Posts tagged with "statutory requirements"

Considering Teacher Evaluation Under Connecticut Law

On Sunday night, the Chicago Teacher’s Union called for a strike that lasted this entire week, stemming from disagreements over such negotiable employment terms as teacher evaluations. As Katherine Wojtecki explained, “Teachers are concerned about job security in the wake of a new program that evaluates them based on their students’ standardized test scores” that had the potential to leave thousands of teachers without jobs.[1]

Presently, Connecticut law governing teachers is rather extensive and goes into particular detail regarding employment, tenure, and notice and hearing on failure to renew or termination of contracts. See Connecticut General Statutes (C.G.S.) § 10-151. The process of evaluating teacher performance, particularly in light of the potential pitfalls as seen in Chicago, had already become a focal point of legislation in this State. At the present time, Connecticut law requires continuous evaluation of school teachers by every district, taking into consideration more factors than mere test results: 1) teacher strengths; 2) areas that need improvement; 3) improvement strategy indicators; and 4) numerous measures of student academic growth.[2]

By July 1, 2013, the State Board of Education “must develop new model teacher evaluation program guidelines for using multiple indicators of student academic growth.”[3] In addition, public schools will be required to collect data not just on mastery test scores but also students and teachers themselves. This data will then be used when evaluating student performance and growth. Teacher data that must be collected is articulated in C.G.S. § 10-10a:

(i)                  Teacher credentials, such as master’s degrees, teacher preparation programs completed and certification levels and endorsement areas

(ii)                Teacher assessments, such as whether a teacher is deemed highly qualified pursuant to the No Child Left Behind Act, P.L. 107-110, or deemed to meet such other designations as may be established by federal law or regulations for the purposes of tracking the equitable distribution of instructional staff

(iii)              The presence of substitute teachers in a teacher’s classroom

(iv)               Class size

(v)                 Numbers relating to absenteeism in a teacher’s classroom

(vi)               The presence of a teacher’s aide

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

For more information regarding statutory requirements that govern teacher layoffs and evaluations, please follow this link, which provides a summary produced by the Office of Legislative Research. Should you have any questions about teacher evaluations or other education law matters, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya, Esq. at Maya Murphy, P.C.’s Westport office located in Fairfield County at (203) 221-3100 or at JMaya@mayalaw.com.


[1] “Source: Tentative deal reached in Chicago teacher strike,” by Katherine Wojtecki. September 14, 2012: http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/14/us/illinois-chicago-teachers-strike/index.html

[2] “Teacher Layoff and Teacher Evaluation Requirements,” by Judith Lohman, Office of Legislative Research. February 9, 2011: http://cga.ct.gov/2011/rpt/2011-R-0075.htm

[3] Id.

Assessing the Best Interests of the Children When Considering a Request for Relocation

Written by Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.

When a court considers a parent’s wish to relocate the children’s residence and a parenting plan will be affected, it looks to the statutory requirements of General Statutes § 46b-56d: whether the move is for a legitimate purpose, the location is legitimate in light of this purpose, and relocation is in the best interests of the children. Subsection (b) of the statute outlines five non-exclusive factors a court will consider when answering the third part of its inquiry:

  • The reasons each party opposes or seeks relocation.
  • The quality of the relationship each party has with the child.
  • The impact of relocation on the quantity and quality of the child’s future contact with the non-relocating parent.
  • The degree to which the life of the relocating parent and child is enhanced socially, economically, and educationally as a result of the relocation.
  • Whether it is feasible that the relationship between the non-relocating parent and child will be preserved.

Even if a party establishes that the purpose for and location of the move is legitimate, their request to relocate will be denied if the court finds that it is not in the best interests of the children to do so. All three statutory criteria must be satisfied.

Five years ago, the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford ruled on a matter involving one parent’s request to relocate with her minor children to Vermont. That case, Frostmann v. Frostmann, 2007 Conn. Super. 3411, is particularly notable in light of the court’s careful, detailed analysis of whether the move would be in the best interests of the children.

Following dissolution of her marriage and the establishment of a parenting plan, the mother wished to relocate with her two minor children from her residence in Old Greenwich to Vermont. She explained that she grew up in Vermont and had an affinity for rural life, in stark contrast to the culture in Greenwich. The mother sought to develop farmland acreage in hopes of becoming financially independent, and even had initial engineering plans drawn up. The values and lifestyle in Vermont would not only make her happier, but also would be more suitable for her children and their needs. The mother provided a parenting plan schedule that afforded more time to the father than in the present plan, and consistently kept the father up-to-date on all major and many minor events in their children’s lives.

The father staunchly opposed the move, arguing that because the “dailiness” of involvement with his children would be disrupted, his relationship with them would be adversely affected. In addition, the father personally knew what it was like to be relocated with a parent and the attendant pain inflicted, and did not want his children to suffer the same.

