Posts tagged with "time restriction"

Court Amends Time Restriction for Engineering Firm Non-Compete Agreement

Maintenance Technologies International, LLC v. Vega, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 136

Maintenance Technologies International, LLC (MTI) was a Milford, Connecticut-based company that offered highly specialized engineering maintenance services to clients.  The company employed Mr. Daniel Vega as an engineer from February 25, 2002, to October 7, 2005.  His responsibilities for this position included conducting vibration analysis, infrared thermography, motor testing, and laser alignment.  He signed a covenant not to compete as part of his employment agreement with the company.

The restrictive covenant prohibited Mr. Vega, for a period of two years following termination, from engaging in competing business activities within one hundred fifty miles of MTI’s current principal place of business.  The agreement further stated that he could not own any stock in a competing business located within one hundred fifty miles of MTI’s principal place of business.

Breach of the Employment Agreement 

Mr. Vega informed his superiors that he would be voluntarily terminating his employment with the company due to family related issues and his personal ambition to finish his master’s degree in theology.  Once he quit MTI however, he began to work for Schultz Electric Co., a competing company with major offices in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.

MTI’s management interpreted this move as a violation of the non-compete agreement executed when Mr. Vega’s employment with the company started and sued him in Connecticut state court.  The company requested that the court enforce the provisions of the restrictive covenant in order to prevent any further violations of the agreement.  The court found in favor of MTI, granted the company’s request for an injunction, but amended the time restriction to be only one year, instead of the two-year period as stipulated in the agreement.

The Court’s Decision

In reaching its decision, the court assessed whether MTI had a legitimate interest that needed protection and whether the restrictions in the non-compete agreement were reasonable in scope.  The court recognized that the company spent a great deal of resources on training its employees and this created a valid interest according to the court.

Furthermore, the employees were on the front lines with regard to the business relationships with MTI’s customer and had direct access to proprietary and confidential information.  The court held that a company’s employees and customer relationships are its most valuable assets and are worthy of protection under Connecticut law.  Injunctive relief, therefore, was reasonably necessary for the fair protection of the employer’s business interests.

Next, the court examined whether the specific restriction contained in the agreement were reasonable in scope.  The court held that they amounted to a reasonable and legitimate restriction of Mr. Vega’s ability to work.  They provided an adequate amount of protection to MTI while not overreaching and unnecessarily restricting Mr. Vega’s ability to secure future employment.  The limitations still allowed many viable career options for Mr. Vega.

The court did however slightly amend the time restriction.  It was concerned that the full two years could prove to be “somewhat inequitable” and reduced the restriction to one year, instructing the parties that they could submit arguments prior to the expiration of the one year regarding a potential extension to the full two years as stipulated in the covenant not to compete.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Enforcement of a Non-Compete Agreement in the Salon Industry

Piscitelli v. Pepe, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3264
Case Background

Ms. Francine Piscitelli owned and operated a hairdressing and beauty salon since 1985.  She employed Ms. Bernadette Pepe as a stylist from 1990 to July 31, 2004.  The salon moved and underwent a change in its trade name in 1997.  Ms. Piscitelli had Ms. Pepe sign an Employment Agreement on February 27, 1997, that contained a restrictive non-compete covenant.

The non-compete agreement prohibited Ms. Pepe for one year following termination from engaging in competing business activities, soliciting the salon’s employees, or soliciting the salon’s current clients.  The agreement designated a restricted area for the covenant not to compete: Branford, North Branford, East Haven, Guilford, and the portion of New Haven east of the waterway formed by the Quinnipiac River, New Haven Harbor, and Morris Cove.

Ms. Pepe signed a three-year lease on March 9, 2002 for a premise in North Branford to operate a full-service hair and nail salon.  Ms. Piscitelli learned of this in May 2004, confronted Ms. Pepe about the development, and Ms. Pepe confirmed what her boss had been hearing around the salon.  Ms. Pepe assured her boss that she would not be soliciting any of the employees or any current clients beyond her own.  Ms. Piscitelli was comforted by these assurances and allowed Ms. Pepe to continue to schedule appointments at the salon until she voluntarily terminated her employment on July 31, 2004.

