Posts tagged with "testimony"

Court Awards Wife Alimony in Addition to a Portion of Husband’s Business

It is well recognized that in dissolution actions, a trial court may exercise broad discretion when dividing property and awarding alimony, as long as it considers all relevant statutory criteria. For many reasons, one of which is that a trial judge has the benefit of observing witnesses first hand, an appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s decision unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. This of course is a very heavy burden for an appellant to satisfy, but the standard makes sense, and is not insurmountable. That being said, the appellate process presents its own challenges and to the extent an appellate court may exercise its own discretion to arrive at a desired result, it can be relatively unpredictable.

In a recent appellate decision, the Court addressed whether it was appropriate for a trial judge to award a wife alimony in addition to a portion of the husband’s business, which provided his sole stream of income. In McRae v. McRae, 129 Conn. App. 171 (2011), the defendant owned a software production company, while the wife owned a decorative painting business. The main issue of contention at trial concerned the value of the husband’s company. Both parties utilized business valuation experts who introduced testimony on the issue, and after hearing evidence, the Court relied on the husband’s expert. Interestingly, the Court also made findings as to the parties’ respective earning capacities, as opposed to their actual earnings. The Court ultimately divided the marital property equally, including the husband’s business as part of the marital estate. In addition, the Court awarded the wife periodic alimony for a term of ten years.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court’s decision to take his business into account in both the property division scheme and the award of alimony constitutes improper double dipping, a generally recognized concept. The Appellate Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision on two main grounds. First, it held that although C.G.S.A. § 46b-81 allows a trial court to consider its property division order when fashioning an alimony award, nothing in the statutory framework forbids a court from awarding periodic alimony to one spouse when the court has made an equitable distribution of the other spouse’s closely held business. The Court also held that the trial court specifically based the alimony award on the parties’ earning capacities- not the husband’s business- which it is permitted to do. This case further exemplifies not only the broad discretion a trial court is permitted to exercise in the context of a dissolution action, but also illustrates the degree of deference the Appellate Court will afford a trial judge when reviewing the underlying decision.

Should you have any questions regarding matrimonial cases, please do not hesitate to contact our office. Attorney DeMeola welcomes inquiries regarding matrimonial matters and can be reached in the firm’s Westport office by telephone at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at mdemeola@mayalaw.com
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Our family law firm in Westport Connecticut serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton. We have the best divorce attorneys and family attorneys in CT on staff that can help with your Connecticut divorce or New York divorce today.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to a divorce law attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100. We offer free divorce consultation as well as free consultation on all other familial matters. Divorce in CT and divorce in NYC is difficult, but education is power. Call our family law office in CT today.

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Courts Afford DCF Great Deference on Appeal

A recent decision rendered in a case involving the Department of Children and Families demonstrates the extent to which courts defer to the agency’s conclusions when reviewing a matter on appeal. In this particular case, the plaintiffs were the maternal aunt and uncle of two children, ages fourteen and sixteen. After receiving reports that the children were being physically and emotionally neglected, the Department conducted an investigation, ultimately substantiating the allegations as to both children. When the plaintiffs learned they were going to be placed on the Central Registry, they requested an administrative hearing.

The hearing officer found that DCF had received several prior reports for this family, ranging from allegations of physical abuse to emotional neglect. The hearing officer also found that on one occasion, the plaintiffs forced their nephew to sleep on dirty laundry, and on other occasions, locked him out of their home. At one point, the aunt and uncle stated the nephew was a financial obligation and they did not want him to return to their care. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs agreed to transfer guardianship of the child to the paternal uncle.

The hearing officer upheld the allegations of physical neglect as to the nephew based on his finding that the child had been wrongfully denied access to his home. The hearing officer also upheld the substantiation of emotional abuse as to the nephew because of an incident in which the plaintiffs took the child’s backpack and school books from him, and because of several inappropriate statements the plaintiffs made about the child to third parties.