The court readily found that the mother had legitimate purposes for the move, and the location was appropriate in light of these purposes. In their written opinion, the court extensively covers each of the five factors considered in assessing the best interests of the children. It first credited the reasons the mother sought relocation and the father’s relocations for opposition. The court then determined that the children had strong relationships with each parent, and that the relocation would not prove destructive to the children’s relationship with the father. It pointed to the mother’s extensive efforts to keep the father involved and informed, as well as daily phone calls when the children do not see their father.

The court admitted that the distance from the father’s home in Greenwich to Vermont was significant, just shy of 200 miles. However, a schedule could be imposed to ensure that the quantity of contact between the father and his children would remain unaffected. Considering the fourth factor, there was little dispute that the mother would be enhanced emotionally and potentially financially with the move. The children were happy with life in Vermont, and the based on testimony before the court, it believed that the children would thrive there. Finally, the court noted that it was highly feasible that the relationship between the father and his children would remain intact, referencing the mother’s proposed, and generous, parenting schedule. Her conduct proved her to be seeking to enhance the relationship between the father and children.

Whether advancing or defending a motion seeking custody, visitation, and child support, a divorced parent is best served by consulting with an experienced family law practitioner. Should you have questions regarding matrimonial matters, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or JMaya@mayalaw.com.
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Our family law firm in Westport Connecticut serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton. We have the best divorce attorneys and family attorneys in CT on staff that can help with your Connecticut divorce or New York divorce today.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to a divorce law attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100. We offer free divorce consultation as well as free consultation on all other familial matters. Divorce in CT and divorce in NYC is difficult, but education is power. Call our family law office in CT today.

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Jury Instruction Was “Accurate,” Not Misleading: Appeals Court Affirms Evading Responsibility Judgment

In a recent criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected a defendant’s claim that the trial court’s jury instruction regarding the elements of evasion of responsibility was misleading.

This case arose from an incident that occurred on the night of July 16, 2001, in Bridgeport, CT. The defendant consumed six beers in three and a half hours before and while eating dinner. He left the restaurant in his truck and approached the same intersection as the victim, who was on a motorcycle. Without signaling, the defendant turned into the victim’s path, and despite significant effort to avoid a collision, the victim struck the back end of the truck. The victim was thrown from his motorcycle and died from his injuries. A witness observed the accident and later testified that “the truck then stopped, the defendant stepped out of the truck, looked, got back in and took off.” Police pursued the defendant, who stopped only after he was forced to by a second police cruiser. The defendant was visibly intoxicated, and blood alcohol tests produced readings of 0.172 and 0.167, over twice the legal limit.

The defendant was charged with second-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter with a motor vehicle, and evading responsibility, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes (CGS) §§ 53a-56(a)(1), 53a-56b(a), and 14-224(a), respectively. At trial, the defendant testified that “while he was turning left, after giving a signal, he felt an impact toward the rear of his truck, saw nothing and thought someone had hit his vehicle and driven off.” The defendant was convicted on the second two counts. He appealed his conviction, arguing, in part, that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury regarding the elements of evading responsibility. Specifically, he claimed:

1) The court misled the jury by using the word “prevent” rather than “unable” with respect to reporting requirements of CGS § 14-224(a).

2) The court improperly instructed the jury that it had to find that “some outside force caused the defendant to be unable to report the information,” rather than “the defendant’s being unable to report for any cause or reason.”

3) The court did not instruct the jury that the defendant was legally excused from the remaining statutory requirements because he was arrested while seeking assistance for the victim.

The Appellate Court was not persuaded by any of these arguments. Because the defendant did not draw a sufficient distinction between the use of “prevent” and “unable,” the court’s use of the first word was harmless. The Court reiterated that CGS § 14-224(a) does not provide any legal excuse for failing to stop. As the legislative history indicates, “failure to stop immediately cannot be cured at some later time by an operator reporting the incident to police.” As such, a reasonable jury could find that the defendant did not immediately stop and render assistance to the victim following the collision, and by leaving the scene he was not satisfying his duties under the statute. The Appellate Court found that the jury instruction, as given, was proper and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

When faced with a charge of evading responsibility, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Appellate Court Upholds Evading Responsibility Conviction; Defendant Avoided Identification, Failed to Help the Victim

In a recent criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected a defendant’s insufficiency of the evidence claim following his conviction for evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle (evading responsibility).

In this case, the defendant and two friends were at a nightclub when they engaged in a verbal argument with another group, which included the victim. Each group left in their respective cars, with the defendant as a driver, and raced each other along Interstate 95 through Stamford. After getting off the highway, each vehicle was idling at a red light when the victim left his car and attacked the defendant through the driver’s side window. The defendant dragged the victim down the road “in an effort to remove him,” but after swift application of the brakes failed to do so, the defendant hit the gas and the victim fell off. The victim’s friends found him lying in the road with blood running from his mouth and the back of his head, and the victim died shortly thereafter.