In the following months, three stylists left the salon to work for Ms. Pepe at La Bella salon and Ms. Pepe solicited clients of her previous salon regarding the opening of her own salon.

The Court Hearing and its Outcome

Ms. Piscitelli sued Ms. Pepe in Connecticut state court for breach of the non-compete agreement.  Ms. Pepe however contended that the agreement was unenforceable because it: 1) lacked adequate consideration, 2) contained unreasonable restrictions, and 3) there was an adequate remedy at law, thus barring injunctive relief as an appropriate legal solution.  The court rejected these defenses, found in favor of Ms. Piscitelli, and granted her request for enforcement of the covenant not to compete.

While the agreement did not increase Ms. Pepe’s compensation, paragraph ten created additional consideration because it obligated the employer, Ms. Piscitelli, to pay for “certain courses in professional education and training”.  This benefit, according to the court, was adequate consideration in exchange for Ms. Pepe’s covenants.

Furthermore, the court concluded that the covenant not to compete was reasonable with respect to the time and geographical limitations contained therein.  The restrictions did not unnecessarily restrict Ms. Pepe’s ability to earn a living or secure future employment within the salon industry.  The restriction adequately protected Ms. Piscitelli’s legitimate business interests while not excessively harming Ms. Pepe’s career opportunities.

Lastly, the court disagreed with Ms. Pepe that there was an adequate remedy at law available for the case.  The court held that Ms. Piscitelli met the burden of proof to show the need for an injunction and concluded that injunctive relief was appropriate for the case.

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Court Enforces Non-Compete and Rejects “Ambiguous Language” and “Unreasonable Restrictions” Defenses

Century 21 Access America v. Lisboa, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2085
Case Background

Century 21 Access America was a residential real estate sales company based in Milford, Connecticut that employed Ms. Nereida Lisboa as a salesperson from April 2002 until April 2003.  Her employment was contingent upon signing an Independent Contractor Agreement on April 24, 2002, wherein paragraph twelve constituted a non-compete clause.

The restrictive covenant prohibited Ms. Lisboa for a period of two years from working at a competing company located within fifteen miles of Milford, Connecticut.  Once Ms. Lisboa voluntarily terminated her employment with Century 21, she immediately began to work for William Raveis Real Estate, a direct competitor located directly across the street.  Century 21 sued Ms. Lisboa for breach of the non-compete agreement and requested that the court enforce the provisions of the covenant.

Defense Claims

Connecticut courts have the authority to exercise equitable power to order a temporary injunction pending final determination of the order, upon the moving party demonstrating that it will incur irreparable harm in the absence of such an injunctive order.  The court found that an injunction was warranted and proper in this case and as such, granted Century 21’s request for an injunctive order to restrain Ms. Lisboa from further violations of the covenant not to compete.  Ms. Lisboa offered several defenses to invalidate the agreement, including a claim that the language of the agreement was ambiguous and another claim that the provisions were unreasonable.  The court ultimately rejected both of these assertions and held in favor of Century 21.

The challenging party bears the burden of proof to show that an agreement is invalid and should not be binding upon the signatory parties.  The court found no merit in Ms. Lisboa’s claim that the agreement was ambiguous and that she was not obligated to refrain from any specific business activity.  The court stated that “although the covenant is neither a model of clarity or precise craftsmanship, the defendant [Ms. Lisboa] fails to demonstrate how the covenant’s language, in and of itself, is ambiguous”.

Reasonable Restrictions

The court further dissected Ms. Lisboa’s defenses and shot down her claim that the restrictions were unreasonable.  It is well established in Connecticut law that a company has a proprietary right to its clients and is thus entitled to protection for that right.  Century 21 had a legitimate business interest worthy of protection based on the fact that Ms. Lisboa could use information gained from Century 21’s client lists and the time she spent with the company to solicit business for herself and her new company to the detriment of Century 21.