In explaining its limited role on appeal, the court stated that it may not retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the weight of the evidence or questions of fact. Rather, its duty is simply to determine, in view of all the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. The fact that a hearing officer discounted contrary evidence in the record does not affect the validity of the DCF decision. In reviewing the case on appeal, the Court must defer to the agency’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, either in whole or in part.

In light of that standard, the court ultimately held that the testimony and documents produced at the hearing convinced the officer to uphold DCF’s determination. As the Court expounded, “The ‘book bag incident,’ the ‘sleeping on dirty clothes event,’ the plaintiffs’ insults of [the child] given at the hospital and probation office, and the barring from the house for both [children] were in the record.” Therefore, there was no basis to overturn the hearing officer’s decision.

Should you have any questions regarding DCF cases, or family matters generally, please do not hesitate to contact Michael D. DeMeola. He can be reached in the firm’s Westport office at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at mdemeola@mayalaw.com.
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Our family law firm in Westport Connecticut serves clients with divorce, matrimonial, and family law issues from all over the state including the towns of: Bethel, Bridgeport, Brookfield, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, Monroe, New Canaan, New Fairfield, Newton, Norwalk, Redding, Ridgefield, Shelton, Sherman, Stamford, Stratford, Trumbull, Weston, Westport, and Wilton. We have the best divorce attorneys and family attorneys in CT on staff that can help with your Connecticut divorce or New York divorce today.

If you have any questions or would like to speak to a divorce law attorney about a divorce or familial matter, please don’t hesitate to call our office at (203) 221-3100. We offer free divorce consultation as well as free consultation on all other familial matters. Divorce in CT and divorce in NYC is difficult, but education is power. Call our family law office in CT today.

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Court Denies Injunction Against Former IBM Executive

By:  Michael D. DeMeola, Esq.

Early in the morning of January 19, 2011, Mr. Visentin notified IBM that he was leaving the company to work for a major competitor- Hewlett-Packard.  Just one day later, he found himself the subject of a lawsuit.  On January 20, 2011, in an effort to enforce the parties’ noncompetition agreement, IBM filed suit against Mr. Visentin, a former executive, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets.  On January 24, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, and scheduled the case for a preliminary injunction hearing.  Within five days of providing IBM with notice of his departure, Mr. Visentin was effectively without a job, precluded- at least temporarily- from engaging in his newly secured position.  This case demonstrates not only the force, speed and agility of a large corporation’s legal team, but perhaps more importantly, illustrates the effectiveness of a quickly orchestrated and well-executed legal defense.

Prior to his resignation, Mr. Visentin worked for IBM in various capacities for twenty-six years.  In 2006, he became a Global Vice President in the company’s Integrated Technology Services Group (ITS).  Then, in September, 2007, he became General Manager of the ITS business.  Responsible for providing its clients with various technology services, including services to improve data storage and recovery capabilities, protect networks from viruses, and implement data security systems, this segment generates approximately five thousand to nine thousand deals per quarter, and total revenue of $2.5 billion annually.  In December, 2008, Mr. Visentin was appointed to IBM’s Integration and Value Team, a leadership group that develops IBM’s corporate strategy.  Although there were technical aspects of Mr. Visentin’s various positions, after hearing four days of testimony, the Court found that he was a business manager, not a technical expert.

As part of his employment with IBM, Mr. Visentin signed two noncompetition agreements, the first on July 16, 2008 and the second on July 29, 2009.  The July 29th agreement essentially provided that during his employment with IBM, and for 12 months thereafter, he would not directly or indirectly engage in or associate with any competitors of the company.  Mr. Visentin also agreed to a restrictive covenant precluding him from soliciting IBM clients for a period of one year, and IBM employees for a period of two years.

IBM’s first argument was that if Mr. Visentin were allowed to work for HP, IBM would be irreparably harmed because Mr. Visentin’s new position posed the risk that he would inevitably disclose confidential IBM information.  IBM argued that Mr. Visentin possessed a plethora of confidential information including strategic business and marketing plans, “strategic initiative,” new service offerings, acquisition plans, the operational finances of the ITS business, IBM’s competitive business and pricing strategies, the identity of new client targets, the identify of troubled clients, and IBM’s competitive strategies to attack HP.

