admit to the existence of a policy and directive while claiming that its employees were simply exercising their own judgment.  Dramatically and emphatically, the curtain of governmental immunity draws away, paving the way for a plaintiff to reach the eyes and ears of a jury.

An injured person seeking legal assistance as against the state or a municipality faces a virtual hornet’s nest of obstacles and legal entanglements.  A trusted, informed advocate is essential to place such a claim in the best possible legal position.  The invitation is open to consulting with attorneys at our firm who are experienced in this type of civil litigation.

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If you have questions regarding any personal injury matter, contact Joseph Maya at 203-221-3100 or by email at JMaya@MayaLaw.com.

NYC Expands Law to Ensure Employers Provide Adequate Accommodations to Pregnant Employees

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According to Day Pitney, an expansion to the New York City Human Rights Law to include pregnancy discrimination will go into effect. Under the new law, NYC employers with four or more employees will have a duty to provide reasonable accommodations to pregnant women and those who suffer medical conditions related to pregnancy and childbirth.

Reasonable Accommodations

Examples of reasonable accommodations listed in the bill include assistance with manual labor, bathroom breaks, disability leave for a reasonable period of time arising from childbirth, breaks to facilitate increased water intake and periodic rest breaks for those who stand for long periods of time.

The Legislative Intent section of the bill suggests that when an employee requests a reasonable accommodation in order to maintain a healthy pregnancy, it generally is not reasonable for the employer to place that employee on an unpaid leave of absence.

Although the New York City Commission on Human Rights and the New York courts have not yet interpreted or applied this new law, the Legislative Intent section suggests that employers may have a duty to accommodate pregnant employees with medical restrictions by providing such employees modified job duties, assistance to perform certain job duties or alternative job duties.

Accommodation Requirements

An employer is required to provide such accommodations that would permit the employee to perform the “essential requisites of the job,” unless (i) the employer is unaware that the employee is pregnant, has given birth or has a related medical condition; (ii) providing the accommodation will result in an undue hardship for the employer; or (iii) the employee would not be able to perform the essential requisites of the job even with the accommodation.

NYC employers will be required to provide written notice of these new pregnancy and childbirth accommodation rights to new employees at the start of their employment and to existing employees within 120 days of the law’s effective date of January 30, 2014. In addition to providing each individual employee with written notice of these rights, employers also should post in a conspicuous location the poster provided by the New York City Commission on Human Rights. The poster is available here.

Violations of the Law

Employees who believe their employers have violated the new law will have the ability to file a claim with the New York City Commission on Human Rights or pursue a private right of action in court without first exhausting administrative remedies. Remedies for violating the law include back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney fees and costs.

Credit: Basil Sitaras