The company was well within its rights to employ reasonable restrictions to protect this legitimate business interest.  Ms. Lisboa’s license to engage in the real estate industry is valid throughout the state of Connecticut and the covenant only restricted her business activities within a relatively small area with a fifteen-mile radius.  This, in combination with a limited time restriction, made the court conclude that the geographical restriction was in fact reasonable and enforceable.

The court identified a legitimate business interest that required protection and concluded that the provisions of the covenant not to compete were reasonable, leading it the grant Century 21’s request for injunctive relief in the form of enforcement of the non-compete agreement.

 

The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., are experienced and knowledgeable employment and corporate law practitioners and assist clients in New York, Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Westport, and elsewhere in Fairfield County.  If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Connecticut Non-Compete Prohibits Client Solicitation in Investment Services Industry

In Robert J. Reby & Co. v. Byrne, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2115, Mr. Patrick Byrne worked at Robert J. Reby & Co., a financial firm in Danbury, Connecticut, as a registered investment advisor from June 2005 to July 2005.  The company advises high net worth individuals and families in the areas of trusts, wealth management, and taxation.  Mr. Byrne signed an employment contract with Robert J. Reby & Co. wherein it contained a non-compete agreement that stipulated he be prohibited from soliciting the company’s clients or disclosing any of its confidential information in the event of his termination.  Following Mr. Byrne’s short employment with Robert J. Reby & Co. he began to work at Aspetuck Financial Management, LLC, a wealth management firm based in Westport.   Robert J. Reby & Co. alleged that Mr. Byrne solicited its clients for his new firm, Aspetuck, in direct violation of the non-compete agreement.  Mr. Byrne countered that the provisions of the non-compete were unreasonable in the sense that it placed an excessive restraint on his trade and prevented him from pursuing his occupation.

The court held that the non-compete agreement between Mr. Byrne and Robert J. Reby & Co. contained reasonable terms and was enforceable.  It failed to see any merits in Mr. Byrne’s claim that the agreement was too broad and created an insurmountable occupational hardship.  The provisions of the agreement only restricted a very small segment of Mr. Byrne’s occupational activities.  The terms he agreed to only prevented him from soliciting the specific and limited group of people that were clients of Robert J. Reby & Co..  The court held that the covenant was not a pure anti-competitive clause because it did not prevent him from engaging in the investment services industry as a whole.  This limited scope with regard to the prohibition levied upon Mr. Byrne caused the agreement to be reasonable and therefore enforceable.

The court also took time to discuss the public policy behind finding the non-compete agreement enforceable and establishing the legitimacy of the agreement.  Companies, according to the court, have a legitimate interest in protecting their business operations by preventing former employees from exploiting or appropriating the goodwill of its clients that it developed at its own, and not the employees’, expense.

If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment contract, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Court Uses Connecticut Law to Supersede Massachusetts Law in Application of Non-Compete Agreement

In Custard Insurance Adjusters v. Nardi, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1003, Mr. Robert Nardi worked at Allied Adjustment Services’ Orange, CT office beginning in September 1982 as the vice president of marketing, overseeing the adjustment of claims for insurance companies and self-insurers.  The company had Mr. Nardi sign non-compete and confidentiality agreements as a term of his employment.  The agreements established that he could not solicit or accept claims within a fifty-mile radius of Allied’s Orange office for a period of two years following his termination.  The agreements further specified that the names and contact information of Allied’s clients were the company’s confidential property.  The choice of law provision stated that Massachusetts law would be controlling (Allied had its headquarters in Massachusetts).  On September 1, 1997, Allied sold its business and all its assets, including its non-compete agreements, to Custard Insurance Adjusters.  Mr. Nardi became increasingly worried about future employment at Custard when the company restructured its compensation format, allegedly decreasing his annual income by 25%.  At this point, Mr. Nardi began to inquire about employment at other companies and in particular contacted Mr. John Markle, the president of Mark Adjustment, with whom he had a previous professional history.  He also arranged meetings between Mr. Markle and four other current Custard employees to discuss switching companies.  While the companies are competitors in the insurance industry, Mark’s business was restricted to the New England region while Custard operated nationally.  Custard terminated Mr. Nardi and asked the court to enforce the non-compete agreement.