In denying IBM’s application for an injunction, the Court first noted that a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy which should not be routinely granted.”  Med. Soc’y of State of N.Y. v. Toia, 560 F.2d 535, 538 (2nd Cir. 1977).  Indeed, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate, first, that it will be irreparably harmed if an injunction is not granted, and, second, either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation, as well as a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly in its favor.  Lusk v. Vill. Of Cold Spring, 475 F.3d 480, 485 (2nd Cir. 2007).  To show that it will be irreparably harmed, a movant bears the burden of demonstrating that absent an injunction, it will suffer an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but rather actual and imminent, and one that cannot be redressed through a monetary award. Payment Alliance Int’l, Inc. v. Ferreira, 530 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

Next, the Court explained that in New York, properly scoped noncompetition agreements are enforceable to protect an employer’s legitimate interests so long as they pose no undue hardship on the employee and do not militate against public policy.  BDO Seidman v. Hirshber, 712 N.E. 2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999).  The Court further explained that trade secrets and confidential information are considered legitimate interests; however, only that confidential information or those trade secrets that the employee misappropriates or will inevitably disclose are protectable.  Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E. 2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976).

In ruling in Mr. Visentin’s favor, the Court noted that his primary job at IBM was to be a general manager, explaining, “[a]lthough trade secrets may have lurked somewhere on the periphery, the real thrust of his position was to manage his teams to make them as efficient as possible.”  The Court relied on Mr. Visentin’s testimony that he had never taken a computer science course and considered himself a generalist.  Mr. Visentin testified, “I am not technical, I don’t know the details of offerings, I’m more of a general manager and I run a business.”

The Court also relied on the testimony of Mr. Visentin’s new manager at HP, who confirmed that Mr. Visentin’s generalist qualities were the driving factor behind his hiring.  Mr. Visentin’s future manager testified that he hired Mr. Visentin because, “he had good general IT services knowledge [and] broad experience,” and that Mr. Visentin struck him, “as a process-oriented thinker, a guy who could sort of connect the dots, if you will, of the overall responsibilities of the job.”  He also testified that Mr. Visentin’s job would not include involvement in technical services, but rather would be to “manage people.”

Although IBM identified numerous types of information potentially in Mr. Visentin’s possession which it argued should be afforded protection, the court noted that much of the information is either applicable to all large corporations, in the public domain, or outdated, and, thus, does not constitute “trade secrets.”   The court also explained that simply showing Mr. Visentin had access to some confidential information does not sufficiently demonstrate irreparable harm.  IBM failed to provide specific examples of confidential or trade secret information that could actually be used to its detriment if Mr. Visentin were allowed to assume his new position at HP.  The Court further held that IBM failed to demonstrate Mr. Visentin’s position at HP would require him to disclose any confidential IBM information he might remember.

Attorney DeMeola is an associate in Maya Murphy, P.C.’s Litigation Department, practicing primarily in the areas of Labor/Employment Law and Civil Litigation.  He can be reached by telephone in the Firm’s Westport office at (203) 221-3100 or by e-mail at mdemeola@mayalaw.com.

 

 

Testimony Deemed Proof of Market Value of Shoplifted Goods Where Defense Counsel Failed to Object to Its Admission

In a recent criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected a defendant’s insufficiency of the evidence claims regarding the value of shoplifted goods and the element of “taking” under Connecticut’s larceny laws.