The defendant did not stop to provide any aid to the victim. Instead, he drove to his apartment complex, which was located nearby, and rather than notifying police of the incident himself, his friend made the phone call instead. During this phone call, the friend claimed that he was the driver and did not inform police about the victim’s injuries. The defendant and the third occupant perpetuated this lie. However, the defendant subsequently admitted that he was the driver, and gave a new sworn statement relaying the events as they actually occurred. The defendant was charged with and convicted of negligent homicide with a motor vehicle, evading responsibility, and third-degree making a false statement. Following sentencing, the defendant appealed, claiming there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of evading responsibility. He agreed that the predicate elements (first three) were proven, but claimed that he was “legally justified” in leaving the scene and complied with the statutory requirements.

When a court considers a sufficiency of the evidence claim, it must first “construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction.” The court must then determine whether or not the facts admitted to evidence, along with attendant inferences, support a jury’s determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To convict a criminal defendant of evading responsibility under General Statutes § 14-224(a), the State must first prove: “(1) the defendant was operating a motor vehicle, (2) the defendant was knowingly involved in an accident and (3) the accident caused physical injury to any other person or damage to property.” When these threshold elements are established beyond a reasonable doubt, the State must establish one or more of the following: failure to (4) immediately stop and render necessary assistance; (5) provide identifying information with the person injured or owner of damaged property; or (6) if unable to satisfy (5), call police and leave such identifying information with them. Connecticut courts have held, however, that this statute “does not leave an operator an excuse for failing to stop.”

In this case, the Appellate Court determined that the jury reasonably concluded that the defendant evaded responsibility. He never reported the accident; rather, his friend made the call. The friend “failed to inform the police of the circumstances of the accident and the fact that the victim had been injured, [nor did he] identify the defendant as the operator.” During the initial investigation, the defendant did nothing to reveal the truth of what occurred. The Court noted that in a previous case, the Supreme Court of Connecticut stated, “[t]he purpose of the statute on evading responsibility is to ensure that when the driver of a motor vehicle is involved in an accident, he or she will promptly stop, render any necessary assistance and identify himself or herself.” The defendant failed to satisfy the requirements of § 14-227(a), and after considering and rejecting additional matters on appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment.

When faced with a charge of evading responsibility, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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In Light of Recently Decided Precedent Regarding Breath Tests, Court Affirms Judgment in Pending DUI Appeal

In a recent criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut considered whether a court improperly denied a defendant’s motions in limine to exclude toxicology evidence that he argued did not comply with statutory requirements.

This case arose from an incident that occurred after midnight on July 10, 2004. The defendant was driving his vehicle on the Merritt Parkway when he drove off the Exit 38 off-ramp and hit multiple trees before coming to a stop. A Norwalk police officer arrived and observed the defendant outside the vehicle, but the defendant denied that he was the driver. Soon thereafter, a state trooper arrived and made the following observations of the defendant: the smell of alcohol, red glassy eyes, and a cut on his hand and lip. He concluded that the defendant was the driver, and administered field sobriety tests, which the defendant failed.

The defendant was brought to the state police barracks in Bridgeport and asked when he started to drink. He responded he consumed four beers at a restaurant in Stamford beginning at 10pm the night before and stopped drinking after the accident occurred. He additionally noted that he did not have anything to eat since breakfast the morning before. The defendant submitted to two breath tests on the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine, which resulted in blood alcohol content readings of 0.225 and 0.209, both more than two-and-a-half times the legal limit.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an elevated blood alcohol content, which violated Connecticut General Statutes (CGS) § 14-227a(a)(2). Before trial, he submitted several motions in limine exclude the Intoxilyzer results, claiming that the tests “did not comply with state regulations in force at the time of the incident.” The court denied the motion, noting that the breath tests performed in this case were in compliance. The defendant plead nolo contendere (no contest), and after sentencing he appealed his conviction. He argued that the court improperly denied his motion because “the apparatus reports blood alcohol content in terms of weight per volume percent and not a weight per weight percent.”

After the defendant’s initial brief was submitted, but prior to adjudication of this appeal, the Appellate Court published its decision in State v. Pilotti, 99 Conn. App. 563 (2007). In Pilotti, the facts were substantially the same and the defendant made the same argument as presented in the case at bar. The Pilotti Court noted that the legislature intended to include breath testing under CGS § 14-227a(b), not just blood testing, and further wrote:

[CGS] § 14-227a(b) requires the state to establish as a foundation for the admissibility of chemical analysis evidence that the test was performed with equipment approved by the department of public safety. It does not require … that the device satisfy the criteria set forth in the regulations.

In other words, evidence will not be deemed inadmissible where “testing that complies with the regulatory requirements is deemed to be competent evidence.” Thus, in the case at bar, the Appellate Court found that Pilotti was controlling, and because this case was nearly identical, it held that use of the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine satisfied the statutory requirements of CGS § 14-227a(b).

When faced with a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (a.k.a. driving under the influence) or license suspension, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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