The court first sought to tackle the issue of the choice of law provision since it designated Massachusetts law as controlling but this lawsuit was brought in Connecticut state court.  The court asserted its authority over the issue and case because it could not ascertain any “difference between the courts of Connecticut and Massachusetts in their interpretation of the common law tort breach of fiduciary obligation brought against a former officer of a corporation”.  The court emphasized that above all else, the legal issue at hand was that of contractual obligations and a company’s business operations.  It asserted its authority in this respect by stating it believed “that the Massachusetts courts interpret the tort of tortious interference with contractual and business relationships the same way our [Connecticut’s] courts do”.  Additionally, the court cited that the application of Massachusetts law would undermine Connecticut’s policy to afford legal effect to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) and Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), two-state statutes used by Custard to sue Mr. Nardi.

Next, the court addressed the enforceability of the non-compete agreement signed by Mr. Nardi and Allied.  Mr. Nardi contended that the provisions of the agreement were only binding upon the signatory parties (himself and Allied) and that Custard lacked the authority to enforce its provisions.  He asked the court to deny Custard’s request to enforce the non-compete because it was “based on trust and confidence” between the signatory parties and “was thus not assignable”.  The court rejected this train of thought because the non-compete explicitly contained an assignability clause and it held that the non-compete covenant was properly and legally transferred to Custard under Massachusetts law.

Mr. Nardi based a substantial portion of his defense on the claim that Custard violated, and therefore invalidated, the agreement when it modified his compensation format.  He alleged that he was the victim of unjustified reductions in his professional responsibilities and compensation following Custard’s acquisition of Allied in 1997.  Mr. Nardi however was still an executive at the new company despite a reduction in rank and he himself had expressed excitement about becoming an executive at a national, instead of a regional, company.

The court ultimately found the non-compete to be valid and enforceable, therefore granting Custard’s request for injunctive relief.  It assessed the facts of the case and Mr. Nardi’s current position to amend the time restriction of the agreement, however.  Taking into account that he was starting a family and had a young child in conjunction with estimates that the full restrictions could amount to a 60-70% loss of business for Mr. Nardi, the court reduced the time limitation from two years to six months.  The court concluded that while the provisions were reasonable at face value, they could have unforeseen consequences that would have severely impaired Mr. Nardi’s ability to make a living in order to provide for his family.

If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

Court Enforces Non-Compete Agreements Connected to Franchise Agreements

Court Enforces Non-Compete Agreements Connected to Franchise Agreements
Carvel Corporation v. DePaola, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1190