This case arose from an incident that occurred on January 30, 2007. Stratford police responded to a shoplifting in progress at a local Wal-Mart. At the store’s loss prevention office, the officers observed live camera footage of the defendant and her accomplices attempting to hide DVDs, first in a clear plastic tote, then within a suitcase. The defendant stayed inside the store as the accomplices pushed a cart with the suitcase to a store exit and left it there as they proceeded outside, where they were arrested. The defendant then moved to the cart and pushed it slightly, but was detained before actually leaving the store. Pursuant to police department procedure in shoplifting cases, the officers asked a store employee to scan the DVDs and provide a receipt as if they were purchased. There were 101 DVDs with an aggregate value of $1,822.72.

The defendant was charged with larceny in the third degree and conspiracy to commit larceny in the third degree. At trial, an officer testified as to how the value of the DVDs was calculated, but could not remember the exact amount. After being shown a copy of his report to refresh his recollection, the officer testified that the total amount was $1,822.72. Defense counsel did not object to the line of questioning or the testimony on the grounds of hearsay or competency. No other evidence regarding the value of the DVDs was provided, such as the receipt or the DVDs themselves.

The defendant was convicted on both counts and sentenced to three years of incarceration. On appeal, she first argued that the officer’s testimony was incompetent evidence that the value of the DVDs exceeded $1,000. He did not have an independent knowledge of their value and was merely reciting a value from a document not entered into evidence. Even if such testimony was competent, the use of the store’s price tags was an inadequate measure of market value. Rather, according to the defendant, evidence of actual sales was necessary.

The Appellate court found that the officer’s testimony was sufficient proof because defense counsel did not object to its admission. “If [inadmissible] evidence is received without objection, it becomes part of the evidence in the case, and is usable as proof to the extent of the rational persuasive power it may have.” The Court noted that “market value” and “selling price” (a.k.a. price tags) are synonymous terms, and that “any evidence which reasonably tends to show the present value of the stolen goods may be admitted.”

The defendant next argued that there was insufficient evidence of a taking, as she was still inside the store and had not brought any DVDs outside at the time she was detained. In Connecticut, larceny consists of “(1) the wrongful taking or carrying away of the personal property of another; (2) the existence of a felonious intent in the taker to deprive the owner of [the property] permanently; and (3) the lack of consent of the owner.” To constitute a criminal taking, what is necessary is the “implicit transfer of possession or control,” not whether the item itself was removed from the owner’s premises. To constitute larceny in the third degree, the value of the property must exceed $1,000.

In this case, the Appellate Court was once more not persuaded that there was insufficient evidence. The actions taken by the defendant and accomplices “in concealing the DVDs and moving them to an area where they quickly could be removed from the store” was sufficient evidence to establish the essential taking element of larceny.

When faced with a charge of larceny, burglary, conspiracy, or attempt, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Trial Court Did Not Err in Rejecting Irrelevant Evidence; Appellate Court Upholds Conviction

In a recent criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut affirmed a defendant’s convictions following a traffic stop that revealed reckless driving.

This case arose from an incident that occurred on March 14, 2006. Bethel police initiated a traffic stop to investigate the defendant’s dump truck and trailer for properly displayed plates. The plates were present but obscured, and officers immediately noticed a wire hanging from the rear of the trailer. Upon further inspection of the trailer, officers determined that the wire was disconnected, from the trailer’s independent braking system. Furthermore, it did not appear to be connected to the dump truck or “any other source that could have provided power to the trailer’s brakes.” Officers requested that the defendant demonstrate whether or not the trailer’s brakes operated, but the defendant refused to comply. Officers cited the defendant for reckless driving, driving with obscured license plates, and failing to carry a valid insurance card. Upon the arrival of a tow truck, the defendant relinquished his keys and stated to the tow-truck driver, “There’s still no brakes [on the trailer] with you towing it.”

The defendant submitted a motion seeking to introduce Connecticut statutes and agency regulations as evidence that the officers lacked authority to inspect his trailer’s brakes. He also proffered evidence that “demonstrated a sense of bias against the defendant among [other] officers that had filtered throughout the Bethel police department and affected the credibility of the officers who were at the scene and who testified during the state’s case-in-chief.” The trial court denied the motion, saying the evidence was irrelevant. Subsequently, the defendant was convicted of the three cited charges as well as interfering with an officer. He appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion.