Carvel Corporation sells retail manufacturing licenses and related goods/services to franchises that operate Carvel ice cream stores. Misters Leopold and David DePaola operated two such Carvel stores in Waterbury, Connecticut. The two men contracted with Carvel on November 1, 1990 to obtain a retail manufacturer’s license for Carvel franchise store # 1578 for a period of ten years. The parties entered into non-compete and trade secrets agreements on March 22, 1991. Later that year, on September 11, 1997, the DePaolas entered into an agreement for a license for Carvel franchise store # 2704. Several restrictive covenants accompanied this second franchise agreement. The DePaolas were prohibited from operating ice cream stores within two miles of their previous Carvel locations for a period of three years following the abandonment or expiration of each respective license agreement. Additionally, the covenants stated that legal disputes would be “interpreted, governed, and construed pursuant to New York law”.
On October 31, 2000 the first license agreement expired but Carvel alleged that the DePaolas continued to operate that location as an independent ice cream store. The company learned a few weeks later that the DePaolas had begun to operate the second location in the same manner, as an independent ice cream store not classified as a Carvel franchise. Carvel Corp. sued the DePaolas for breach of the restrictive covenants and specifically claimed that they would disclose valuable and proprietary trade secrets during their current and future business activities. Carvel requested that the court issue two injunctions: one to order the DePaolas to cease using and to return any and all Carvel property and a second to cease the operation of their independent ice cream stores in order to comply with the non-compete agreements. The DePaolas were compliant with returning Carvel property but took issue with the company’s request that they cease their operations of the two ice cream stores. The agreement had a choice of law provision designating New York law as controlling, but the Superior Court of Connecticut sitting in New Britain was able to adjudicate the case because of the similarities in New York and Connecticut laws’ treatment of non-compete and other employment agreements.
The court found in favor of Carvel Corporation and ordered that the DePaolas cease their operations of their two independent ice cream stores in Waterbury, CT in order to comply with the non-compete agreement. To reach its decision regarding the enforceability of the underlying employment contract between the parties, the court analyzed whether Carvel had a legitimate business interest that warranted protection, the degree to which the restrictions were reasonable, and to what extent the restrictions would make the DePaolas bear occupational hardships.
The court held that Carvel did have a legitimate business interest that was threatened by the DePaolas’ continued business activities. While the company did not exercise physical control or have a leasehold interest over the stores, the company had an interest in its goodwill and name recognition that was connected to the customers of the DePaolas’ ice cream stores. Next, the court held that the restrictions, both time and geographical, were reasonable in scope and enforceable by an injunction. The stated purpose of the restrictions was to “prevent dilution of the exclusivity of the valuable Carvel know-how and Carvel trade secrets”. The restrictions enumerated in the non-compete agreement were firm enough to protect Carvel’s legitimate interest but limited enough so as not to unnecessary restrict the DePaolas’ economic activities.
The DePaolas claimed that should an injunction be issued, they would “lose both their income and their investment” because the “hardships would be immediate, devastating, and irreparable”. The court rejected this argument however and held that the DePaolas had entered into the agreements on their own accord without coercion and as such were responsible to bear the risk of hardships that may be the product of the agreements’ terms.
In light of a legitimate business interest and reasonable restrictions, the court granted Carvel’s request for an injunction restraining the DePaolas’ actions in order to prevent further violations of the legally binding non-compete agreements.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Court Enforces Non-Compete Agreements Connected to Franchise Agreements

Court Enforces Non-Compete Agreements Connected to Franchise Agreements
Carvel Corporation v. DePaola, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1190

Carvel Corporation sells retail manufacturing licenses and related goods/services to franchises that operate Carvel ice cream stores. Misters Leopold and David DePaola operated two such Carvel stores in Waterbury, Connecticut. The two men contracted with Carvel on November 1, 1990 to obtain a retail manufacturer’s license for Carvel franchise store # 1578 for a period of ten years. The parties entered into non-compete and trade secrets agreements on March 22, 1991. Later that year, on September 11, 1997, the DePaolas entered into an agreement for a license for Carvel franchise store # 2704. Several restrictive covenants accompanied this second franchise agreement. The DePaolas were prohibited from operating ice cream stores within two miles of their previous Carvel locations for a period of three years following the abandonment or expiration of each respective license agreement. Additionally, the covenants stated that legal disputes would be “interpreted, governed, and construed pursuant to New York law”.
On October 31, 2000 the first license agreement expired but Carvel alleged that the DePaolas continued to operate that location as an independent ice cream store. The company learned a few weeks later that the DePaolas had begun to operate the second location in the same manner, as an independent ice cream store not classified as a Carvel franchise. Carvel Corp. sued the DePaolas for breach of the restrictive covenants and specifically claimed that they would disclose valuable and proprietary trade secrets during their current and future business activities. Carvel requested that the court issue two injunctions: one to order the DePaolas to cease using and to return any and all Carvel property and a second to cease the operation of their independent ice cream stores in order to comply with the non-compete agreements. The DePaolas were compliant with returning Carvel property but took issue with the company’s request that they cease their operations of the two ice cream stores. The agreement had a choice of law provision designating New York law as controlling, but the Superior Court of Connecticut sitting in New Britain was able to adjudicate the case because of the similarities in New York and Connecticut laws’ treatment of non-compete and other employment agreements.
The court found in favor of Carvel Corporation and ordered that the DePaolas cease their operations of their two independent ice cream stores in Waterbury, CT in order to comply with the non-compete agreement. To reach its decision regarding the enforceability of the underlying employment contract between the parties, the court analyzed whether Carvel had a legitimate business interest that warranted protection, the degree to which the restrictions were reasonable, and to what extent the restrictions would make the DePaolas bear occupational hardships.
The court held that Carvel did have a legitimate business interest that was threatened by the DePaolas’ continued business activities. While the company did not exercise physical control or have a leasehold interest over the stores, the company had an interest in its goodwill and name recognition that was connected to the customers of the DePaolas’ ice cream stores. Next, the court held that the restrictions, both time and geographical, were reasonable in scope and enforceable by an injunction. The stated purpose of the restrictions was to “prevent dilution of the exclusivity of the valuable Carvel know-how and Carvel trade secrets”. The restrictions enumerated in the non-compete agreement were firm enough to protect Carvel’s legitimate interest but limited enough so as not to unnecessary restrict the DePaolas’ economic activities.
The DePaolas claimed that should an injunction be issued, they would “lose both their income and their investment” because the “hardships would be immediate, devastating, and irreparable”. The court rejected this argument however and held that the DePaolas had entered into the agreements on their own accord without coercion and as such were responsible to bear the risk of hardships that may be the product of the agreements’ terms.
In light of a legitimate business interest and reasonable restrictions, the court granted Carvel’s request for an injunction restraining the DePaolas’ actions in order to prevent further violations of the legally binding non-compete agreements.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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Court Modifies Geographical Restriction in order to Enforce a Non-Compete Contract

Court Modifies Geographical Restriction in order to Enforce a Non-Compete Contract
Eastcoast Guitar Center, Inc. v. Tedesco, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 320

Eastcoast Guitar Center, Inc. was a company based in Danbury, CT and employed Mr. Richard Tedesco as a sales/customer service representative from 1997 to 1999. The company had Mr. Tedesco sign a non-compete contract on January 27, 1997 that prohibited him for one year following his termination from competing directly or indirectly with Eastcoast Guitar within a one hundred mile radius of the store’s location at 25 Hayestown Road, Danbury, CT. This provision created a protected/prohibited area that included the entire state of Connecticut and extended into portions of Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island. Eastcoast Guitar terminated Mr. Tedesco’s employment on August 16, 1999 and he began to operate his own company known as Guitar Hangar, an internet-based guitar sales company. Eastcoast Guitar sued Mr. Tedesco in Connecticut state court for violation of the non-compete contract and requested that the court issue an injunction to enforce the restrictions and prevent further violations of the covenant.
The court found in favor of Eastcoast Guitar and enforced the non-compete contract on a modified basis. In its analysis, the court applied the five-prong test to assess the enforceability of the non-compete contract as stated in Robert S. Weiss & Associates, Inc. Wiederlight, 208 Conn. 525 (1988). Specifically, the court looked at: 1) the scope of the time restriction, 2) the scope of the geographical restriction, 3) the protection afforded to the employer, 4) the restraint of the employee’s ability to obtain future employment, and lastly 5) the extent the agreement interfered with the public’s interest. All of these factors must be reasonable in order for a plaintiff to be entitled to injunctive relief in a legal dispute.
The court, after reviewing all the evidence and testimony, found that the agreement satisfied the factors with exception of the geographical restriction. It recognized that the company had a valid business interest that deserved protection and as such changed the geographical restriction from one hundred miles to thirty miles and ordered that the agreement be enforced. The one hundred mile radius was too broad and overreaching according to the court and it felt that its modification of the restriction to prohibit only Fairfield, Litchfield, and New Haven counties was reasonable and legally acceptable under Connecticut law.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.

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