In Connecticut, police officers have the duty to enforce our laws and preserve the peace. “If [an officer] is acting under a good faith belief that he is carrying out that duty, and if his actions are reasonably designed to that end, he is acting in the performance of his duties.” Quite notably, such duties are not merely restricted to the arrest function. In this case, the Appellate Court reviewed the statutes and regulations offered by the defendant, but was not persuaded that the officers did not have authority to inspect the brakes on his trailer. Therefore, it concluded that preclusion of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Evidence is relevant if it makes the existence of a material fact more or less probable, so long as it is neither unduly prejudicial nor cumulative. However, it is the duty of the proffering party to establish relevance with a proper foundation. In the context of impeachment evidence, this may be accomplished in one of three ways: an offer of proof, independent establishment by the record itself, or statement of a good faith believe that the inquiry is justified by an adequate factual basis. In this case, the defendant failed to provide any connection between evidence of bias and the lack of credibility of the officers involved in this case. Rather, his claims were purely speculative, and “[i]t is entirely proper for a court to deny a request to present certain testimony that will further nothing more than a fishing expedition… or result in a wild goose chase.” Therefore, the judgments were affirmed.

When faced with a charge of reckless driving, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Driver Found Guilty of Evading Responsibility, Despite Not Realizing He Caused Victim’s Death

In a recent criminal law matter, the Appellate Court of Connecticut affirmed a defendant’s conviction for evading responsibility, unconvinced that the State did not present sufficient evidence of the crime.

This case arose from an incident that occurred shortly before midnight on June 3, 2008. A tractor trailer struck a motorcycle driven by the victim, who was killed instantly. However, the driver of the truck did not stop to render any assistance, but instead drove off. Subsequently, the defendant, a tractor-trailer truck driver, was arrested and charged with evading responsibility in violation of Connecticut General Statutes (CGS) § 14-224(a).

At trial, the State presented testimony from two witnesses. The first saw the accident and testified that she observed two working headlights on the tractor-trailer truck just prior to the collision. A second witness observed a tractor-trailer truck parked a short distance from the accident. This witness “saw the driver get out of the cab of the truck, walk around to its front, and then get back into the cab and drive away.” This witness further noted that the truck’s left headlight was not lit, and both witnesses described unique features and characteristics that were present on the defendant’s tractor-trailer truck.

The State also submitted a sworn police statement given by the defendant. He stated that he was driving at the intersection at the time of the incident when “he heard a ‘bang.’ He stated that he assumed something had become ‘hung up between the truck and the trailer’ and therefore stopped only briefly before leaving the scene of the accident.” The defendant further claimed that the headlight that was out was in that condition earlier that night. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to forty-four months of incarceration. The defendant appealed, arguing that the State provided insufficient evidence that he was the driver of the truck that killed the motorcyclist, and that he knew he was involved in an accident.

To convict an individual under CGS § 14-224(a), the State must prove “(1) the defendant was operating the motor vehicle, (2) the defendant was knowingly involved in an accident… (3) that accident caused the death or serious physical injury of any other person… [and] (4) that the defendant failed to stop at once to render such assistance as may have been needed…” Particularly important, however, is the interaction between the second and third elements: a defendant doesn’t have to know that the accident actually caused an injury.

In this case, the Appellate Court believed that based on the evidence presented, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was the driver in question. Furthermore, that the defendant did not know he caused an injury was not dispositive. “[W]hether a defendant had knowledge that an accident caused injury… is irrelevant to the crime of evading responsibility.” Because the first three elements were satisfied and the defendant did not stop to render assistance to the victim, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated CGS § 14-224(a). After addressing and rejecting additional matters on appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed judgment.

When faced with a charge of evading responsibility, an individual is best served by consulting with an experienced criminal law practitioner. Should you have any questions regarding criminal defense, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya in the firm’s Westport office in Fairfield County at 203-221-3100 or at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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